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Since the 1980s, when it became clear that immigrants from France’s ex-colonies were likely to settle with
their families in France, the French have repeatedly questioned the cultural compatibility of Muslim
immigrants and their descendants with French Republican values. Recent security concerns about Islamic
terrorism in Western countries have reinflamed this debate about French Muslims’ “assimilability,” albeit
with a novel focus on the cultural affiliations of French Muslim youth, in particular. The French State and
politicians are concerned about survey data showing that, even as such youth have acceded to legal
citizenship, they nevertheless exhibit a greater adherence to Islamic norms and more numerous
transnational links than their parents’ or grandparents’ generations, and may, for these reasons, pose a
threat to French sovereignty. This dissertation investigates these top-down claims of French Muslim
youth’s unprecedented religiosity and transnationalism, seeking to ethnographically test the veracity of
such hypotheses and to offer a more nuanced, historically emplaced account of youth’s cultural
identifications and practices.
Based on long-term research with youth ages 13 to 30 who grew up in North, West, and East African
Muslim households in Marseille’s northern housing projects, I demonstrate that such youth embody
various emic forms of belonging to France, many of which stretch mainstream definitions of what
constitutes Frenchness. Through ethnographic observation of these youth while they partook in Arabic
classes, spent time with their peers and family, and navigated public space, this work reveals that youth
more often perform local cultural belonging than are accorded French cultural citizenship, or the right to
be seen and heard as French within the public sphere. I document the forms of alienation from Marseille
that youth experience as a result, quite notable among them a gendered reverse migration phenomenon
whereby orthodox-identified Muslim young women are planning to leave Marseille for their parents’ home
countries and the Gulf States. Two further foci of the dissertation are the role of Arabic language
education, both publicly provided and denominational, in shaping youth’s cultural trajectories, and also the
analysis of youth’s language practices. I contend that, as diasporic youth draw upon—and play
with—standard and non-standard varieties of French and Arabic, they afford the listener unique insight
into where they are coming from and where they are headed, or their life-worlds and aspirations.
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ABSTRACT
DIASPORIC BELONGING:
THE LIFE-WORLDS AND LANGUAGE PRACTICES
OF MUSLIM YOUTH FROM MARSEILLE
Cécile Anne Marguerite Evers
Asif Agha
Stanton Wortham

Since the 1980s, when it became clear that immigrants from France’s excolonies were likely to settle with their families in France, the French have
repeatedly questioned the cultural compatibility of Muslim immigrants and their
descendants with French Republican values. Recent security concerns about
Islamic terrorism in Western countries have reinflamed this debate about French
Muslims’ “assimilability,” albeit with a novel focus on the cultural aﬃliations of
French Muslim youth, in particular. The French State and politicians are
concerned about survey data showing that, even as such youth have acceded to
legal citizenship, they nevertheless exhibit a greater adherence to Islamic norms
and more numerous transnational links than their parents’ or grandparents’
generations, and may, for these reasons, pose a threat to French sovereignty.
This dissertation investigates these top-down claims of French Muslim youth’s
unprecedented religiosity and transnationalism, seeking to ethnographically test
!vi

the veracity of such hypotheses and to oﬀer a more nuanced, historically
emplaced account of youth’s cultural identifications and practices.
Based on long-term research with youth ages 13 to 30 who grew up in
North, West, and East African Muslim households in Marseille’s northern
housing projects, I demonstrate that such youth embody various emic forms of
belonging to France, many of which stretch mainstream definitions of what
constitutes Frenchness. Through ethnographic observation of these youth while
they partook in Arabic classes, spent time with their peers and family, and
navigated public space, this work reveals that youth more often perform local
cultural belonging than are accorded French cultural citizenship, or the right to
be seen and heard as French within the public sphere. I document the forms of
alienation from Marseille that youth experience as a result, quite notable among
them a gendered reverse migration phenomenon whereby orthodox-identified
Muslim young women are planning to leave Marseille for their parents’ home
countries and the Gulf States. Two further foci of the dissertation are the role of
Arabic language education, both publicly provided and denominational, in
shaping youth’s cultural trajectories, and also the analysis of youth’s language
practices. I contend that, as diasporic youth draw upon—and play with—
standard and non-standard varieties of French and Arabic, they aﬀord the
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listener unique insight into where they are coming from and where they are
headed, or their life-worlds and aspirations.
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NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

Throughout this manuscript, I rely on the MSA transcription standards of
the American Library Association-Library of Congress (c.f., reference list) when
transliterating Arabic. A left-facing apostrophe is used to indicate the letter ’ayn
( )عand a right-facing one is used for the letter hamzah ()ء. Personal names with
Arabic sources are spelled according to the owner’s preference if known, and
according to MSA conventions if unknown. Terms in MSA are italicized within
the body of the text. The sole exception is words familiar to general readership
(e.g., Sunni, Koran, Muslim, Mecca, Medinah, Wahhabi, Salafi, Sharia), for
which I use English conventions.
Other conventions of note are that I italicize languages other than English
(e.g., French, MSA, etc.) throughout the body of the text, and that for my
transcripts I make selective use of Schegloﬀ ’s (2007) discourse analytic
conventions. Within the transcripts, International Phonetic Alphabet
transcriptions are indicated by phonetic [brackets], while overlapping speech
across speaker turns is shown with {curly brackets}. I provide the French
original versions of my participants’ quotes, and their dates of occurrence, in
footnotes in most chapters except Chapter Two, given its introductory nature.
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I.

Citizenship, Belonging, and Language
among Marseille’s Diasporic Youth

I.

Introduction

They spoke French perfectly. This is how Coco, one of the cartoonists at
Charlie Hebdo, described the Kouachi brothers who terrorized the newspapers’
headquarters on January 7th, 2015 (L’Internaute, 1-7-2015). One of the people
taken hostage on November 7th, 2016, during the attacks on the Bataclan
concert hall, in turn aﬃrmed that his assailants “spoke entirely in French, with
barely a dash of a North African accent, nothing more” (L’Humanité,
11-17-2016).1 Language surfaces early on in these witnesses’ accounts because
how we speak is believed to be a window onto where we call home and who we
are. As Belgian poet-singer Julos Beaucarne sings (1980), “An accent is good. It’s
a whole country unfurling from one’s mouth, with its houses, its forests, its
paths, its factories. And in a voice, all one’s anxieties. Where are you coming
from? Where are you going?”2 Investigations would later reveal that the men

“Le tout en français, avec à peine une pointe d’accent nord-africain, mais sans
plus” (L’Humanité, 11-17-2016).
1

“C’est bon l’accent. C’est tout un pays qui sort d’une bouche, avec ses maisons, ses forêts, ses
sentiers, ses usines. Et puis dans les voix toutes les angoisses. D’où viens-tu? Où vastu?” (Beaucarne, 1980).
2
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responsible for both strings of Parisian attacks were French-born individuals.
The Frenchness of their speech, as judged by the witnesses above, ultimately
proved a reliable indicator of their nationalities, though not of their cultural and
political visions. Indeed, their cultural identifications assumed a trajectory
leading away from their nationalities and legal citizenships; they were going
somewhere other than where they were coming from, in the words of
Beaucarne.
Events like these in France, along with the July 7th, 2005 bombing of the
London Underground train system, likewise perpetrated by locally born men,
have alerted Europeans to the potential for European nationals to wish—and act
—to disrupt the sovereign integrity of their birth countries. My study did not
center on such individuals, who in fact represent a microscopic slice of the
demographic describable as French Muslim youth. I begin by addressing them,
however, because the disjuncture they embody, between being French citizens
and yet feeling animosity rather than belonging towards France, introduces
terminology key to understanding the French Muslim youth around whom my
study did revolve, all of whom, like the lion’s share of Muslims in France,
cultivated perfectly benign dreams for the future. To capture the experiences of
the youth appearing in these pages, I elaborate a three-way terminological
distinction. When I speak about youth’s French nationality and legal citizenship,
!2

I refer to their de jure, passport-holding relationship to the French nation and
the kinds of rights it bestows: freedom of movement across borders, political
involvement, state protection, etc. Beside this more objective measure is a more
subjective measure of Frenchness. This is the Frenchness that is personally
claimed or decided upon, which I term cultural belonging. An individual’s claims
to Frenchness can be subtracted from, however, by others failing to publicly
recognize them as culturally French. The practice of measuring the cultural
Frenchness of others was illustrated, for instance, by Coco when she oﬀered that
the Kouachi brothers spoke French perfectly, or by the man taken hostage when
he remarked that his takers spoke entirely in French, with barely a touch of a North
African accent, nothing more. Thus, a third dimension of Frenchness is cultural
citizenship, which I define as the right to be seen and heard as French in one’s
public interactions with others.
In what follows, I examine the histories and political dimensions of each
of these three relationships to France—nationality and legal citizenship, cultural
belonging, and cultural citizenship—as they apply today to French Muslim
youth, in particular. In Section II below, I recount how French Republican
citizenship has been formulated as a privileging of the body politic’s needs over
individual cultural diﬀerences: first, during the French revolutionary era; second,
during the Third Republic; and thirdly, during the citizenship and national
!3

identity debates that have lasted from the 1980s to present. Towards the latter
part of this discussion, I dote especially on contemporary political
representations of French Muslim youth as, either, occupiers of French space or,
alternatively, a demographic experiencing cultural upheaval of various sorts.
Subsequently, in Section III, I detail my research participants, sites, ethnographic
methods, and analytical tools. Section IV concludes with an overview of the
dissertation’s chapters. Each of them assumes a diﬀerent vantage on a central
problematique: why were these diasporic youth, who were by and large legal
French citizens and also experienced themselves as locals to Marseille or else
French in a more cosmopolitan sense, nevertheless frequently denied cultural
citizenship by Marseille’s ethnically French (de souche) inhabitants, as well as
actors and programs working on behalf of the French State?

II.

French Republican Citizenship: What Kind of Collectivity?

The particular mark of French Republican citizenship, since its initial
formulation in 1789, has been a tension between a tendency towards the liberal
autonomy of the individual, on the one hand, and a focus on the social and
political collectivity, on the other (Laborde, 2004; Young, 1989). The Declaration
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, for instance, outlined a model
!4

of French citizenship structured around an unconditional right to private
property, but also around the right (and duty) to participate politically in the
State’s deliberations alongside fellow citizens. The first three articles of the
Declaration set up this initial tension between individual and collectivity in the
definition of the citizen:
“(1) All men are born and remain free, and have equal rights. Social distinctions are

unjustifiable except insofar as they may serve the common good. (2) The purpose of
political association is to preserve the natural and inalienable rights of man, i.e., liberty,
private property, the inviolability of the person, and the right to resist oppression. (3)
Sovereignty resides essentially in the nation as a whole; no group or individual can
exercise any authority not expressly delegated to it or him.” (Osmańczyk & Mango,
2003, p. 1937)

Whereas the freedom to be a proprietor was individually assured, political
liberty—of the sort sought by the subjects of the feudal, ecclesiastical, and
monarchical Old Regime, with its unequal privileges—depended upon concerted
political participation. Political rights had to be claimed equally by each individual
in order to eﬀectively combat despotism. The citizen was, in a word, “a subject
who rises up (qui se relève)” at the side of other citizens (Balibar, 1991[1984], p.
40). Linguistic propaganda during the First Republic (1792-1804) evinced a
similar emphasis on fighting oppression by finding a unified political voice. A
document from June 4th, 1794 entitled “An invitation from the National
Convention to the French people, to speak only French,” identified French as the
language of citizens’ accession to the Republic:

!5

Citizens, you detest political federalism, swear oﬀ linguistic federalism. Language should
be like the Republic: from North to South, throughout French territory, the ways of
speaking, like the hearts, must be in unison. These diverse dialects have gushed from
the impure spring of feudalism. This fact alone should make them odious to you. They
are the last ring in the chain with which tyranny bound you. Hurry to break it. Free men,
put aside the language of slaves, to adopt the language of liberty. (Kibbee [Trans.],
n.d.).3

In summary, this early formulation of French citizenship, though it placed
certain rights, like the right to private property, fully in the hands of the
individual, likewise demonstrated a keenness for individual, mainly political,
rights that were meant to be exercised en masse.
This emphasis on freedom from tyranny through joint political
participation was meaningfully influenced by the mid-18th century writings of
Jean Jacques Rousseau on the general will. I briefly touch on Rousseau’s
influential position here in order to prefigure the later triumph, at two key
moments in the history of thinking about French citizenship, of the collective
over the individualistic understanding of the citizen. In The Social Contract,
Rousseau (1993[1762]) leads with an argument about human nature. Man,
according to him, is a ratiocinative being who resolves that his self-preservation
is of utmost importance: “…as soon as he reaches years of discretion, he is the
sole judge of the proper means of preserving himself, and consequently becomes
his own master” (p. 181). Rousseau then proposes an analogy, between the

My thanks go to Robert Moore for sharing Douglas Kibbee’s translation of this archival
document with me.
3
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family as the model of the first political unit and the French Republic. He
deduces that, much as children find it in their self-interest to surrender their
independence to their father in exchange for protection, adults, too, recognize
the advantages of “a form of association which will defend and protect with the
whole common force the person and goods of each associate” (p. 191). Thus,
man trades away his “primitive independence” (p. 187), alienating his liberty, in
Rousseau’s idiom, for the sake of self-preservation. By Rousseau’s theory of the
social contract, as such, people abstain from their individual personalities and
predilections in order to partake in, and yoke themselves to, a self-governing
“Republic or body politic” that looks out for the common good (p. 192). For a
variety of reasons discussed below, this theoretical bequest from Rousseau
would later resurface at two decisive junctures in French Republican history:
first, during the Third Republic (1870-1940), and second, in the 1980s. Each of
these two periods was characterized by a deepening of France’s relationship with
foreigners, first abroad, then at home, circumstances that prompted France to
reexamine the modalities of French citizenship.

Citizenship in the Third Republic
The Third Republic, which lasted from 1870 to 1940, witnessed vigorous
French imperialism, in Africa, the Caribbean and South America, Southeast
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Asia, and Oceania, progressive changes in road and rail infrastructure (c.f.,
Weber, 1976), the First World War, and Fawzive labor immigration to France.
Casualties from the Franco-Prussian War (1870) and World War I, coupled with
a demographic stagnation in France more generally, had led to a dire need for
men to work in France’s industries and the army (Camiscioli, 2009).4
Legislation enabling immigration followed suit, and by 1931 the population of
foreigners, mainly from Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Spain, residing in France
numbered 2,715,000, 6.6% of France’s total population, over the 381,000 in
1851, totaling 1.1% (Schain, 2008, p. 40). It was in fact to strengthen France’s
military ranks that one of the first pieces of legislation on naturalization, the
Law of June 26th, 1889, was drafted (McGovney, 1911). With this law, French
legislators repealed naturalization based on descent, or jus sanguinis, and
instituted jus soli naturalization, allowing those born to foreign parents on
French soil to acquire French nationality at legal maturity. During World War I, a
further 662,000 immigrant workers were recruited to man France’s war-time
industries, half of whom were from Western Europe and another half of whom
came from France’s colonies (i.e., Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Indochina) and
China (Nogaro & Weil, 1933). The individuals from France’s colonies, many of

Childers (2003) registers France as having the lowest birth rate in the world at the end of the
19th century.
4
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whom fought the Great War in France’s name (c.f., Fogarty, 2008), were
excluded from full citizenship rights, as were their “French” brethren back
home, totaling an estimated sixty million across France’s colonial holdings
(Lewis, 1962).5 It was within this three-fold context, of private and public
industry recruiting hundreds of thousands of foreign laborers to work in France,
the strategic naturalization of these workers’ French-born children, and the
exclusion of “native” Frenchmen overseas from citizenship status, that the
Rousseauean core of French citizenship, that of the collective cemented by the
will of individuals to participate in politics, was reiterated, only with culturally
particular overtones.
In a lecture given by the rationalist Ernest Renan in 1882, he
distinguishes between the French form of nationalism, which he claims is
grounded in people’s “daily plebiscite” (1990, p. 19), and the German form of
nationalism, in which the “ethnographic principle” of the Volk, or German race,
“is substituted for a national one” (p. 13). He deplores the latter and lauds the
French nation’s basis in “a spiritual principle,” namely, “the will to perpetuate
the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form” (p. 19).
The French treatment of the people in their colonies varied by case. Senegal, for instance, was
unusual in the extension of rights like the vote and education to inhabitants of its four
Communes. Even so, Commune inhabitants had to meet certain requirements in order to access
such rights (c.f., Diouf, 1998). Because colonial Algeria was a French département, Algerians had
the option to become French nationals, starting in 1880, and citizens, in 1958, but always
pending requirements (P. Silverstein, 2008; Weil, 2008).
5
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This heritage, he specifies, is neither linguistic, nor ethnoracial, nor religious.
Rather, it lies in the French people’s common memory of the “great deeds”of the
past and “the wish to perform still more” (p. 19). At the very time Renan was
speaking, however, was the individual’s simple wish to participate politically or
perpetuate great deeds enough to assure him or her citizenship in the French
nation? Certainly, for the foreigners, French women, and colonial subjects who
lived during the Third Republic, a profession of faith in Republican civic
principles was not suﬃcient to guarantee them membership in the sacred
collectivity described by Renan.6 Cultural and ethnic heritage, rather,
represented “the anthropological minimum” (Mehta, 1999, p. 63) mediating
individuals’ access to French citizenship.
In sum, thus far I have described how, during the Third Republic, French
thinkers and politicos were challenged by the country’s intensifying ties with
foreigners and newly French people overseas to account for the less-thanuniversal scope of their citizenship. I used Renan’s thesis as a case study of how,
in response, the French appealed again to Rousseau’s concept of a general will
that rises above ethnographic particularities and personal interests. In addition
to further belaboring the political nature of ties between the individual and the
Republic, Renan’s writing underscores the quasi-religious, moral terms in which
6

Suﬀrage for women was not granted in France until 1944.
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such political arguments were couched. The subtext of such appeals to the
general will was that “groups judged not capable of adopting that general point
of view” (Young, 1989, p. 251), or individuals deemed likely to fail the test of
civic faith in the French union (Citron, 1987), could be excluded in practice
from French citizenship and yet not impair its ideals. Now, prior to moving into
the citizenship debates of the 1980s, I discuss two brief historical examples of
how individuals who were in fact denied French citizenship viewed their
exclusion from the Third Republic. These examples will aid in fleshing out the
distinction between legal citizenship, cultural belonging, and cultural
citizenship.
A first example shows how the residents of France’s overseas départements,
who were French nationals but not legal citizens, desired citizen status because
of the cultural belonging they felt to France. At the International Colonial
Congress of Paris in 1889, on the centennial of the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and Citizen, a man named Alexandre Isaac, who was a French-educated
native of the Antilles and a Senator in the French département of Guadeloupe,
took the floor to denounce contradictions in the document’s application. He
stated:
“I cannot understand how (…) between a colonizing people and the inhabitants of the
colonial country there should be only a relationship of domination; that the customs, the
language, the knowledge of the European nations are a reserved patrimony which the
natives should not be permitted to touch; that, finally, in the external territories of
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which these nations have taken possession, there should be only subjects, never
citizens.” (Lewis, 1962, p. 139).

Senator Isaac sought to convince those attending the congress that, at least for
the case with which he was most familiar, that of the West Indies, the cultural
and linguistic assimilation of islanders had proceeded to such a point that it
would be nothing short of logical to continue their assimilation in constitutional
terms (Lewis, 1962). The incorporation of colonial residents into the French
“community of interests” stood to benefit the metropolis, thought Isaac, not
least because such individuals bore the spirit of the French nation aloft:
Should not a colony be considered, even after a conquest, once the traces of violence
have been eﬀaced, as a fraction of the national individuality, which is linked to the
original country by bonds of aﬀection as well as by a community of interests?” (Lewis,
1962, p. 142).

A second example illustrates how, for such non-citizen individuals linked to
France, their feeling of cultural belonging stood in stark contrast to how they
were regarded by the native French people they encountered, who denied them
not only legal but also cultural citizenship.
Upon his visit to Marseille in 1929, Ludovic Naudeau, a traveling
journalist working for a Parisian weekly, waxed nostalgic about a city whose
revolutionary commitment to progress and civilization heaved under the weight
of a foreign worker population. Naudeau’s reflections and encounters with
members of the worker population, which in the early inter-war years exceeded
a quarter of the city’s inhabitants (López & Témime, 1989), reveal that whereas
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the workers considered themselves locals, the French were likely to consider
them foreigners. Naudeau reports, for instance, on a stirring story told him by
an old-timing Marseillais. The Marseillais, who was trying to locate a particular
foreigner, visited a building where foreigners were rumored to live. Much to his
surprise, when he queried the building's residents about the whereabouts of the
foreign man he sought, they replied, “there aren’t any foreigners in this place;
we are all Italian” (p. 201). Having likely been in Marseille for many years, the
residents considered themselves locals, if of the Italian persuasion. Naudeau
himself is in turns impressed by the French fluency and mannerisms exhibited
by the local population of non-white people, and then bewildered by their sheer
numbers. Mostly, his piece reads as a distressed account of the city’s ethnic
diversification: would not Marseille’s autochthonous population be genetically
swept away by "all those sidis, all those gingerbread-faced people (à figure de pain
d’épice), all those brothers from the coasts, all those blackies (noirauds)… that
enormous allogeneic mass that only continues to densify" (1929, p. 200)? His
closing sentence blends admonishment of what the future could hold with a
reminder of France’s past agreements on the constitutive marks of the French
soul: “I dare not try to envisage with any clarity by which signs will manifest,
here, a hundred years from now, what we have agreed to call the French soul.
No! I dare not!” (p. 202).
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Naudeau’s travel bulletin, together with Senator Isaac’s hints at the
limited scope of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, are worth
examining insofar as they expose the thick web of cultural and ethnic preconditions that undergirded French Republican citizenship as it was understood
during the Third Republic. These anecdotes reveal that access to French
citizenship, in either of the dimensions I have delineated, legal or cultural,
depended on more than simply a “daily plebiscite” (Renan, 1990, p. 19), despite
much oratory to the contrary. “Foreigners” with ties to France, whether they
lived in a French département abroad or labored in the Hexagon, performed and
claimed Frenchness, and still they were not acknowledged as potential fellow
citizens. An examination of Renan and Naudeau’s writing demonstrates how
they draw on Rousseauean ideas to sanctify the political collectivity, which they
refer to as France’s “spiritual principle” or “soul,” and also to selectively
establish certain individual cultural diﬀerences as detracting from this union’s
moral integrity. By couching their rejection of cultural and ethnic diﬀerence in
terms of people’s supposed inability to contribute civically, such writers were
eﬀectively able to sustain the French citizenship construct’s veneer of
universality. In practice, meanwhile, the distribution of French citizenship
privileged a French ethnic and cultural order. Nowhere was the reality of ethnic
barriers to French citizenship clearer, additionally, than in the stories here
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presented of foreigners (and, in some cases, French nationals) who, despite
identifying culturally or politically with France, were deprived of public
recognition as legal or cultural citizens of France.

The Citizenship and National Identity Debates, 1980s - Present
The previous section demonstrated how, between 1870 and 1940, French
nationality, citizenship, and cultural belonging often proved not to be
overlapping, congruent processes. This section dwells on another formative
moment in the history of French citizenship, beginning in the 1980s and
continuing to present. Marking the end of economic immigration to France, this
period ushered in a debate about the settled immigrant population, their
children, and more specifically, these populations’ right not only to French
nationality but also to legal as well as cultural “citizenship in France” (Balibar,
1984, p. 1752).7 Weil (2008) identifies this period as the third iteration of the
relationship between citizenship and nationality. In the first period, under the
French Revolution, citizenship was primary, and nationality was derivative of
being a citizen. The second period, lasting from the beginning of the 19th
century to the 1980s, decoupled nationality from citizenship, and focused more
squarely on how foreigners’ personal circumstances interacted with policy
Balibar (1984) compares this to the “right to French citizenship” per se, as debated during the
French colonial period, for instance (p. 1752).
7
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frameworks for nationality (e.g., jus sanguinis until 1889, jus soli afterwards).
Nationality during this period, moreover, did not necessarily pave the way to
citizenship, as illustrated by the case of French indigenous residents of certain
colonial départements and French women (until 1944) who, though French
nationals, lacked equal access to certain civic rights, like the vote or education.
The third period, beginning in the 1980s and continuing to present, reinstated
the reciprocal relationship between nationality and citizenship, only now
assuring that legal citizenship was derivative of nationality. In what follows, I
chronicle the dynamics leading up to the creation of a new consensus about
citizenship during this most recent period and explain in what sense the
contemporary citizenship construct is classically Republican. Through a
discussion of the terms in which both the political left and right couch their
discourses on integration, and specifically that of French Muslim youth, I set the
stage for my own study and research question, which are described in the
following section.
If the French need for man-power after World War II resembled that of
World War I and the inter-war years, the circumstances under which foreigners
arrived and lived in France during the second half of the 20th century
nevertheless diﬀered considerably from the earlier period of immigration. For
one, worker populations increasingly became settled communities. Ordinances
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from 1945 made it possible for laborers to remain in France past the duration of
their work contracts, and the family reunification (regroupement familiale) Decree
of April 29th, 1976 would increase the relative proportion of women and
children to men, as compared with the previous decades (Schain, 2008).
Secondly, decolonization and the end of the War in Algeria in 1962 eﬀected a
shift in the demographic balance of immigrants: by 1982, immigrants from
Africa and Asia outnumbered those from Europe (ibid.).8 Thirdly, to address the
housing shortage created by relatively fluid decades of immigration and family
reunification, large-scale construction of government-subsidized worker housing
began in the 1960s and 1970s, under the aegis of the National Society for the
Construction of Worker Housing (SONACOTRA). These public housing
projects, known as Habitations à Loyer Modéré, came to replace most of the hostel
accommodations in which male workers had been living since the start of
immigration (Hargreaves, 2007).9
Economic and political dynamics converged in the 1970s to reverse the
flexible immigration policy of the years since World War II. On the one hand,
Schain (2008, p. 49) reports that, in 1982, foreigners from the European Community resident
in France numbered 1,580,000, whereas 2,100,000 foreigners from outside the European
Community were registered. This demographic shift frustrated the National Immigration
Oﬃce’s (ONI) eﬀorts to favor people arriving from European countries over those arriving from
Africa and Asia.
8

Hargreaves (2007) notes that, according to a census by INSEE, in 1990 there were 100,000
individuals, 85% of whom were Africans and most of whom were men, still living in hostel
accommodations.
9
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the world economy’s Fawzive contraction in the early 1970s put an end to the
economically prosperous years (Les Trente Glorieuses) France had enjoyed since
World War II, drying France’s thirst for foreign labor. On the other, 1974 saw the
election of a centrist-conservative president, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.
Giscard d’Estaing’s administration exerted a conservative influence on
immigration policy, proposing for instance to forcibly return 100,000 foreigners
per year, many of whom were Algerians, to their countries of origin (Weil,
1991). He was denied a second term, however, defeated by French socialdemocrat François Mitterand in 1981, who remained in the presidency until
1995.10 The socialist party’s tenure in oﬃce would nevertheless be marked by
significant power sharing with the political right. A right-wing coalition achieved
victory in the 1983 municipal elections, and again in 1986 during elections for
the National Assembly, prompting President Mitterand to appoint right-leaning
Jacques Chirac to Prime Minister in 1986. Despite these political hands-oﬀs,
both parties perceived the necessity of hammering out an across-the-politicalspectrum consensus on immigration policy.
Consensus was to emerge on the legislative front first. In May of 1984,
the National Assembly unanimously voted in a law that had the following three

Mitterand is France’s longest-serving president and remained in the presidency for two full
seven-year year terms. In 2000, a referendum reduced the presidential term to five years.
10
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eﬀects. First, it dismantled previous plans by which foreigners would have been
forced to leave France. Second, it limited all further immigration only to the
families of those presently installed in France, refugees, and students. Third, the
law granted ten-year residency permits to adults already in France, regardless of
employment status or national origin (Taguieﬀ & Weil, 1990; Weil, 2008). The
post-immigration context of the mid-1980s also gave way to another, more
subtle kind of consensus; namely; the emergence of a dominant idiom, among
French political elites as well as academics, for discussing cultural diversity
within France. On television and in oﬃcial documents, politicians from across
the aisle urged France’s ethnic minorities to harness their cultural diversity,
confining it to the private sphere, for the sake of a more socially and morally
cohesive union. Gesturing to this idiom’s resuscitation of a classically
Republican focus on national unison, Weil (1991) characterizes this unusual
merger between politicians as “the new Republican synthesis” (p. 187).
This discourse of Republican citizenship and cultural integration was
surprising in the agreement shown by its proponents as well as its timing. The
neo-Republican turn in political discourse followed hard upon the heels of the
anti-colonial identity struggles of the 1960s and the multiculturalist “right to
diﬀerence” movement of the 1970s and early 1980s (c.f., Giordan, 1982), not to
mention its consolidation during a democratic-socialist presidency. Favell (1998)
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oﬀers convincing reasons, however, as to why it was at this time in particular
that the integration of immigrants, and especially Muslim immigrants, became
“the epicenter of party political debate and positioning, and the key test-site for
the continued validity of Republican ideals” (p. 48). If the question of
immigrants’ compatibility with the French national identity was much
politicized during these years, Favell estimates this was not because France
eﬀectively “discovered” the Islamic cultural traditions of its immigrant
population at this time, or because of competition over scarce jobs.11 Rather, in
the mid-1980s France was in the throes of questioning its political sovereignty
as a nation-state. Following the general trend taking hold of Europe at the time,
France was liberalizing its financial markets, deregulating business, and
pursuing transnational policy frameworks for security and the economy, like
those proposed by the European Community. France’s political sovereignty and
national unity were, thus, already facing challenges when the far-right National
Front party hit its political stride in the 1983 municipal elections. This
unprecedented political success gave a platform to the National Front’s concerns
about the divisive influence of immigrants, and specifically Muslims, on France’s
cultural, ethnic, and political cohesion.
In 1989, three girls entered their middle school wearing headscarves. Although the State
Council eventually ruled in favor of the girls’ right to wear the headscarf, this event, known as
the “scarf aﬀair,” fueled a Fawzive debate in favor and against the girls’ decision, one which
reignited whenever Islam became politicized, like after 9/11 (Bowen, 2009).
11
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Although the National Front never achieved preponderance in the
electorate, with electoral successes falling between 10-25% over the past thirty
years, the binary they helped to erect, between a national unity based in
Republican principles and a dangerous cultural pluralism, gained remarkable
traction across the political spectrum in the mid-1980s and continues to
reverberate throughout French political discourse today. The Republican concept
of French citizenship that crystallized in the 1980s, which required citizens to
restrict mores perceived as culturally diﬀerent to the private sphere, was, again,
articulated in the Rousseauean idiom of a need to defend the body politic from
partition and corruption. This logic of citizens needing to defend the French
national identity was not an altogether new one though, and Taguieﬀ and Weil
(1990) trace it—along with some of its stereotypical roles: foreigner, invader,
patriot, collaborator—to the “political mythology” (p. 101) of the Vichy Regime
(1940-1944). Only the threats have drastically changed; with indulgence in
individualism and cultural singularities representing the contemporary
“disturbances of the collective order” (Durkheim, 1951[1897], p. 246). Below, I
compare how recent political discourse from the right and the left has portrayed
the nature of “the threat.” I contend that political representations of French
youth from Muslim families, as, alternately, "occupiers" of French space
(according to the right), or a "lost generation” (according to the left), share in a
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deep-seated fear of social “anomy” (Durkheim, 1951[1897], p. 254) and are,
hence, inhibited from attending to the ways in which youth display cultural
rootedness.

The Political Right and the Left Speak to Diversity within France: “Homesick at Home”
versus “The Lost Generation”
Each year since 2007, on French television, tele-journalist and antiracism activist Rokhaya Diallo awards (or rather, projects) “golden bananas” to
politicians who contribute to racist stereotypy through their public speech. The
satirical Y'a Bon ceremony confers awards with names like “the Super Patriot
Award,” “the Barely Veiled Racism Award,” and “In the Good Ole Times of the
Colony Award” upon unsuspecting politicians and public figures. In 2013, thenPresident of the center-right Union for a Popular Movement Party (UMP) JeanFrançois Copé eked out a victory over several competitors for “the Lost
Territories of the Republic Award.”12 Copé delivered the comments warranting
his selection on October 5th, 2012, while on the campaign trail for presidency of
UMP. He revealed his despair at certain swaths of France:
“...those neighborhoods where certain of our compatriots, mothers and fathers
whose exasperation I can understand, upon returning home from work in the
evening, learn that their son had his pain au chocolat torn from him by thugs (voyous)
as he was leaving school, who explain to him that ‘we don't eat during Ramadan.’
There are some French families that live their suﬀering in silence, and to whom no

The original award titles are Prix Super-Patriote, Prix Racisme à Peine Voilé, Prix Au Bon Vieux Temps
des Colonies, and Prix Territoires Perdus de la République.
12
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one speaks, except to stigmatize them and insult them with every name in the book,
to the point that today they are obliged to hang their heads and to leave, if they can,
as far as possible, despite the fact that they are citizens of the Republic.” (Le
Parisien, 10.6.12)

Above and beyond equating those who keep Ramadan with thugs, in these now
famous remarks Copé hints that such petty thieves have come to speak for the
French Republic. They presuppose a Republic within which their Islamic norms
are customary, as indicated by their speech in the first-person plural (on, "we").
Forms of punishment for infringing such norms, we learn, include the
expropriation of old staples of French baking, like the pain au chocolat, from the
clutches of wide-eyed schoolboys. Copé’s depiction, in which diasporic Muslim
youth occupy French space and cause French “natives” (français de souche) to lose
their bearings and evacuate, pervades right-leaning political discourse. The left
also speaks in terms of a disorientation, interestingly, only the roles of victim
and perpetrator are reversed in their discourse. In the eyes of the French left, it
is diasporic Muslim youth who undergo a destabilization process, whether
because of cultural disjunctures with their parents’ generation, or due to French
institutions’ failure to deliver socioeconomic equality. Below, I touch on each of
these two circulating portrayals of French society in turn and discuss how both
are haunted by the specter of a Durkheimian anomic disintegration.
Copé’s political candy-gram from Ms. Diallo was named after an edited
volume entitled Les Territoires Perdus de la République (Brenner, 2002). Indeed, the
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threat Copé introduces, of authentic French cultural values shrinking in
jurisdiction, is also the thematic kernel of Brenner’s book. The volume
assembles the accounts of a dozen schoolteachers and principals who attest to a
climate of anti-semitism, racism, sexism, and violence unfurling in the heartland
of the French Republic, the French public school system. This “new
doxa” (Brenner, 2002, p. 54) is spearheaded by France's new “nous, the children
of the Arabo-African immigration” (p. 69). Thus, one author reports that a gang
of Franco-Maghrebi girls thrashed two thirteen-year old girls on the steps of a
Jewish private school in Aubervilliers. Several express disbelief at how, on
September 12th, 2001, some students extolled Al-Qaeda for its role in weakening
the U.S.-Israeli axis against Palestine. Yet another teacher recounts his
disturbance when, during a history lesson on World War II, a handful of pupils
praised Hitler. The book’s contributors, in sum, warn of home-grown French
values—like those of the Republican triptych: egalité, fraternité, liberté—receding
in the wake of an “Islamic advance” (p. 43). This text exemplifies the social
phenomenon Cohen (1980) has termed a moral panic, when “a condition,
episode, person, or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to
societal values and interests; its nature presented in a stylized and stereotypical
fashion by the mass media” (p. 9).
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The propos of another writer, novelist Richard Millet, establishes that the
right’s moral panic about Muslim youth is laced through, additionally, with an
anxiety about people of color. During an appearance on public television channel
France 3 in 2012, Millet commented on his perceived transformation into an
ethnic minority within France:
“I would like, no, not to play the devil’s advocate, but I would like to depart from
another position, that of my singularity. What am I? I am an ethnically French person
(un français de souche). ((raises both hands, palms forward)) How dreadful (quelle horreur)!
Catholic. How dreadful!. Heterosexual. How dreadful! I have everything going against
me. I would like to say, for example, that I am haunted by the question of identity, not
only my identity but also the national identity. How dreadful too, of course. I would like
to say, for example, that I take the RER [subway] on a quotidian basis. For me, the
Châtelet-Les-Halles station at 6 in the evening is an absolute nightmare, especially when
I am the only white person. So, am I allowed to say that or not? Is it playing along with
the National Front, Mr. Guéant, or who knows who. No! There is pain for me associated
with having to ask myself which country I am in, ethnically, racially, religiously,
etc.” (2.7.12)

In a short essay entitled “Chronique № 3” that appeared on his personal website
two years later, Millet further fleshed out the nature of his dismay upon passing
through the Châtelet-Les-Halles subway terminal:
“French civilization is dead at Châtelet-les-Halles, I thought, the other night, around six,
at the moment when, for lack of another option, I entered into that human mustiness
(remugle), all races and ethnicities confounded in one feverish body in search of social
legitimacy (…) This post-racial laboratory, this accelerator of multicultural particles, this
uterus of the radical inversion of all values, was able to produce nothing more than that
characteristic state of contemporary servitude in which the human forgets himself to the
point that he begins to smile internally, in the Babelian swarm where each ignores the
other while keeping him under close watch, dreading to be assimilated into the mystical
body of the French nation, which is dead nonetheless.” (Millet, 18.12.14)

Millet paints an apocalyptic canvas in which, now that those once seeking entry
to the French nation have been admitted, the ethnically French come to doubt
their place, and whether they still want to partake, in “the mystical body of the
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French nation.” The French motherland’s adoption of ethno-racially diverse
individuals turns the “normal” order of aﬀairs on its head: as France draws her
adopted children closer to her bosom, now her biological children feel estranged,
their just complaints at this treatment now grounds for others’ exclamations of
“quelle horreur!”
This strategy of depicting a radically inverted world reappears throughout
right-wing discourse. Philosopher and Académie Française member Alain
Finkielkraut, for instance, explained the prevailing mood in France to New York
Times journalist Rachel Donadio with the description, “people are homesick at
home” (Donadio, 1.8.15).13 With these words, Finkielkraut implied that an
unspoken force had transformed the French landscape, making it
unrecognizable to those who call it home. Finkielkraut’s comments show
distinct similarities to the rhetoric used in the 1980s by radical right-wing
Germans who were against the presence of Turkish guest workers. In the
infamous Heidelberg Manifesto, for instance, a circle of professors expressed
their fears that Turks were irreversibly transforming the German people,
language, culture, and religion. They cautioned that “Many Germans already feel
foreign in their own neighborhoods, workplaces, and homeland in

This interview took place, quite by coincidence, two days prior to the terrorist attack by a pair
of young Frenchmen of Algerian descent on satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo.
13
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general” (Göktürk, Gramling, & Kaes, 2007, p. 112). This kind of account,
whereby locals and foreigners switch places due to an “invasion” by the latter,
has long been popular with the far-right National Front party in France as well.
In 2010, Marine Le Pen, who was then campaigning to become the president of
the National Front, likened Muslims’ Friday prayers in the city of Lyon to an
occupation of French territory: “Sure, there aren’t any tanks. There aren’t any
soldiers. But it’s an occupation all the same, and it weighs on the residents” (Le
Figaro, 12.11.10). To summarize, politicians and writers speaking from France’s
political right bear in common a tendency to narrate themselves as silenced,
dispossessed, occupied, and lost. These predicaments are, furthermore, typically
identified as bred by the presence of Muslims and people of color in France.
Discourse from the political left partakes in a parallel idiom of loss and
disorientation, only the demographic portrayed as straining to return to its
bearings, in this case, is French Muslim youth themselves. Only a couple of
weeks prior to Copé’s remarks on the campaign trail about Muslim youth
stealing pains au chocolat, the leftist weekly Marianne circulated an installment
about the abject circumstances under which French Muslim youth live in
Northern Marseille (Marianne, 10.15.12). This issue of Marianne came to my
attention the same way as most, with its headlines— “Marseille, lost territory of
the Republic: Delinquency, unemployment, poverty, corruption”— beckoning to
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me from the windows of the café (and horse-race betting shop) at the foot of my
apartment building. The 8 a.m. lineup at the café, with punters from all walks of
life riveted to the television screen and the café owner alternating between
brewing coﬀees and taking bets, set a vivid backdrop to the article's potemkin
tale of a city doing its best to dissimulate the likes of gerrymandering, hashish
rings, mafia vendettas (to the tune of nineteen homicides since the beginning of
the year), and destitution beneath the town’s aﬄuent sectors and world-class
attractions. The city had become irrecuperable due to “decades of disastrous
policies” (n.p.), noted the article. Those who suﬀered disproportionately from
the “apartheid-era” socioeconomic gap resulting from this mismanagement,
however, were the immigrant and immigrant-descendant inhabitants living in
the city’s northern quarters, who were lacking employment, transportation, and
security (n.p.). The author all but sounds the death knell for the city, concluding
that Marseille’s government oﬃcials have left residents roaming “free of their
moorings and of any authority” (n.p.). The article’s explanation that such forms
of social agitation result from a lack of imposed authority harks back once more
to Durkheim’s (1951[1897]) theory of anomy, or normlessness. According to
Durkheim, delinquent practices can be seen as resulting from a break-down in
the amount of social regulation to which people are subject. Below, I present
studies undertaken by leftist sociologists and state-funded statistical institutes
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that have followed this line of reasoning further, identifying various failed forms
of social regulation thought to have set diasporic youth, in particular, adrift.
A sociological study by Lagrange (2010), carried out in the project of Le
Val Fourré in Paris’ western suburbs, identified higher percentages of secondary
school failure, delinquency, and joblessness among male adolescents of
Maghrebi and West African descent specifically. Lagrange traces the diﬃculties
faced by male youth raised in West African families, in particular,14 to African
mothers’ relative lack of parental authority over them compared to fathers and
both parents’ diﬃculty at being educational role models for their sons. The
establishment of healthy relationships between mother and son, argues
Lagrange, would be aided by “empowerment policies” designed to help women
“extend their activities…and develop their autonomy” (p. 25). Whereas
Lagrange looks to weak filial relationships as the source of youth’s instability,
others like Brouard and Tiberj (2005) identify disproportionate unemployment
as the primary characteristic distinguishing youth raised in Muslim (African and
Turkish) households from other French youth.15 The authors are of the mind
that the youth from these households that they studied did not consistently
Lagrange singles out the countries of the Western Sahel, Senegal, Mauritania, and Mali, and
also the countries near the Gulf of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Benin, Togo, the
Ivory Coast, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
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Brouard and Tiberj’s (2005) study was based on survey data collected from two samples of
people: one of 1006 ethnically French people above 18 years of age, and one of 1003 people
above 18 years of age, born to Maghrebi, African, and Turkish parents.
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share in a common aﬃliation or practice of Islam. They report great variation in
their sample population’s responses on this count. They conclude, rather, that
the main sense in which youth from Muslim households could be seen as
“communitarian” (p. 121) lies in their joint economic marginalization from
mainstream society.
Another much larger survey-based study, conducted by National Institute
for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and the National Institute for
Demographic Studies (INED) in 2010, yielded findings about the religiosity of
second and third-generation youth in France that contradicted Brouard and
Tiberj’s conclusions. The “Trajectories and Origins,” or TeO, study was
administered to 9,600 immigrant descendant youth and 9,600 first-generation
immigrants (INSEE & INED, 2010). It revealed that the French Muslim youth in
the sample exhibited greater religiosity and transnationality than either, nonMuslim descendants of other religious backgrounds, or their first-generation
parents. Religiosity was evaluated on Likert scale responses to questions like “do
you attend religious events” and “do you wear religious paraphernalia?,” while
conclusions about transnationality were drawn from responses to questions like
“where do you want to be buried,” “how frequently do you visit your parents’
home country,” “do you stay in touch via online media,” “do you vote there,”
and “do you send remittances?” Lagrange (2010) hailed the TeO study’s findings
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as indicative of a reverse secularization phenomenon, whereby, since the end of
the 1960s, each generation of Muslims in France has increased its adherence to
Islamic norms over the former.
Although the TeO study’s authors do not oﬀer any causal explanations for
these trends among French Muslim youth, they nonetheless flag two other,
possibly related, tendencies that disproportionately aﬀect immigrant
descendants from Muslim households. The first is these individuals’ greater risk
of finding themselves unemployed compared to the ethnically French:
“For descendants of immigrants from Turkey (1.3), sub-Saharan Africa (1.7), Morocco or
Tunisia (1.6), Algeria (1.8), and for immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa (1.7) and
Algeria (1.8), the risk of unemployment is significantly greater than that of [ethnically
French] natives.” (INSEE & INED, 2010, p. 59)16

The second trend is for these same individuals, descendants of immigrants from
the Maghreb, sub-Saharan Africa, and Turkey, to report a greater likelihood of
racist encounters, of being refused employment for unjust reasons, and of being
questioned about their “real” origins despite being born in France. The authors
conclude that “these discriminations are essentially an issue relating to visible
minorities” (p. 131).
To summarize, this appraisal of discourse from the French left has
allowed a glimpse into the left’s portrayal of French Muslim youth as a “lost
The numbers within parentheses correspond to these individuals’ risk of being unemployed
compared to the mainstream French population. In all cases, immigrant descendants of these
origins are at greater risk of being unemployed; in some cases, their risk is almost twice as great.
The sample looked at immigrant descendants aged 18 to 50.
16
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generation,” teetering on the edge of lawless anomie. The causes proposed to
account for their unmooring are various: lack of parental supervision, few
employment opportunities, racial discrimination. A general account seems to
have emerged, however, of the results of such anomy; namely, that youth react
to their relative freedom and unmet expectations by veering towards strict
observance of Islamic norms for conduct. In the upcoming section, I describe
how through my research project I have endeavored to rectify this
understanding of French Muslim youth as culturally lost or afloat.

III.

This Study: The Scope of the Inquiry, Sites, and Methods

My dissertation research consists of an ethnography in which I examined
the forms of cultural belonging youth from Muslim households in Marseille
performed on a daily basis. Over fourteen months, between 2012 and 2013, I
documented the cultural as well as linguistic dimensions of how individuals in
several youth friendship-groups positioned themselves, whether with respect to
their diasporic peers, their immigrant parents, or mainstream society and State
institutions in Marseille. My goal in undertaking this research was to trouble the
State’s homogenization of French-Muslim youth: as a demographic moving
homogeneously towards religiosity and transnationalism. By examining youth’s
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speech practices—both what they said and how they said it—I learned a great
deal about what religiosity and transnationalism signified for them personally.
Specifically, I found that youth’s concepts and practices relating to religiosity and
transnationalism held little similarity to those described in the survey-based
literature, where the behaviors in which such youth engage are typically
designated as “foreign” or being at odds with France.
Rather, youth nurtured aspirational trajectories that, while they may have
involved Islam and transnational movement, were nevertheless solidly crafted in
the byways of Marseille. Nowhere was the local nature of youth’s personal
aspirations more clearly reflected, furthermore, than in the language varieties
they selected to index their identities. The youth who partook in my research
drew on both, family and peer-learned non-standard repertoires of Marseillais
French, dialectal Arabic, and other heritage languages (e.g., Wolof, Comorian),
as well as standard repertoires of Arabic and French learned in French schools
and neighborhood prayer rooms, when projecting images of themselves as pious
cosmopolitan Muslims or savvy project (quartiers) dwellers. After conducting this
research, it is my contention that immigrant descendants in Marseille exhibit a
host of signs indicating their cultural belonging. It is, quite evidently, when
others do not recognize such youth to belong, denying them cultural citizenship,
that youth experience varying measures of alienation from home.
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Data Collection: Sites and Analysis
Marseille provided the ideal research site in which to investigate the
aspirations and identities of diasporic youth born to Muslim families. Marseille
is France’s second-largest commune, with 859,543 people, of whom 34,776 are
Moroccan, Algerian, or Tunisian nationals, 11,774 are sub-Saharan African
nationals, 61,281 are French by acquisition, and 725,689 are French-born
(INSEE, 2008).17 Since at least de-colonization, it has also sheltered generations
of immigrants from Muslim countries in North, West, and East Africa, a fact
that makes of Marseille today home to many young people with diasporic ties
(Sayad, Jordi, & Témime, 1989). Marseille’s Muslim communities are thus
longstanding and highly active in community, educational, and worship activities
throughout the city’s diﬀerent neighborhoods, as evidenced for example by the
plethora of Muslim community associations (e.g., Institut Méditerranéen
d'Études Musulmanes, Union des Familles Musulmanes, Association des
Travailleurs Algériens), the existence of private Muslim primary and secondary
schools, locally produced Muslim radio programming (Radio Galère, Radio
Gazelle), and the current struggle to build Marseille a central mosque (Le
Monde, 10.27.11).

These INSEE figures do not account for the large number of undocumented immigrants of
various origins living and working in Marseille, nor for numbers of immigrant descendants.
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The majority of the sixty or so youth, aged thirteen to thirty, with whom I
carried out this research were young men and women I met through the
educational institutions in which they were enrolled, whether for full-time
school or for elective classes at night or on the weekends. Thanks to personal
connections I made within Marseille’s public school system and in a handful of
private Islamic organizations with didactic missions, I was able to spend time
with youth, as well as adults, in these settings, and also render my services as a
part-time Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and English teacher. The main
educational settings and groups of people with which I carried out ethnographic
research, continuously over the 2012-2013 academic year and during the
adjoining summers, are the following:
1. I observed MSA and French language arts classes two-three times weekly at
a public collège (secondary school) located in Marseille’s northerly 16th
arrondissement. There, I followed students in the bilingual French-MSA track
who were in grades 6ème, 5ème, 4ème, and 3ème , though the students I became
most familiar with were those in 3ème, which is to say fourteen-year old
students finishing their last year before high school. I accompanied this class
on a school field-trip to Paris and also spent time with the students and the
MSA teacher after school and on the weekends.
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2. A second site where I conducted research was a private Muslim secondary
school or collège, likewise located in Marseille’s northern neighborhoods, in
the 15th arrondissement. As a part-time English teacher at this school, I became
acquainted with students in all four grades (i.e., 6ème, 5ème, 4ème, and 3ème), aged
11 to 14. My time at this school likewise involved participation in
community and worship activities as well as a week-long trip to London with
the 3ème class in April, 2013.
3. At the local public university, a further group of participants comprised
young, highly devout Muslim women in their first and second years in the
MSA bachelor degree program. With this group of female friends, I attended
various MSA classes at the University, tajwīd18 classes and Friday prayers at a
nearby mosque, Muslim speaker events, and recreational activities such as
Muslim sisters’ parties, meals, and hiking.
4. Observation and several interviews were likewise conducted with
administrative and teaching personnel in the three above-mentioned
institutions. At the public secondary school, I interviewed and frequented a
handful of the teachers. I also met several times with the woman who served
as the academic inspector for MSA classes in this school as well as in other
schools across Southern France. At the private Muslim secondary school, I
18

MSA tajwīd refers to classes in Koranic elocution.
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interviewed teachers, administrative personnel, recess monitors, and
religious leaders present in the school community and also observed classes
other than my own (i.e., MSA, Islamic Studies, French language arts). At the
public university, I interviewed one of the principal professors in the MSA
degree program.
5. Remaining spheres of participation included attendance at the adult MSA
classes of a Muslim community center (3rd arrondissement), tutoring high
school students in various languages at the Union des Familles Musulmanes
downtown (1st arrondissement), teaching a once-weekly adult MSA class to
adult French and heritage-language (Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian)
speakers at a secular community center downtown (2nd arrondissement), and
weekly Wednesday outings with 12-16 years olds who attended this same
community center. In addition to my interactions with youth in these spaces,
I also interviewed adults with whom they spent much of their time,
including their parents and siblings, community members, and school and
community center monitors.
The methods of investigation for this research were qualitative, combining
traditional ethnographic methods for data gathering, including participant
observation, semi-formal interviews (Briggs, 1986), document collection, and
the writing of field notes (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995), with discourse
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analysis and linguistic anthropological techniques for collecting and analyzing
data, as well as the gathering of video footage and data from youth’s social
media interactions. 19 I recorded my participants’ speech with a professionalgrade digital voice recorder and used a regular video camera and a tripod to
capture video footage, when necessary.20 The speech data I collected represented
a mix of interviews and spontaneous speech behavior, allowing me to mine my
participants’ speech for examples of reflexive social activity, or metapragmatic
discourse, as well as speech tokens “in action,” or pragmatics (M. Silverstein,
1976). When analyzing my data, I transcribed audio with the aid of a
transcription pedal and the softwares ExpressScribe, and video with the software
InqScribe. When the need arose to analyze speech in a more phonetically
detailed way, I used the audio-editing application Audacity and the acousticanalysis software Praat. Most of my phonetic transcriptions using the
International Phonetic Alphabet remain impressionistic, however, leading me to
believe that, given more work, further information could be gleaned from more
precise transcriptions in the future. As for the conceptual tools I employ to
analyze my data, I provide more information about each of these tools when, in
the course of my chapters, they present themselves as useful to the cases at
19

As per IRB regulations, youth signed consent for each of these types of data collection.

Approximately one-hundred hours of audio data were recorded and fifteen hours of video
data.
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hand. A final note is that the overwhelming majority of my research participants
preferred to have their real names appear in this work. To respect their wishes
and yet maintain a semblance of confidentiality, I have omitted people’s last
names. I have also, of course, used pseudonyms when people did not want their
first names mentioned or when the material they provided was politically
sensitive.

VI.

Overview of Dissertation

This chapter explored the divide between a France that grants legal
citizenship and yet occasionally withholds other, more subtle, sorts of
recognition, like cultural citizenship, from diasporic youth. Chapter Two is a
short ethnographic chapter that serves as a complement to Chapter One. In
Chapter Two, I introduce some of my research participants and show, via three
ethnographic snippets, how diasporic youth from Marseille are constructed by
others as “foreign” or “un-French.” Chapter Three, in turn, focuses in on the
daily lives and cultural practices of a group of students who attend a public
school MSA class in Marseille’s 16th arrondissement. This chapter demonstrates
that these young men and women express various emic guises of cultural
belonging to Marseille, even if these manifestations may not always match the
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mainstream French population’s definition of Frenchness. Chapter Four turns to
address how youth from the same MSA class negotiated their relationships with
people from their parents’ home countries and also ethnically French people
from more aﬄuent parts of Marseille. In Chapter Five, I examine the experiences
of diasporic youth from Marseille who identify as orthodox Sunnis. There, I
analyze the alienation youth report in regards to their home town, its gendered
nature, and the measures some orthodox young women are taking to remedy
their lack of a sense of home. Chapter Six presents an in-depth look at the social
ramifications of a particular educational initiative, begun in 2012 by Marseille’s
Ministry of Education, whereby a new, revamped kind of MSA was being taught
to local youth from Muslim households. Chapter Seven, finally, attends to how
certain gender ideologies, prevalent among the students in the MSA class from
Chapters Three and Four and the orthodox-identified youth presented in
Chapter Five, aﬀected these respective groups’ feelings about what kinds of
language were appropriate or inappropriate to use, and were in turn influenced
by these youth’s socialization into Islamic norms about sexuality and modesty.
Taken together, my hope is that the chapters of this dissertation provide
the reader with a more nuanced, multi-faceted view of how diasporic youth in
Marseille position themselves, whether vis-à-vis their home town, their parents
and their parents’ countries of origin, and the French State and France’s
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mainstream population. This work also places special emphasis on youth’s
language practices. This is because I found such practices to aﬀord unique
insight into youth’s life-worlds and aspirations, helping to answer questions
about where they were coming from and where they were headed. My optimistic
perspective is that any step towards increasing general familiarity with the
experiences of such youth will, over time, aid in brightening their futures.
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II. Snippets from Contemporary Marseille:
Cultural Belonging without Cultural
Citizenship
I.

Introduction

This section introduces some of the key dynamics taking place among
social groups in Marseille. How does the city’s mainstream population perceive
the diasporic youth with whom they are generally unfamiliar? How do ethnically
French adults who work with such youth in the public school system understand
their behavior and aspirations? Also, how do sub-populations of diasporic youth
perceive one another? The three anecdotes I narrate will begin to describe a
dichotomy that will be more fully fleshed out in subsequent chapters, between
outsiders’ perceptions of diasporic youth as foreign or wayward individuals, and
their own sense of themselves as belonging culturally within France. The three
interactions I analyze provide examples of how particular listeners went about
judging the cultural aﬃliations of diasporic youth, often with reference to their
speech, but also, quite probably, in response to certain visual signs, like youth’s
appearance. I propose that the accuracy of a listener’s judgement about a
speaker’s identity and intentions is mediated by their social proximity to that
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speaker, and also by their past experiences with ethnic others. I show how, in
other words, diasporic young people’s foreignness or Frenchness resided
primarily in the ears and eyes of their beholders.

II.

A Drive with a Cabbie from Marseille: “A Connotation of the
Maghreb”
On a crisp morning in November, 2012, I toted my suitcase to the Place

de la Joliette and got in the only waiting taxi. Speeding along the empty freeway
towards the airport, the driver was interested to learn that I lived in the
neighborhood of La Joliette but am originally from San Francisco. He
volunteered that “seventy percent of people that work in, or, that come to La
Joliette are people exterior to Marseille.” He told me that people arrived by fast
train or plane, often from Paris, because of the growing business opportunities
in the neighborhood. La Joliette, we were both aware, has since 1995 been the
target of a seven billion dollar, mostly private urban renewal project called
l’Euroméditerranée. Historical buildings tied to the docks of La Joliette’s port
are undergoing Fawzive renovations, as are its Haussmannian boulevards (e.g.,
Rue de la République, Boulevard des Dames, Boulevard de Paris). This
commercial investment and beautification has placed La Joliette back on a par
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with downtown Marseille (le Centre Ville), spelling an expansion of the city’s
center to include previously industrial areas. For many, this reorientation of La
Joliette, away from its historical links to industry and port activities, and
towards the city’s civic center and Marseille’s bourgeoisie (Roncayolo, 1996),
has been accompanied by no small degree of nostalgia. La Joliette is no longer
cloaked in blue, as Albert Londres (1929) described it upon his visit, referring to
the dockers of all ilk stationed at its docks and bars in their coveralls. Whereas
for the past 150 years La Joliette has housed mostly working-class immigrants,
and, at key moments, also refugees (Attard-Maraninchi & Témime, 1989), in the
past couple of years its has become agleam in glass buildings, banks, hotels, and
restaurants. From Monday to Friday, well-dressed workers file in and out of
silvery oﬃce buildings and restaurants with lunch-only hours, returning to their
home cities in the evenings or on the weekends and leaving La Joliette to the
few original inhabitants who can still aﬀord to live there.
The driver, himself a descendant of Neapolitan immigrants to
Marseille, continued with his reflections on Marseille’s shifting demographics.
“Marseille’s population today has little in common with its population in the
1960s” (c.f., Transcript 2.1). Given our previous discussion, I assumed he was
referencing the gentrification of La Joliette. I inquired whether he saw “a change
in accent” as a result. To this, he gave an enthusiastic yes, only he went on to
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describe, not the more standard (or français d’oïl) French accents accompanying
the Parisians and other urbanites commuting to La Joliette (Trimaille &
Gasquet-Cyrus, 2013), but the Maghreb-connoted speech of youth from “the
banlieues,” or peripheral suburbs.
Transcript 2.1.21 Changing Demographics
French Original

English Translation

Driver: La population qui fait Marseille
maintenant n’a plus rien à vo::ir avec une
population des année:: des années soixantes.
Cécile: Mhm, mhm, et vous voyez un accentpardon, et vous voyez un changement dans
l’accent?
Driver: Oh oui! Oui, oui, oui, les gens
maintenant, du fait de la mixité ont un accent qui
est, disons, de banlieue. Nous on le ressent parce
que- ((windy))
Cécile: -Qui est plus quoi?
Driver: Qui est plus un accent de jeunes de
banlieuesCécile: -AhaDriver: -!Que de Marseille. Il y en a de
l’intonation… Ils ont une façon de parler qui est
plu:s ((clicks against teeth)), on dirait qui est pl-y
a plus de connotation de…du-du Maghreb.

Driver: Marseille’s population today has
little in common with its population in the
1960s.
Cécile: Mhm, mhm, and do you see an
accent-sorry do you see a change in accent?
Driver: Oh yes! Yes, yes, yes, as a function
of the social diversity now people have an
accent that is, let’s say, from the banlieue.
We detect it because- ((windy))
Cécile: -That is more what?
Driver: That is more of a banlieue youth
accentCécile: -AhaDriver: -Than from Marseille. There’s an
intonation… They have a way of speaking
that is mo:re ((clicks against teeth)), we
might say that is mor-there’s more a
connotation of the… the-the Maghreb.

The driver’s reference to youth from Marseille’s banlieue puzzled me, particularly
because, unlike Paris or other French cities, Marseille never developed a true
banlieue. Instead, the housing projects clustering at its northern and southernmost extremities remain within Marseille’s municipality (Donzel; 1995;
Roncayolo, 1996). I asked the driver for clarification about what he called a
21
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banlieue intonation. “We understand each other, no problem,” he replied; only
youth from Marseille’s northerly projects “take pathways (passerelles) in their
speech diﬀerent from those of this country’s speakers.” Whereas his own speech
he qualified as “sing-song” (chantant), youth’s speech, he said, “drags much
more” (beaucoup plus trainant). In an eﬀort to appeal to my cultural coordinates,
he analogized his Marseillais accent to the English of a fourth-generation IrishAmerican in Texas. How diasporic youth speak French, by contrast, he compared
to the English that might be spoken by a Mexican person in Texas.
Although the driver began by noting a demographic shift aﬀecting La
Joliette, it quickly became clear that the more crucial demographic—and
sociolinguistic—shift for him was the changing population of the city’s workingclass northerly neighborhoods (les quartiers) since the 1960s. He was concerned
that the European immigrant populations, whose families had “one or two
children,” were being outstripped by “foreigners,” who “easily have four to six
children.” This immigration narrative, of first “Europeans” and then “foreigners”
arriving in Marseille, revealed that his cultural baseline was likely that of the
first wave of immigration to Marseille, the Italian wave, the smells of which
likely graced his own family’s kitchen. Indeed, Italian immigrants immigrated
most numerously to Marseille between 1830 and WWII (López & Témime,
1989), residing in the working-class neighborhoods north of the Canebière
!46

(Naudeau, 1929). Today, however, most people living in Marseille’s quartiers are
immigrants or are descended from immigrants coming from North, West, and
East African countries (Césari, Moreau, & Schleyer-Lindenmann, 2001). The
driver’s anomalous use of the term banlieues to cover Marseille’s quartiers, as
such, served as an indicator of his misgivings about the ethnic transformation of
such neighborhoods, banlieues in Paris and other cities typically showing large
populations of African immigrants and their descendants.
If the driver’s cultural baseline was the Italian-descended community in
Marseille, his linguistic point of reference was, not Standard French, but the
Marseillais accent. Certainly, how he spoke throughout our conversation,
making liberal use of the velar nasal syllable-finally, word-final schwa, and gently
aﬀricating his stop consonants (e.g., gentil ‘nice’ [ʒəŋʧi]), was decidedly
representative of the old-timing Marseillais accent (Binisti & Gasquet-Cyrus,
2003). It was with reference to this “sing-song” accent that he judged diasporic
youth to have a “dragging,” Arabic-connoted learner variety of French.
Sociolinguists have identified other urban youth vernaculars (Rampton, 2011)
from throughout France as having a similar “Arabic coloration” (coloration arabe;
Billiez, 1992, p. 120), whether in phonology (Billiez, 1992; Gasquet-Cyrus,
2009; Jamin, 2005), lexical borrowings (Caubet, 2001; Doran, 2002), intonation
contours (Fagyal & Stewart, 2005, 2011), or pragmatics (Tetreault, 2009). Billiez
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(1992) drew the interesting conclusion that Arabic phonology, once embedded
in a French surround, was suﬃciently emblematic so as to dissimulate its French
surround. This resonates, too, with Agha’s (in press) remarks that even the
slightest breach of an enregistered variety can warrant listeners to characterize
such breaches as “slang” ways of speaking, easily equating their linguistic
deviance with social deviance.
Sitting in the airport after leaving the cabbie behind, I was struck by how
a son of Neapolitan immigrants was led to call a slightly younger generation of
immigrant descendants, from the same working-class neighborhoods as him but
with African parents, “foreigners.” He appeared to be operating on an ideological
premise according to which European immigrant-descendants could become
“locals,” but non-European immigrant-descendants would remain culturally
foreign. Although due to the fleeting nature of my relationship with the driver I
cannot estimate what exactly motivated his use of the label “foreigner” for
people born locally, perhaps he, like other actors in French immigration debates
throughout the 20th century who gestured to skin color as a reason for certain
immigrants’ inassimilability (Camiscioli, 2009), was also moved by a perception
of youth’s phenotypic diﬀerences from Europeans to interpret them thus.
Perhaps this axis of diﬀerence, combined with a soupçon of linguistic diﬀerence,
prevented the driver from hearing in such youth’s French the hallmarks of the
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very Marseillais accent in which he was addressing me (c.f., Chapter Three).
This driver oﬀers an illustrative example of what Roxy Harris (2006) has
discussed as the need to “think with the ears rather than think with the
eyes” (p. 11). Harris recommends that sociolinguists, interestingly, avoid
making superficial, ethnicity-focused judgements of diasporic Europeans’
identities by listening to them more carefully.22 It would appear that this kind of
attentiveness could also benefit members of the European public more generally,
though how realistic it is to divorce the acts of seeing and hearing one’s
interlocutors from one another remains an open question. In this case at least,
the cabbie’s assignment of such youth to the category of “foreigners” likely
proceeded from his perception that they diﬀered from him on multiple
dimensions, some of which he had ideologized as irreconcilably distinct.

III. In the Teachers’ Lounge with Charlotte: The “Wesh Wesh” Local
Vernacular
Each week on Wednesdays, Charlotte and I enjoyed a mid-morning free
period together before classes resumed, English classes for her and Modern
Harris (2006) says that whereas a visual approach might lead the English to perceive such
youth as Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis (or alternatively, Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims),
paying attention to their speech enables their reassessment as British or even London-born.
Based on his own work with diasporic youth from West London, he concluded, for example, that
they embody “an everyday low-key Britishness, albeit a Britishness with new inflections” (2006,
p. 1).
22
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Standard Arabic classes for me. We would sit in the teachers’ lounge, chatting
and drinking espressos from the coin-operated machine. Through the lounge
window, we could see the main thoroughfare separating the public secondary
school from La Castellane Project across the street. Visible, too, beyond the six
towers of La Castellane, was the northern sweep of Marseille’s industrial bay.
Charlotte, a woman in her thirties raised by Parisians in southwestern France,
had been teaching English at this public school for six years. The Ministry of
National Education had placed her in this “educational priority area” (zone
d’éducation prioritaire) based on a point system of teacher seniority. Teachers with
relatively few years of teaching under their belts headed to schools in
challenging neighborhoods, like this one. The school in eﬀect catered to two
projects: La Castellane, with around 7,000 residents, and, right above the
school, La Bricarde, with around 2,000 residents. These projects provided
government-subsidized housing to working-class, primarily immigrant families,
a disproportionate number of whom, more than 50%, were living below the
poverty line (Césari, Moreau, & Schleyer-Lindenmann, 2001).
Charlotte taught English to the same class of students, Class 3B, that I
observed in their Modern Standard Arabic and French classes. One morning, I
conducted an interview with her in order to learn more about her perspective, as
one of these students’ teachers, on why these youth spoke the Arabic-accented
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French remarked upon by the taxi driver in the first anecdote. Charlotte’s initial
point was to distinguish between two local types of speech: first, Marseille’s
historical vernacular, which she called le parler marseillais; and second, the type of
French her students speak, which she termed le parler local, or the vernacular
local to Northern Marseille’s projects. Charlotte explained that she always made
a point of correcting the students’ local kind of French, so much so, in fact, that
the students wondered “if that lady is a French or an English teacher.” Charlotte
clarified, furthermore, that whereas Marseille’s historical vernacular could be
recognized by any northerner as autochthonous to Marseille, her students’
vernacular was so circumscribed as to be unrecognizable anywhere outside of
the projects. She reminded her students of this fact by feigning
misunderstanding when they would use their vernacular in class. The Castellanois
fashion of pronouncing the Standard French adverb après (‘after,’ [ɑpʁε]) was to
drop the “p” and add a geminated rasping “x” sound, yielding akhé ([ɑχχε]).
Charlotte would play on the quasi-homonymic word for bus stop in Standard
French, arrêt ([ɑʁε]), quizzing the students thus: “Stop? Which stop, the bus
stop?” (“Akhé [ɑχχε], quel arrêt [ɑʁε], l’arrêt [lɑʁε] de bus?” ). She reported
coaching students to pronounce the letter ‘p:’ “p-p-p, a-près!” and reminding
them that this “thing is not in fact the real language.”
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Although Charlotte routinely modeled Standard French pronunciation for
her students, this routine did not seem to derive from a view of them as secondgeneration “semi-linguals” deficient in French (Bloomfield, 1927;
Christopherson, 1948). Charlotte recognized, for instance, that which heritage
language, if any, her students heard at home (e.g., Algerian, Tunisian, Moroccan,
Comorian, Wolof, Turkish, Romani) had little bearing on how they spoke French
amongst themselves. She reflected that “the kids can, uh, just as likely be a
Gipsy as a Kurd as a Comorian and yet not pronounce the ‘p’.” Rather, Charlotte
recognized youth’s stylistic use of the parler local and corrected instances of akhé
on the conviction that such linguistic trappings would not serve them well in
the future. Charlotte’s insight into youth’s speech as a vernacular in its own
right contrasts sharply with how the cab driver in the last section designated
diasporic youth’s speech as a learner variety of French. Her reflections resonate,
in fact, with decades of sociolinguistic research asserting that children or
grandchildren of people who migrate to new countries come to speak, not
learner varieties of those countries’ majority languages, but vernaculars capable
of expressing certain identities (Bills, 1977; Fought, 1997; Hinskens, 2011;
Kotsinas, 1988). Charlotte’s description of the project vernacular with the label
parler is also telling in this regard, intimating an awareness that devices like akhé
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hang together with several other elements in a coherent speech style shared by
youth of varying backgrounds.
Charlotte went on to delineate the demographic scope and speech
ideologies that made her students’ vernacular unique. “We say akhé. We’re from
the Northern Projects,” she imitated. According to Charlotte, the parler local was
traceable to the northern projects, spanning the youth of all diﬀerent familial
backgrounds who lived there. Marseille’s traditional vernacular (le parler
marseillais), by contrast, was typically considered the purview of white, workingclass folks who live near l’Estaque or Marseille’s Vieux Port (c.f., Binisti &
Gasquet-Cyrus, 2003). As for the social meaning of her students’ parler,
Charlotte summed up that “it’s all about holding onto a form of social status.”
In Transcript 2.2, Charlotte sheds light on what she means, exactly, when she
says that “holding onto a social status” motivates her students to speak as they
do.
Transcript 2.2.23 The Wesh Wesh Vernacular
French Original

English Translation

Charlotte: Ils aiment bien parler ce que j'appelle
le wesh wesh, donc “We::sh, je m’en bats [əmbɑ:]
les couilles, ma main [mã] sur [syχ] le Coran
[ko:χə̃].” Donc du coup je les imite si je les croise.
Je fais “Ouais, j’habite dans le 1-3. Je mets la
casquette à l’envers." Ils parlent un peu comme ça
aussi-

Charlotte: They like to speak what I call
the wesh wesh, so “We::sh, I don’t give a
fuck, my hand on the Koran.” So I just
imitate them if we cross paths. I say “Yeah,
I live in the 1-3. I wear my hat backwards.”
They talk kind of like that too-

23

This interview dates from 6.10.13.
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Cécile: -MmmCharlotte: -Pour faire style justement “je suis du
93 à Paris,” mais bon, ils n'ont pas l'accent d'un
ban-d'un banlieusard parisien
Cécile: Pas du tout c'est très diﬀérentCharlotte: Non pas du tout MAIS ils aiment bien
quand même faire un peu "wesh wesh.” “Wesh wesh
la famille.”
Cécile: Mmm, et pour toi ça te rappelle un peu
les banlieues parisiennes-c'est ça, un peu leursCharlotte: -Ben PLUS euh, oui, fin le kaid de
banlieue parisienne. Voilà, on veut ressembler au
kaid de banlieue.
Cécile: Mhm, tu connais un peu ce milieu la à
part la télé?
Charlotte: Bah à part-non…. J’ai pas la télé… euh
((laughs))
Cécile: C’est bien ça. ((P laughs)
Charlotte: Le rap, euh, voilà, puis de se balader à
Paris dans le RER et tout. Ça, ils accèdent au
centre de Paris. Et puis, euh, j'avais des cousins
aussi qui habitaient en banlieue parisienne. Doncc'est plus après, en eﬀet, par les medias quoi, la
radio, le cinema… toutes formes de medias.

Cécile: -MmmCharlotte: -Just to put on the style of “I’m
from the 93 in Paris,” except that, well,
they don’t have the accent of a ban-of
someone who lives in the Parisian banlieue
Cécile: Not at all it’s very diﬀerent
Charlotte: No not at all BUT they like
putting on their wesh wesh anyway. “Wesh
wesh your family.”
Cécile: Mmm, and it reminds you a bit of
the Parisian banlieues-that’s kind of theirCharlotte: -Well MORE uh well the kaid
from the Parisian banlieue, yeah they want
to act like the Qaid from the banlieue
Cécile: Mhm, do you know that milieu a
bit, apart from the T.V.?
Charlotte: well apart-no… I don’t have a
T.V. uh ((laughs))
Cécile: That’s nice. ((P laughs)
Charlotte: Rap, uh, yeah, plus walking
around Paris, in the RER and all. They
serve central Paris. And, uh, I had cousins
too who lived in the Parisian banlieue. So
it’s more through the media actually, the
radio and the movies… all forms of media,
it turns out.

This transcript is edifying insofar as it reveals that Charlotte, despite
teaching students from La Castellane and La Bricarde projects on a daily basis,
lacks in familiarity with the precise modalities and social meanings of their
vernacular. She introduces yet another label for their speech, “le wesh wesh.” A
reduplication of the Algerian interrogative word for ‘what,’ wesh [wɛʃ] served the
students of Class 3B as a way of saying “what’s up?” Charlotte likewise attempts
to phonetically imitate her students’ wesh wesh speech, rasping the “r” ([χ]) in
the words sur [syχ] and Coran [ˈko:‧χə̃] and speaking with a rap-like meter.
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However, she employs neither the word-final schwa, nor the open-mid,
unrounded back vowel /ɔ/, nor the velar nasal /ŋ/, features that students in
Class 3B would surely have stamped on words like couilles, which she renders as
[kuj:], Coran, which she pronounces in Standard French, without the velar nasal
[ˈko:‧χə̃], and habite, on which she omits the word-final schwa [ɑbit]. The only
features of her imitation that hark back to youth at the secondary school would
be wesh and the devoicing of French ‘r,’ and even these phenomena have been
described for French youth vernaculars in banlieues elsewhere (c.f., Doran, 2007
for Parisian examples of Algerian wesh; Billiez, 1992 for examples of voiceless “r”
in Grenoble).24 Similarly, her use of the back ‘a’ [ɑ] (e.g., embats [əmbɑ:]) recalls
Jamin’s (2007) description of the same feature among youth in the Parisian
banlieues of La Courneuve and Fontenay-sous-Bois, but not her own students’
speech per se. Further, the rising-to-falling pitch contour Charlotte gives to the
penultimate and ultimate syllables of the intonation phrase Coran [ˈko:‧χə̃] and
famille [ˈfɑ‧mij] parallels the tonal pattern observed among Parisian youth from
La Courneuve by Fagyal (2005). Last but not least, Charlotte mentions the 13th
arrondissement as the neighborhood to which her students pledge allegiance
(“Yeah, I live in the 1-3. I wear my hat backwards”), though both La Castellane
In the French popular media, wesh is also stereotypically associated with how youth greet one
another in the Parisian banlieues. The expression came to greater notoriety in the 2001 film
“Wesh wesh qu’est-ce qui se passe?,” which was set in the 93rd department, northeast of Paris in
the Île-de-France region.
24
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and La Bricarde Projects are located in the 16th arrondissement. Charlotte’s
rendition, as such, does not only fail to pinpoint youth from Northern Marseille
in any unmistakable way; it channels youth from the Parisian banlieues.
The larger point to be taken from these observations is that Charlotte,
despite her more enlightened perspective on her students’ strategic use of a
youth vernacular, nevertheless perceives few diﬀerences, in repertoire or in
social function, between the youth vernaculars of La Castellane and La Bricarde
projects, of other projects elsewhere in Marseille, or, indeed, of the Parisian
banlieues. Her imitations and understanding of the function of her students’
vernacular appear to be inspired, less by careful observation of their practices,
than by an idea of dynamics in the Parisian banlieues, gleaned perhaps from travel
or media exposure. She suggests, for instance, that just as youth from the
Parisian banlieues wish to act out “the kaid,” so, too, do her students locally
aspire to emulate this trouble-maker type when they speak in their parler local.
Charlotte’s underlying assumption is that youth who live in socioeconomically
disadvantaged neighborhoods, regardless of their location in France, engage in
parallel forms of linguistic deviance in order to strategically perform the same
kind of social deviance. Hence, whereas the taxi driver in the previous anecdote
put youth’s linguistic departures down to their cultural diﬀerence or
foreignness, in this section Charlotte constructs an account of diasporic youth
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from Marseille as using their speech and behavior to expressly reinforce their
social marginality. As will become clear in Chapter Three, the students in Class
3B performed their in-group speech register (Agha, 2007a) in line with an
identity and aspirations that bore little resemblance to Charlotte’s account of
their parler local’s significance. Thus, although Charlotte frequented these youth
on a daily basis, her comments attest to the degree of social and cultural
unfamiliarity, or distance, that she continued to maintain vis-à-vis their desires
and cultural aﬃliations.

IV. Coﬀee with Two Administrators at a Private Muslim School: “Animal
Sounds”
No recess break eluded Fawzi, the recess monitor, as an opportunity for
some good-natured teasing. Popping his head into the makeshift teachers’ shed
from the yard, he found me making photocopies of a handout for my upcoming
English class. “Un caccuppino?,” he oﬀered with a grin. I shook my head no but,
before I could even begin to laugh at his word games, he was already back in the
yard with the kids. The school where Fawzi and I worked is a private Muslim
secondary school serving children ages 11 to 17. Nestled in Northern Marseille’s
15th arrondissement, about a twenty-minute bus ride from the public school where
Charlotte teaches, this school serves a more orthodox community of Sunni
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Muslims. When the director and his wife, Anwar and Hanan, founded the school
and its adjoining mosque, they envisioned a school that would not only teach
religion, Modern Standard Arabic, and Islamic history classes alongside the
French national curriculum, but one that would remain financially accessible to
the neighborhoods it serves. Parents pay one-hundred and fifty Euros a month
to have their child attend this private school, rather than other public schools in
Northern Marseille for free. For many of these parents, who made a living
working blue collar or retail jobs, or were unemployed, and often depended on
government-subsidized project housing, paying this monthly sum nevertheless
remained a hardship.
After teaching my English class, I wended my way to the central
administrative oﬃce of the school. The corner-view sécretariat oﬃce was a
magnet of sorts for teachers and administrators alike throughout the day, both
because Lamia, the head secretary, was responsible for pacing the school day,
and because, unlike other rooms in the still partially built school, the sécretariat
had consistent heat. Instead of Lamia though, I found Fawzi in the oﬃce with
Yaman, the assistant director, chatting and enjoying cappuccinos.25

Fawzi was 23 years old at this time and Yaman was in his early thirties. Fawzi was born in
Marseille to Kabyle parents from Algeria, while Yaman was born in Morocco but came to
Marseille at a young age.
25
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Both were well familiarized with my research questions, and neither
missed a beat when I wondered aloud why the kids at this school, who are
almost exclusively born in Marseille to parents hailing from North, West, and
East African Muslim countries, spoke so diﬀerently from the same-aged kids
with similar cultural and socio-economic backgrounds that I observed at the
public secondary school no more than a couple kilometers away in La
Castellane. “Isn’t it simply that they don’t frequent the street as much?,”
tendered Yaman. Fawzi agreed with Yaman straightaway. Raising his volume and
lowering his pitch in a clear imitation, Fawzi added that the “no one scares
me”—je crains dégun [ʒə kχəŋ dεgœŋ]—way of speaking can really be acquired
simply by hanging out with the wrong crowd. He went on to tell us how he and
his twin brother received diﬀerent “educations.” Whereas Fawzi attended a
small sleep-away high school one-hundred kilometers from Marseille, during the
same period his brother began living in the northern project of La Busserine and
“stayed in the street hanging around (à trainer) with some guys (gars).” Fawzi
recounted how his brother became someone light years away from him in terms
of speech and behavior. As his brother’s friends and activities diverged, he
“spoke more...he had more of, well, an accent, because he would insist on some
words and accents but not on others.” He began using expressions Fawzi did not
understand, such as tu duhes [dəħ], ‘you’re pissing me oﬀ,’ and khéner dégun [χεnε
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dεgœŋ], to ‘not be bothering anyone.’ “It’s all Comorian to me!,” exclaimed
Fawzi as Yaman looked on, bemused.
I recognized the expressions Fawzi imputed to his twin immediately, if only
because the students I observed in Class 3B over at the public school used them
as well. Such expressions, which in fact constituted Arabic-sounding
neologisms, with Arabic phonemes like /ħ/ and /χ/, were part of the youth
vernacular that Charlotte, and also Yaman and Fawzi here, identified as
characterizing the social persona of the youth from Marseille’s projects. Though
many of the students who attended this private Muslim school lived in housing
projects as well, Fawzi and Yaman drew distinctions in the way their students
were being educated at the school. They were being taught to emulate the
Prophet Mohamed in demeanor as well as speech. And, added Fawzi, “if, short
of going all the way back to the Prophet, the students want to resemble
someone, they already have a strong example in the Director. Not only does he
hold a doctorate in mathematics, he is a director, an imam, almost a statesman!”
In the following transcript, Yaman and Fawzi elaborate further on how an
Islamic education comports with “correct” speech, whereas a street education
connotes coarseness and is indexed by the raucous speech style of the projects.
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Transcript 2.3.26 Teaching French, but What Kind of French?
French Original

English Translation

Cécile: C’est quoi un peu la philosophie du collège
par rapport à l'enseignement du français? Vous
voulez leur enseigner un français de Paris, un
français de Marseille, un français comment?
Yaman: Euh
Cécile: Un français international, un français quoi?
Yaman: Qu’ils s'expriment correctement et qu'ils
savent surtout écrire correctement, donc euh…
Cécile: Mmm… après, les accents, euh, de quartiers
tout ça, vous…Yaman: -Ah non, les accents de quartiers c'est
même pas un français. C’est-c'est, c’est, une
révolte le le milieu du quartier -

Cécile: What is kind of the school’s philosophy
with regards to how French is taught? Do you
want to teach them a Pari:sian French or one from
Marseille, what kind of French?
Yaman: Euh
Cécile: An international French, a what kind of
French?
Yaman: That they express themselves correctly
and that they know how to write correctly in
particular, so uhm…
Cécile: Mmm… and as for the accents, uh, from
the quartiers and all youYaman: -Oh no, accents from the quartiers are not
even a type of French. It’s it’s it’s revolting the
quartier milieu -

Fawzi: c'est une horreur
Yaman: -Ce n'est du français. C’est des, des, des,
cris animaliers!!!
Fawzi: Voilà! ((Yaman laughing)) Wesh!
Yaman: Akha [ɑχɑ], wakha [wɑχɑ]

Fawzi:

It’s a horror

Yaman: -It’s not French. It’s, it’s, it’s animal
sounds!!!
Fawzi: Yes! ((Yaman laughing)) Wesh!
Yaman: Akha [ɑχɑ], wakha [wɑχɑ]

Fawzi: Akha [ɑχɑ], akha [ɑχɑ]
Yaman: Je te jure, des fois, si j'entends les élèves
d'en face s-s’invectiver, mais je… mais on se croirait Fawzi: Akha [ɑχɑ], akha
dans un zoo! Je te jure…
Yaman: I swear, sometimes when I hear the
Fawzi: C’est comme akha [ɑχɑ]. Je regardais
students across the street a-assailing one another
well I… well you would think we were in a zoo! I
un documentaire
swear it…
Yaman: Ah oui?
Fawzi: It’s like with akha. I was watching a
Fawzi: Je regardais un documentaire, eh, TF1 ladocumentary
dessus. Le Black, comment il s’appelle?
Yaman:

Roselmack

Cécile: Ah

Yaman: Oh really?
Fawzi: I was watching a documentary, eh, TF1 on
that the black guy. What is his name?
Yaman: Roselmack
Cécile: Ah

All of the speech that I cite in this anecdotal section is drawn verbatim from a long interview I
held in the main oﬃce on December 13th, 2012.
26
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Fawzi: Roselmack commence à faire un reportage
oû bien súr il dénigre les musulmans ((sniggering))
et les, euh, les jeunes maghrébins, et il dit “dès
qu'on arrive on entend ce qu’on appelle ‘les
guetteurs.’ Leur rôle? La surveillance.” Et dès qu'ils
voyaient quelqu’un de suspect ils crient "akha kha
kha" [ɑχɑ χɑ χɑ]((sounds like a crow cawing)) et là
ils disent-il dit “‘a-kha,’ ce qui veut dire ‘attention’
en arabe.”((Yaman sniggers)) Alors Leila elle dit
“ah bon,” et elle me fait “moi non plus j'étais au
courant”((Cécile and Fawzi laugh))
Cécile: Ça veut dire quoi akha en fait?
Fawzi: Ça-ça veut rien dire akha
Cécile: Mmm

Fawzi: Roselmack starts doing a report in which
of course he denigrates Muslims ((sniggering))
and the, euh, young Maghrebis, and he says “as
soon as one arrives one hears what one might call
‘the watchdogs.’ Their role? Surveillance. And as
soon as they see a suspicious person they yell ‘akha
kha kha’ [ɑχɑ χɑ χɑ]((sounds like a crow cawing))”
and then they say-he says “‘a-kha’ this means ‘be
careful’ in Arabic” ((Yaman sniggers)). Then Leila
says “really?” and adds “I didn’t get the memo on
that one” ((Cécile and Fawzi laugh))
Cécile: What does akha mean really?
Fawzi: It-akha, it means nothing
Cécile: Mmm

Earlier on, Fawzi had explained how the “words and accents” being used by
his brother during his transformation into a “project guy” were as foreign to
him as the Comorian language, an oft-heard language in Marseille due to the
sizable Comorian immigrant population. In Transcript 2.3, he goes on to mock
how Harry Roselmack, the TF1 television anchor renowned for being the first
black man on the French nightly news, reported on a project in Northern
Marseille. Fawzi takes on a journalistic, disembodied kind of diction and syntax:
“one hears what one might call ‘the watchdogs’” (on entend ce qu'on appelle ‘les
guetteurs’). The punchline comes, of course, when Fawzi imitates Roselmack’s
dictionary-like definition of akha [ɑχɑ] as a word that “means ‘be careful’ in
Arabic.” Although akha is indeed a vocative that certain youth from Northern
Marseille rely on to draw attention or exclaim at some occurrence, and it does
display the Arabic phoneme /χ/, Yaman and Fawzi and his fiancée are well aware
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that it represents a neologism created in Marseille’s projects. Fawzi, for instance,
imitates his fiancée’s sarcasm (e.g., “Really? I didn’t get the memo on that one”)
at the idea that lexemes from Marseille’s project vernacular could in any way be
associated to “Arabic,” dialectal or standard. Although the school staﬀ members’
dismissal of Roselmack is worth a laugh, the most intriguing detail in this
transcript is their stance on the youth vernacular spoken by kids from
Marseille’s projects. Earlier in the transcript, Yaman laid out his disgust at the
“accents from the quartiers,” stating that these “revolting” accents more closely
resemble “animal sounds” than the French language. He relays his impression of
being “in a zoo” when he hears the students from the nearby public school
talking in the street. In the course of this conversation, as such, Yaman and
Fawzi eﬀectively renounce the project vernacular’s ties with “Arabic” of any sort,
or with French.
In Chapter Five, in which I focus on youth who practice an orthodox form
of Islam in Marseille, like Fawzi and Yaman and the students at their school, I
elaborate further on how the ideologies such individuals hold about what
qualifies as “good” or “real” language are closely tied to the orthodox
community’s self-imagery of themselves as being sophisticated, global-minded
Muslims who happen to live in Marseille. Not unlike Charlotte, who flouted
youth’s parler local for being too insular, orthodox-identified Muslims in
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Marseille perceived all non-standard accents in Marseille, including Marseille’s
historical vernacular and youth’s project speech, as undesirable insofar as they
were illegible at the French national level and internationally. Another point of
comparison between Fawzi and Yaman’ remarks and those of Charlotte and the
taxi driver is that, while all similarly cast out the project register associated with
youth from Marseille’s projects, only the ethnically French people read
foreignness, or Maghrebi connotations, into the project way of speaking. At the
private Muslim school, meanwhile, the diasporic people who worked there
interpreted the project vernacular as an exaggeratedly Marseillais, or Marseillespecific, form of speech. This became apparent when one of Fawzi and Yaman’
colleagues, an accountant named Halima, joined the previous conversation. She
specifically described the project way of speaking as “the super-pronounced
Marseillais accent” (l’accent Marseillais super-prononcé). This depiction is in fact
quite accurate, leading to the conclusion that individuals who are situated close
to, or who share in, the experience of living in Marseille’s projects may also be
more capable of detecting important sociophonetic information conveyed in
people’s speech. Another complementary interpretation is that diasporic people
of color, even if they belong to a distinct social sub-group, such as the orthodox
Muslim community in Marseille, do not draw conclusions about other diasporic
individuals’ identities based primarily on their visual appearance. The same may
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not be true for white people in Marseille, whose aural perceptions seem to be
tinted by their interlocutors’ appearances. A conspicuous instance of this
dynamic was that of the cab driver, who esteemed that youth from Northern
Marseille whose speech connoted the Maghreb were “foreigners” parallel to
Mexicans recently arrived in Texas.

V.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has dealt with how individuals in Marseille who are situated
at various degrees of social remove from, or proximity to, the city’s northerly
housing projects apprehended youth who live there. Through three examples,
one of a taxi driver who was largely unfamiliar with youth from Muslim
households in the projects, a second with a teacher who instructed youth from
two projects on a daily basis, and a third involving the young diasporic Muslim
staﬀ at a denominational school, I showed the way in which perceptions of
project youth’s foreignness or wayward aspirations relied, less on these youth’s
actual manifestations of any cultural belonging or lack thereof, than on the
ideologies and experiences of the person doing the perceiving. My suggestion, as
such, is that diasporic individuals are more likely than other French people to
experience disjuncture while maneuvering in French society. Despite a diasporic
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person’s move to emically declare him or herself a cultural member of Marseille,
evincing what I term cultural belonging, others may nevertheless not recognize
him or her as such, eﬀectively denying them the right of cultural citizenship.
Chapters Three, Four, and Five, in particular, revolve around the forms of
cultural belonging that myriad groups of diasporic youth from Marseille exhibit.
In addition to airing this contradiction between cultural belonging and
citizenship a bit further, this chapter has also insinuated the existence of microdiﬀerentiations taking place within the broader minority group of diasporic
youth in Marseille. An interesting question in this regard is whether highly
practicing Muslims like Fawzi or Yaman confer cultural citizenship upon other
diasporic youth who embody what they called “street” education, and whether,
likewise, Charlotte’s students in Class 3B would see Frenchness in the cultural
attachments of orthodox students from Yaman and Fawzi’s school. Certainly,
Halima the accountant’s understanding of project youth as speaking in a
profoundly Marseillais way would portend a positive answer. What, though, of
Yaman’ disparaging portrayal of project speech as non-French animal sounds? In
what way does this portrayal diﬀer from the racist way individuals in French
history have painted immigrant populations? One might think, here, of
Naudeau’s (1929) comments, for instance, when he visited immigrant
residences north of the Canebière and said that “Marseillais slums (taudis
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marseillais)...reduce humankind to the level of animality” (p. 198). A seamstress
I once visited in Marseille provided another more contemporary example of this
kind of metaphor. A pieds-noir who relocated to Marseille from Algiers after the
War, she spoke to me, without the slightest whiﬀ of shame, about the immigrant
“fauna” (la faune) with their dishonest ways who plagued her existence in
Marseille. Although Yaman compared the speech of impious project youth to
animal sounds, his motive was by no means a racist one, however.
Rather, for youth and adults who practiced orthodox Islam in Marseille, a
key part of projecting an image of themselves as pious, ethical sophisticates was
to formulate others, by contrast, as wholly unlike them. Merton (1968[1949])
discusses this practice of managing one’s self-image in relation to others in
terms of “reference groups,” or when “people take the standards of significant
others as a basis for self-appraisal and evaluation” (p. 40). Practicing Muslims in
this context, as such, saw fit to juxtapose themselves besides less pious
diasporic individuals precisely because they viewed them as comparable
(“significant”) to them; as people who, in other words, warranted placement in
their social landscape. In terms drawn from linguist Trubetzkoy’s (1969) theory
of phonological features, these diasporic subcultures coexisted, not in a privative
relation to one another, but in one of equipollent opposition. In this analogy,
communities of diasporic youth in Marseille enjoyed their own range of “plus”
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values, even if such values were formulated using one another as comparative
anchors.
Of further note is that, their inner distinctions not withstanding, diasporic
youth groups in Marseille faced the same kinds of diﬃculties with the
mainstream granting them cultural citizenship. As presented in Chapter Five,
for instance, the French mainstream in Marseille tended to view youth who
practiced orthodox Islam as especially diﬀerent from them, culturally speaking.
Visual indicators such as religious clothing and skin color prevailed in the
calculations that French-origin individuals made of pious youth’s cultural
aﬃliations, and they were more often seen as foreign than diasporic youth who
did not assiduously practice Islam. Ironically, the mainstream’s dependency on
visual indicators eﬀectively prevented this pious community’s recognition as a
model of the very kind of assimilation French politicians crave (Haut Conseil à
l’Immigration, 2000), that of a “French Islam” (Bassam, 1992; Ramadan, 1999).
Pious individuals like Fawzi and Yaman, as such, represent an ill-starred foil to
the experience of Asian Americans and other so-called “model minorities” in the
United States (Stacey, 1996). Since the 1960s, Asian Americans have been
constructed by mainstream America as a model minority. When accusations of
racism and communist paranoia were running high during the Cold War and
Civil Rights years, for instance, mainstream Americans appeased these charges
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in part by holding up Asian Americans as a case of successful integration into
American society, a “model minority” (Reyes, 2004). In the case of pious
diasporans in Marseille, in contrast, these individuals in eﬀect constructed
themselves as exceptional citizens and yet the mainstream did not acknowledge
them as such. More will be revealed about diﬀering diasporic youth’s
constructions of self and aspirations in the following chapters.
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III. The Projects: Linguistic Antics
of Class and Ethnicity in the
Mediterranean Borderlands
I.

Introduction: Residents of the Borderlands
"Nosotros los Chicanos straddle the borderlands. On one side of us, we are
constantly exposed to the Spanish of the Mexicans, on the other side we
hear the Anglos' incessant clamoring so that we forget our language. Among
ourselves we don't say nosotros los americanos, o nosotros los españoles, o nosotros
los hispanos. We say nosotros los mexicanos (by mexicanos we do not mean
citizens of Mexico; we do not mean a national identity, but a racial one). We
distinguish between mexicanos del otro lado and mexicanos de este lado. Deep in
our hearts we believe being Mexican has nothing to do with which country
one lives in. Being Mexican is a state of soul—not one of mind, not one of
citizenship. Neither eagle nor serpent, but both. And like the ocean, neither
animal respects borders." (Anzaldúa, 1999[1987], p. 84).

This chapter investigates the stories told by youth from La Castellane
housing project about where they were coming from and where they were
headed. Through their telling of tales about themselves and their parents, but
also about Marseille’s projects and their parents’ home countries (or bleds), it
becomes clear that these youth considered themselves French enough to diﬀer
in crucial ways from someone born in the bled (a blédard/e) but, simultaneously,
similar in suﬃcient respects to their blédard parents to be immediately
distinguishable from a French person lacking that ethnic and linguistic heritage.
In the spirit of Anzaldúa's reflections above, youth were neither Marseillais in
the mainstream sense, nor people born in the bled, but somehow both. To wit,
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between the poles of the Marseillais and bled identities, youth discerned another
identity for themselves. They described themselves as cultural products of
Marseille’s quartiers, or Marseille’s neighborhoods that revolve around housing
projects, an identity here argued to exemplify the concept of the borderlands
(Anzaldúa, 1999[1987]). This chapter illustrates the enregisterment (Agha,
2005), or historical elaboration, of the way of speaking youth call Castellanois,
alongside other kinds of conduct, as emblematic of this quartiers identity.
Through a detailed analysis of how youth communicated with one another in
their peer groups, I also tease out diﬀerences between Castellanois and two other
“enregistered voices” (Agha, 2005, p. 39) that youth invoked in their
interactions, both of which are further detailed in Chapter Four. Across this
chapter and the next, both of which look at youth from Class 3B in the 16th
arrondissement, I argue that youth in fact made recourse to three phonolexical
registers: Castellanois, which indexed youth’s own identity; clando, via which
youth performed their parents’ generation; and paillot, how they enacted
ethnically French people in Marseille. These three enregistered voices served
youth as resources for enacting proximity or distance to certain social positions,
and also for taking stances on issues involving race, class, religion, and matters
of comparative national development.
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This chapter likewise explores what it means to say that borderland
identities and languages are syncretic, a case of neither, nor, but both. My use of
the term syncretism to describe the identity and way of speaking characteristic
of youth from Marseille’s Castellane Project, in particular, opens up an analytic
space within which to regard their practices as actions that explicitly positioned
them in relation to other people and places. How youth behaved, in other words,
did not reveal them to be the uneasy bearers of hybrid, fragmented identities;
nor did these diasporic youth seem to inhabit a "third space" (Bhabha, 1990)
wholly diﬀerent from France and their parents’ home countries. Rather, young
people from La Castellane are shown to lean on a variety of communicative
resources, including linguistic “interferences” (Haugen, 1956) between French
and Arabic varieties, accent stylizations (Rampton, 1995, 1999), music, clothing,
and bodily hexis, to relate to past generations and class and race configurations
in Marseille and, hence, position themselves within the French post-colonial
legacy.
The remainder of the chapter is split into two sections. Section II reviews
a handful of labels that anthropologists and other social scientists have leaned
on to capture the supposed neither-here-nor-there-ness of youth like those who
appear in this chapter, including second-generation, hybrid, mobile, and
transnational. A summary of these critiques paves the way for my argument, in
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Section III, that youth from La Castellane Project can more precisely be
considered what Martínez and Sayer (1994) have called border people—or
diasporic locals, in my own idiom. Section III proceeds through a first subsection in which I introduce life in the 16th arrondissements’ projects and the
quartiers identity claimed by a particular classroom of students in a local school,
and then a second sub-section where I detail the forms of linguistic syncretism
these youth called Castellanois. Overall, this chapter adds to understandings of
post-colonial subjectivities the insight that the communicative forms of play in
which such youth engage double as implicit claims to their own French but
diasporic and working-class ethnic identity.

II.

Labels for Diasporic Youth: Critiques and New Directions

A forceful critique of the “second-generation” label comes to
anthropology from Rumbaut (1976; 2004), a sociologist who operationalized the
idea that important diﬀerences exist intra-generationally. In a 1976 study, for
instance, Rumbaut pointed out how the Cuban generation “1.5,” who arrived in
the United States from Cuba in the 1960s and came of age there, was influenced
by the concept of exile in a way the Cuban second-generation was not. Rumbaut
(2004) further refined his “decimal” typology (e.g., generation 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75,
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2, 2.5), meant to capture these diﬀerences in educational, linguistic, and
occupational outcomes between generational cohorts, with the understanding
that outcomes could also be guided by the personal circumstances of a particular
cohort. Thus, in a study of refugee youth from Southeast Asia who moved as
adolescents to San Diego, Rumbaut and Ima (1998) found that youth’s adaptive
resources varied along with their national origins, reasons for relocating, and
contexts of reception.
Rumbaut’s (2004) insights into acculturation have been further nuanced
by anthropological scholarship, especially with respect to how diasporic youth
form their ethnic identities. Lo and Reyes (2004), for instance, do not approach
terms like first and second generation as a priori categories. Rather, their
analyses burrow into the “indexically emergent” (p. 119) lives of such
categories. In order to better grasp why “particular categories become relevant in
the moment of speaking” (Lo & Reyes, 2004, p. 119), the authors are attentive
to local discourses about ethnicity and their circulation. Emic ethnic categories
have been illuminated by Kang and Lo (2004) and Rosa (2010), in two pieces
that address how youth use such labels to position themselves and others in
interaction. In Kang and Lo’s (2004) study with Korean-American youth in Los
Angeles, for example, local ethnonyms like “Korean Korean” or “Koreanwashed” stepped in to replace more etic categories based on generation. Rosa
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(2010), too, shows that youth apply local ethnic labels in ways that frustrate
generational categorizing. He describes the context of a school in Chicago
marked by ethnic solidarity between youth of varying Mexican and Puerto Rican
heritages. There, children with one Mexican and one Puerto Rican parent, who
in other settings might have identified as the “MexiRican” or “PortoMex”
members of generation 1.5, instead pronounce themselves “Latino.”
These examples stipulate that diasporic contexts call for a sharper
analytical lens than generational cohorts or ethnicity, if thought of as a
preformed essence that inheres in people. In a move away from such categories,
Mandel (2008) chooses to speak of “processes of ethnicization” (p. 2) in her
research with Germans of Turkish origin in Berlin. She interrupts Germans’
representation of diasporic Germans as monolithic “Turks” by documenting how
diasporic Germans reappropriate Turkishness and identify in complex
combinations of the following dimensions: “rural, urban; elites, working-class;
Sunnis, Alevis; Turks, Kurds; Islamist, secular; or naturalized Germans, Turkish
nationals” (p. 2). Mandel (2008) hence uncovers a gap between etic views of
ethnicity and the more emic, processual understandings explained by diasporic
individuals.
The latter concept of ethnicity is a close cousin to what Stuart Hall
designated under "new ethnicities" in 1992. Below, he urges a new usage of
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“ethnicity,” one reflecting the historical specificity—and discursive basis—of
ethnic identities:
“If the black subject and black experience are not stabilized by Nature or by some other
essential guarantee, then it must be the case that they are constructed historically,
culturally, politically - and the concept which refers to this is 'ethnicity.' The term
ethnicity acknowledges the place of history, language, and culture in the construction of
subjectivity and identity, as well as the fact that all discourse is placed, positioned,
situated, and all knowledge is contextual. Representation is possible only because
enunciation is always produced within codes which have a history, a position within the
discursive formations of a particular space and time” (1992, p. 226)
The construction of ethnicity, understood in this broad sense of the cultural
attachments developed by a person in a specific time and place, turns out to be
the elemental activity underway in the discursive exchanges between youth
studied in the remainder of the chapter. Specifically, the transcripts reveal the
ethnic categories invoked by youth from La Castellane project to be only loosely
tied to the generational cohorts to which they technically belong or to the ethnic
categories to which they might etically be ascribed (e.g., West African,
Maghrebi). Rather, it is youth’s living circumstances, mainly, their
neighborhood, friends, and school, that play a key role in the ethnic stances they
develop, with ethnicity understood in the processual and overarching way
outlined above.
If labels like second-generation or etic ethnic terms no longer qualify as
descriptive, given the historical contingency of how youth claim ethnic
identities, then what additional purchase might other descriptors for diasporic
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youth (e.g., hybrid, cosmopolitan, transnational) hold, if any? Friedman (2002),
for one, rues the uncritical application by anthropologists of adjectives like
transnational, hybrid, and mobile to the people they study. He argues that
certain anthropologists’ tendency to use these terms rests upon, on the one
hand, a vision of people as culture “containers,” and on the other, a fear of
falling into the structuralist reverie of bounded and homogeneous languages,
individuals, or nation-states. The “moral-political solution” (Friedman, 2002, p.
25) to the essentialism and boundedness that skulk in the shadows of the
discipline, says Friedman, is for anthropologists to answer with cultural analyses
averring the hybridity and transnationalism of their research subjects. He notes
that this inclination dissimulates an anthropological position that is both etic
and highly privileged:
“It is the discourse of global elites whose relation to the earth is one of consumerist
distance and objectification. It is a bird's-eye view of the world that looks down upon
the multiethnic bazaar of ethnic neighborhoods and marvels at the fabulous jumble of
cultural diﬀerences present in that space. Hybridity is thus the sensual, primarily visual,
appropriation of a space of cultural diﬀerence.” (Friedman, 2002, pp. 27-28)

Friedman further illustrates his point with a comparison of the emic and etic
meanings attributed a traditional Papua New Guinean shield. Its maker had
decorated the shield with an advertisement for a popular but foreign beer, and
the shield presented as a hybrid object to unfamiliar viewers, one fusing a
Western, modern product with local traditions. The shield maker later explained
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to Friedman, however, that he had chosen the beer advertisement because it
symbolized danger, prowess, and the “life force” of war. Friedman summarizes
his point by saying that labels such as hybrid and transnational tend to lean on
scholarly analyses that are inattentive to the ways in which the people involved
may be reappropriating and integrating cultural elements into meaningful
wholes. A similar critique can be summoned in the case of other theoretical
catchphrases as well, notably “superdiversity” (Blommaert, 2010). To deem the
European “landscape” superdiverse in human and linguistic terms connotes, not
only the observer’s degree of remove from people’s precise biographies, but
likewise their own baseline of “normal” diversity.
A parallel logic can be applied to the uncritical exercise of labels like
mobile, migrant, cosmopolitan, and transnational. Friedman (2002) asks what
to make of the anthropological readiness to see a world busied with roving
people, particularly when “less than 2 per cent of the world's population is on
the move, internationally” (p. 33). Taking up Friedman’s question, Hage (2005)
submits in response that it may be worth examining the very way mobility is
labeled, for distinct positionalities may be revealed in the process. Why was it
that when he left Lebanon to do his doctorate in Australia, this movement was
not called migration but simply going abroad to study? He wonders if the
Lebanese merchants and bankers whom he researches would be accorded the
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same terminological benefit of the doubt. They do not speak of their movement
in terms of migration either: “They say I am ‘living’ in New York, I am living in
Paris, or, ‘where were you living during the war?’” (Hage, 2005, p. 470).
Migration thus appears more of an etic term, but what of other labels? Mandel
(2008) oﬀers similar reflections on German double-standards in the use of the
term cosmopolitan. She contrasts an enlightenment version of cosmopolitanism,
such as underpins the German State's campaign to replace Germany’s Second
World War reputation with one of a cosmopolitan and world-open (Weltoﬀen)
society, with the more “demotic” cosmopolitanism oﬀered by Turkish Germans.
Only what Turkish Germans bring to Germany, quite tellingly, is not called
cosmopolitanism at all (p. 14). That it is socioeconomic or physiognomic
parameters which lead migrants to be distinguished from non-migrants (or from
refugees, as per the current debate), or cosmopolitans from immigrants, reveals
both the highly etic nature of these determinations and the political stakes
involved in qualifying people in this manner. Given these positional discourses,
it may be that in the theoretical scramble to dismantle borders and illustrate
globalization, some anthropologists have trodden over not-inconsiderable
inequalities in terms of people's ability to move and the importance of locally
based practices. Thankfully, there not need be, as Friedman (2002) remarks, a
contradiction between the fact of building lives and cultures locally and being
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open to global influences. Indeed, it is precisely this play with the global from a
local position that the “borderlands” heuristic aﬀords—if not more emically,
then more empirically.
The late Gloria Anzaldúa (1999[1987]) writes of a certain Chicano
identity that spans the border between Mexico and the United States. As she
specifies in the anecdote that began this chapter, this border identity is a racial
one, not a national one. It is also, in her formulation, communicated primarily
via a “Chicano” language, and in her own case by a Chicano Tejana language. She
explains further that, “for a people who are neither Spanish nor live in a country
in which Spanish is the first language; for a people who live in a country in
which English is the reigning tongue but who are not Anglo; for a people who
cannot entirely identify with either standard (formal, Castillian) Spanish nor
standard English, what recourse is left to them but to create their own
language?” (Anzaldúa, 1999[1987], pp. 77). To these ethnic and linguistic
mainstays of her Chicano Tejana identity, Anzaldúa joins other memorable
sensations: the corridos songs that “wafted through her bedroom window,"
"woodsmoke curling up to an immense blue sky,” and “homemade white
cheese...melting inside a folded tortilla” (p. 83). Anzaldúa's homeland perches on
the Texan border with Mexico, and yet she experiences it, not as fragmented, but
simply as where she comes from, a place she cannot but evoke through multi!80

sensorial memories. In other words, despite the the Chicano borderlands being
“neither eagle nor serpent, but both” (p. 84), these places are nevertheless
regular homes for those who inhabit them. This coincides with Jackson’s (2005)
description of how Harlemites, via their “ghetto fabulousness” and “the
underside of the global” it represents, declare “social margins quite central to
the people who live there” (p. 60). In Section III below, I delve into how youth
from Marseille’s northern housing projects construct a broadly ethnic identity
and corresponding language for themselves that, in their syncretism, point to
youth’s location in the Mediterranean borderlands.

III.

Class 3B: La Castellane Project and Castellanois

It was 7:45am and the students of Class 3B were readying themselves for
the first class of the year. On the sixth floor of bloc (‘tower’) one, inside the
housing project known as La Castellane, Kader was reviving yesterday’s
mohawk. Ayman, his next-door neighbor, dropped by and they carved two
matching slits into their left eyebrows. On the fourth floor, Kardiatou parted her
hair into pigtails, stepped into pink Palladium hightops, and slipped on some
Senegalese bangles. One floor down and over in bloc 2, Sabrina backcombed and
then smoothed her bangs into a crest atop her head. Two-hundred steps above
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the six towers of La Castellane lies a smaller but taller project called La Bricarde.
Sheyreen and Kenza left La Bricarde and were making their way down the steps
to the secondary-school below, not minding the September sun in their
imitation Adidas tracksuit and Burberry scarf.
Minutes later down in Madame Chérif ’s third-floor classroom, warm air
wafted in through the horizontally cocked windows as the students filed in for
the first time of the 2012-2013 school year. As they passed the teacher and
headed to their seats, each student said Ṣbaḥ al-khayr, ustedhah (MSA. 'good
morning, teacher') to the teacher, who responded with Ṣbaḥ al-nūr (MSA. 'bright
morning'). 8am rang and old friends gave up conversation while roll was called.
The Ustedhah’s roll continued undisturbed until her call of “Abdel Kader” [ʕabdəl
'qɑ:-dəɻ] was met with a drawled “no need for the Abdel [abdεl] piece” (“c'est pas
la peine Abdel [abdεl]”) from Kader.
Along with his peers from Class 3B, Kader was beginning his fourth year
of a bilingual Modern Standard Arabic and French track at the secondary level.
This year was their last in collège, or secondary school, and they were slated to
choose at the end of the year whether to move on to high school or vocational
programs. In spite of three years of MSA study with the old teacher, Monsieur
Bashir, Kader continued to prefer a shortened, more French version of his name.
He disclaimed how his new teacher pronounced his name, as a compound with
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MSA phonology (e.g., /ʕ, q, ɻ/), in favor of simply “Kader” [ka-'dεχ], which
conforms to neither MSA nor Standard French phonology. At the end of the day,
while on the bus running from Northern Marseille towards the center of town,
Madame Chérif filled me in on similar name preferences shown by her students
of past years at the same public school:
“For compound names, like the Abd [ʕabd]-such-and-such, the Abdallahs [ʕabdɑl:ɑ]
become Abdel [abdε:l], the Abdel Kaders [ʕabdəl qɑdəɻ] become Kader [kadεʁ], the Abdel
Majids [ʕabdəl maji:d] become Majid [maji::d]... It’s, well, that! A portion is removed
because it strikes them as long and seemingly ridiculous.”27

Certainly, the lengthy, compounded first name called out by Madame Chérif,
replete with MSA phonemes ‘ayn [ʕ], qaf [q], and a dark ra [ɻ], sounded unlike
anything Kader was used to being called by his friends. While in her words,
above, Madame Chérif imagined he would prefer the Standard French version of
his name, namely Kader [kadεʁ], instead he and his friends opted for a neithernor pronunciation. Indeed, their usual pronunciation of “Kader” [ka-'dɛχ]
switched [k] in for MSA’s qaf /q/, used French stress rules, and yet also replaced
the typical French 'r' /ʁ/ with the Arabic phoneme /χ/. I learned about this local
rendering of Arabic-sourced names through a blunder of my own, albeit in a
diﬀerent setting. In the private Muslim secondary school where I taught, early
on in the year I was introduced by Hanan, the school director’s wife, to one of
“Pour les noms composés, si tu veux en ‘abd-katha ‘abd-katha [ʕabd-kaða ʕabd-kaða], les
Abdallahs [ʕabdɑl:ɑ] c’est Abdel [abdε:l], les Abdel Kader [ʕabdəl qɑdəɻ] c’est Kader [kadɛr], les
Abdel Majid [ʕabdəl majid] c’est Majid [maji::d]... C’est, donc, voilà! On supprime une partie
parce que ça fait long, parce que ça fait ridicule” (Madame Chérif, 4.4.12).
27
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the recess monitors, Nasser. I touched a palm to my chest and said in French,
"Nice to meet you, Nasser [‘nɑ:-sɪʀ]." Hanan quickly corrected me, "Nasser!
[na-‘sœʁ]." To my surprise, Hanan, who speaks fluent Tunisian and excels at
MSA, was asking me to pronounce Nasser’s name not in MSA but in French.
She was being respectful of his own background as a diasporic individual who,
like Kader, grew up in the projects, only on the south side of town. I later
learned that, being his usual polite self, Nasser had in fact refrained from cluing
us into the exact pronunciation he preferred. Throughout the school year I
witnessed Nasser introducing himself to visitors at the school as [na-'sœχ].
Much like Kader, Nasser chose not only French stress and vowels (which Hanan
had gotten right) but additionally the Arabic-sourced voiceless fricative /χ/ in
lieu of French "r" /ʁ/.
Among young Castellaners, linguistic syncretism of this sort did not end
at names. It stretched from discourse markers, to run-of-the-mill words, even to
expressions that youth freshly imagined. Although what they spoke was
recognizably French, young people from La Castellane consistently employed
consonant and vowel inventories and lexis that did not tally exactly with
Standard French, nor Marseille’s historical vernacular, nor MSA or dialectal
varieties of Arabic. When asked about the languages he spoke in his daily life,
Kader listed Algerian as the language he spoke to his Algerian father, French or
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Algerian as what he spoke to his French mother (herself born of two Algerian
parents in Marseille), and “Castellanois” as what he used with his four brothers
and friends. Unlike French or Algerian, Castellanois was about “traﬃcking in
words” (trafiquer des mots) from both, explained Kader. Another classmate named
Sheyreen, whose mother is Algerian and step-father is Egyptian, shed further
light on Castellanois and this type of French’s relationship to dialectal Arabic.
“We make remixes, actually” she said, explaining Castellanois as speaking
“French with an Arabic accent.” By her estimation, Parisians and “those who
don’t speak [dialects of] Arabic” lacked culture because they spoke only “French,
French, French.” By comparison, “we speak the project version (version quartiers)
because growing up in Northern Marseille (Quartiers Nord) we basically come to
mix languages.” 28 Before turning to examples of how youth used Castellanois,
below I present how the students of Class 3B described the significance of
growing up in the quartiers.

Tough Love in the Quartiers
The demographics of the projects of La Castellane and La Bricarde
resembled those of Class 3B, the classroom in the public school across from La

“Nous on parle version quartier parce que comme on a grandit dans les Quartiers Nord en fait
on mélange les langues. Des fois on crée des mots avec des langues diﬀérentes. On fait des
remixes en fait. On fait des remixes” (Sheyreen, 10.29.12).
28

!85

Castellane, only writ large. Of all the students in the four MSA classes Madame
Chérif taught at the secondary school (6ème-3ème, or 5th-8th grades), only a
young man named Florian in Class 4B was recognizably French by the students’
standards. Teased on account of his blond hair, blue eyes, and Catholic name, he
countered with accounts of his trips to visit his Tunisian grandpa in the bled, or
country of origin. Each of the other students boasted a bled of aﬃliation, whether
by dint of one or both parents’ birthplace or, less frequently, grandparents’
birthplace. For the majority of the students from Class 3B, that bled of aﬃliation
was Algeria. There were also students, however, whose parents came from
Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, the Comoros Islands, Mayotte, Egypt, and Yemen.
There were likewise three students who came from mixed marriages between
someone from one of these countries and someone born in France. One of these
three French-born parents said she had French ethnic heritage and came from a
working-class (ouvrier) milieu in the North of France, while the other two
themselves grew up in Algerian households in La Castellane.
Like Class 3B, the population of the 16th, 15th, 14th, and 13th
arrondissements, together called the Quartiers Nord, was characterized by a greater
number of people born in the bled or having bled origins than people ethnically
identifiable as French-origin (français de souche). This preponderance of French
people of Arab, West African, and East African (mainly Comorian) origins living
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in Northern Marseille is not well captured, however, in the census statistics
published every ten years by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic
Studies (INSEE). France is unique in choosing not to collect statistics on its
citizens’ and residents’ ethnic identities. The only available figures that might
serve as a proxy pertain to immigrants versus French nationals. Thus, for
example, INSEE (2002) reports that 87% of people living in Marseille are French
citizens and the remaining 13% are immigrants. Not surprisingly, such numbers
ill-reflect the numerical and cultural significance of the city’s French diasporic
population. These percentages also dissimulate the relatively greater
concentration of diasporic citizens in Northern Marseille. Although all of
Marseille’s population has been shaped by “successive immigrations (apports de
population) from outside,” the neighborhoods to Marseille’s North have,
historically, received more numerous immigrants from North and sub-Saharan
Africa (Maurice & Deloménie, 1972, p. 34).
Northern Marseille was predominantly settled by foreign workers who
came to support Marseille’s industry and port in the 19th and 20th-centuries. If
before World War II these workers were overwhelmingly Italian and Spanish,
then between 1945 and the 1970s French colonial ties and later decolonization
would prompt the arrival of new workers in Northern Marseille, namely, North
Africans and sub-Saharan Africans from France’s (ex)colonies, as well as other
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smaller contingents, like the Romani, the Portuguese, and the Turks.29 During
this period, quite diﬀerent housing arrangements arose in the north of the city
than in its southern neighborhoods. Maurice and Deloménie (1972) describe
how, in the 1960s, projects like La Castellane were drafted with northerly
coordinates and targeted working-class, mainly foreign residents:
“La Castellane welcomed, much as expected, a youthful population, with few
qualifications, of heterogeneous social provenance, and more mobile as well. The policy
outlook of the organizations promoting its construction contributed to aggravating the
arrondissement’s marginalization. If, in the South, public organizations and private
entrepreneurs each took shares of real estate, in the 16th only HLMs were built” (p. 37,
my translation).

This development of HLMs (Habitations à Loyer Modéré), or rent-controlled and
government-subsidized housing, to the city’s north was the result of zoning
policies that aimed to create homes for foreign workers close to their places of
employment along the Northern littoral, the site of Marseille’s industry.
Urbanization policies of this sort, attempting to circumscribe the
movements of Marseille’s immigrant population, continue to present. They
remain apparent, for example, in the city’s unwillingness to extend Métro
transportation any further north than the Bougainville Métro stop, which lies at
the southernmost edge of the 15th arrondissement. Likewise, the city’s cheap
public bike network, called Le Vélo and begun in 2007, has its northernmost

In 1972, North Africans represented 45.8% of the foreign population of Marseille. To illustrate
their unequal distribution over urban space, there were at this time five times as many Algerians
in the 16th arrondissement as in the southerly 9th arrondissement (Maurice & Deloménie, 1972) .
29
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stations in the 2nd arrondissement near the Docks, which belongs to the central
part of town. As such, the main means of transportation around the Northern
arrondissements is the bus network. Due to construction delays and the relatively
larger size of the northern neighborhoods compared to those downtown,
however, most residents contend with long bus rides. To illustrate, my 7-km (4mile) commute between Bougainville Métro, which is already located in
Northern Marseille, to the project in La Castellane would take between 50
minutes and an hour and ten minutes. Perhaps due to this relative isolation, the
students in Class 3B maintained secluded lifestyles to the north of the city, only
rarely venturing downtown or to the beaches and parks of the southern districts.
It was, for instance, quite an undertaking when I invited female students from
Class 3B to visit me on Sundays where I lived at the Northern edge of Central
Marseille. Their mothers got quite anxious about them using public
transportation and would go through considerable trouble to find someone from
the neighborhood who owned a car and could chaperone the girls back and forth
from the 16th arrondissement. This worry carried over to a school-organized trip
some of the students and I were planning to take to Paris in April as well. As
neither the students nor many of their parents had ever been to the nation’s
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capital, some parents came along to both see the sights and reassure themselves
about their children’s whereabouts.30
Members of Class 3B, hence, shared in identifying as immigrant
descendants of their parents’ respective bleds and as Marseillais who, born and
raised in one of the city’s northern housing projects, continued the diasporic
history of the city. Class was a major part of this diasporic identity, and the
students saw their bled backgrounds and ethnicities as bound up with their
working-class status. To have bled origins, summed up a student named
Sheyreen, is to live in a “rotten neighborhood” (quartier pourri). Césari, Moreau,
and Schleyer-Lindenmann (2001) have written about how, in Marseille, often
being diasporic or being an immigrant means a greater likelihood of both,
residing to the city’s north, and being either working-class or below the poverty
line. The map in Figure 3.1 clearly depicts this clustering of poverty to
Marseille’s North. The intensity of the color red corresponds to the percentage
of people living below the poverty line, which INSEE (2002) defines as having a
monthly revenue of less than 621.38 Euros. The 16th arrondissement is shown in
varying shades of red and pink, meaning that between 25-50% or, in some cases,
more than 50%, of its population make do with less than the sum mentioned. Of
Although these 13 and 14 year-olds’ sphere of movement within Marseille and France is
relatively reduced, many of them have at some point in their lives been traveled to their parents’
respective home countries, via the 9-hour ferry to close North African destinations like Oran or
Algiers, or (less frequently) via plane to places like Grande Comore or Dakar, etc.
30
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manufacturing. The mothers who worked jobs, in turn, were employed as
housecleaners, nannies, and cooks. Another anecdote, drawn from my
observation of the public school across from La Castellane where students
attended Class 3B, illustrates the perceived connection between being from the
bled and working blue-collar jobs. In this excerpt from my fieldnotes on October
18th, 2012, I describe a conversation I held in passing with the recess monitor.
The new recess monitor started work today at school. In the yard, he asks me if I’ve
heard the joke about “les générations.” I say no. He starts: “Well, there’s this man in
Algeria dreaming about France. He thinks to himself, ‘The streets are paved in gold...’
But, shortly after arriving in France, he discovers three things. One, the streets aren’t
paved in gold. Two, sometimes, they aren’t paved at all. And three, he’s the one who’s
supposed to pave them!”

The monitor’s joke expresses cynicism about his parents’ generation being
brought to France to do strenuous jobs, and students expressed similar
frustrations about the lack of options they felt were available to them other than
blue-collar jobs. The students’ French teacher, who was born in France to an
Arab family, tapped into students’ concern and organized a project where
students had to locate somebody from the projects who had what they would
define as success. Students brought in journalists, lawyers, and others who had
grown up in La Castellane, and they generally seemed enthused to have these
additional role models.
If sometimes students were frustrated to be working class or poor, other
times they were proud too. One from student Class 3B, named Karim, doggedly
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aﬃrmed his pride at being from the housing projects by wearing a t-shirt that
read “100% carshare.” His t-shirt made a reference to highly publicized comments
made by Nicolas Sarkozy, then-Minister of the Interior, in 2005. Following an
episode of gun violence in the housing project of La Corneuve outside of Paris,
Sarkozy had vowed that he would “flush out the housing project with a highpressure hose” (nettoyer la cité au kärcher). Karim’s shirt could thus be read, in
other words, as “100% project material.” Kader flaunted his project pride by
loudly singing the lyrics to songs by local band Zbatata in the hallways at school
or before classes started. This one was one of his favorites, and he shared the
music video with me. The chorus is a mantra upholding the “busted” (cramé)
nature of the northern neighborhoods:
“Marseille is the Quartiers Nord. Marseille is busted (cramé). It’s, it’s, it’s trouble (chaud).
It’s boiling. We don’t give a fuck (on s’en bat les couilles). Khuya (Algerian ‘brother’), that’s
Marseille. It’s, it’s, it’s only picking up speed.”31

Even some of the teachers in the school maintained a working-class outlook,
whether out of solidarity or their own political leanings, I do not know. One day
in the teachers’ lounge, for instance, I overhead one of the teachers complaining
of another who refused to unionize. He fumed about how “there’s nothing
worse than a working-class guy who’s made it” (un ouvrier enrichi). These
examples attest to the working-class spirit prevalent within La Castellane and its
“Marseille c’est Quartiers Nord. Marseille c'est cramé. C’est, c’est, c’est chaud. C’est bouillant.
On s'en bat les couilles. Khuya, c’est Marseille. Ça, ça, ça démarre, ça y est.”
31
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adjoining school. Students’ comments about their diasporic links to the bled,
moreover, are shown to be inseparable from both their frustration and pride at
being from the northerly, socio-economically marginalized parts of the city.
As will be detailed further in Section IV, the relevant contrast to their
own diasporic identity for students from Class 3B was people who were French
by descent. Tellingly, they avoided the term for such individuals that is more
typical among French-speakers nationally, français de souche. Instead, they
discussed such people as being “sans origines,” or without any origins, thus
positioning their own kind of ethnic heritage as the default. Castellaners also
used the label “paillot” for the ethnically French.32 Their use of paillot tended,
furthermore, to cue stereotypic associations with wealth and with living in
central or southern Marseille, as the following two examples indicate. Thus, one
day at the ice-rink in a southern arrondissement, Sheyreen and two other girls
from Class 3B looked on as two teens skated and spun at the center of the rink.
Sheyreen oﬀered in French, “it’s the paillot families that can aﬀord ice-skating
classes.” To make sure I understood, she then glossed her use of paillot with “les
françaouis” [lε fʁə̃ˈsawi], using one of the words for French person in North
African varieties of Arabic [fʁə̃ˈsawi] but adding a French article and French

The term paillot is more widely used than just in La Castellane. That said, the diasporic youth I
taught in the central districts used the term bodge in lieu of paillot. Bodge appears to have
approximately the same scope of reference.
32
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plural morphology. With this gloss, Sheyreen made it apparent that paillot
involved an Arabic-speaking person’s perspective on ethnically French people. A
second example demonstrates how youth consider paillots to be, in addition to
better oﬀ than diasporic Marseillais, also less likely to live in the housing
projects. Hence during an afternoon chat at my apartment, a student named
Soumia was speaking with me and some girlfriends about how La Castellane
was primarily meant for people without means—but also people with bleds. She
mused, “I once heard there was an older French lady (femme française) living in
my tower but I’ve never actually seen her.” These anecdotes speak to youth’s
conception of these opposing identities in intersectional (Crenshaw, 1992)
terms. While being a diasporic Marseillais subsumes a geographic location to
the North, being working-class or poor, and having bled origins (or being of
color), so, too, does being a paillot Marseillais, according to the diasporic youth I
polled at least, involve living in Southern Marseille, being middle or upper class,
and being bled-less (or white).
Insofar as youth from Class 3B defined their diasporic identity in a
manner that additionally invoked ethnicity and class, I witnessed youth engaging
in interesting manipulations of other sister categories, like “Muslim” or “Arab.”
One took place at the public school on the special day of the school calendar
known as “Language Day,” where each language class invites outsiders into their
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classroom to learn about the language they are learning. In front of an audience
of students, parents, and administrators, a student from Class 3B explained that
“our MSA class is for les arabes.” Madame Chérif shot the student an amiable
wink lest she go on portraying the class as an ethnic ghetto for Arabs only, and
she looked as though she was jotting a mental note to herself to address the
student’s misunderstanding at a later time. On an afternoon later that week,
Madame Chérif gathered the students’ attention and opened the floor to a
discussion of what unified the students of the class, whether it was in fact being
Arab or perhaps their Muslim upbringing. To her surprise, students in the class
were in agreement that Arabs and Muslims were the same. “There is no
diﬀerence. All Muslims are Arab and all Arabs are Muslims,” explained one
student. At this point, Madame Chérif looked incredulously at Kardiatou, whose
parents are Senegalese Pulaars, and Nacima, whose parents are from Grande
Comore. She asked the class to meditate on how these two students were from
Muslim but non-ethnically Arab families, but to little avail. The students
appeared to be thinking about what it meant to be Arabe from a diﬀerent,
project-centric perspective. Unlike other instances where I saw the label Arabe
being used to specifically point out an individual’s Arab ethnic heritage, in this
instance Arabe served as something other than an ethnonym.
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The following case-in-point demonstrates how Arabe can also serve as a
placeholder for the diasporic Marseillais identity, which is to say being workingclass and having ties to a bled, any bled. In a more centrally located community
center, I was parti to a conversation between a group of 14-year old girls. Four of
them had Arab parents and the other three did not. The issue was for the four
girls to find the appropriate label for the three seemingly white girls in their
midst. It was decided that Cloë and Mado, who were born to French parents and
were middle-class, lacked origins and were hence paillot. Antonia, who looked no
less white than Cloë and Mado, was by contrast judged “une Arabe like us.”
Significantly for the arbitrating girls, Antonia not only grew up in Statesubsidized housing (HLMs) and knew the right gab, but she also had a bled. She
had two bleds, to be precise, her mother being Romani and her father Polish. The
group determined, further, that Antonia was as Arabe as Dalila was paillot. Dalila
was the 25-year old organizer for their outings, and both her parents are
Algerian. The girls felt, however, that on account of her higher economic means
and purely French way of talking, Dalila did not qualify as une Arabe.
In both the case of Kardiatou and Nacima from Class 3B, and that of
Antonia and Dalila from the community center, narrower categories like
musulman (Muslim), Arabe (Arab), and paillot (ethnically French) were deployed
in unexpected ways. This flexible deployment owed to the adjudication of these
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young people’s identities with respect to the umbrella category of being
diasporic, and the class and bled dimensions this category entails within
Northern Marseille. Within that category, it was of vanishing importance
whether Kardiatou and Nacima’s parents were from Senegal and the Comoros,
or Antonia’s were from Romania and Poland. As long as these young women
were tied to a bled and the working class, they could claim status as diasporic
youth within Marseille. Arabe could, in this sense, be used in this setting
synonymously with diasporic or pan-ethnic status. Hall’s (1992) remarks that,
depending on how ethnicity is constructed under particular historical
conditions, ethnic categories may grow to absorb other categories of shared
experience, seem quite à propos in this regard. If, conversely, one has a bled but
is from a diﬀerent class background or does not speak like the projects, as in
Dalila’s case, failure to meet the minimum requirements of the diasporic
experience in Marseille, or failure to be Arabe in the second sense outlined here,
can lead to one being positioned as white-washed.
Before turning to language, a final dimension of the shared experience of
youth from La Castellane, which also begs discussion, is Islam. As intimated
above, being Muslim was also part of being a diasporan from Marseille. Of the
twenty students in Class 3B, all self-identified as “musulman” when asked about
their religion. How they lived their religion, however, was tied into social life in
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La Castellane and La Bricarde. The students’ practice of Islam involved mainly
observing three principal traditions. They celebrated Muslim holidays,
particularly the Ramadan fast, did not eat pork, and avoided alcohol. In
observing these rites, they nevertheless tolerated a bit of flexibility. During
Ramadan, for example, although they fasted youth paid no more heed to prayer
times than during the rest of the year. Likewise, while all stayed away from pork,
eating religiously sanctioned (or ḥalāl) meat was often bracketed for
convenience’s—or hunger’s—sake. I often ate with the students in the fast food
shops at the nearby mall, and none seemed concerned that the hamburgers were
not ḥalāl. Lastly, it was, and especially for the boys, not beyond the scope of
possibility to drink an occasional beer. Islamic obligations beyond these big
three, including such practices as prayer and rules of dress, were largely
dispensed with, and this choice did not seem to overly burden the students'
consciences.
In fact, students would often advertise their nominal form of Islam, or
modicum of religious practice, in Madame Chérif ’s class. This took the form of
students mocking religious expressions in MSA, which the students were well
aware had the duplex quality of being both the sacred language of Islam and the
secular target language for their instruction. When for example one day Madame
Chérif asked the class “How do we say ‘my big sister’ [in MSA]?,” Nacima
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retorted with a loud “Allahu Akbar! [MSA. ‘God is great’],” playing on the correct
answer’s use of the same elative structure (MSA. ukhtī al-akbar). Likewise, no
scheduling of the homework or an exam ensued without a great number of
students pointing out the hoped-for contingency of such dates with
exclamations of “In Shā Allah! In Shā Allah!” (MSA. ‘If God wills it’). Yet another
student’s favorite retort to her peers when she was being called out for being
disruptive was to silence them with the religiously loaded, “Shaytān!,” or ‘devil’
in MSA. Students looked forward, nevertheless, to the time spent with their
families and friends during Ramadan, and happily took days oﬀ from school for
Islamic holidays not observed in the French school calendar. This shared
commitment to upholding the Islamic faith, if minimally, contributed to the
feelings of solidarity among the inhabitants of the 16th arrondissement’s projects
that I describe below.
The diasporic Marseillais identity documented thus far is summed up, in
the words of Class 3B students, as “être du quartier,” or being from the projects.
Above and beyond having a bled, being working class, and keeping with some of
the Islamic pillars, this identity is also something youth sensed in their
interactions around the 16th arrondissement. More specifically, youth from Class
3B relayed the belief that interactions within the projects were marked by a sort
of tough love. For instance, when asked where he wanted to live as an adult
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Mohamed from Class 3B emphasized the importance of staying in the quartier
where his Moroccan parents raised him: “That way my son has a project
upbringing (l’éducation quartiers)... He won’t let anybody mess with him... A
project upbringing means he is tough, that he’s scared of nobody.”33 Oussama,
too, wanted to stay in La Castellane: “I’ll always stay here because it’s where I
grew up, in La Castellane. And people are sociable, solidary.”34 According to
these young men, increased strength of character and community solidarity were
worthy prizes for toughing it out in Northern Marseille’s projects. In another
interaction, this time with a young taximan raised in the 16th by East African
parents, Northern Marseille was described as having a “certain ambiance.” The
young man recalled “rocky living conditions,” when for example his single
mother struggled to put meals together for him and his siblings at the end of the
month. This was coupled with a feeling of attachment or indebtedness to the
projects as well, however: “Even when we have almost nothing, we are still
happy to be in Marseille... It’s still a paradise. It remains a little paradise (un petit
paradis) regardless.” 35
“Comme ça mon fils il a-du-il a l’éducation quartiers. (…) Il se laisse pas faire. L’éducation de
quartier c’est il est dur, il a peur de personne” (Mohamed, 4.2.13).
33

“Moi je veux vivre à Marseille parce que c’est là où j’ai grandi, à La Castellane. Et les gens sont
sociables, solidaires” (Oussama, 4.2.13).
34

“C’est Marseille, il y a quand même une certaine ambience qui fait que même si on a presque
rien on est quand même contents d’être à Marseille (…). Ça reste un paradis. Ça reste un petit
paradis quand même Marseille” (Taxi driver, 4.8.13).
35
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This mantra of tough love also manifested in a common family metaphor
youth used to talk about quartiers interactions. One day, during a walk with
several students down the main thoroughfare of La Castellane, I observed an
exchange between Nacima, whose parents are Maorese, and a 20-year old
guetteur, a scout paid to make sure drug sales run smoothly and alert higherranking others to the presence of the police in the project. Though he did not
know her well, the guetteur recognized Nacima and greeted her with “ça va ma fille
[fijə]?” (‘how are you my daughter?’), appending the word-final schwa of the
project’s youth vernacular to the word “daughter.” Nacima was obviously
pleased at her interaction with the young man but chagrined that it had to take
place in front of her girlfriends. A young woman of Comorian descent, Rouqiya,
helped her out by playing down the interaction to the group. Rouqiya explained
to me in a voice loud enough for the others to hear: “Everyone knows and
watches out for everybody else in La Castellane. It’s the capital of all bleds.”36 As
shown by this anecdote, Castellane residents recognized the project’s designated
role in reuniting the people in Marseille who have bled ties. Rouqiya, for one,
indicated that if there existed an imaginary nation reconstituted from the home
countries of all of Marseille’s immigrants, then Marseille would be its diasporic

“Tout le monde se connait et veille sur les autres à La Castellane. C’est la capitale de tous les
bleds” (Rouqiya, 4.11.13).
36
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capital. The residents of La Castellane, as such, modeled their interactions with
one another, both passing and more intimate, after ones between kin. Although
they were joined by bled rather than blood, the step to create of the projects a
metaphoric family aﬃrmed residents’ intention to combat poverty through
solidarity. In the second subsection, I address the kind of language youth have
created to reflect these experiences of growing up in the housing projects of
Marseille’s 16th arrondissement.

Castellanois and Syncretic Linguistic Interference
At the beginning of this section, I introduced Castellanois as the French
syncretic register, in Agha’s (2007a) sense, youth from La Castellane used to cue
their belonging to Marseille’s northern housing projects.37 Here I will describe
this register, and its use and evaluation, in more detail. As per Agha (2007a),
registers are social formations that often involve language but may also include
other modalities of human behavior. To signal this multi-modal aspect, Agha
also refers to “registers of conduct” or “semiotic registers.” He defines a register,
thus, as “a repertoire of performable signs linked to stereotypic pragmatic eﬀects
by a sociohistorical process of enregisterment” (p. 80). This definition encloses
Although I became most familiar with La Castellane and, hence, foreground the way young
Castellaners term their speech (“Castellanois”), students in Class 3B who were from La Bricarde
housing project also participated in this register. I use the term Castellanois because the students
called it thus, but it could just as well have been called Bricardois.
37

!103

the three dimensions of register organization he proposes. The first dimension is
the forms or signs, linguistic and para- or non-linguistic (e.g., gesture, bodily
hexis, clothing, etc.), that constitute the register’s “repertoire” (Agha, 2007a, p.
169). The second dimension, “social range” (p. 169), is the range of pragmatic
or social uses to which such forms can be put. As the definition above indicates,
the register’s forms acquire pragmatic eﬀects only through their repeated linking
to social types. This linking takes place over time and itself constitutes a sphere
of discursive activity in which people comment on social life and its significance,
what M. Silverstein (1979, p. 209) has called “ethnometapragmatics,” and Lucy
(1992), language’s “reflexive activity” (p. 11). The third dimension, “social
domain” (Agha, 2007a, p. 169), is the demographics of the register. Who uses
it? Who cannot use it but can recognize it, although they may ascribe diﬀerent
values to its use? For whom is the register outside the scope of recognition? I
discuss these dimensions of Castellanois below in order to arrive at a more
comprehensive picture of the register’s “total linguistic fact,” comprising form,
use, ideology, and domain (M. Silverstein, 1985a; Wortham, 2008).
Perhaps like most registers, speaking Castellanois in order to index oneself
as a quartiers youth is primarily an act of self-versus-other positioning. As Said
(1978) argued in the context of the West’s construction of the “Oriental” East,
self-concepts are “made up of human eﬀort, partly aﬃrmation, partly
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identification of the Other” (Said, 2003 [1978], xvii). Lo and Reyes (2004, p.
118), too, speak of the “relational unfoldings of identity” as Americans tangle
with one another. They write that, “there is no Asian Pacific American without
Caucasian American, no African American without Latino, no self without the
other” (p. 118). Through the following vignettes, it becomes apparent that the
type of linguistic syncretism the students of Class 3B have created, namely,
between Marseille’s working-class vernacular and dialectal varieties of Arabic, is
first and foremost an eﬀort to aﬃrm their own diasporic project identity, while
also carefully setting themselves apart from the first-generation immigrants
from the bled and the paillots with whom they might be confused.
Transcript 3.1 serves as an initial foray into Castellanois. This transcript is
drawn from a longer video interview I held with three female students from
Class 3B towards the end of the school year. By this time, I had spent two
semesters in their company, both in and outside of school, and they were
confident I knew enough about them to understand their linguistic playfulness.
Before the transcribed segment, I was asking Soumia, Samia, and Asma about
how they would characterize their own speech in reference to other people’s
speech. To answer my question, the young women produced three diﬀerent
pronunciations of the French word “midi,” or ‘noon.’ The first is their attempt to
say midi in Standard French, with an alveolar [d]. To understand the meaning of
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this form, it is important to preface that the students associated speaking
Standard French with people from Paris, on the one hand, and with ethnically
French paillots who live in Central and Southern Marseille, on the other. For
instance, earlier in the year, Sheyreen had drawn the following verbal map of
language use for me. She compares people who speak in “o,” or use Standard
French and its word-final phonology, to people like herself who speak in “eng,”
her way of capturing the word-final phonology of Castellanois.
“Downtown, they have a weird kind of accent. It’s kind of like the Parisians too. They
talk in ‘o’ [õ]. ‘Comment [kɔmõ] ça va?’ They all talk in ‘o’ [õ], like pourquoi [puʁkwõ],
comment [kɔmõ]. All the syllables with “eng” [əŋ] are transformed into “o” [õ].” 38

Indeed, one of the particularly salient diﬀerences between Standard French and
the strongly Marseillais way these youth speak is the transformation of Standard
French’s word-finals nasalized vowels into vowel plus velar nasal /ŋ/. Above,
Sheyreen likewise locates people who speak in “o” in Paris and in “downtown”
Marseille. To return to the transcript at hand, the second iteration of midi given
by the three girls is the Castellanois pronunciation, with a post-alveolar aﬀricate
[ʤ]. Soumia oﬀers this pronunciation as an example of her own way of saying
midi. The third pronunciation of midi, with a dental [d̪ ], is the students’
imitation of the way their first-generation parents pronounce the word,

“Au centre, ils ont un accent un peu bizarre aussi, comme un peu les parisiens. Ils parlent en
‘on’ [õ]. ‘Comment [kɔmõ] ça va?’ Ils parlent tous en ‘on’ [õ], genre pourquoi [puʁkwõ],
comment [kɔmõ]. Toutes les syllabes en ‘eng’ [əŋ] ils transforment en ‘o’ [õ].” (Sheyreen,
10.29.12).
38
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influenced no doubt by Arabic dialectal speakers’ tendency to produce a dental
[d̪ ] before high, front vowels. Aside from brief excursions into voicing the paillot
(e.g., [midi]) and the first-generation speaker of French (e.g., [mid̪ i]), the three
girls carry out the conversation mainly in Castellanois. I have bolded its
characteristic phonetic features in the French-language transcript to direct the
reader’s attention, and I continue to do so throughout the remainder of the
transcripts in this chapter.
Transcript 3.1.39 Midi
French Original

English Transcription

Soumia: On peut pas dire [ʤi:χ] midi [midi]
Asma: Midi [midi]
Soumia: Midi[midi]
Samia: Mide [midε]
Soumia: J'arrive pas!
Soumia: Midji [miʤi]
Samia: On dit [ʤi] midji [miʤi
Asma: Midji [miʤi]
Samia: Midji [mi:ʤi]
Asma: Midi [midi]
Soumia: Mon père il dit midi [mid̪ i]
Samia: Mon père aussi! Mon père aussi il dit
midi [mid̪ i]…midi [mid̪ i]
Soumia: Et akhé [ɑχχε] quand il me dit “il est
quelle heure?” et je dis [ʤi] “midji [miʤi]” hein,
il se moque de moi.
Samia: Il dit “Non! C’est midi [mid̪ i]!”
((giggling))
Cécile: Pourquoi il se moque de toi?
Soumia: Ouais parce que je dis midji [miʤi]. Il
me fait “arrête de dire [ʤi:χ] midji [miʤi]
dis [ʤi] midi [mid̪ i]”
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This video clip dates from 5.30.13.
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Soumia: We can’t say midi [midi]
Asma: [midi]
Soumia: [midi]
Samia: [midε]
Soumia: I can’t do it!
Soumia: [miʤi]
Samia: We say [miʤi]
Asma: [miʤi]
Samia: [mi:ʤi]
Asma: [midi]
Soumia: My dad says [mid̪ i]
Samia: My dad too! My dad says it too
[mid̪ i]... [mid̪ i]
Soumia: And akhé [ɑχχε](‘then’) when
he asks
me “what time is it?” and I say “[miʤi]”
hah he makes fun of me
Samia: He says “No! C’est [mid̪ i]!”
((giggling))
Cécile: Why does he make fun of you?
Soumia: Yeah because I say [miʤi]. He’s
like “stop saying [miʤi]. Say [mid̪ i]”

Asma: Midi [mid̪ i]
Soumia: Ouais, j'arrive pas
Asma: Midi [mid̪ i]
Samia: Midi [mid̪ i]
Cécile: Parce que pour lui midji [miʤi] ça fait
comment?
Soumia: Parce que ouais en fait midji [miʤi] ça
fait trrrop [tχɔ::] accent marseillais [mɑχsεjε]
quoi ... midji [miʤi]!

Asma: [mid̪ i]
Soumia: Yup, I can’t do it
Asma: [mid̪ i]
Samia: [mid̪ i]
Cécile: Because what does [miʤi] seem
like to him?
Soumia: Because yeah, you know, [miʤi]
seems too:: Marseillais accent, you
know... [miʤi]!

In this transcript, Soumia, Samia, and Asma manifest their greater
alignment to the identity indexed by the Castellanois pronunciation of midi than
to either of the two personas cued by midi’s other pronunciations. They, for
instance, aﬃrm their diﬀerence from paillots by claiming inability to pronounce
the word with an alveolar [d]—even as they are, in fact, pronouncing it. The way
their first-generation parents pronounce midi with a dental [d̪ ], by contrast,
strikes them as amusing. Unlike the paillot pronunciation, however, they do not
claim inability to pronounce midi like their parents. This stance-taking unfolds
entirely through these three young women’s remarkable orientation to phonetic
detail. Their awareness of minute, indeed allophonic, variations in sound
suggests that these particular forms have already become “enregistered” (Agha,
2005) in group-centric ways, along with others, as indicative of social types like
the paillot or the first-generation immigrant. The social type of the project youth,
and its association with the aﬀrication of /d/, also appears to have some
measure of social recognition beyond its domain of speakers. Although not a
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speaker of Castellanois, Soumia’s father understands his daughter’s
pronunciation of midi to be, not simply Marseillais, but heavy-handedly so (“trop
accent marseillais”). That he judges an additional social element, beyond being
just Marseillais, to inhere in his daughter’s use of aﬀrication or palatalization is
telling. Likely familiar with the host of features that characterizes his daughter’s
register, Soumia’s father knows that, when used jointly, they index the
laminated identity of being both from Marseille and diasporic.
A quick glance at the bolded features in Table 3.1 reveals Castellanois’
greater proximity to Marseille’s historical vernacular than to Standard French.
Before youth from La Castellane began aﬀricating, Marseillais of varying class
and cultural backgrounds had been palatalizing their stop consonants before /i/
and /u/ for many decades (Gasquet-Cyrus, 2013). Another mainstay of
Marseille’s historical vernacular that also appears in Castellanois is the realization
of Standard French /o/ as [ɔ], as in trop (“too much”) below. Castellanois also
diﬀers in its forms from Standard French and Marseille’s vernacular. Its
speakers, for example, use a greater intensity of aﬀrication, realize French “r” as
Arabic-sourced fricative [χ], borrow words from Arabic varieties (e.g., za’ama
[zaʔma] Algerian discourse marker ‘like’), or else invent new French but Arabicsounding words (e.g., axé [ɑχχε], ‘then’). Sheyreen, ever the lucid language
critic, explained during an afternoon visit to my apartment that youth from the
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16th arrondissement speak like the South of France, “only project version” (mais en
version quartier, 10.29.12).
Table 3.1. Marseille’s Sociolinguistic Landscape from Youth’s Point of View (Examples from
Transcript 3.1) 40
Type of
Speech
Register

Standard French

Marseille’s
Historical
Vernacular

Castellanois

L2 French

Indexed
Social
Persona

The well-oﬀ paillot
from Marseille,
the Parisian

White, working-class
Marseillais

Diasporic
Marseillais youth

Firstgeneration
immigrant
from the bled

midi/miʤi

miʤi
(voiced postalveolar aﬀricate)

mid̪ i
(dental [d̪ ]
<dialectal
Arabic/MSA)

ɑpʁε “after”
(voiced uvular
fricative)

ɑpʁε

ɑχχε ‘then’
(voiceless uvular
fricative)

maʁsεjε
“Marseillais”
(voiced uvular
fricative)

maʁsεjε

mɑχsεjε
(voiceless uvular
fricative)

tʁo “too much”
(voiceless uvular
fricative, closed
mid-back V)

tʁɔ
(voiceless
uvular fricative,
open mid-back V)

tχɔ
(voiced
uvular fricative,
open mid-back V)

Repertoire midi “midday”
of Forms
(alveolar or
pre-alveolar [d])

To summarize, these students’ Castellanois does, in eﬀect, use several
phonetic features characteristic of a broad Marseillais accent, including the velar
nasal /ŋ/ syllable-finally, word-final schwa, an opened rounded back vowel /ɔ/
40

Bolding in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicates features of interest, not necessarily Castellanois features.
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where in Standard French it would be closed, and left dislocation of an object or
adverb (e.g., toujours je fais ça, “I always do that”). It is the very features that
occur in Castellanois and not in the Marseille vernacular, however, which serve to
invest it with its singular indexicality. These include the substitution of the
uvular voiced fricative /χ/ for Standard French uvular voiceless fricative /ʁ/ in
most environments, the heavy aﬀrication of dental stops before front vowels /i,
ε/ and back vowel /u/, the insertion of Maghrebi Arabic (and occasionally,
Comorian, Romani, etc.) lexemes and discourse markers, and the creation of
new “Arabic-sounding” words (e.g., ham-ham [ħamħam], ‘slut’). It follows, of
course, that although Castellanois and Marseille’s vernacular partially overlap in
repertoire, any single form of Castellanois does not have the same pragmatic
eﬀect or social range as the corresponding form in Marseille’s historical
vernacular. An instance of aﬀrication in Castellanois would evoke the diasporic
project dweller to someone acquainted with it, whereas aﬀrication in Marseille’s
historical vernacular would index the working-class, ethnically French fisherman
mode of life depicted for example in the œuvre of cinematographer and author
Marcel Pagnol, 1895-1974 (Binisti & Gasquet-Cyrus, 2003).41

Gasquet-Cyrus (2013) reports, quite interestingly, that since the 2000s palatalization and
aﬀrication have become increasingly associated within Marseille with how youth from the
Northern Quarters talk and less linked to Marseille’s vernacular. Were this kind of form in
question, then, its indexicality would likely depend on the speaker’s other behavior.
41
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Transcript 3.2 oﬀers an example of the non-identity—in pragmatic terms
—of homophonous forms shared by Standard French, Marseille’s vernacular, and
Castellanois. In this video excerpt, three young women from Class 3B and I are
brainstorming names that are typical of first-generation immigrants, whom the
students stereotypically call clandos.42 Halfway into the transcript, Samia and
Soumia begin talking about how they dislike the bled pronunciation of their
names, with first-syllable stress and three syllables (see right-most column in
Table 3.2). They prefer the Castellanois pronunciation of their names, with
second-syllable stress and two syllables (see Castellanois column below). Samia is
also worried, however, that due to homophonous pronunciations of her name
between Castellanois, Standard French, and Marseille’s vernacular, people might
mistakenly take her preferred pronunciation to mean she belongs to one of these
other groups, rather than to La Castellane.

42

Section IV deals specifically with the social figure of the clando.
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Table 3.2. Examples of Register Forms
Type of
Speech

Standard French

Example sa-'mja: ‘Samia’
Forms
(short [a],
stress on 2nd σ,
disyllabic)

Marseille’s
Vernacular

Castellanois

L2 French
(Native Arabic
Speaker)

=

sa-'mja:

=

sa-'mja:

'sa:-mi-ja
(long [a],
1st σ stress,
trisyllabic)

su-'mja: ‘Soumia‘ =
(short [u],
stress on 2nd σ,
disyllabic)

su-'mja:

=

su-'mja:

'su:-mi-ja
(long [u],
1st σ stress,
trisyllabic)

Transcript 3.2. Soumia and Samia
French Original

English Translation

Soumia: ((laughing)) Zulikha [zuliχɑ]
Samia & Asma: Zulikha [zuliχɑ]!
Samia: Ça c'est un nom qui fout leSoumia: Tranquille [tχəŋkilə]! Mais putain [pytəŋ],
ça va aller dans le video
Cécile: Et pourquoi ce sont des noms clandos en fait?
Samia: Chez pa::s... Zulikha [zuliχɑ]
Asma: Non, c’est pas des noms clandos. C'estSamia: -C’est pas des noms clandos. C’est des noms
qui fait chauﬀer quoi
Soumia: Chez pas. T’es dans la classe, tu [ʧy]
entends “oh Zulikha [zuliχɑ]!” Tu [ʧy] te retournes
directemente vers la persone tu [ʧy] la regardes
Cécile: C’est des noms qui font...?
Asma: Remarquer
Soumia: Chauﬀer
Samia: Chauﬀer
Cécile: Chauﬀer ça veut dire quoi?
Samia, Asma, Soumia: Remarquer
Cécile: Mmm mmm mmm
Soumia: Bon, moi je parle pas parce que mon
prénom est un peu aussi [ɔsi]Samia: -Ouais moi moi je-j’aime pas au lieu de-les
gens les Arabes et tou::t au bled... Ici ils disent Samia
['sa:-mja]. ((pause indicating she is now talking
about the bled)) 'Sa:::m-i-ya ['sa:::-mi-ja]. Ils disent
toujours “i”

Soumia: ((laughing)) Zulikha [zuliχɑ]
Samia & Asma: Zulikha [zuliχɑ]!
Samia: It’s a name that screws shit uSoumia: Chill! Crap, that’s going on the
video Cécile: And why exactly are these
clando names?
Samia: Dunno... Zulikha [zuliχɑ]
Asma: No, they’re not clando names. TheSamia: -They’re not clando names. They’re
names that make you stand out y’know?
Soumia: I dunno. You’re in class, you
hear "oh Zulikha [zuliχɑ]!" You turn right
around and look at the person
Cécile: They’re names that make you...?
Asma: Noticeable
Soumia: Stand out
Samia: Stand out
Cécile: What does “stand out” mean?
Samia, Asma, Soumia: To be noticed
Cécile: Mmm mmm mmm
Soumia: We::ll, I shouldn’t talk because
my name is a bit like that tooSamia: -Yeah I-I do-don’t like it when
people-Arabs and all in the bled... Here
they say Samia ['sa:-mja]. ((pause
indicating she is now talking about the
bled)) 'Sa:::m-i-ya ['sa:::-mi-ja]. They
always say the "i"
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Soumia: Moi suis toujours Sou-mi-ya ['su-mi-ja]
Samia: Sa:::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja]. Viens là Sa:::miya
['sa:::-mi-ja]. J'aime pas!
Soumia: Sa::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja]
Samia: Sa::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja], ah! C’est pas beau!
((giggling)) ... Non…
Cécile: Pourquoi, tu-tu prefères quoi?
Samia: Samia [sa-'mja:]! Mais Samia [sa-'mja:] ça
fait aussi un petit peu:: ((((circular head movement
indicating snobbery))
Soumia: Bah c'est normal. On dirait [ʤiχε] au bled il
va dire[ʤiχ] Samia [sa-'mja]?
Samia: Non non c’est pSoumia: Ah c'est pas comme ça
Samia: Ils rajoutent des [ʀa:::] des [qa:] à la fin ....
Ah, c'est pas drole [dχɔl]

Soumia: I’m always Sou-mi-ya ['su-mi-ja]
Samia: Sa:::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja] come here
Sa:::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja]. I ha:::te it!
Soumia: Sa::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja]
Samia: Sa::miya ['sa:::-mi-ja], ah! It’s so
ugly! ((giggling)) ... Na::w
Cécile: Why, what do you-you prefer?
Samia: Samia [sa-'mja:]! Even if Samia
[sa-'mja:] seems a bi::t ((((circular head
movement indicating snobbery))
Soumia: Hey that’s normal. Really think
someone from the bled would say Samia
[sa-'mja]?
Samia: No no, it’s morSoumia: Nope, that’s not how it goes
Samia: They add [ʀa:::]s and [qa:]s in at
the end.... Ah it’s not even funny

Samia’s head gesture is key to understanding how homophony in forms
may not be identity at the level of pragmatics. Like Kader and Nasser from the
initial anecdotes of the chapter, Samia prefers her name pronounced in
Castellanois, with French stress and vowel length. Meanwhile, she acknowledges
that there may be more aﬄuent diasporic people in Marseille who, to indicate
that class belonging, pronounce their own Arabic-sourced names in Standard
French. Samia’s head wag shows her negative stance on uppity people of that
sort. Possible confusions notwithstanding, Samia continues to prefer her name
pronounced like in La Castellane: “Here, they say Samia [sa-'mja].” This
transcript likewise allows a second glance at some of Castellanois’ characteristic
forms, bolded in the original French text. As before, there is aﬀrication of /d/
and /t/ (e.g., tu > [ʧy], dire > [ʤiχ]) and use of the open-mid back vowel /ɔ/
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(e.g., osi > [ɔsi], dʁol > [dχɔl]). The velar nasal also appears in lieu of a
nasalized word-final vowel (e.g., [pytəŋ], and French /ʁ/ is consistently replaced
with Arabic-sourced /χ/ (e.g., tʁɑ̃ki:l > [tχəŋkilə]).
I turn now to discussing linguistic syncretism in greater depth. Why have
youth from La Castellane created and made of Castellanois, specifically, a vehicle
for expressing their diasporic Marseillais identity? The majority of students in
Class 3B grew up exposed to both Marseille’s vernacular and dialectal Arabic
varieties. As such, they were particularly well positioned to exploit their
knowledge of both of these linguistic systems. Kurylowicz (1964, p. 40) defines
linguistic syncretism as “the suppression of a relevant opposition under certain
determined conditions.” Hill and Hill (1986), and later Woolard (1999), would
draw upon this definition in their further elaboration of linguistic syncretism.
Hill and Hill (1986) contribute the insight that bilingual speakers may
compromise the usual degree of separation between two linguistic systems for
an express cultural purpose of their own making. Woolard (1999), in turn,
creates a typology of linguistic syncretism in which she includes the phenomena
of bivalency, interference, and code-switching. These three linguistic phenomena
have in common that they take place in bilinguals’ communication and involve
“live, unresolved copresences” between two (or more) languages, thus allowing
speakers to “thrive in their tense intersection” (pp. 5-6). Castellanois is a register
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that is characterized by a high degree of the interference type of syncretism, and
below I will suggest some possible social functions for such interference
phenomena.
Interference, as per Haugen’s (1956) early definition, represents a kind of
“linguistic overlap” whereby bilinguals apply their two linguistic systems to a
single linguistic form (p. 50). Woolard (1999) develops this idea, identifying
interference as the special case of linguistic syncretism when a speaker actively
selects both languages at once by drawing on their respective systems, often at
diﬀering levels of language (e.g., phonology, morphology, syntax, prosody).
Unlike the bivalent type of syncretism, where bilinguals deploy words or sounds
that “could ‘belong’ equally...to both codes” and are hence ultimately decided
based on the listener’s viewpoint (p. 7), speakers who engage in the interference
type of syncretism find ways of choosing both languages at once in order not to
have to settle on either alone. Hill and Hill (1986) provide examples of
interference from their research with Mexicano (Nahuatl) and Spanish bilinguals
in the Malinche Volcano region of Central Mexico. Mexicanos, for example, use
the expression “sus personitas de ustedes” to mean “your respected persons” (p.
196). Although the expression appears Spanish and looks as though it employs a
regular Spanish diminutive, the form personitas in fact represents a calque from
Mexicano honorific morpheme -itas. Hill and Hill (1986) argue that this and
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other instances of interference in their data capture the desire of certain
Mexicano-Spanish bilinguals to put on an authentic or legitimate Mexicano
persona. When speaking in Spanish, such individuals nativize the European
language’s phonology, morphology, syntax, and prosody, thus taking on the
“Mexicano accent in Spanish” that will eﬀectively convey their purist persona (p.
198).
Below, I enumerate and analyze various examples I observed of youth
doing interference between Marseille’s vernacular and dialectal varieties of
Arabic. Involving the consistent overlap of these varieties at some level of
language, these examples reveal Castellanois to be a “double-voiced” register, in
Bakhtin’s (1984, p. 189) sense. Bakhtin coined the term double-voicing to
capture how certain linguistic texts are uttered or written from more than one
perspective, or voice. He found that double-voicing was in fact an utterancespecific manifestation of the more general condition of the speech community he
called “heteroglossia” (1981, p. 272) or its composition by many voices in
tension with one another. Since Bakhtin, a handful of ethnographers and
linguists have shown how actual linguistic varieties characteristic of a social
group, or “registers” in the technical sense already given, may also be doublevoiced. Urciuoli (1996), for instance, studied English-Puerto Rican Spanish
syncretism in the “ordinary bilingual speech” of Puerto Rican-Americans in New
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York (p. 35). Meanwhile, Meeuwis and Blommaert’s (1998) pieced together that
immigrants to Belgium from the Democratic Republic of Congo were using
Lingala-French and Swahili-French as monolectal, unmarked codes. Eisenlohr
(2006), too, investigated how Hindu Mauritians shifted between two
linguistically syncretic voices, creole fransise and a purist Bhojpuri mixed with
Hindi. These ethnographies have demonstrated that two (or more) linguistic
codes may be jointly enregistered as indicative of one social identity. This kind of
lamination between codes looks “diverse” at the level of practices but, at the
level of ideologies about speaker types, coheres into a single, double-voiced
persona. Castellanois represents yet another instance of these “hybrid social
voices” (Agha, 2009, p. 254) and is perhaps best thought of as the coloration of
French with dialectal Arabic. Interestingly, moreover, it appears that, so
intimately have Castellanois’ forms been associated with the social identity of the
diasporic project youth that the mere insertion of a Castellanois form, even into a
language like MSA or English, can cue the same identity. In other words, due to
the enregisterment of a particular social range for Castellanois linguistic forms,
youth from La Castellane are able to gesture to their identity within multiple
languages. This holding steady of identity across languages presents an
interesting comparison case to research showing that bilinguals diﬀer in how
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they express their identity, depending on the language in which they are
speaking (Koven, 2004).
The following example demonstrates how youth draw upon their
knowledge of Marseille’s vernacular, in eﬀect the matrix language for
Castellanois, when looking for places to interpose Arabic-sourced elements. Thus,
during an MSA lesson in which Madame Chérif was introducing new vocabulary,
she brought up the MSA words ustādh and ustādhah, male and female teacher,
respectively. She began with, “What is the meaning of ustādh?” ()ما معنى أستاذ؟, to
which the students collectively replied “professeur!,” or teacher in French. She
then asked the same question, only with ustādhah ()أستاذة, emphasizing the
feminine singular morpheme, -ah, at the end. Surprised to see the student
named Sabrina uncharacteristically raising her hand, Madame Chérif called on
her. Sabrina drawled: “Ça veut dire professeuse [sa vœ ʤiχ pχɔfεsœ:wz]” (‘it means
teacheresse’). Sabrina’s sentence begins with a subject and verb that could
equally have belonged to Standard French. The latter two forms, “dire professeuse”
(‘means teacheresse’), could only be read as Castellanois, however. These forms
display several kinds of interference, both morphological and phonological.
From the morphological standpoint, Sabrina brought the incorrect French
feminine morpheme (-euse) to bear on the word for teacher. Sabrina, seeking to
highlight the feminine semantics of the MSA word ustādhah, had likely found the
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correct French feminine morpheme, -e, unfitting due to its non-pronunciation in
professeure. She thus borrowed from French another more evidently feminine
morpheme, -euse. The eﬀect was to create a fictive but French-sounding calque
of the MSA word for female teacher. Rendered in Castellanois phonology, both her
calque and the preceding infinitive verb dire brandish the typically Marseillais
features of aﬀrication (e.g., Standard French [diʁ] > [ʤiχ] and the realization
of /o/ as [ɔ] (e.g., Standard French [pʁofεsœr] > [pχɔfεsœ:wz]). In both dire and
professeuse Sabrina likewise substitutes the two French ‘r’s’ /ʁ/ for Arabicsourced [χ] (e.g., [pχɔfεsœ:wz]). As if to corroborate Soumia’s father’s remark
about Castellanois being heavy-handedly Marseillais (c.f., Transcript 3.1), Sabrina
also exaggerates [œ] by lengthening it and latching on an atypical [w] to
heighten its roundedness. Her entire sentence now reads as one in Castellanois.
Like slang varieties more generally (Agha, in press), a key feature of Castellanois
is that its utterances resemble Standard French or Marseille’s vernacular, but
only fractionally so.
As apparent from this analysis, what distinguishes Castellanois’ repertoire
is a partial resemblance to these other two varieties but also, quite importantly,
interference from Arabic phonology. This interference is an active one, as
Woolard (1999) has argued. Woolard reuses the term interference in Haugen’s
(1956) sense, meaning not the unwilling intrusion of one’s first language into
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one’s second language, but how bilinguals can expressively deploy both their
languages jointly in order to assume particular cultural stances. In their
complementary work on Chicano English, another second-generation linguistic
register, both Bills (1977) and Fought (1997) submit that Chicano English is not
American Latino youth’s learner variety of English, interfered with by their
knowledge of Spanish. Many of its speakers, Fought (1997) reminds the reader,
do not in fact speak Spanish. Rather, Chicano English represents a
“vernacular” (Bills, 1977) or a “dialect” (Fought, 1997), meaning a form of
speech whose combination of California Anglo varieties and Mexican Spanish is
mainly culturally elaborated. Castellanois is similar to Chicano English in at least
two respects. First, youth from La Castellane had a regional variety of Arabic as
a first language only very rarely. Perhaps two of the students, Kader and Siwar,
spoke fluent Algerian and Tunisian, respectively. Second, youth from families
that were not Arab also spoke Castellanois to claim project status. These two
dynamics argue strongly in favor of categorizing Castellanois as a variety youth
produce for its distinct cultural relevance, much of which owes to active
interference phenomena. As demonstrated by Sabrina’s utterance, Castellanois
syncretically joins two varieties and so, in a sense, adheres to neither one fully.
The examples of interference in Table 3, below, show a similar tendency.
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Table 3.3 collects examples of Castellanois expressions, including a
discourse marker, a vocative, verbs, adjectives, and nouns, that are used by
students from Class 3B in syntactically French contexts. They all, however,
display a measure of Arabic phonological influence, showcasing consonants
like /χ/ and pharyngeal /ħ/, and also the back vowel /ɑ/, each existent in
varieties of Arabic. Although such expressions might bring up associations of
“Arabic” in the minds of French speakers unfamiliar with the language (c.f.,
Chapter Two), they do not in fact evince any ties to Arabic varieties’ lexicons.
The one exception is l-hala, which has an etymological cousin in [l-ħa:la:],
‘celebration’ in North African varieties of Arabic. This form, which also exists in
other youthful varieties of French (c.f., Caubet, 2007), nevertheless departs from
Table 3.3. Castellanois Expressions Showing Interference
Castellanois Examples
of Interference (in IPA)
ɑχχε ‘then’ (discourse marker)
ɑχɑ ‘careful!’(vocative call for attention)
ʤəħ/χ ‘to annoy’ (e.g., tu djeuh [ʧy ʤəħ = you’re
pissing me off; djeuhman ‘an annoying person’)
χεnε ‘to be uncool” (e.g., ce filme etait khéné = that
movie was uncool)
ħam-ħam ‘a slut’ (e.g., cette fille est une ham-ham =
that girl is easy)
ħa:s ‘a crisis’ (e.g., c’est la hasse = it’s trouble)
l-ha:la ‘trouble’ (e.g., arrête de faire l-hala = stop
acting up)
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its etymological source insofar as young Castellaners depharyngealize the “h”
and have degenerated its meaning to ‘trouble.’ I will elaborate on one of these
examples in order to show how elements at various levels of linguistic
organization, and from both Marseille’s vernacular and dialectal varieties of
Arabic, converge in these forms.

Figure 3.2. “Soumia Tu Djeuh”

On a class day when Madame Chérif had to briefly excuse herself to speak
with someone in the hallway, a student named Soumia began doodling on the
chalkboard. One of the male students told her, Soumia tu djeuh [su-'mja: ʧy ʤəħ]
(‘Soumia, you’re annoying), aﬀricating the “t” in tu [ʧy] and the “d” of djeuh
[ʤəħ] and emphasizing the pharyngeal “h” at the end (c.f., Figure 3.2). Soumia,
as if to avenge herself, took to writing Mohamed’s complaint out on the board.
Soumia wrote what Mohamed had said, first in French, then in MSA. Although
she did not orthographically render Mohamed’s aﬀrication of stops in either her
French or MSA sentences, her tidy MSA version of Soumia did in fact reflect her
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preferred Castellanois pronunciation, adding a non-standard long “a” to indicate
stress on the last syllable ([su-'mja:]). She also wrote in the letter “khā’” to
represent how some Castellaners pronounce deuh with a [χ] sound. Both
Mohamed’s initial sentence and Soumia’s rendition of it join the syntax and
aﬀrication of Marseille’s vernacular with some phonological elements from nonstandard varieties of Arabic (e.g., /ħ, χ/). This type of syncretism abounded both
in and outside the classroom. Thus, Chainez enjoyed bothering Madame Chérif
with “Maḥdame!!” [maħda:m], inserting an unmistakable pharyngeal “h” into her
pleas for the teacher’s attention. Another insisted that the teacher spell and
pronounce her name, which would have been Jihad [ʒiha:d] in MSA, as the
aﬀricated Castellanois version, Djihad [ʤiha:d]. Upon seeing Djihad write her
name on the board for all to see, spelling it with the letters dal, jīm, ha’, alif, dal
()دجهاد, Madame Chérif laughed and asked another male classmate also named
Jihad whether he, too, preferred the aﬀricated pronunciation. Having only
recently arrived from Yemen, he quite predictably demurred. Another student
introduced me to her cat, whose name, bandit [bəŋʤi], she pronounced with the
heavy aﬀrication and velar nasal of an exaggerated Marseillais accent.
The overall eﬀect of such Castellanois forms on the Francophone or
Arabophone listener is to impart the impression of someone speaking
Marseillais-like French but layered with Arabic-like elements; neither listener
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would recognize their language completely. That said, it is important to note
that what young Castellaners speak together remains highly recognizable as
being a variety of French. In a similar vein, Deumert (in press) has remarked
that the syncretic South African register called Tsotsitaal is unlike Europe’s socalled “multi-ethnolectal” youth vernaculars (c.f., Kern & Selting, 2011) in one
important respect. She observes that, “African urban vernaculars are more
heavily mixed and often deliberately unintelligible to outsiders (indexing their
origin as secret languages), while European ethnolects show limited mixing and
are generally intelligible to outsiders” (p. 10). Although Castellanois forms can,
indeed, often be understood by outsiders, it nevertheless remains the case that
accessing their corresponding sphere of ideological meanings requires familiarity
with those who live in Marseille’s northern projects.
Thus far, I have described how circulating youth discourses about what
being from the projects means have contributed to enregistering a linguistic
variety, syncretically composed of Marseille’s working-class vernacular and nonstandard varieties of Arabic, as indexical of the diasporic youth persona typical
of Marseille’s projects. These discourses, presented earlier in Section III,
described La Castellane as the solidary capital of all bleds, also the role of being
raised in the projects (l’éducation quartiers) in making you tough, and lastly how
youth represented project interactions in kin terms. The linguistic behaviors
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shown to cue this identity, moreover, were marked by interference-type
syncretism between Marseille’s vernacular and non-Standard Arabic.
To close this section, below I review some examples suggesting that
forms showing linguistic inventiveness more generally, whether in French, MSA,
or even English, were also read by young Castellaners as signaling the same
project identity. This overall spirit of linguistic freedom was once conveyed by a
student named Chainez, when during a small tutoring session at school she
shouted out, “We’re from Marseille. We talk like we want. We are
Marseillais!” (On est de Marseille. On parle comme on veut. On est des Marseillais). The
following examples evince general linguistic playfulness at the intersection of
the standard-to-non-standard continua of both French and Arabic, and
specifically in the guise of Castellanois’ intrusion into other languages than
French. One day, a student named Fares responded to the teacher’s question of
“Can you open your notebooks?” with the Arabic-inflected English aﬃrmation
“yas!” [jɑs], prompting laughter and the recycling of this response for the
remainder of the year. On another occasion, Madame Chérif invited Yamin and
Karim to the front of class to perform a dialogue they had memorized from the
textbook. The interaction unfolded like this:
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Karim: Min ayna anta? (MSA. ‘where are you from?’)
Yamin: Ana min al-Maghreb [maχʀεb] (MSA. ‘I am from Morocco’)
Karim: ((bent over laughing)) Ouais, makhhhreb! [maχχχʀεb] (French ‘Yeah,
makhhhreb!’)
Madame Chérif: ((says nothing and moves on while students laugh))43

Here, Yamin seemed to forget his location in the MSA classroom and produced
the Castellanois form al-Maghreb [maχʀεb] (‘Morocco’). He swapped out the
voiced uvular ‘r’ /ʁ/, which exists equally in MSA and in French, for Castellanois
‘r’ [χ] and francisized the final vowel to [ε], neglecting to give the correct MSA
pronunciation of the word for Morocco: [al-maʁʀib]. Needless to say, Karim
found the mismatch between Castellanois’ usual setting and Yamin’s use of it in
the MSA classroom, and in MSA to boot, exceedingly funny. For eﬀect, he
repeated and exaggerated what Yamin had said, making the other students
dissolve into laughter.
Madame Chérif was well aware of youth’s use of Castellanois. Unlike other
teachers, who tried to coach students on their pronunciation as if Castellanois
was an unconscious failure of their articulatory organs, she most often ignored it
altogether when her students brought such features as the Castellanois /χ/ into
the MSA class, as above. She appeared to understand a great deal about
Castellanois’ interactional meanings as well. This excerpt from my fieldnotes

43

This interaction dates from 10.24.12.
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describes a telling interaction between Madame Chérif and a male student
named Ayman:
Watching Sara (Madame Chérif) seat Ayman at the back of class, Kenza looks at me and
says “he’s a non-stop panic attack” (il a une crise de nerfs). Today, he’s got his hair gelled like
James Dean. He’s wearing tight faded jeans tucked into white Lacoste hightops and a grey
t-shirt with gothic-like script. He has “Allah” written in Arabic on his right hand in purple.
Throughout class, Sara calls on him repeatedly on purpose. In his responses, he
pronounces anti as antchi and i’dadati as i’dadatchi, but she doesn’t correct him.

Here, Madame Chérif resisted correcting Ayman’s transformation of MSA anti
‘you’ into [anʧi] and MSA i’dādyatī ‘my prep school’ into [jʔda:djaʧi], perhaps
because she had read his use of Castellanois-like pronunciation in MSA as a
defiant stance on his part and preferred not to engage him in that behavior.
Other times, she would simply laugh at what the students came up with, as
when she introduced the new MSA verb sakana ‘to reside,’ and Fares felt inspired
to go to the board and conjugate the verb in the present-tense of French: “Je
sakane, tu sakanes, nous sakanons...” She would likewise smile when Anisa’s
classmates called her “Anisatun,” with the MSA (indefinite nominative) case
ending, which they did to mock her when she answered too many questions
right about MSA grammar.

IV.

Concluding Remarks

To conclude, this chapter addressed, first, the spirit youth from La
Castellane and La Bricarde believed to characterize these projects and their
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residents, and second, how youth expressed this spirit of “tough love” through
communicative means. Specifically, youth linguistically invoked their workingclass solidarity through heavy use of features and lexis from Marseille’s
vernacular, while they indexed their diasporic bled ties by peppering this broad
Marseillais with phonological and other elements drawn from non-standard
varieties of Arabic. The resulting syncretism, which they termed Castellanois,
represented a double-voiced speech register whose interference phenomena and
linguistic inventiveness pointed to the singular persona of the diasporic project
youth. The linguistic analyses in this section focused on how youth created
multi-vectorial junctures between several varieties in their repertoires at
diﬀerent levels of language, the total eﬀect of which was to “tinge” their
vernacular Marseillais base with Arabic-like additions.
From a more theoretical perspective, this chapter has addressed how to
define the borderland and, relatedly, what it means to be diasporic. The term
borderland, as Anzaldúa’s opening remarks established, is not primarily meant
to capture how certain places are geographically situated near or on a border
between countries. Rather, the borderlands are a theater in which actors are
brought to confront their country’s historical imbrication with bordering
countries. Whereas the residents of places more distant from the border may
stray from such “connected histories” (Subrahmanyam, 1997), imagining them
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to be parallel, borderlands residents mingle daily with people from neighboring
places. In Marseille, for instance, no diasporic person remains unaware of French
traditions in their environment, just as no ethnically French person may live in
Marseille and forget France’s colonial history. Further, when people from
diﬀerent social groups meet in Marseille, it is often not on equal footing. Thus,
youth from Class 3B may be downtown doing an internship in a department
store and encounter French-origin youth who call downtown home. Marseille, as
such, can be considered a “contact zone,” which as per Pratt (1991) is a place
“where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of
highly asymmetrical relations of power" (p. 34). It might also be viewed as a
“spotty borderlands,” in Zartman’s (2010) formulation. He writes about how, in
addition to national borders, some borderlands are characterized by other
internal borders. Northern Marseille illustrates this concept insofar as its
population is grouped into cultural “islands” isolated from the larger population;
although, as Zartman says, individuals who live in these enclaves nevertheless
have “diverse contacts and influence” across internal and external borders alike
(p. 8).
These reflections inspire the question of whether border places more
closely resemble buﬀer zones that function to separate the countries on either
side, France from its Southern border countries, for instance; or whether they
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might also play a role in bridging connections across countries. Speaking of the
Mediterranean specifically, Darling (2006) proposes that its borders function to
"overlap and blend" neighboring societies (p. 55). Although this kind of blending
might be observed in architecture or cuisine, nowhere is it clearer than in the
cultural practices of diasporic or so-called “border people” (Martínez & Sayer,
1994). Youth from La Castellane exemplified this syncretism, characteristic of
the borderlands as Anzaldúa described them. Their cultural and linguistic
practices were not, however, arbitrarily hybrid. Instead, students from Class 3B
elaborated culturally syncretic practices that explicitly positioned them in
relation to other places, like Paris, Central and Southern Marseille, and the bled,
and to other people, like Parisians, paillots, and clandos, the latter two types of
people being the subject of the next chapter. In other words, no third national
category of, say, Arab-Frenchness or French Arabness, became necessary to
capture the cultural singularity of these youth. Youth from La Castellane, rather,
were observed simply to be expanding upon what it means to be French today.
Kulick (1998) arrived at a similar conclusion in a quite diﬀerent context.
Summarizing his work with Brazilian travestis (or transgendered male
prostitutes) in Salvador de Bahia, he argues that gender studies has no need of a
“third gender” space to accommodate travestis' gendered subjectivity. Rather, he
encourages scholars of gender and sexuality to see travestis as expanding upon
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the gender binary. They are not trying to “squeeze themselves into the ‘wrong’
gender” (p. 232). To the contrary, he recognizes their articulations of gender
(e.g., their desire for men, their feminine beauty standards, their God-inspired
aversion to sex-change operations) as “distillations of patterns that exist
throughout Brazilian society” (p. 236). In a similar vein, the identity and
practices of youth from Class 3B highlighted elements of the French
mainstream, Marseille’s working-class culture, and the North and sub-Saharan
African societies they call bleds. In so doing, youth succeeded in
recontextualizing discourses circulating within such borderlands societies,
particularly with respect to Islam, ethnicity, immigration, and, as will become
apparent in Chapter Four, modernity.
A final consideration is what these youth’s practices disclose about the
construction of ethnicity. As Anzaldúa implied when she said being a Chicano
person from the borderlands is a “racial identity” (1999[1987], p. 84), border
places subject national identities to racial and ethnic identities. This chapter has
illustrated how youth from La Castellane articulated an ethnic identity, in Stuart
Hall’s broad sense of the term “ethnicity” (1992), that encompassed nods
towards class, nation, Islam, and race. Diasporic projecthood is, by this
definition, an ethnic identity, and its construction is indeed both ideological and
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processual, as Mandel (2008) has argued about ethnicity construction in the
German context.
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IV. Indexing the Self by Distancing the
Other: Clando Versus Paillot Imitations
I.

Introduction

If in Chapter Three I examined how through Castellanois youth gestured to
their own coherent, if syncretic, identity, in this chapter I present two other
phonolexical registers, and their corresponding personas, from which youth
playfully distanced themselves. A first section presents the stories youth tell
about the bled and people from the bled. I contend that youth’s chronotopic
formulations (Agha, 2015) of the bled and blédard people as backward helped
them position themselves, as youth born in France, as forward-thinking and
sophisticated, by contrast. I also examine the particular linguistic features youth
have enregistered as indexical of people from the bled, as well as examples of
how youth deployed this register—which they labeled clando—to diﬀerentiate
themselves from the first generation of immigrants to France, their parents’
generation. I argue, additionally, that clando is a persona that youth have
repossessed from French mainstream discourse, where the persona of the
“clandestin” (clandestine person) circulates and is negatively viewed. A second
section reports on how, similarly, youth mock Standard French to set themselves
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apart from the ethnically French. Specifically, I cover instances of youth using
Standard French speech forms in an exaggerated way to mock the ethnically
French and well-to-do people who live on the south side of Marseille. The
distant stance youth take on the paillot persona represents yet another case,
alongside that of clando, of Castellanois youth’s use of “othering” to position
themselves (Said, 1978).

II.

Stories of the Bled and Clando Imitations

Right before Winter Break, Madame Chérif began a new chapter in the
textbook with the students of Class 3B. The dialogue for that chapter took place
in a Moroccan city and mentioned the sights and sounds of a central plaza. It
was several minutes into the lesson when Kader blurted out “I didn’t know
there were movie theaters in the bled!” Madame Chérif looked at him squarely,
and responded, “You know, the bled is better than La Castellane.” This prompted
a loud “Of cou::::::::rse” (bien sur) from Mohamed. Again, Madame Chérif made
her point: “You guys think it’s great here and the bled is a Third World country.”
The last word on this topic was Mohamed booming “This place is Vegas!” (ici
c’est Las Vegas!). This section addresses how youth from Class 3B constructed
their parents’ home countries, or bleds, as both distant in style and backwards in
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time compared to Marseille’s projects. I argue that, by giving the bled a “thereand-then” chronotopic formulation (Agha, 2015), youth not only positioned
people from the bled as located in that particular envelope of time and space;
they also chronotopically formulated the projects and project dwellers like
themselves to exist in the “here-and-now.” The main activity through which
youth articulated these contrastive time-space frames was a mocking routine
that involved imitating how native Arabic speakers pronounce French and thus
dissociating themselves from the persona of the first-generation immigrant. I
begin by introducing examples of youth enacting this L2 French register, and
then I turn to analyze the various stereotypic qualities and chronotopic
dimensions in play when youth performed this register.
The students in Class 3B were quite familiar with how native Arabicspeaking adults in their milieu pronounced French, and they often took the
liberty of imitating them speaking thus. Their imitations fell into two broader
types. Some followed a reported speech construction, in which youth reported
on what someone, a parent for instance, had said, while others represented
instances of what Vološinov (1986) calls free direct style, or when “elements of
the reported message creep into and are dispersed throughout the entire
authorial text” (p. 133). In these cases, youth enacted the learner French register
themselves, without any framing devices signaling the presence of reported
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speech. A first example showcases the youth stereotype according to which
Arabic speakers have trouble producing words with consonant clusters, varieties
of Arabic showing two but no three-consonant clusters. I overheard a male
student ask his friend the following: “Have you seen the guys at the Porte d’Aix
who say ‘Marlboro? Marlboro? Malobo? Mal au dos [malodo] (back pain)?’” The
student was referring to mostly male immigrants who illegally lay out their
wares on the sidewalk around the Porte d’Aix, one of Marseille’s central
landmarks in the heart of a mostly Muslim neighborhood. He plays on the
similarity between the name for the cigarette brand Marlboro, which features a
three-consonant cluster (r-l-b), and the expression for back pain, mal au dos, in
which the vowel ‘o’ breaks up the consonant cluster. While this example
involved the reporting of an unknown individual’s (likely fictitious) French
speech, students from Class 3B also reported the genuine speech of people they
knew, especially their parents and neighbors.
In Transcript 4.1, for example, Mohamed recounts to a group of male
classmates and myself an encounter he had with Anisa’s mom. Anisa is a female
student in Class 3B, and she and her family, who have roots in Algerian Kabylia,
live in the same tower of La Castellane as Mohamed and his family. Mohamed
tells how he came across Anisa’s mom on the way back from the supermarket
while on summer vacation. He had been surprised at her invitation to eat some
!137

home-made rice cake at their place. Although he mostly narrates the story in
Castellanois, the IPA renditions of which are shown in bold, when he relays what
Anisa’s mom said to him, he switches to Arabic-influenced learner French and
some Berber-like nonsense sounds.
Transcript 4.1.44 Mohamed’s Story about Anisa’s Mother
French Original

English Translation

Mohamed: Et vous connaissez Anisa qui est dans
la classe?
Cécile: Ouais, bien sur.
Mohamed: Eh ben sa mèreElias & Kader: Oooh ((hooting))
Mohamed: -on descendais de Carrefour. Elle
est venue me voir et l'été je devais aller
en Algérie
Cécile: Hmm ((K laughing in background))
Mohamed: Elle m'a dit [ʤi] quoi, elle m'a dit
[ʤi]: Tu [ty] viens chi↑ [ʃi] moi ↓. Je te fais [fi] un
cake↑ [kik] du:::↓ [dy] riz [ʀi] chi [ʃi] moi. Ha ma
tcho tcho tu [ty] auras"
Elias: À poile
Mohamed: Elle fait trop [tχɔ] rire!

Mohamed: And you know Anisa who’s in
class?
Cécile: Yeah, of course.
Mohamed: Well, her momElias & Kader: Oooh ((hooting))
Mohamed: -we were coming down from
Carrefour. She came to see me and that
summer I was supposed to go to Algeria
Cécile: Hmm ((K laughing in
background))
Mohamed: You know what she said to
me, she said “You’ll come to my house. I’ll
make you a rice cake at my place ha ma
tcho tcho you’ll have”
Elias: Naked
Mohamed: She really makes you laugh!

Here, Mohamed switches between Castellanois register in the preface to
his anecdote (e.g., dit [ʤi]) and a modified learner French in his reported speech
clause. He cues his imitation of Anisa’s mother by transforming French vowels
according to the cardinal “i-a-u” Arabic vowel system (e.g., chez > shi [ʃi]), fais >
fi [fi]), using a swinging pitch, rolling his “r’s” (e.g., riz [ʀi], and no longer
44

This transcript dates from 2.11.13.
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aﬀricating his ’t’s’ and ‘d’s.’ 45 In this anecdote, the voice of the first-generation
parent appears to be one stereotypically associated with qualities like providing
people with a down-south kind of welcome. This warm welcome suggested by
Mohamed’s portrayal of Anisa’s mother was likely, furthermore, to have led
Elias to slip in the typically adolescent male tag-along “naked” at the end of
Mohamed’s story. Mohamed wraps up his story, tellingly, with the pleasant
captioned “She really makes you laugh.” This transcript, in sum, exemplifies
how youth at times drew on a register associated with first-generation
immigrants to France, and, in so doing, commented on these individuals’
distinguishing qualities as compared to the speakers, their French-born children.
In addition to reported speech constructions, students from Class 3B also
exploited this stereotypical Arab French-language learner register when
narrating themselves. These instances displayed a quality aptly described by
Vološinov (1986) as “reciprocal infectiousness” (p. 133), holding between the
narrated world of characters (like the first-generation immigrant) and the young
diasporic narrators. In simpler terms, when youth spoke thus, they eﬀectively
imbued themselves with some of the stereotypic qualities they tended to
associate with the register. A first example of this took place on a school day

As far as I have been able to ascertain from a conversation with a native Berber speaker,
Mohamed uses Berber-like gibberish at the end of his imitation (ha ma tcho tcho).
45
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when Madame Chérif had assigned Class 3B an MSA test. One male student,
Elias, was unable to take his test because several of his friends stole his paper
from him and scribbled across the front in red. By the time I saw the test during
the break period, Madame Chérif already given Elias a grade for (what she
presumed was) his work: 0/20. Above the grade, however, were the French
sentences: ‘I am the boss! Give me the answer and give me a 20’ (“Je suis li boss!
Donne li réponse et mi moi 20”).46 I have underlined how, in pretending to be him
taking the test, Elias’ friends substituted French vowels with Arabic’s cardinal a-

Figure 4.1. Elias’ MSA Test
The Standard French orthographic rendition of these sentences would be “Je suis le boss.
Donne les réponses et mets-moi 20.” (Though this was written to the teacher, the students used
informal tu forms).
46
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i-u vowels, a hallmark of this phonolexical register.
This example reveals yet another realm of stereotypical qualities youth
linked to the first-generation immigrant, those relating to being overly direct
and perhaps academically inept. Elias’ friends intended to invest Elias with some
of these qualities by giving him such a voice. Madame Chérif was herself quite
angered by the gesture, though she thought Elias was the culprit. When she
placed the test on the table in front of me in the teachers’ lounge, she
declaimed: “He’s making fun of Arabs!” I will comment more on how firstgeneration people like Madame Chérif reacted to this routine at the end of this
section.
If in the previous case, Elias was forced to speak in the first-generation
register, there were also many instances when youth willingly took on the
learner register to perform certain traits. Figure 4.2, for instance, is drawn from
students’ favorite medium, cell-phone texting. It shows a texted conversation
between two female students from Class 3B. One student poses a question in
French: “Have you seen The Maze Runner it looks tooooo good oulalaan I really
want to see it.” Her text evidences two tokens of the aforementioned vowel
transformations according to Arabic phonology, specifically her substitution of
“ju” [ʒu] for je ‘I’ and “lu” [lu] for le ‘it.’ Her transliteration of French oh-la-la
with an “n” at the end is likely the velar nasal of Castellanois. Perhaps inspired by
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Figure 4.2. Text about the Maze Runner Movie

the sprinklings of the Arab French-learner register in her friend’s text, the other
young woman takes fully to the register in her response: “The truth, I’m
drooling and all as soon as I see the trailer.” In this sentence, she does not miss
a single opportunity to use Arabic “u” instead of French “o” and Arabic “i”
instead of French “e.” Her friend’s response is “PTDRRR” (pétée de rire, ‘dying of
laughter), showing clear amusement at her friend’s imitation. The young woman
in the second text uses this register to express that she is, quite doltishly,
drooling over the movie trailer. Here, the young women linguistically invoke the
stereotypic figure of the first-generation Arab as a means to show their
overexcitement at a new movie coming out.
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What I have been discussing until now as the persona of the firstgeneration immigrant, which youth indexed through a particular French
phonolexical register, was often labeled the persona of the clando. Though only
linguistic behaviors have thus far been enumerated as indexical of the clando
persona, other behaviors involving one’s actions and appearance likewise formed
part of the clando figure’s repertoire. Importantly, first-generation as well as
French-born diasporic youth could be said to be acting clando by engaging in any
of these telltale behaviors. An example of how youth designated first-generation
individuals clandos pertains to Class 3B’s teacher, Madame Chérif. On a
particular week day, she came to school wearing a pair of high-heeled shoes, one
of which had a wobbly heel. As Madame Chérif and I were walking down the
hall after the last class of the day, the heel snapped oﬀ and she lurched forward.
I managed to catch her, and we both righted ourselves only to hear Chainez, an
MSA student in the 4ième class, yell down the hallway, “Madame Chérif is a
clandotte!” The student’s use of the female version of clando in this context
served to liken her teacher to a newly arrived immigrant who could perhaps not
aﬀord a new pair of heels, a suggestion that left Madame Chérif obviously
embarrassed. Significantly, however, youth never called someone a clando who
was in fact an illegal immigrant to France. Though the label for the register itself
was an apocope, or word-final clipping, of the lexeme clandestin, meaning
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clandestine or paperless, youth only deployed the label clando to pick out
diasporic individuals they knew who behaved in amusing ways and whom they
wished to mock, gently and, occasionally, less gently.
Transcript 4.2 oﬀers an example of how youth also applied clando to their
French-born diasporic peers when they found their behavior anomalous or out
of sync with preferred modes of acting, dressing, and speaking. This case also
illustrates how the figure of the clando was additionally accompanied by
ideologies of time and space, or chronotopic formulations, which, as per Agha
(2015), are time-space depictions that perdure for some period of time because
people repeatedly orient to them. The ensuing conversation takes place between
three female students from Class 3B: Fouhda, Sabrina, and Maisara. The three
young women single out Kader, who is often teased in class about his facility
with Algerian, and also about the fact that he and his brothers slept four to a
bedroom at home, as being bled-like, or a clando.47

Fouhda is third-generation Algerian, Sabrina is half second-generation Algerian and half thirdgeneration, and Maisara’s parents are Comorian. None of them speak a regional variety of
Arabic.
47
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Transcript 4.2. Kader is a Clando48
French Original

English Translation

Fouhda: Kader [kadεχ] tout [ʧy] le monde dit
[ʤi] que c’est un {cl-}
Cécile: {-C’est quoi un clando voila pourquoi
c’est-}
Fouhda: -{clando} Parce que il a l’accent quand il
parle, quand [kəŋ] il s’habille [abijə] et tout.
Exemple [εksəmplə], genre [ʒə̃χ], quand [kəŋ]
il met des survêts long [lɔŋ] et que c’est l’hiver il
va mettre des socquettes [sɔkεtə] et tout le mondeSabrina: -((giggling)) Tu [ʧy] es un clando tu
[ʧy] es {venu à la nage [naʒə] et tout}
Fouhda: {Genre} [ʒə̃χ] et ici, en France et tout, on
met pas des socquettes [sɔkεtə] avec un survêt. Ça
se fait pas on met des chaussettes longues. Et lui
non [nɑŋ]! Quand les ((unclear)) sur son pantalon
remontent on voît tous les socquettes [sɔkεtə]((M
laughing)) et tout le monde dit [ʤi] “ah, tu [ʧy]
es un clando” {et tout}
Sabrina: {T’es} [ʧε] venu à la nage du bled
Maisara: Tu [ʧε] es venu de la nage
Fouhda: Tout le monde dit t’es venu à la nage et
tout, ‘che pas quoi… Ou des fois sa façon de
s’habiller. Il va s’habiller tout en vert il va mettre
des grosses [gχɔsə] chaussettes [ʃɔsetə]
rouges [χu:ʒə] et tout. Attends dis [ʤi], arrête,
c’est clando ça!
Sabrina: Mais genre [ʒə̃χ]... Il est bizarre [bizaχ]
aussi [ɔsi] genre [ʒə̃χ]

Fouhda: Kader, everyone says he is a {cl}Cécile: -{And what’s a clando, I mean, why
is i}Fouhda: -{Clando} because he has the
accent when he talks, when he dresses
and all. Example, like, when he wears long
sweats and it’s winter but he’ll wear ankle
socks, and everyoneSabrina: ((giggling)) You’re a clando. You
{came swimming and all}Fouhda: {Like}, here in France and all, we
don’t wear ankle socks with a tracksuit. It
isn’t done. We wear long socks. But not
him, he’s gonna wear ((unclear)) and
when his pants get hiked up we see all
those ankle socks, and everyone says “ah,
you’re a clando” {and all}
Sabrina: {You} arrived swimming from
the bled
Maisara: You arrived from-swimming
Fouhda: Everyone says you arrived
swimming and all. I don’t know what... Or
sometimes his way of dressing. He’s
gonna dress all in green, then wear thick
red socks and all. Wait, come on. That’s
clando!
Sabrina: But he’s weird, too, like

In this segment, Fouhda, Sabrina, and Maisara call Kader a clando to
position themselves as cool in comparison to Kader’s uncool way of speaking
and dressing. In order to achieve distance between themselves and Kader, the
girls create contrastive deictic frames, mapping themselves into the “here” of the
quartier and Kader into the “there” of the bled. Personal deictics create the first
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deictic contrast. Whereas the young women speak as “I” (je), “we” (on), and
“everyone” (tout le monde), non-present Kader is referred to as “he” (il) or
addressed as “you” (tu). This personal diagram is then mapped into a spatial
contrast. The girls situate themselves in La Castellane with the spatial deictic of
proximity “here” (ici), while they transport Kader to the bled through the distal
deictic “over there” (là-bas). Kader’s spatial “transposition” (Haviland, 1996) to
the bled is further reinforced, additionally, by the girls’ reiteration of the
derogatory statement “tu es venu à la nage” (‘you arrived here swimming’).
Specifically, the verb venir (‘to come’), which is a path-encoding verb implying
movement from an outside location towards an origo coinciding with speaker
location, implies a deictic origo for Kader that is in the bled, not in France.
Considering Stasch’s (2011) definition of the chronotope as “scale of
spatial and temporal horizons within which some events are understood as
meaningfully occurring” (p. 3), a Bakhtinian (1981) chronotope—or, more
technically, a chronotopic formulation (Agha, 2015)—is thus discernible in the
girls’ narrative. What the girls appear to be constructing in this segment is a
chronotopic formulation of the quartier versus another of the bled. Marseille’s
projects are given a position as spatially central, and also present in the
contemporary “now” of France. In this here and now, as the girls indicate, long
socks are worn in winter under one’s sweats. This project chronotope is made
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central to the above interaction, moreover, through the de-centering of the bled.
Kader is depicted, not only as distant in space from the girls, but also as
removed in time. He, quite anachronistically, wears ankle socks in winter and
mismatched colors to class. Students also contrasted the time and space of the
bled to those of La Castellane in the opening anecdote to this section. In that
instance, Kader doubted if there were any movie theaters in Morocco and
Mohamed pronounced La Castellane “Las Vegas.”
This chronotopic formulation of La Castellane as flashy and cool, and of
the bled as backwards and stagnant, echoes Dick’s (2011) reflections on how
diasporic individuals often speak about movement in ways pervaded by
discourses of modernity and progress. In her piece on the modernist chronotope
deployed by Mexican Uriangatense immigrants to the U.S., Dick (2010a)
concludes that the way immigrants, returnees, and those who stayed discussed
migration revealed that people’s physical movement to the U.S. was often talked
about in terms of time. Likely influenced by circulating discourses of progress
and modernism, Dick’s informants conceived of moving to the U.S. as moving
forward in life (seguir adelante), an advancement that was contrasted with staying
in Uriangato, México, made equivalent to being trapped in a benighted place.
Just as the people who stayed in Uriangato were perceived as backwards in time
and immigrants as forward-looking, so, too, does the narration by these three
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young women chronotopically position the projects and its diasporic inhabitants
as forward, and the bled and those who come from there as retrograde.
Another transcript furnishes evidence that students from Class 3B justify
some of the binaries sketched above, between the bled and the projects, and the
clandos and young project dwellers, through the semiotic process of iconization
(Irvine & Gal, 2000) in addition to chronotopic formulations. Specifically, in
Transcript 4.3 below a group of six male students is shown to naturalize the
“rawness” of people from the bled by sketching iconic links between the
“scratchy” sounds of their languages (e.g., Algerian, Tunisian, etc.) and the
types of people they are. Quartiers youth, by contrast, are smooth-talking and
street-wise, as presupposed by the syncretic lilt of Castellanois. The linking of
sound to shape or sound to texture can be understood as a form of synesthesia,
or the apperception of one sense in terms of another. Eisenlohr (2006), for
instance, documents how in the French ex-colony of Mauritius, speakers
iconically link the articulatory movements needed to produce Standard French
phonemes [ʃ] and [ʒ], namely, a “pointing” of the lips, to a speaker’s degree of
precision or refinement. Gasquet-Cyrus (2013) reports, similarly, that the
Standard French spoken by Marseille’s bourgeoisie can be described, depending
on the listener’s perspective on people in this social group, as either “l’accent
pointu,” the pointed-lips or tidy accent, or the “cul de poule” (literally, chicken
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anus or, figuratively, uppity) accent. Whereas in both those examples speakers
gave certain articulatory movements, or shapes, ideological meanings, in the
excerpt in Transcript 4.3, by contrast, youth focus on the connection between
active articulatory organs, the texture of the resulting sound, and people’s
qualities.
The Russian novelist Vladimir Nabokov is catalogued in the Dictionary of
Hallucinations (Blom, 2010) as having experienced a form of conceptual
synesthesia. He himself describes in his autobiography how the thought of one
or several letters was immediately accompanied by a secondary perception of
color, shape, and texture.
"The long a of the English alphabet...has for me the tint of weathered wood, but a French a
evokes polished ebony. This black group also includes hard g (vulcanized rubber) and r (a
sooty rag being ripped). Oatmeal n, noodle-limp l, and the ivory-backed hand mirror of o
take care of the whites. I am puzzled by my French on which I see as the brimming
tension-surface of alcohol in a small glass. Passing on to the blue group, there is steely x,
thundercloud z, and huckleberry k." (Nabokov, 1989[1947], p. 34).

Was Nabokov a victim of this parade of sensory ideas or visions? Or was he
involved, perhaps creatively, in the linking of these sounds (or imagined
graphemes) and ideated sensations over the course of his lifetime? Whereas
Nabokov suﬀered synesthesia as an individual neurological ailment, this
transcript suggests that synesthesia can also be explored as a group-centric
process whereby pairings are made between sounds and sensations and form the
basis of ideologies that naturalize types of people. Below, I asked the young men,
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whom I had gathered in an empty classroom, to identify male and female names
they would say are typically clando. In response, they developed two themes.
First, they portrayed clando people from the bled as tough or rough-hewn,
inasmuch as they iconically resemble the throat-itching, stomach-breaking
phonemes /ħ, χ, ʀ/ required to produce their names. Secondly, and by contrast,
the image of the suave, street-wise youth from La Castellane is aﬃrmed by the
creamy, pomade-like Castellanois that youth from the project speak, exemplified
by how they render their names.
Transcript 4.3.49 Clandos Names
French Original

English Translation

Cécile: Ouais, c'est quoi des-des noms clandos en
arabe?
Ayman: Oh Haj Issa::: euh genre les trucs avec
[ħ:::] [eħ:::]
Oussama: Mahmoud [maħmu:d]
Elias: Avec un "h" dedans, non [nɑŋ] mais t'as
[ʧɑ] compris quand [kəŋ] il y a un “h” devant
Oussama: Rashid [ʀaʃi:d]
Mohamed: Abdel Kader [abdεl kadεχ]
Cécile: Et pourquoi Rashid?
Oussama: Rashid [ʀaʃi:d]- ((someone makes an
[aħħħħħħħħ] sound)) parce que c’est un prénom
arabe
Cécile: Donc c’est clando?
Oussama: Non [nɑŋ], mais il y a des rashids qui
parlent français
Mohamed: Et ouais le frère à SheyreenKader: ((loudly)) Elle m’a quitté [kiti], je
m’appelle Rashid [ʀaʃid::]! ((laughing))
Kader: Ah Khaled [χχ:alε:d] ((laughing, someone
tapping on table))

Cécile: Yeah, what are some clando names
in Arabic?
Ayman: Oh Haj Issa::: Well, like, things
with [ħ:::] [eħ:::]
Oussama: Mahmoud [maħmu:d]
Elias: With an "h" in them, no, but you
know, with an “h” in front
Oussama: Rashid [ʀaʃi:d]
Mohamed: Abdel Kader [abdεl kadεχ]
Cécile: And why Rashid?
Oussama: Rashid [ʀaʃi:d]- ((someone
makes an [aħħħħħħħħ] sound)) because it’s
an Arab first name
Cécile: So it’s clando?
Oussama: NO, but there are some rashids
who speak French
Mohamed: Uh yeah, like Sheyreen’s
brotherKader: ((loudly)) She left me, my name is
Rashid [ʀaʃid::]! ((laughing))
Kader: Ah Khaled [χ:alε:d] ((laughing,
someone tapping on table))
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Ayman: [χχa] Genre [gə̃χ:] euh tu [ʧy] dois
prononcer avec ta gorge, avec ta gorge
Oussama: Je m'appelle Khadija [χadija]
Elias: Ça pique le [χχχχχχχχχ]!
Cécile: Il y en a pas de ((unclear)) dans les noms
clandos?
((unclear)): Khamisa [χamisa]
Oussama: Parce que [paχs-kœ] ça c’est en français
((now to tablemate)) Commence pas!
Ayman: Ka:::- Kader [kadεχ]
Cécile: Kader?
Kader: Ça passe crème [kχεmə]!
Cécile: Ça passe quoi?
Mohamed: Ça passe POMADE ((laughing))
pomade
Cécile: Et les noms pour les filles cl-clandottes?
Multiple: KHADIJA [χadija]
Ayman: Zohra [zuħra]
Kader: Rashida [ʀaʃida]
Oussama: NON, NON, Zouliha [zuliħa]
Ayman: Attends, attends, attends! Vas-y CASSE
LE VENTRE!
Oussama: Non, Cutter Cutter [kœtεχ]
Mohamed: Zinouba [zi:nubɑ] ((laughing))
Kader: Cutter c’est les parents à Samia ça
Elias: Lakhdar [lɑχdɑʀ]
Kader: C’est le frère à Kenza, Lakhdar ((laughing))
Sabah [sabεħ]
Oussama: HOUDA [ħudɑ] ((shrieking))
Elias: Même le street factor il n’y est pas
Ossama: ((talking about Ayman)) Il sort les
prénoms de ses cousines obligé ((laughing))
Ayman: Oh par Allah [ɑɫ:ɑ:] que non. La tête de
ma mère que non. Non, genre [ʒə̃χ] mon arrière
grandmèreOussama: -istaghfirullah [istɑɣfiruɫ:ɑ:](MSA ‘may
God forgive you’)
Ayman: Mais c'est vrai ((laughing)) elle s’appelleje me moque pas d’elle
((unclear)): Istaghfirullah [istɑɣfiruɫ:ɑ:]
Kader: istaghfirullah [istɑɣfiruɫ:ɑ:] Ayman
Ayman: MAHJOUBA! [maħju:ba]
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Ayman: [χχa] Like uh you have to
pronounce with your throat, your throat
Oussama: My name is Khadija [χadija]
Elias: The [χχχχχχχχχ], it itches!
Cécile: There isn’t any ((unclear)) in
clando names?
((unclear)): Khamisa [χamisa]
Oussama: Because that’s in French ((now
to tablemate)) Don’t start!
Ayman: Ka:::- Kader [kadεχ]
Cécile: Kader?
Kader: It goes over like butter!
Cécile: Like what?
Mohamed: It goes over like POMADE
((laughing)) pomade
Cécile: And what about names for clclandottes?
Multiple: KHADIJA [χadija]
Ayman: Zohra [zuħra]
Kader: Rashida [ʀaʃida]
Oussama: NO, NO, Zouliha [zuliħa]
Ayman: Hold up, hold up, hold up! Now
go for it-BREAK YOUR STOMACH!
Oussama: No, Cutter Cutter [kœtεχ]
Mohamed: Zinouba [zi:nubɑ]
((laughing))
Kader: Cutter that’s one of Samia’s
relatives
Elias: Lakhdar [lɑχdɑʀ]
Kader: It’s Kenza’s brother, Lakhdar
((laughing)) Sabah [sabεħ]
Oussama: HOUDA [ħudɑ] ((shrieking))
Elias: There’s not even any street factor
Oussama: ((talking about Ayman)) He’s
pulling his girl cousins’ names out of the
bag ((laughing))
Ayman: By Allah I’m not. On my
mother’s head I’m not.No, but like my
great grandmotherOussama: -istaghfirullah[istɑɣfiruɫ:ɑ:]
(MSA ‘may God forgive you’)
Ayman: No, but seriously. ((laughing))
Her name is-I’m not making fun of her
((unclear)): Istaghfirullah[istɑɣfiruɫ:ɑ:]
Kader: istaghfirullah [istɑɣfiruɫ:ɑ:] Ayman
Ayman: MAHJOUBA! [maħju:ba]

Cécile: Wow c’est ta grandmère?
Ayman: Non, mon arrière grandmère
Kader: Elle a fait fort hein [œŋ]

Cécile: Wow that’s your grandmother?
Ayman: Non, my great grandmother
Kader: She did a solid job. Yep.

Beyond the extreme amusement being had all around, it is also worth
suggesting that the male youth in this segment are likewise engaged in drawing
ideological, and especially iconic, links between the texture of certain sounds
and the people who speak them. The boys state, for example, that in order to
produce such clando miracles as Mahjouba [maħju:ba], one must “pronounce with
the throat” and “break the stomach.” People from the bled are thus constructed
as rough-hewn and capable of doing diﬃcult things, like braving immigration to
France for instance. Mid-way through the transcript, Kader introduces his own
name, only he pronounces it in Castellanois, as [kadεχ]. He informs me that
“Kader” rendered in this way goes over smooth as hair gel (ça passe pomade). It
dovetails perfectly, moreover, with the “street factor” required of project youth.
This transcript serves to show how youth from La Castellane naturalize the
speech repertoires associated with the personas of both the diasporic youth and
the clando. On the one hand, this group of young men establishes ties of
resemblance between the “raspy” varieties of North African Arabic and the firstgeneration clando. To this they contrast, on the other hand, how their own street
cool reflects in Castellanois, a register whose forms correctly apportion the
phonological softness of French and the brawn of non-standard Arabic.
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Importantly, constructing people from the bled as tough but unsophisticated
enables youth from La Castellane to position themselves as a degree less tough
and a lot more up-to-date. Kiesling (2001) calls this type of self-other
positioning the strategy of “marking the other” (p. 102). Just as in Kiesling’s
piece white fraternity boys indirectly made a subject position for themselves by
creating a diﬀerent category for African Americans, the examples in Transcripts
4.2 and 4.3 likewise demonstrated how clando imitations diminished people born
in the bled as they also, if implicitly, carved out a sophisticated identity for youth
from Marseille’s projects.
A final set of comments addresses the social repercussions of youth’s
clando mocking routine. Was it the case that, insofar as Madame Chérif was
oﬀended by her students’ deployment of clando register, youth’s routine was
somehow a pejorative one? Did youth’s recycling of the figure of the clando,
along with its backward temporal qualities, for instance, spell youth’s reiteration
of negative “First-World” perspectives on the “Third World”? Did overhearers
tend to construe instances of clando mocking as having a voicing structure where
diasporic youth from the projects were “animators” who, ultimately, had French
people prejudiced towards immigrants as their “principal” (Goﬀman, 1979, p.
17)? For various reasons, it would seem not. First, as mentioned, people whom
youth positioned as clando were, in the instances I witnessed, never in fact illegal
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immigrants. They were, rather, often close to the speaker, a relationship typically
gestured to via co-textual cues bespeaking aﬀection. Thus, Mohamed wrapped
up his story about Anisa’s mother with kind comments about her comicality,
and Sabrina, Maisara, and Fouhda in fact got along quite well with Kader, who
incessantly teased them back. Secondly, although Madame Chérif was ill-at-ease
with youth’s clando imitations, it may have been the case that she was unfamiliar
with the full social range of the clando register and its more innocuous uses.
Certainly, youth themselves seemed to find great pleasure in finding new
behaviors, like Kader’s “ankle socks,” or new social stances, like eagerness at a
new movie, that could be grouped under the clando persona. Their keenness to
exploit all of clando’s possible indexical niches is reminiscent of other strategic
uses of foreigner-type talk in France, notably by foreigners. Vigoureux (2011)
writes about how West African marabouts or clairvoyants in France, in composing
paper advertisements to market their healing services, played up all possible
linguistic marks of being African learners of French in order to perform the
“authentic African persona” that they believed their French clients would
entrust with their healing needs. Lastly, the clando imitations reviewed here
were, moreover, enacted by youth who were in fact diasporic, meaning their own
parents were from a bled.
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In a final transcript, I give an example of a mainstream French person
making a joke that negatively represents clandestine immigrants. Transcript 4.4
represents a joke that Nathalie, one of the ethnically French adult students in
my MSA class, which was held at a community center in downtown Marseille,
told to our class. Her joke tells the story of a North African male who wishes to
leave for France and, in preparation, attempts to perfect his French as much as
possible.
Transcript 4.4.50 Nathalie’s Joke
French Original

English Translation

Nathalie: Il y a un autre c’est un-c’est un,
pareil, un-il y en a un qui veut aller en France.
On lui dit “Bon, il faut que tu apprennes bien
à parler français. Il faut pas qu’on sente que
t’as un-.” Alors il apprend euh pendant dix
jours la même phrase: “Bonjour monsieur, je
voudrais un cafe s'il-te plait et deux
croissants." Alors il arrive à Paris, il rentre
dans un bar. Il dit "Bonjour monsieur, je
voudrais un cafe et deux croissants." “Ah, il y
a plus de croissants." "Bah c'est pas garave
[gaʀaf], don-ne [don:ə] moi une biroche
[biʀioʃ]" ((other classmates laughing))

Nathalie: There’s another (joke). It’s it’s a-it’s
a, same thing, there’s one (guy) who wants to
go to France. He’s told “Okay, you have to
learn to speak French well. It’s best if no one
hears that you have a-.” So he learns uh the
same sentence during ten days: “Hello sir, I
would like a coﬀee please and two croissants.”
So he arrives in Paris, and he walks into a bar.
He says, “Hello sir, I would like a coﬀee please
and two croissants.” “Oh, there aren’t any
more croissants.” “Oh, that’s not a problem,
give me a brioche [biʀioʃ]” ((other classmates
laughing))

The joke’s punchline plays on the contrast between the man’s assiduous
linguistic preparation for life in France and how he thoughtlessly botches his
whole plan to “pass” as French in exchange for a brioche, since there are no
croissants. Focused as he is on either the brioche or complying with the French
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barman, the character slips back into his natural Arabic-influenced French,
trilling his ‘r’s,’ inserting vowels between consonant clusters, and pronouncing
‘v’ as ‘f.’51 The image produced is one of the Arab who settles for less, speaks
broken French, and lacks the ability to juggle two thoughts at once. Although
Nathalie does not explicitly use the label clandestin, by telling this joke she
nevertheless contributes to constructing the figure of the newly arrived
immigrant to France and his stereotypical qualities.
To summarize, clandestin is a pejorative label that certain individuals in
mainstream France use to talk about and denigrate a minority group. Like other
pejorative labels or slurs, such as the word nègre in French or dyke in English,
clandestin appears to have been reappropriated by those who constitute the
collective referent of the term. In parallel to the Négritude Movement or Dykes on
Bikes, the youth of Class 3B repossessed clandestin and now appear to be using it
for their own, wholly transformed, purposes as they perform and identify clandos
in their midst.

Nathalie was in her ninth month of MSA study when she told this joke. When she, for
example, pronounces the ‘v’ as an ‘f,’ she seems to be drawing on her knowledge of the Arabic
alphabet, such as the non-existence of ‘v’ in the Arabic alphabet.
51
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III.

Paillot Imitations

The section above demonstrated how students in Class 3B have
enregistered a repertoire of Arab-learner French as indexical of the figure of the
clando, or first-generation immigrant to France. If through clando mocking youth
were able to identify themselves as French-born diasporans, at a contrast to
their parents’ generation, this section deals with how by invoking
yet another figure and linguistic repertoire, that of the paillot and Standard
French, youth eﬀectively cued their diﬀerence from ethnically French people in
Marseille. On the very first day I observed Class 3B, for instance, I had a telling
interaction with a female student named Jihad. At that time, the students knew
little about me, such as the fact that I was in fact born and raised in the United
States. All they knew was what they could garner from examining me and
Madame Chérif ’s brief introduction: I was white and I had a French, Catholic
name. Thus, Jihad (the same one who prefers her name spelled Djihad) took the
desk directly behind mine, beside another student. As I took out my notebook, I
caught Jihad making exaggerated motions to unpack her backpack, with flicks of
the hand I can only describe as prissy. I then overheard her say to her tablemate
in a sing-song voice, “You are so very kind” (Vous êtes si aimable). Jihad’s use of
the pronoun for formal, second-person address (vous), her school-like diction
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(aimable ‘kind’), and her standard pronunciation of très [tʁε:] and aimable
[εmɑ:bl], was immediately recognizable as a parody of Standard French.52 I was,
of course, the target for this mocking, and Madame Chérif later summarized the
situation, which she had also noticed, saying “Oh, she was just performing for
you.” Inoue (2006) writes that often a mocking stance can be enacted through
hyperbole in the narrating event; in other words, through the speaker’s
impeccable, almost too-perfect performance of a voice. To wit, it was through an
exaggeratedly standard form of French that Jihad succeeded at commenting,
cynically, on the original form of that speech (namely, Standard French) and
those who employ it. In this last section of Chapter Four, I compare paillot
register to that of clando and consider the possible social functions of paillot
mocking for youth from Northern Marseille.
As described when introducing Marseille’s geographic divisions, the city
is marked by a geographic and social separation between its North and South
that dates to the 19th century, when the city’s industrial landmarks began
clustering to the North of the Commune (Roncayolo, 1996). The Castellanois
lexeme “paillot” mirrors this history of the city. Insofar as youth invoke paillot to
Her pronunciation was recognizable as Standard French because, first, it lacked Castellanois’
word-final schwa on aimable, second, she used French “r” [ʁ] in lieu of Castellanois ([χ]) in très,
and thirdly, she inserted the long back [ɑ] in the second syllable of aimable that is typical of posh
Parisians’ way of speaking. For an example of this way of speaking, see the 1993 film Les Visiteurs.
The character Béatrice, played by Valérie Lemercier, plays the descendent of French nobility and
uses an unmistakable back [ɑ] in some vocalic contexts.
52
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pick out aﬄuent people of French souche (or ethnic origin), who likewise operate
in Standard French, the label is keyed to Southern Marseille and its residents. As
Central Marseille has become more gentrified, however, less vernacular and
more standard forms of French have begun to be stereotypically associated with
central arrondissements as well (Trimaille & Gasquet-Cyrus, 2013). Perhaps this
gentrification phenomenon will widen paillot’s social range, which until now, has
designated people who live in Southern Marseille, dress “BCBG” (bon chic bon
genre,’like a yuppie’), speak Standard French, and are generally middle or upper
class. The word paillot, as such, is often a human referent noun. It can also,
however, function as an adjective. One Sunday afternoon, for instance, a group
of girls from Class 3B came to visit my apartment. They sat chit-chatting around
my kitchen table while I made tea and prepared snacks. When I oﬀered them
navettes, dry biscuits that are traditional Marseillais fare and whose long shape
commemorates that of the boat that brought St. Lazarus and his sisters to
Marseille from Jerusalem, I was met with polite refusals from around the table.
Anisa finally blurted out “That’s a paillot thing. You know, a French thing.” The
lexeme paillot itself derives from the Standard French word for straw (paille). A
glance at an etymology dictionary will show that, in the Middle Ages, it referred
to straw bedding or insulation for granaries. It then joined the ranks of argot in
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the 19th century, coming to mean ‘door mat,’ and now appears to have fallen out
of use in perhaps all but Castellanois.
The following interaction takes a look at some of the social contrasts
signaled by paillot. Like the clando register, paillot is also organized in terms of a
repertoire of linguistic and other forms and a stereotypic social indexicality
(Agha, 2007). In Transcript 4.5, I asked Sabrina, Maisara, and Fouhda about how
they talked versus how people in downtown Marseille talked. The transcript
points to how these three young women link their own Castellanois speech to the
projects and Standard French to paillot people, whether Parisians or people in
Central and Southern Marseille.
Transcript 4.5.53 Speaking French Well and Speaking it Badly
French Original

English Translation

Cécile: Mais vous parlez de la même façon que les
gens en Centre Ville?
Sabrina: Ça dépend en fait. Ils parlent plus paillot.
Vous voyez? Ils maitrisent[mεtχiz]
mieux que nous, Madame. Nous on dit [ʤi]
n’importe [ĩpoχtə] quoi des fois.
Cécile: Paillot c’est quoi?
Sabrina: Paillot c’est euh... Comment on appelle...
((yelling to Maisara)) Ça veut dire [ʤiχə] quoi
paillot? C’est quoi le paillot?
Maisara: C’est-c’est les parisiens [paʁizjəŋ] quand
ils parlent.
Sabrina: ‘Chez pas, paillot, genre [ʒəχə]...Madame,
ils parlent bien [byεŋ]
Maisara: Non [nɑŋ], c’est des français.

Cécile: So do you speak the same way as
people downtown?
Sabrina: It depends, actually. They speak
more paillot. You know? They have it
(Standard French) down better than us,
Madame. Sometimes, we say any old
thing.
Cécile: And what’s paillot?
Sabrina: Paillot is uh... How do you say...
((yelling to Maisara)) What does paillot
mean? What’s the paillot?
Maisara: It’s-it’s Parisians when they talk.
Sabrina: I dunno, paillot, like...Madame,
they talk nice
Maisara: No, they’re French people.
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This transcript dates from 11.12.12.
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Sabrina: Ils parlent bien [byεŋ]! Vous avez vu,
nous on parle [paχl] tro::p [tχo::] mal. Oh c’est pas
pareil [paχεj]avec les...
Cécile: Avec les quoi?
Sabrina: C’est pas pareil [paχεjə]! Nous, exemple,
on dit [ʤi].. On dit [ʤi] pas, ‘ça va’ et tout. On dit
‘Wesh’ [wεʃə] et tout, vous avez vu?
Cécile: Mmm
Sabrina: Eux ils disent [ʤi:z] “Salu:::t” [salu:::w]
et tout “Coucou:::” [kuku::::]. Nous on dit [ʤi]
‘Wesh’ et tout. ((Maisara laughing)). C’est ça,
Madame, paillot.
Cécile: Vous, vous ne dites pas ‘coucou’?
Sabrina: Non [nɑŋ]
Cécile: Pourquoi? Coucou ça fait quoi?
Sabrina: Les paillots ils disent [ʤiz] “Salut, ça va,
coucou.” Nous on dit “Wesh, bien [byεŋ] ou bien
[byεŋŋ]?” ((then, to Maisara and Fouhda, who look
like they’re about to cross the street to La
Castellane)) Tu vas où Maisara? Fouhda! ((to
Maisara and me)) Les paillots disaient [ʤizε]
“Salut, coucou, ça va? Tu as [ʧu a] passé des
bonnes vacances?” [vakəŋsə]. Nous on dit “Wesh,
bien [byεŋ]ou bien[byεŋŋ]? C’était
comment [koməŋ] tes vacances?” [vakəŋsə] et
tout
Maisara: ((laughing)) Wesh, bien ou bien. T’as
[ʧja] bien passé tes vacances? [vakəŋsə]
Cécile: Et c’est qui qui parle comme ça dans votre
classe?
Sabrina: Dégun! [dεgœŋŋ]
Maisara: Personne, Madame. C’est plus vers le
Centre Ville.

Sabrina: They talk nice! You know, we
speak bad (French). Oh, it’s not the same
with the...
Cécile: With the what?
Sabrina: It’s not the same! Us, for
example, we say... We don’t say “how are
you (ça va)?” We say “Wesh” and all, you
see?
Cécile: Mmm
Sabrina: Them, they say “Hey (salut)” and
all, “Hiya (coucou).” Us we say “Wesh” and
all. ((Maisara laughing)). That’s it,
Madame, that’s paillot.
Cécile: You guys don’t say “Hiya
(coucou)”?
Sabrina: Nope
Cécile: Why, how does it seem?
Sabrina: The paillots, they say “Hey, how
are you, hiya (Salut, ça va, coucou).” We say
“Wesh, good or good? ((to Maisara and
Fouhda, who look like they’re about to
cross the street to La Castellane))Maisara,
where are you going? Fouhda! ((then, to
Maisara and me)) The paillots would say
“Hey, hiya, how are you, hiya (Salut,
coucou, ça va)? Did you spend a nice
vacation?” We say “Wesh, good or good?
How was your vacation?” and all.
Maisara: ((laughing)) Wesh, good or good.
Didya have a good vacation?
Cécile: And who talks like that in your
class?
Sabrina: Dégun! (Nobody)
Maisara: No one, Madame. It’s more a
downtown thing.

As indicated by the bolded IPA transcriptions, for the most part Sabrina and
Maisara narrate in Castellanois, dotting their French with Marseillais lexis (e.g.,
dégun, ‘nobody’) and vernacular features like word-final schwa, the velar nasal,
aﬀricated stops, but also with Arabic-sourced wesh (‘what’s up?’) and voiceless
fricative /χ/. When, however, Sabrina imitates paillot people, she switches to
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higher pitch, uses diﬀerent greetings (e.g., salut, coucou) and phraseology (e.g.,
comment ça va?), and adheres to super-standard syntax (e.g., c’était comment tes
vacances?), in a way reminiscent of the nerdy speech Bucholtz (2001) studied in
the San Francisco Bay Area.
Although Sabrina’s imitations of paillot were not as naturalistic as Jihad’s
performance of paillot for her classmates (at my expense), the boundary she
erected between “us” in Northern Marseille and the “paillots” elsewhere in
Marseille partook in positioning youth from La Castellane as diﬀerent from their
urban neighbors in non-negligible ways. When youth from Class 3B invoked the
paillot voice through use of Standard French, such performances often tended to
interactionally position the speaker, by contrast, as a person both of color and
with diasporic ties to the bled. Sabrina also intimated in her remarks above,
however, that despite her dismissal of Standard French, she was nevertheless
aware that its mastery was useful for certain ends. These youth’s relationship to
Standard French is analyzed in greater depth in Chapter Seven.

IV.

Concluding Remarks

Taken together, this chapter and the previous chapter underlined how
youth from La Castellane ideologized their own diasporic project identity, as
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well as the identities of those from whom they sought to diﬀerentiate
themselves, the paillots and clandos, in ways that were both multi-modal and
multi-scalar. These registers’ repertoires comprised linguistic forms, but also
clothing styles, accessories, and attitudes. Likewise, in her research with Latina
gangsters (cholas) in the San Francisco Bay Area, Mendoza-Dentón (2008) has
shown that claiming certain personas, like that of the macha gang girl, requires
the performer’s attention to such diverse aesthetic ingredients as speech,
eyeliner, music, and body weight, among others. Similarly, discourses about
diasporic projecthood also enregistered a range of sign types as indicative of this
persona. This was apparent, for example, when the student named Ayman
enacted defiance of his teacher using Castellanois linguistic forms, the word
“Allah” drawn on his hand, and a James Dean-like getup. Kader, too, was
positioned as a clando by his female classmates on the basis of his ankle socks,
incorrectly colored clothes, and way of speaking.
Youth’s registers were also multi-scalar in at least two senses. First,
speech forms or bodily behaviors only achieved meaning through youth’s
ideological roping of these diﬀerent behaviors together, and this took place at
the level of reflexive discourses or metapragmatics. It is, likewise, for this
precise reason that sociolinguists and ethnographers who study French youthful
varieties are treading cautiously in their suggestions that a “youth
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vernacular” (parler jeune) exists across France (c.f., Jamin, Trimaille, & GasquetCyrus, 2006; Trimaille & Billiez, 2002). Although this remains an open
question, the previous chapter contributed the observation that identity at the
level of form (such as aﬀrication being spread over diverse French settings)
often belies ideological diﬀerences in how specific groups articulate their
identities. A second sense in which registers like Castellanois and Clando, at least,
were multi-scalar was in the chronotopic formulations youth attributed these
personas. In many of the example transcripts, students’ positioning of someone
as a project youth or a clando comported with depictions of that person’s spatial
aﬃliations and temporal qualities, such as being avant-garde and hip or oldfashioned and regressive.
Some last questions deal with where youth from Class 3B are headed,
moving forward. As time marches on, will the young men and women of Class
3B, who are now in high school and working jobs, continue to speak their ethnic
identity and Marseille’s quartiers into being? When I knew them, these youth
envisioned futures locally. They hoped to live in the projects, work nearby, and
marry other second-generation Marseillais. It is possible, however, that since
then new aspirations have come to vie with those of La Castellane. Likewise,
what might the outcome of their linguistic mocking routines turn out to be?
Will their imitations end in the reanalysis of the values stereotypically associated
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with language varieties like Standard French and the learner French spoken by
some first-generation immigrants to Marseille, or will they ultimately contribute
to reinforcing certain stereotypes even as they subvert others? Both Bucholtz
(2001) and Barrett (1999) have observed, in their respective research sites, how
embedding others’ voices in one’s speech can have unexpected, and sometimes
discriminatory, eﬀects. Bucholtz (2001), for one, addresses how nerds’ use of
intelligence to perform hyperwhiteness may have been meant as a critique of
mainstream white norms but, even so, ultimately exposed racially diﬀerent
access to intelligence as a strategy for taking social stances, hence reinforcing
racial markedness. Barrett (1999), in turn, contends that imitating white
women’s speech if you are a black drag queen may serve to question racist and
homophobic assumptions even as it potentially reproduces misogynistic ones.
Similarly, Class 3B youth’s resort to the voice of the clando to perform
interactional stances, like lack of motivation or goofiness, may have tempered
more abjectly derogatory stereotypes about the first generation but also
potentially yielded new oﬀ-shoots of pejoration. It remains to be seen if their
attempts to ridicule Standard French, and its speakers, as prissy and
unimaginative will succeed in yielding new counter-hegemonic evaluations of
that language. In sum, thus far I have contrasted two types of heteroglossic
speech: the double-voiced, syncretic register of Castellanois, on the one hand; and
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youth’s embedding of two other enregistered voices, paillot and clando, in their
speech for the purposes of mocking, on the other. As it stands, mocking reveals
itself to be quite ambiguous in its politics. Syncretic language, by contrast,
seems to push away from tradition and pull towards invention (Lindquist,
2002), potentially upheaving the script.
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V.

Alienated at Home: Marseille’s Muslim
Orthodox Youth Carry Forth Two
Histories of Islamic Piety

I.

Introduction

“Went down the harbour and stood upon the quay /
Saw the fish swimming as if they were free: /
Only ten feet away, my dear, only ten feet away.”

Written by W.H. Auden (1967) in 1939, these three verses describe the
plight of European Jews who, for lack of the right papers or a dearth of departing
ships, could not leave for safer shores during World War II. The port city of
Marseille was, during France’s non-occupied years of 1939-1942, one such point
of frozen departures. Auden, who was not Jewish, emigrated to the United
States himself that same year. Nevertheless, he appears to have sympathized—
perhaps as a queer Englishman living abroad (Roberts, 2005)—with Jewish
fugitives’ sentiment of feeling alienated while at home.
Roughly three quarters of a century later, the atmosphere in Marseille is
again weighing heavily on its human margins. Only now those seeking refuge
are a pious generation of young Muslim men and women who, while born in
Marseille, are made to feel unduly foreign in their hometown. Such youth, born
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to parents from Muslim countries in North, West, and East Africa and raised in
Northern Marseille (Quartiers Nord), report sensing rejection from Marseille’s
non-Muslim inhabitants in both conspicuous and more subtle ways. The forms
of discrimination they enumerate include harassment, hate speech, and being
barred from the public school system, rental housing, and the job market (in
spite of high school and university degrees). It is, moreover, precisely the same
visual signs which such orthodox youth use to signal belonging to their
community, from the floor and wrist-length outfits (e.g., ’abāyah, jilbāb) and
accessories like the ḥijāb or gloves worn by young women, to the beards, short
pants, and caps donned by young men, that are to most non-Muslim people in
Marseille cause for suspicion, fear, and, not uncommonly, loathing.
This chapter gathers narrative and behavioral accounts of how youth have
chosen to live their religious commitments, whether by remaining in Marseille
or leaving. These accounts and my analysis of them are the result of
ethnographic engagement with several orthodox-identified youth peer groups
between 2012 and 2013, and also continuing interactions with them over
Facebook and Skype between 2014 and 2016. While my face-to-face interviews
took place in both individual and group settings, the majority of the Facebook
discussions here reported consisted of online conversations between several
friends and acquaintances, of which I was but one. More detail will be provided
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about the circumstances in which I met and knew each of these participants
when I present them in turn. The firsthand and online ethnographic data
assembled for this chapter provide, I believe, a richer picture of the variety of
resources youth marshal to communicate about their experiences of being
Muslim in Marseille.
As prefaced in Chapter One, a guiding question in this project has been to
inquire into the diversity or convergence in the experiences of those who profess
Islam in Marseille. This question was prompted by the observation of a nationwide tendency for the French State (e.g., INED/INSEE, 2010) to group youth
whose parents hail from France’s African ex-colonies into the broad category of
“Muslim.” Not surprisingly, my ethnographic findings in this chapter
demonstrate that even just within the circumscribed area of Marseille’s northern
housing projects, people practiced Islam quite diﬀerently. These nuances were
not lost on residents of the projects themselves, who could easily name a
handful of local Muslim “types” and their corresponding lifestyle choices. Here,
my concern is primarily with a particular Islamic “figure of personhood,” a term
that Agha (2011, p. 172) defines as a social type that has been linked to a set of
performable behaviors by a precise population. Specifically, I discuss how a
particular sub-set of my diasporic research participants qualified themselves as
“pious Muslims” or “Sunnis.” By this label, they meant that they observed the
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instituted model within Islam according to which one undertakes, not only the
behaviors obligatory under Sharia (Sharī'ah), but also a series of actions
imitating the Prophet and believed to bestow additional spiritual benefits (Asad,
1986; Gleave, 2010). Even for the young men and women who identified as
“orthodox Muslims” or “Sunnis,” however, there remained a measure of fluidity
as to how piety was conceptualized. This chapter takes a magnifying glass to
ideological divergences in youth’s understandings of piety and shows,
specifically, how these diﬀering perspectives led to youth performing piety in
two particular ways, and with not-insignificant repercussions on their personal
trajectories.
Concretely, some youth—young women, in particular—ascribed to an
ideology of piety according to which one must emulate the Prophet’s 7th-century
migration and relocate to places in the Muslim World. For example, in the first
section below I examine a narrative given by a young woman who analogizes her
circumstances in Marseille to those that led to the Prophet’s hijrah, or migration.
I argue that her account shows “interdiscursive” links (M. Silverstein, 2005) to
texts penned by 20th century proponents of Wahhabism, in which they moved to
define piety in terms of al-Walā‘ and al-Barā‘, or loyalty to Muslims and
dissociation from non-Muslims, respectively (Wagemakers, 2012a, 2012b). A
handful of social media examples in the first section illustrate, furthermore, how
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these young women believe it is through leaving Marseille and residing in the
Muslim World that they will be able to tighten their ties to Muslims (al-Walā‘)
and relinquish their ties to unbelievers (al-Barā‘). In the second half of the paper,
by contrast, I gather other narratives and social media instances that point to a
competing ideology of piety, one that deemphasizes the importance of
dissociating from non-Muslims (al-Barā‘) and understands al-Walā‘, or Islamic
solidarity, as arising mainly through local social activism on behalf of Marseille’s
Muslim community. This latter ideology, too, builds interdiscursively upon
radical Muslim thinking, only in this instance on the modernist discourses
crafted by 19th and 20th century Islamic reformers against colonialism. Broadly
speaking, I analyze this central ideological tension, between piety as a
movement away from Marseille and piety as a step towards Marseille’s Muslims,
as a “double movement” in Polanyi’s (2011[1944], p. 136) sense. Insofar as the
majority view the choice to leave Marseille as a form of social dislocation that
does not serve the interests of Muslims at large, I also discuss measures taken
by the community to keep this understanding of piety in check.
The theoretical objectives of the chapter are two-fold. On the one hand, the
data I use to make my arguments indirectly restate the utility of using
complementary forms of media in conducting ethnographic investigations. Both
the first and second sections below furnish textual and visual materials culled
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from diverse media, including face-to-face meetings, Facebook interactions, and
also conversations via Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications like
Skype and BlackBerry Messenger. The sheer volume of the computer-mediated
data I collected, only a portion of which made its way into this chapter, attests to
these media’s important role in how youth convey—but also disseminate—their
versions of pious personhood. Moreover, from a methodological perspective, as
the ethnographer I was frequently led by the imagery a young man or woman
posted to their Facebook status feeds to confirm or reject an interpretation I had
made of their behavior while in other “live” social settings. No doubt the
process I went through, of deciphering youth’s visual cues on social media and
trying to understand which identities were being indexed, has quite a bit in
common with how young people themselves read each other’s displays as they
unfold on the screen.
The chapter, on the other hand, also adds fuel to the growing movement
within religious and Islamic studies to study religion and belief in terms, not of
holy texts and theological tenets per se, but of the “embodied, material features
of lived religion” (Morgan, 2010, p. 7). This focus on lived religion reorients the
gaze towards the ways in which basic Islamic concepts are reworked into local
practices and heterodox traditions by “small-scale, relatively isolated
communities” (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996, p. 37). Such reworkings of religion
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and piety, writes Asad (1993), proceed principally through the discursive
articulation of ideologies in situ. Asad remarks that “The connection between
religious theory and practice is fundamentally a matter of intervention—of
constructing religion in the world (not in the mind) through definitional
discourses, interpreting true meanings, excluding some utterances and practices
and including others” (p. 44). In the case of the youth presented here, my study
of their discourses on religion reveals how, by formulating two definitions of
piety specifically linked to Marseille, such youth have in eﬀect localized the
broader orthodox or Sunni understanding of piety. I consider these ideologies of
piety to be “of Marseille,” on the one hand, insofar as individuals came to
understand piety in one way or another based on their specific biographies and
the opportunities or limits they encountered growing up in Marseille. These
ideologies are also broader than Marseille, on the other hand, because in
creating them youth draw on specific discourses about piety that are more
properly associated with geographic regions like North Africa and the Arabian
Peninsula. The geographically distant discourses from which they draw
inspiration are also removed in time, dating from the 19th to mid-20th centuries.
Thus, I note how in their spoken and written texts youth use the theorizing of
past Muslim authorities to both think through their own circumstances and
impart legitimacy to their own definitions of piety. This embedding of Islamic
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reformist and Wahhabi discourses on piety in their narratives serves as an
example of what Bakhtin (1981) described in a well-worn remark as one of the
mundane features of language: the past “thickens, takes on flesh” (p. 84) as
people knowingly and unknowingly reference the others’ “voices” in their
speech. This interdiscursive process is central to how youth go about
positioning themselves within Marseille’s thriving culture of Islamic orthodoxy.
This chapter, as such, attends to youth’s ideologies about piety as well as their
pious practices in order to capture the subtle “interplay between personhood
and religiosity” (McIntosh, 2009, p. 21); in a word, how these young individuals
personalize piety on a daily basis.

II.

One Ideology of Piety: Al-Barā‘ or Disavowal

Like other school days, I stepped onto the 25 bus line at Bougainville, the
northern-most end of the metro line. As I looked for a seat, I met eyes with
Kenza, a young woman I had met only two weeks earlier at an “all-girls” dinner
to celebrate our mutual friend Safiya’s wedding. I told her I was going to my
teaching job at the private Muslim school a bit further north, in the 15th
arrondissement, and asked where she was headed. Kalima explained that she was
on her way to a café to meet with a young man who had previously lived in
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London. He could tell her what it was like in case she decided to move there.
Looking out the bus window at Northern Marseille, Kalima mused, “In London,
I can be myself, I think.” I wanted to know what about her native Marseille
made her want to leave, so she went on: “I’m too sensitive. It’s diﬃcult to live
here with the stares... I’m French on my mom’s side and Algerian on my dad’s,
but everyone calls me ‘foreigner.’” Looking at Kalima momentarily from the
perspective of the Marseillais on the bus, I imagined they might indeed wonder
at her use of fashion gloves in April and the large gray ‘abāyah, or floor-grazing
dress, on this willowy twenty-one year old. Her way of speaking about Marseille,
describing alienation and the sense of a truer home elsewhere, was familiar to
me, however, from conversations with other young women from the selfidentified Sunni, or orthodox, community in Marseille.
Young women like Kalima dealt with their feeling of being “stuck” in
Marseille by thinking about migration, often to the Islamic heartlands though
occasionally to North Africa and the United Kingdom as well. They dreamed of
exchanging Marseille, the place to which they should hypothetically belong (as
natives to the city), for places that would welcome them and enable them to
fulfill their personal, spiritual, educational, and professional goals. Lacking longterm jobs and husbands, they also reasoned that there could be no better
moment to pick up and leave. The prospect of relocating was nevertheless
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fraught with uncertainty for the majority of these young women, who lacked
financial autonomy from their parents and had often developed only tenuous
contacts in the places to which they hoped to move, whether Algiers, London, or
Doha. An important, if not central, consideration for them as they made their
decisions, whether to move or not, was what religious authorities and sources
had to say about young Muslims relocating from the West to the Muslim World
and, more specifically, about young women doing so on their own. The anecdote
that follows exemplifies how youth tacked back and forth between their own
circumstances and religious texts in determining how to handle the social
dislocation they felt in Marseille.
In the written narrative I analyze below, a young Marseillaise named Qailah
writes on her Facebook page about her desire to break with the alienating
experience of living in Marseille. She settles upon relocation as the most pious
path forward, resting this judgment on comparisons she makes between her lack
of religious freedom locally and the circumstances of religious persecution faced
by the Prophet Mohammed in Mecca. The parallel Qailah draws, along with her
representation of relocation as the utmost confirmation of piety, are examples of
Qailah’s engagement with ideals of piety developed by Wahhabi scholars in 20thcentury Saudi Arabia. The distinguishing mark of the pious believer, in these
writings, was his or her willingness to practice “disavowal” (al-Barā‘) and
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distance oneself from non-Muslim places, practices, and people in the name of
God (Wagemakers, 2012a). A detailed description of Qailah’s transition towards
a pious lifestyle, given below, highlights how she first passed through an
alternative understanding of piety, one centering upon social activism for local
Muslim causes, before settling on the al-Barā‘ concept of piety requiring
movement away and dissociation from non-Muslims.
Over the course of the 2012-2013 school year, I spent time with Qailah in
Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) classes oﬀered by a private religious institute
located in Downtown Marseille. Qailah was a woman in her early twenties who
came from an Algerian Kabyle household in one of Northern Marseille’s
housing projects. Between our first encounter and now, I have observed Qailah
change from being a non-practicing Muslim, to being highly involved in
Marseille’s Muslim community, to restricting her sphere of contacts as she
retreats from Marseille. The first of these phases was exemplified by her
behavior at the beginning of the school year. When I first met her, other
priorities seemed to come before Islam. Qailah had, for instance, signed up for
the Institute’s MSA class, and another in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), but only
attended when class times did not interfere with the coursework she needed to
finish her master’s in social work. In keeping with her nominally Muslim
background, she likewise joined the other students at prayer times only
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occasionally and wore loose sweatpants and long sweaters, with her brown hair
uncovered, throughout the first months of class. Qailah’s classmates were also
amused by her use of Marseille’s “project accent” (accent de quartier) in this
Islamic setting. Indeed, for the pious Muslims in attendance, the sounds and
turns-of-phrase associated with the vernacular speech of Marseille’s projects
cued hyper-local associations that were quite opposed to the kind of Islamic
cosmopolitanism they tried to cultivate, mainly by adhering to more standard
forms of French and Arabic.
By late in the fall, Qailah’s demeanor showed novel facets, however. In a
first instance, she began keeping a tight prayer schedule. This was accompanied
by her adoption of the sporty head-to-knee-length veil known as a jilbāb, which
she wore over long skirts and tennis shoes. Qailah additionally took to
conducting da‘wāh,1 or the Islamic social activism and missionizing encouraged
in the Koran. When for example one of the institute’s founders, Bin Omar,
organized a meeting to enlist volunteers from among the students to collect aid
money for the Palestinian cause and the war in Syria, Qailah was among the first
to step forward and oﬀer her services. She likewise became the director of
Marseille’s branch of a France-wide Muslim charity association. Via the

MSA for teachings and doings in the name of Islamic unity (Canard, 1999), though often
synonymous with Islamic outreach and social activism.
1
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Facebook page she managed for the charity, Qailah coordinated all manner of
social and financial assistance to Muslim families and (mainly divorced)
“sisters” in need, ranging from soliciting blankets, clothes, and monies, to
finding safe housing and distributing free meals. Her posts on behalf of the
charity read much like this one, which she put up in November of 2012.
“Salâm 3alaykoum wa rahmatou Allah wa barakâtouh” (‘Peace be upon you and the mercy
and blessings of God as well’). Are you familiar with the principle of marauding? It
involves a group vigil during the evening and overnight as we roam the area looking for
homeless people. (...) During our marauds we distribute meals, drinks, warm
clothes/covers/blankets, and smiles!”2

In accordance with the pious ideological preference of hewing to the Arabic and
French standards, Qailah opens with an elaborate Muslim greeting in MSA and
then continues in a quasi-academic register of French, using such standard turns
of phrase as “il s’agit de” (‘it involves’) and diction as
“sillonnant” (‘traverse’/‘roam’).3

“Connaissez-vous le principe des maraudes? Il s’agit d’une mission de veille sociale en soirée et
durant la nuit sillonnant le territoire à la rencontre de personnes sans domicile fixe. (....) Lors de
nos maraudes, nous distribuons des repas, boissons, et des vêtements chauds/couettes/
couvertures et des sourires!” (Qailah, 11-15-13).
2

It is worth noting, here, that although this greeting is one typically associated with religious
settings and hence with MSA, Qailah renders it in what Palfreyman and Khalil (2007) term
“common romanized Arabic” (p. 48), meaning the romanized transliteration of Arabic. Her use
of this orthography, typically associated with youth fora online, rather than the more religiously
associated Arabic script, perhaps proceeds from her desire to connect with her charity’s young
Facebook users. She also transliterates the long “a” of salām in French fashion as “â” and the
nominative case ending plus possessive suﬃx of barakāt (‘blessings’), typically barakātuhu in
MSA, using the dialectal Arabic possessive suﬃx /-uh/. These inconsistencies in Qailah’s use of
MSA speak to her ongoing transition towards assuming both, a pious lifestyle, and the language
ideologies associated with such an existence.
3
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Three years have passed since Qailah’s initial forays into Marseille’s Islamic
milieu. She no longer runs the charity as before and has closed its Facebook
page. In September of 2015, I received a phone call from another member of our
old MSA class who filled me in on how Qailah, among others, were doing. This
classmate was happy to report that Qailah had married a local Shaykh from a
Comorian background, but was more downcast when he told me that he only
ever encounters Qailah by accident now, since she no longer feels comfortable
joining in the reunions for the MSA class. He explained that when, not long ago,
he crossed Qailah in the street, he did not in fact recognize her because she was
covering her face and hands. The Facebook post I examine below dates from
January of 2014, when her page was still up and running but Qailah no longer
used it, as before, to make weekly requests for donations. I interpret the
narrative she gives, along with these more recent developments in her Islamic
practice, as Qailah’s movement towards a notion of piety that requires she
socialize less with people in Marseille and, indeed, distance herself from
Marseille altogether. It becomes apparent that Qailah’s current performance of
piety is in fact part and parcel of a broader stance of aversion she has developed
towards Marseille and its inhabitants. The aversion she shows, moreover, is
matched by an equal attraction to the possibility of decamping to places more
properly part of the Muslim world.
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Figure 5.1. Qailah’s Initial Facebook Post

Thus, on a morning in January of 2014, Qailah posted on her charity’s
Facebook page for the first time in several months (c.f., Figure 5.1). She
implored her charity’s followers in French: “May Allah help us to leave this
country. France is going from bad to worse. Mayday!!!!!!!!!!!!”.4 Her post
inspired aﬃrmative replies of “wallahi” (MSA. ‘by God’) and “amin” (MSA.
‘amen’) from several group members. Then a friend, pressing Qailah, inquired
further, “To go where?”. 5 Yet another protested, “But France is our home! Let
those who don’t like us leave France! ”.6 This last sentiment seemed not to
resonate with the majority of commentators on Qailah’s post, none of whom
liked the post. The next post, however, was met with five likes. This female
friend supported Qailah’s desire to leave and spoke, specifically, or her desire to
conduct a religious emigration or hijrah to distance her from the French:
“Qu’Allah nous aide à quitter ce pays. La France, c’est de pire en pire. Au
secours!!!!!!!!!!!” (Qailah, 1-23-14, 7:34 a.m.)
4

5

“Pr aller où?” (1-23-14, 9:35 a.m.)

“Mais on est chez nous en France! Et ceux qui nous aiment pas, c’est à eux de quitter la
France! ” (1-23-14, 10:35 a.m.)
6
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“Salam wa3leyki oukhty. Naam Allahuma amin (MSA. ‘Peace be with you as well, my
sister. Yes O God amen’). May Allah ease our hijra quickly because I hate them [the
French] more and more and I cannot take it here anymore.”7

This young women alternates between religious phraseology drawn from the
Koran (e.g., Allahuma, MSA. ‘O God’) and standardly written French, and her
post is noteworthy for her use of elements of a francized orthography of MSA
(e.g., oukhty ‘sister’/naam ‘yes’) together with examples of the romanized
orthography of MSA (e.g., wa3leyki ‘and upon you’) used by many youth
communicating in Arab countries online or by SMS. Most tellingly, however, is
that this young woman expresses alienation from France through these two
languages and asks Allah, moreover, to facilitate her relocation to a Muslim
country. Underlying the comments made by Kalima (from the section’s initial
anecdote), Qailah, and this Facebook friend of Qailah’s, is a reconceptualization
of Marseille as no longer their home. Specifically, in their discourse these
orthodox young women repositioned Marseille as a place of temporary exile,
rather than their home. A female university student named Bushrah, for
instance, often joked with her girlfriends about being “apatride,” or country-less,
despite her status as a French citizen and local of Marseille. Another young
woman named Radya pointed out, whereas in Marseille she felt disoriented,

“Salam wa3leyki oukhty. Naam Allahuma amin. Qu’Allah nous facilite rapidement la hijra
parce que je les déteste de plus en plus et je ne tiens plus ici.” (1-23-14, 5:06 p.m.)
7
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“when I go to Algeria, I don’t experience country shock.”8 The act of
presupposing the existence of a true home located elsewhere, which these young
women were simply waiting to rejoin, allowed them to indicate their greater
kinship with places in the Muslim World and thus subvert their feelings of
alienation from Marseille.
This transposed reckoning of home was facilitated by a particular analogy
young women elaborated between circumstances in Marseille and conditions in
7th-century Mecca. A follow-up post by Qailah on the same Facebook
conversation illustrates this analogy and its eﬀects on young women’s plans for
the future. At 8:29 p.m., Qailah chimed back in to the Facebook conversation
she had begun that morning, citing only Verse 97 of the 4th Sūrah (Al-Nisā’) from
a French translation of the Koran:
“The angels will ask those whom they claim back while steeped in sin: ‘What were you
doing?’ ‘We were oppressed in the land,’ they will reply. They will say: ‘Was not the earth
of God spacious enough for you to fly for refuge?‘ Hell shall be their home: an evil fate.”9

Here Qailah cues a parallel between the oppressive conditions facing early
Muslims in Mecca during the 7th century and those she and her peers face in
contemporary Marseille. On September 24th, 622 C.E., following a decade of
8

“Je me sens pas depaysée quand je pars en Algérie.” (Radya, 9-19-12)

This English version of Qailah’s French translation comes from Dawood’s (2000, p. 93)
translation and exegesis of the Koran. Qailah’s French original reads: “Ceux qui ont fait du tort à
eux mêmes, les Anges enlèveront leurs âmes en disant: ‘Où en étiez-vous?’ (à propos de votre
religion) - ‘Nous étions impuissants sur terre,’ dirent-ils. Alors les Anges diront: ‘La terre
d’Allah n’était-elle pas assez vaste pour vous permettre d’émigrer?’ Voilà bien ceux dont le
refuge et [sic] l’Enfer. Et quelle mauvaise destination! (Sourate 4 verset 97).”
9
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severe persecution at the hands of his own tribe (the Quraysh) in Mecca,
Prophet Mohammed relocated dozens of his Muslim followers to Medinah. Not
all those who had professed Islam by that time participated in this migration,
known as the hijrah in MSA, and certainly the majority of the Quraysh remained
in Mecca, preferring paganism and their worldly possessions to this lone
Prophet and his monotheistic message (Saleh, 2010). The Verse Qailah cites
above describes the wrath of God and his angels at those who were able to leave
Mecca but decided instead to stay behind.10 Forsaking Medinah as their true
home, as the Verse states, guaranteed these sinful individuals an eternal home in
Hell.
By invoking this Verse, Qailah maps not only parallels between now and
then but also, quite importantly, parallels between the pious and sinful Muslims
of yore and the good and bad Muslims living in Marseille. The Verse’s criticism
of those who did not accompany the Prophet (“fly for refuge”) goes hand-inhand with the attribution of moral superiority to those who did in fact emulate
the Prophet and his decision to move. As described by Afsaruddin (2010, p.
184), in this early period a hierarchy of moral excellence took shape according to
sābiqah, or one’s precedence in converting to Islam, and whether one had been
Some Muslims were physically unable to accompany the Prophet in his hijrah but were
nevertheless “never charged with apostasy or cowardice” (Armstrong, 1993, p. 151). This
immunity was due both to their inability to relocate and to their steadfast commitment to the
Prophet and his mission.
10
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among the first to accompany the Prophet in the dangerous hijrah journey North.
These muhājirūna, or emigrants, risked their lives to stand by the Prophet during
the hijrah and combat religious persecution. They also replaced their kinship ties
to their Meccan brethren with a new allegiance they claimed in Medinah, namely
loyalty to the Ummah or Islamic community (Rubin, 2010). Qailah appears to
support the idea that, just as piety belonged only to those who conducted hijrah
and stood by the Prophet, so must Muslims in Marseille lift themselves from
their circumstances in order to be pious. The morning after her initial post,
Qailah warns those among her charity’s online followers who plan to remain in
Marseille of the dangers this poses to their piety: “At the risk of losing
authenticity, our residence [in France] must be provisional,
temporary...” (1-24-14, 8:51 a.m.). The authenticity of one’s piety, writes Qailah,
relies on one’s sincere intent to relocate, followed upon by an actual relocation.
One of the first signs of this intent, as intimated above, lies in how young
women ideologically recast their continued residence in Marseille in terms of a
life of pious exile. Their discourses frame Marseille as if it was a waiting room to
be abided en route to their true homes, articulated to lie in the Muslim World.
Their stopover in Marseille is, moreover, made tenable only through planning
their departures; as Kalima said in the beginning anecdote, real home awaits
elsewhere.
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Several of the points Qailah touches on—the utmost piety of the first
Muslims who followed the Prophet, her contempt of France, and the need to
relocate—suggest influences on how she conceptualizes piety that come from
other than herself or her unmediated reading of Koran and Ḥadīth (codified
narrations about the Prophet’s life). The understanding that special moral
distinctions are bestowed upon the Prophet and the next two generations that
followed him is, tellingly, the central idea of the geographically dispersed
movement in Islamic thought called Salafism. Indeed, the very term for the
movement derives from its followers’ strict intent to follow the conduct of alsalaf al-ṣaḥiḥ, or the pious predecessors, described by the Prophet himself to be
“khayr ummatī,” or the best of his (literally, “my”) community (Wagemakers,
2012b, p. 3). Despite some terminological confusions over which thinkers,
precisely, considered themselves proponents of Salafism (c.f., Lauzière, 2010),
Salafism is here understood in Wagemakers’ (2012b) sense as the movement
proper to 20th-century purists who used textual analysis of Ḥadīth to strictly
imitate Islam’s pious predecessors in as many domains of life as possible. 11
Although Qailah’s stance might be said to point in some respects towards a
more Salafi interpretation of Sunni Islam, it could also be said that in her

Due to Salafis’ close following of Koran and adherence to the ways of the salaf as described in
Ḥadīth texts, they notably do not follow any of the five schools (madhhab) of Sharia within
Sunnism.
11
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contempt for Marseille and intent to move away Qailah approaches the tenets of
the Najdi Saudi branch of Salafism better known to the public as Wahhabism (alWahabiyyah). Influenced by the earlier writings of Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab
(1703-1792), 20th-century Wahhabi scholars like the Saudis ‘Abd al-‘Azziz b. alBaz (d. 1999) and Muhammad b. Salih al-‘Uthaymin (d. 2001) theorized piety as
depending upon the duplex practice of al-Walā‘ and al-Barā‘. Practices
corresponding to al-Walā‘, defined as showing loyalty only to Muslims, and alBarā‘, meaning the disavowal of anything related to disbelief (kufr) and
disbelievers (kuﬀār), included not greeting non-Muslims or celebrating their
holidays, not showing attachment to non-Islamic people, places, and things, and
refusing to live in or visit the West unnecessarily—all at the risk of being excommunicated from the community of believers (Wagemakers, 2012a).
The way in which Qailah positions relocation as central to her ongoing
piety reveals two specific interdiscursive ties to Wahhabi creed. As per M.
Silverstein (2005), interdiscursivity takes place when an individual on a certain
occasion creates a text, spoken or written, that reveals their “retrospective or
recuperative relationship to either another discursive event (in what I term a
manifestation of “token”-interdiscursivity) or to an internalized notion of a type
or genre of discursive event (in what I term “type”-interdiscursivity)” (p. 9).
Both Qailah’s interdiscursive gestures can be considered examples of type!187

interdiscursivity insofar as she references, not a certain event or writing of
Wahhabi scholars, but their sphere of ideas and thought process. The first
interdiscursive link of Qailah’s, as such, is the way in which she sequentially
retraces in her Facebook comments the originary reasoning of Salafism.
Specifically, she provides a Koranic verse speaking of disbelievers in the 7th
century and then she warns against Muslims in Marseille displaying the same
inauthenticity. Thus, she recreates the parallel upon which Salafi philosophy was
founded, that between the moral Muslims of yore and those of today. Her
second interdiscursive indication lies in her advocacy for relocation. Her
insistence on leaving Marseille, or planning to, channels an ideology of piety
resembling Wahhabi scholars’ insistence on al-Barā‘, or the disavowal of nonMuslim conditions. After bridging Islamic time, as described, Wahhabis move to
single out al-Barā‘ as “the litmus test to separate the ‘true’ Muslims from the
rest” (Wagemakers, 2008, p. 4). In other words, Wahhabis’ understanding of
hijrah as an instance of the Prophet showing disavowal (al-Barā‘) projects a
course of action for Muslims like Qailah who, wondering about their un-Islamic
surroundings, find their way to the al-Barā‘ interpretation of residence in the
West.
Qailah likely became familiar with this mode of reasoning through reading,
her classes at the Institute, or through her contact with other young women also
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seeking a way of addressing their feelings of alienation. It is worth noting, in
this regard, that within Marseille the ideology of piety as relocation is something
I have only encountered among young women. It may be the case that young
Muslim women, given their relatively more visible styles of dress compared to
young Muslim men, are more liable to feel unloved and alienated by Marseillais
society and are hence more likely to seek redress through stringent religious
solutions to their predicament. This section has described a growing subculture
of piety specific, for the moment, to young orthodox women. In the next section,
below, I analyze several images and texts from social media to illustrate the
importance of these networks in solidifying this particular understanding of
piety, namely, as warranting relocation and other forms of disavowal.

Practices of Piety: Exemplifying Al-Barā‘
In this section, I examine three examples of social media engagement by
young orthodox women to document how the disavowal of non-Muslims, or the
ideology of piety known as al-Barā‘ (‘disavowal of non-Muslims’), is in eﬀect
practiced. The first example, drawn from conversations with Radya, presents
how this young woman is going about planning to in fact leave Marseille. A
social media network she has developed is shown to play a pivotal role in her
willingness to relocate to Doha, Qatar. The second two examples, gathered from
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two young women who do not have the means to leave Marseille but
nevertheless yearn to, demonstrate how they practice disavowal from within
Marseille, in part via social media. All three cases point to the centrality of social
media as young women either, network in preparation for their departure or,
alternatively, seek to communicate their commitment to disavowing Marseille to
their peers while still living in Marseille.
Radya, who turned twenty this year but was seventeen when I met her,
occasionally attended the same private institute where Qailah was taking MSA
classes. A couple of months into the 2012-2013 class year, however, Radya
stopped visiting the Institute in Marseille altogether, preferring to spend her
time mostly at home, an apartment in a housing project on the outskirts of Aixen-Provence. When I asked her why she stopped attending classes, Radya
replied, “I never go outside. What for? I’d rather stay home and speak to
interesting people.”12 Since her junior year of high school, Radya had in fact
begun leading an unusual life for a French-born seventeen-year old.13 Inspired by
visits to her mother’s family outside Algiers, back in Marseille Radya began
wearing the ḥijāb and removing it before entering school premises. She likewise

“Je sors jamais dehors. Pour quoi faire? Je préfère rester à la maison et parler avec des gens
intéressants.” (11-2-12).
12

Radya’s father was born in Marseille to a Moroccan father and a pied-noir (or French) mother.
Her mother was born in Algeria, of Arab heritage, and speaks to Radya in Algerian.
13
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became increasingly disenchanted with the French public curriculum and, in
particular, with her history and geography teacher’s perfunctory treatment of the
French-Algerian War, and took to skipping classes. Hence, at the outset of her
baccalaureate year, Radya left high school and enrolled in distance-schooling.
The “interesting people” with whom she conversed at home during this
period were three women, two from Qatar and another from Saudi Arabia,
whom she had met while shopping in a boutique in Aix. Radya surprised the
tourists with her cosmopolitan allure, mainly her subscription to the New Yorkbased online magazine Fashion Week and her use of Algerian that sounded
markedly un-Algerian in accent. During her trips to Algeria, Radya had observed
a diﬀerence between how people from the capital spoke Algerian, namely with
many contributions from French and Berber, and how people from her family’s
province of Batna spoke Algerian, “with accents from there [Batna] but only in
Arabic words...their dialect is more [standardly] Arabic.” She began emulating
this way of speaking, reassured that even if she was far from perfecting her MSA
at least she could use a pure Algerian untainted by non-Arab influences. In an
interesting turn of events, Radya has since her encounter with these women
three years ago also become fascinated with learning from them how to speak
Saudi and Qatari (Khalījī) Arabic. These varieties, she now believes, display the
greatest linguistic proximity to the speech forms from the Arabian Peninsula
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that participated in shaping MSA during and in the centuries following the
Prophet’s lifetime (Suleiman, 2012). Intent on fashioning herself into one of
these “true Arabs,” as she calls them, Radya spends her afternoons and evenings
conversing and texting in Saudi and Khalījī. This she does via several Voice over
Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications, notably Skype, BlackBerry Messenger, and
Viber, with her girlfriends in Abha (Saudi Arabia) and Doha (Qatar), as well as
their friends and relatives.
In the Fall of 2014, Radya was able to arrange an initial trip to Doha to visit
her friends there. She returned with stories of what life was like for young
Muslims “in the real Muslim lands” (dans les vraies terres musulmanes): the
courtesy of strangers, modesty in the streets, and the ease with which her
friend’s family hosted her for two months. Now back in Marseille, Radya has
discontinued her distance learning and given up on her baccalaureate. Based on
assurances from the well-to-do family in Doha that they can easily find her
employment in the fashion sector in Doha, Radya bides her time sketching
designs for modern ‘abāyahs (head-to-toe dresses) and awaiting the day when
she can leave Marseille to settle “back home” (chez moi), as she refers to Doha.
Akin to Yang’s (2009) description of online communities as fora allowing the
Chinese to express and aﬃrm their “utopian impulses” (p. 156), Radya has and
continues to use VoIP applications as networking devices to further define many
!192

of her hunches, whether about Marseille’s depravity or the Arabian Peninsula’s
paradisiacal oﬀerings for young Muslims. Since her last visit to Doha she has,
moreover, resolved to use Khalījī in her VoIP correspondence. Learning Khalījī
constitutes a central piece of preparation before leaving for Doha, and I argue
that Radya’s formulation of a local Gulf persona for herself is one among several
measures she is taking to ease her impending resettlement.
Figure 5.2 depicts a Messenger conversation between Radya and her friend
Maha, who is from Abha, Saudi Arabia. In the conversation, Radya and

Figure 5.2. Radya’s BlackBerry Messenger Conversation with her Saudi Friend Maha
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Maha resume a previous joke about how Maha is counting on Radya—now the
recognized world traveler—to reserve her a ticket to Japan. Maha pleads in
Saudi, “Just don’t let me go back to Saudi Arabia. Reserve for Japan instead.”
Radya laughs and says “of course” (min ‘uyūnī), using a generic expression that
literally means ‘from my eyes.’ Maha then sends kisses of appreciation and
finishes with “bless your eyes” (tuslim ‘uyūnij). Although Maha usually sticks to
Saudi Arabic, in this instance she opts to address Radya with the Khalījī
possessive suﬃx -j rather than the Saudi -sh or -s or MSA -k. When I inquired
with Radya via as to why Maha had chosen the Khalījī rather than the Saudi or
MSA suﬃx, she laughed and explained in French that Maha has grown
accustomed to Radya using the Gulf dialect in her speech: “Every time Maha
uses the Saudi way, I say ‘lol,’ so now she just addresses me using the way I
prefer.”14 In a Whatsapp text to me later that afternoon, Radya clarified in
English: “usually in saudia they don’t use [ جj] but she seen that i am speaking
like this... yeah coz when she use [ كk] i always answer with [ هههhhh] [ جj]!”
This text conversation is telling because it illustrates how, by 2015, Radya has
clearly taken to playing the role of a Khalījīyyah (or woman from the Gulf) with

“Chaque fois que Maha utilise la façon saoudienne je dis LOL, donc maintenant elle
m’addresse de la façon que je préfère.” (5-24-15).
14
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her acquaintances, even when they come from elsewhere and are less familiar
with Khalījī speech. Moreover, unlike the female university students from the
United Arab Emirates studied by Palfreyman and Khalil (2007), who preferred
the “common romanized Arabic” orthography in their online conversations,
Radya and Maha employ the Arabic script to exchange with one another. This
choice to use the Arabic script, typically associated with Arab culture and the
history of Islam, harks back to Radya’s intent to speak in varieties, like “pure”
Algerian or Khalījī (Gulf Arabic), that she believes will align her with the pious
purity and linguistic past of MSA. In sum, Radya’s VoIP interactions with people
in the Gulf help her to both, learn varieties like Khalījī, through which she
presents herself to her acquaintances as a pious person aﬃliated with the
geographic nucleus of Islam, and set up relationships with people in the region
who are likely to facilitate her actual departure.
Whereas Radya leans on social media to network for her relocation and
develop the kind of Gulf-based pious persona she imagines for her life in Doha,
other orthodox young women from Marseille nurture the same dream but
currently lack the means to undertake their hijrah, or religious emigration. Manal
was a 24-year old university graduate when I met her in 2013. Born near
Marseille to two Arab Algerian parents, Manal grew up with little religious
education. Friends at Marseille’s local university helped her in that regard, and
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she began practicing and wearing the veil in 2010, later switching to the more
modest jilbāb. Since her graduation, Manal’s main source of income has been a
low-paying retail position. She nevertheless holds out for a more prosperous
future and the means to relocate permanently to Algeria. Though she was not
born there, she refers to it as “my country” (mon pays) and returns often via the
ferry between Marseille and Algiers. Manal, like Radya, grew up with both
French and Algerian spoken in her household. As part of her pious ethic, she,
too, would like to improve her MSA. For lack of time, however, she instead
dedicates herself to making her French as polished as possible, with the
understanding that to speak Standard French and not Marseille’s iconic
vernacular is yet another way of disaligning with the city.
One of the French-language fora she participates in online is a private
Facebook group for women entitled “Hijrah to Algeria.” There one can listen to
clips in which religious scholars speak in French about the meaning and
necessity of conducting hijrah, particularly from European countries, and read
French-language articles about why a young Muslim woman does not need a
maḥram, or male escort, in order to conduct hijrah to the Muslim World. Frenchborn women also contribute posts on a weekly basis dealing with the novelties
and diﬃculties of creating new lives in Algerian locales. Topics discussed include
where to send their children to school, best places to grocery shop and get a gym
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Figure 5.3. “Faith” (Imān) Magazine

membership, and which religious resources are available. The page also
addresses more practical concerns, like how to obtain Algerian papers and work
permits as a French-born person. Manal occasionally reposts interesting articles
from this forum on her Facebook page, such as the promotion for a magazine
issue shown in Figure 5.3. Posted in March of 2015, the image depicts the cover
of an Islamic magazine published in France called “Faith” (Imān). This issue in
particular features the title “Desire to leave... Special Issue on hijrah” and a
photo of a Muslim woman beside a suitcase on a desert landscape. Below this,
the elegantly composed French captions read: “Once upon a time, emigration;”
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“The reason behind hijrah;” “Why stay? Why leave?;” “Travelers in this
lifetime;” “They left;” and “En route to a new life.”
These examples of Manal’s engagement with Facebook demonstrate its
duplex utility for her. On the one hand, her Facebook page serves as a platform
through which to convey to her friends and acquaintances her plans to relocate
and, thus, her commitment to this understanding of Islamic piety. On the other,
Facebook also allows her to tap into online social networks like the Hijra en
Algérie group and hence glean information about the technicalities involved in
hijrah. Judging from the posts made by recent emigrants to Algeria and the
number and specificity of comments that accrue to each post, this Facebook
group no doubt aids young French Muslim women in working out the details of
their plans to move to Algeria. Most recently, for example, a “sister” posted
about her positive experiences newly living in the capital, Algiers. She writes
that “since I began living in Algeria, I have really advanced in the knowledge of
our religion. I have started reading and writing the [Modern Standard] Arabic
language... I have also been able to enroll my children in a private Muslim school
run by the Saudi Arabian Embassy.”15 Several sisters who presumably live in
France followed up with her in the comments section, pleading with her to
“Depuis que je vis en Algérie, j’ai beaucoup avancé dans l’apprentissage de notre religion, je
commence à lire et à écrire la langue Arabe... J’ai d’ailleurs pu scolariser mes enfants dans une
école privée islamique dirigée par l’ambassade d’Arabie Saoudite d’Algérie.” (11-13-15).
15
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provide more information about her children’s school. One wrote: “Salam
alaykoum (MSA. ‘peace be upon you’) would it be possible for the sister [who
posted] to contact me min fadlikum (MSA. ‘please’) I have some questions
concerning the private school.”16
The two previous examples showed how among the various channels
through which Radya and Manal communicate their pious desire to live in the
Muslim World, social media proved particularly useful in broadcasting the
imminence of their departure from Marseille. This final example illustrates the
use of social media to exhibit young women’s disavowal of Marseille and France,
much in the same vein as Qailah’s “Mayday!” post. Expressing fatigue and
disgust with life in Marseille is, in eﬀect, the other side of the coin of departure.
Thus, in 2012-2013, I met an orthodox young woman named Bushrah who was
studying for her B.A. in Arabic and Arab civilizations at the local university.
Then, after leaving Marseille, we became friends on Facebook. I was intrigued by
the trajectory of one of her posts in particular. In November of 2014, Bushrah
changed her profile picture to the image depicted in Figure 5.4. The image
captures a cartoon drawing of a man who, as he steps back with both hands up,
claims in a mix of French and MSA: “No one loves me. I do not love anyone. Al-

“Salam alaykoum serait-il possible que la sœur me contacte min fadlikum j’aurai des questions
concernant l’école privé” (11-13-15).
16
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ḥamdulilleh (thanks be to God).” In choosing this image, along with its
accompanying text and content, Bushrah conveyed to her Facebook friends a
strong sense of apathy towards the nature of social relationships in France.
Initially, her change of picture solicited no replies and only a few “likes” from
friends. However, when several months later, on January 8th, Bushrah added the
hash-tags #JeSuisCool (#ImChill) and #TeamJeMenFouDeTout
(#TeamIDoNotGiveACrapAboutaThing) to her profile picture, friends
contributed a torrent of comments. January 8th, 2015 was, tellingly, the day after
the shootings at the Charlie Hebdo Magazine headquarters.

Figure 5.4. Bushrah’s Profile Picture
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Bushrah’s addition of two hash-tags, one claiming that she “is chill” and
the other that she “does not give a crap,” at this moment of crisis in French
society eﬀectively transformed her apathetic attitude to a clearly anti-French
stance, one on a par, for instance, with the pro-Muslim “I am not Charlie Hebdo”
campaign that circulated on some of my research participants’ Facebook pages in
the days after the shooting. Contributing to her anti-French stance here,
additionally, is a voicing contrast Bushrah sets up through a change in linguistic
footing. The cartoon’s text, on the one hand, alternates between a more
standard form of written French, which insists on the formal non-contracted
personne ne m’aime (‘no one loves me’),17 and the MSA formula Al-ḥamdulilleh.
These linguistic varieties are consistent with the language practices and
aspirations of Muslim orthodox youth in Marseille, as described in the cases of
Qailah and Manal. If the text and image represent the voice of the pious French
Muslim youth, then the hash-tags, by contrast, “style” (Hill, 1999; Cutler, 1999)
the voice of the non-Muslim French person. What reveals Bushrah’s hash-tags to
be be an instance of voicing the other is her extra-normative resort to profanity
(e.g., je m’en fou, ‘I do not give a crap/fuck’),18 a language practice otherwise very
negatively viewed within her peer group. One of Bushrah’s best girlfriends
The more informal counterpart, common in speech, would be personne m’aime, without the
negative particle ne.
17

18

I have kept the mispelling of je m’en fous as is, given its appearance in the hash-tag.
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described their group’s avoidance of profane language thus: “One mustn’t say
bad words or speak loudly in the street. We have to be respectful, say sorry, and
smile when insulted. One can never be vulgar.” 19 Bushrah’s deployment of
profanity, thus, reveals that she is assuming the voice of the non-Muslim French
“other,” also indicated by her use of French slang borrowed from English in the
hash-tags (e.g., cool, team). As Cutler (1999) has proposed in her article on how
an adolescent white male adopts African American Vernacular features in his
speech, or Barrett (1999) has described in his article on how African American
drag queens employ a register of “white women speech” in their performances,
embedding speech associated with an out-group in one’s own talk can act as a
metacomment on those who are in fact thought to speak in such a way. Here,
Bushrah animates the voice of the non-Muslim French youth to cue her skeptical
stance on the degree of “team commitment” such youth display. Via her
hashtags, Bushrah suggests that these are the kinds of comments non-Muslim
French youth make when French Muslim youth face troubles in their midst. Not
only is she cynically returning the favor of not showing solidarity, but, by using
their type of speech to do so, she signals that her move to dissociate from the

“Il faut pas dire de mots grossiers, ni parler fort dans la rue. On doit être respecteux, dire
pardon, sourire quand on nous insulte. Il faut jamais être grossier.” (10-29-12).
19
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French victims is an echo of previous moves the French made to disalign with
her.
Some of Bushrah’s friends found this cynicism amusing, as was the case
of one friend who likened Bushrah’s attitude to that of the Japanese cartoon
character Calimero: “Mdrrr, #BushryModeCaliméro ACTIVÉE!” (Lol,
#BushryCalimeroMode ACTIVATED). Calimero is a black chicken who
complains of being unfairly treated in his family of yellow chickens and hence
goes about life with a rather negative, defensive outlook. Other friends, by
contrast, were disappointed by Bushrah’s transition from apathy, as connoted by
the original image and text, to her outright declaration of disregard for the
French victims, as purveyed by her hash-tags. One writes “Moi je
t’aiiiiiime” (‘Me, I loooooove you’); another, “Oui moi aussi je t’aime
Soumy” (‘Yeah, I love you too Soumy’); then a third young woman named Mimi
adds a large emoticon with tears running down its face. These three female
friends seem to be urging Bushrah away from this ideology of piety as disavowal
of the French and towards a less combative stance vis-à-vis the French. Indeed,
as I intimated in the introduction, some orthodox-identified youth from
Marseille were proponents of an ideology of piety requiring aﬃliation with
Marseille, one that contrasted starkly with the ideology of piety as disavowal
being incarnated here by Bushrah.
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Via these three examples, it becomes apparent that social media provide
useful spaces, for both, evincing one’s commitment to leave Marseille, as in the
examples concerning Radya and Manal, or communicating disavowal of France,
as demonstrated by Bushrah. Because these ideological takes on piety are also
reflected in the language ideologies held by youth, it becomes of particular
importance to take these fractally recursive (Irvine & Gal, 2000) ideologies into
account when interpreting how youth engage with one another through online
media. Without knowing, for instance, that Radya puts Gulf Arabic on a pedestal
based on an etymological link she draws between it and MSA, which she
considers the utmost religious language, her use of Khalījī could not be
recognized as a display of piety in hopes of relocation. Likewise, in the absence
of familiarity with the ideology, prevalent in Marseille’s orthodox community, by
which one’s adherence to standard varieties of French and Arabic is performative
of piety, Bushrah’s change of footing, from her own voice to styling the other’s
voice, could not be read as a cynical gesture.

II.

Another Ideology of Piety: Al-Walā‘ and Knotting New Ties to
Muslim Marseille

Karl Polanyi (2011[1944]) coined the term “double movement” (p. 136)
to describe a social dynamic whereby some part of society acts to weaken the
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social fabric and then those aﬀected gather and push back to protect themselves.
Although he used the expression to capture the dehumanizing eﬀects of market
capitalism on the laborer and the protective measures people developed to check
those eﬀects, a kind of protective countermovement nevertheless appears to be
afoot within Marseille’s community of faithful youth. Above, I hinted at the
significance of how friends commented on Bushrah’s post in ways that
challenged her stance of apathy and disavowal. Indeed, the majority of the
orthodox youth I encountered while in Marseille did not consider that piety was
best exemplified through actions showing al-Barā‘, or disavowal of Marseille’s
non-Muslimness. Rather, the majority deemed dreams like Qailah’s or Radya’s,
to forsake ties to hometown and nation and pursue an unencumbered Islamic
life in the Muslim World, unnecessary and, in their penchant towards
individualism, not truly of service to the Islamic Ummah. According to the youth
presented in this latter part of the chapter, piety was instead a function of
whether they contributed to the well-being of the Muslim community in
Marseille. Specifically, their ideology of piety emphasized al-Walā‘, or Islamic
solidarity, in the form of Islamic social activism conducted on local Muslims’
behalf. In order to understand the means and ends associated with this
interpretation of piety, I consider a narrative by a young teacher named Saleh. In
his historical narrative, Saleh informs me of how French colonialism
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incapacitated religious education in Algeria and, with it, people’s ability to be
pious Muslims. His solution, however, lies not in disavowing the French. Rather,
he discloses a plan for fostering Islamic education and, through it, the quotient
of Islamic piety within France. In the final section, I discuss examples of how
this concept of piety involves a “move towards” Muslims within Marseille. I
argue, furthermore, that pious behaviors of this sort illustrate, first, a
commitment to an unrecognized school of thought (madhhab) within Islam that
the late Shahab Ahmed (2016) called the “madhhab of Love” (p. 41), and second,
what Ghazzal Hage (2005) has termed “existential mobility” (p. 470).
On a Tuesday afternoon after teaching at a private Muslim secondary
school in Northern Marseille, I happened to catch the same train to nearby Aixen-Provence as Saleh, the 28-year old history and Islamic civilization teacher at
the same school. Saleh lives in Aix but was born in Istres, a small city about 50
kms northwest of Marseille, to Kabyle parents who had immigrated there from
Tizi Ouzou, Algeria. He grew up in a family that was only nominally Muslim, or
only practiced “the big three,” meaning no pork, no alcohol, and the Ramadan
fast. Living in a small city, Saleh had few opportunities to meet Muslims until he
went to high school. There, he made friends with other North Africans who
frequented the one prayer room in Istres and began to learn about what it meant
to be a practicing Muslim. More than a decade later, Saleh is now married with
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two children, a highly committed Muslim, and a teacher for Marseille’s only
private Islamic secondary school.
We chatted on the train about the course his life had taken and how it
diﬀered from those of many second-generation teens living in Marseille today.
Saleh calmly critiqued how such youth “refer themselves to their national
identity—Comorian, Algerian, Tunisian—without knowing exactly what it is...
It’s superficial. They don’t have a veritable identity, especially because they’re
detached from their country of origin.” A younger Saleh would also have said he
was Kabyle, the tendency being to claim one’s parents’ identity in the diaspora,
he explains. Curious what his current preference was, I asked “Kabyle rather
than...French?” To which he responded, “My-my uncle died so uh you can’t say
‘I’m French,’ not even as a child could I say that. Not even today, though that
has to do with something else, not with the war in Algeria. The [Kabyle]
identity now has little to do with me, but when I was little it did.” Saleh’s uncle
was a martyr in the Algerian War for independence from the French
(1954-1962), and as young man he identified as Kabyle rather than French in
part due to this painful family history. I was curious about this “something else”
that prevented him from feeling French today as well. So I wondered aloud “and
now you feel a little...?”, to which Saleh said promptly in MSA, “Muslim, Muslim,
khalaṣ” (Muslim, Muslim, that’s it). Today, Saleh’s kinship loyalties are primarily
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to other “brothers” and “sisters” in the Muslim Ummah, both past and present.
This loyalty to Muslims, says Saleh, is something he exercises mainly in the
realm of education. Éducation, he reminds me, is in fact the means through
which to arrive at “the veritable understanding of Islam.” Saleh goes on to
explain the rigorous process of self-edification he went through in becoming a
practicing Muslim: “One has to make the eﬀort to understand, to learn. That is
what Islam is about. Lazy people aren’t tolerated! I didn’t know anything,
anything, anything! But now I understand.” The eﬀorts Saleh made to educate
himself in certain Islamic subjects and languages were only the means to his
piety. The ends of his auto-didactic penchant, specifically, were to educate
himself as a Muslim in order to then be able to pass this knowledge on to his
students. In other words, piety for Saleh lay in the commitment he could show
to Marseille’s Muslim community through his educational talent.
Aside from learning about Koran and the other subjects of Islamic
knowledge, Saleh was also working to spruce up his French and learn MSA.
Speaking about the importance of improving one’s French, Saleh remarked on
how the French language can also be a vehicle for Islamic piety: “The Muslim
who comes [to Marseille] must speak French correctly, because the Muslim is
aiming for perfection; plus, it’s a beautiful language, so to speak vulgarly, well...”
Then Saleh cautions that the utmost vehicle for conveying piety is, of course,
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MSA: “it is the language that permits access to a truth—to the truth.” He delights
in the fact that the school’s director, who is also the in-house Imām, gives his
Friday prayer message (khuṭbah) in MSA, and he uses the opportunity to jot
down new vocabulary and try out his listening comprehension. Despite his
individual study of the language, Saleh nevertheless pronounces himself
“psychologically unable” to converse in MSA with the more educated Muslims
around him at the school. He feels as though making mistakes when speaking
would be akin to “making mistakes in the religion.”
The significance placed on perfecting one’s French and MSA, and
minimizing one’s use of Marseille’s vernacular and regional varieties of Arabic
(e.g., Algerian, Tunisian), derives from the potential these languages—in their
“perfected” state—hold for strengthening the Muslim community. MSA, in
particular, does not simply enable comprehension of Islam’s sacred texts. Rather,
says Saleh, when French Muslims harbor knowledge of MSA it safeguards them
against possible cultural and religious incursions against them by the French,
who might otherwise seek to divest them of their community’s strength. Saleh
details his understanding of MSA as a tool for resisting oppression and, by the
same token, building Islamic solidarity, in the narrative below. While still on the
train, I asked Saleh about which Arabic he was studying in his free time. He
replied:
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“Fuṣḥā [MSA]. Yes the-for me dialect is one-are the languages that were developed
and accompanied by uh the colonizers to divide a world that was unified as its
origin... They destroyed the Koranic schools teaching the [Standard] Arabic
language, the universities, the elites, because that’s how it was done... It’s through
force, that’s how it’s always been in order to destroy the elites... During French
colonization for example the first thing that they organized was the destruction of
the madrasahs, of the Koranic schools, and to bar Algerians from educating
themselves... First consequence? Ignorance, diﬀusion of ignorance. Second
consequence? Diﬀusion of-well, development of dialects... And not just that,
because if there’s something well known it’s that the elimination of elites who
mastered this [Standard Arabic] language and who taught it, whether among
women or men, scholars or intellectuals... If there is something well understood in
history it’s that even a majority of the people who dominated during the 19th and
20th centuries used this procedure to avoid-because it’s always the elite bourgeoisie
who carry out the revolts, who spearhead the resistance, etcetera... That’s why we
had to wait 50 years in Algeria to see the-to start down the path of resurrection.”20

By Saleh’s account, the ignorance and social fragmentation sewn by the
French became possible only once they prevented Muslims from accessing
Islamic and MSA-medium education. As an educator and parent of young
Muslims living in France today, Saleh feels he and other Muslim educators
have the responsibility to ensure that youth who belong to the diasporan
Sunni community in Marseille never face that sort of crisis in their

“Fushaa, oua le-pour moi le dialectale c’est un, c'est des langues qui ont été développées et
accompagnées par, euh, les colonisateurs pour diviser un monde uni à l’origine. En détruisant les
écoles coraniques de langue arabe, les universités, les élites, parce que ça s'est fait comme ça (C:
hmm). C’est la voie de la force. Ça a toujours été comme ça: détruire les élites. Pendant la
colonisation française, par exemple, première chose que-qu’ils ont organisée c’est la destruction
des madrassas, des écoles coraniques et d’interdire l'éducation aux Algériens. Première
conséquence? L’ignorance, diﬀusion de l’ignorance. Deuxième conséquence? Diﬀusion des-fin
développement des dialectes, dialectes aujourd’hui... Parce que il y a quelque chose qui est
connu, c’est l'élimination des élites qui maîtrisaient ces-ce langage et qui l'enseignaient (C: oui)
que ça soit parmi les femmes, ou les hommes, euh les savants, ou les intellectuels… Voilà, c’estc'est quelque chose qui est connu en histoire. Même la plupart des gens qui ont dominé au 19ème
20ème siècle utilisaient ce procédé, hein, pour éviter-parce que c’est toujours la bourgeoisie,
l’élite qui mène les révoltes, qui mène la résistance, etc. Une fois que tu as plus ces gens là, c’est
bon. C’est pour ça qu’il faillait attendre jusqu'à 50 ans en Algérie pour voir les-aller vers une
résurrection (Yamin, 4.3.13).
20
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education, and their faith, again. He imagines himself and other young adult
Muslims carrying forth a historic mandate, passed to them by martyrs like
his uncle and a generation of war-time Algerian militants for Islam and
independence: to continue educating children in MSA and their faith at all
costs. Only thus, he thinks, will young French Muslims retain a measure of
intellectual and religious independence amidst mainstream French society.
In the following paragraphs, I delve briefly into the lives and philosophies of
piety of a handful of Islamic reformers who resisted European colonialism.
This historical detour serves to demonstrate the measure of interdiscursivity
between Saleh’s conceptualization of piety and that evidenced in writings by
these Islamic reformers. It becomes apparent that Saleh’s vision of piety, as
resting on Muslims’ eﬀorts to edify themselves and fortify their community,
gathers inspiration from the modernist and militantly community-oriented
ideology of piety espoused by these Islamic reformers.
Many historical figures, Algerian and otherwise, participated in
identifying Islamic edification and MSA as the twin pillars of—what Saleh
terms above—“the path to resurrection” for Muslims under colonial rule.
These ideas germinated in earnest much earlier, however, namely during the
Ottoman Empire. Indeed, in the first half of the 19th century a group of
oﬃcials, oﬃcers, and teachers began organizing across the East (e.g.,
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present-day Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt) to create Islamic reform within
the Ottoman Empire (Hourani, 1962). The Egyptian Rifā’a al-Ṭaḥtāwī and
the Caucasus-born Khayr al-Dīn laid down a modernization program
according to which the future of the Islamic Ummah lay in Muslims’ ability to
study the modern world, reinterpret Sharia in light of it, and emulate
Europe’s justice-based political governance, its free media, and its education
system (ibid.). Many living in the Fertile Crescent at the time perceived a
failure on the part of (Classical) Arabic to participate in these modernizing
tendencies. Thus, in 1836, al-Ṭaḥtāwī opened a School of Languages in Cairo
with the mission of translating European documents into Arabic and
training oﬃcials and translators in the expanding language (Holes, 2004). In
1919, the new Damascus Academy was tasked with rendering Arabic capable
of expressing modern ideas while retaining its purity (ibid.).
A diﬀering and slightly later generation of Islamic reformers, including
the Persian Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, the Egyptian Muḥammad ‘Abduḥ, his
Lebanese student Amīr Shakīb Arslān, and the Syrian Rashīd Riḍā, among
others, continued to call for reform within Islam but likewise militated for
pan-Islamic unity in the face of an encroaching Europe. With WWI
impending, these thinkers endorsed solidarity in the Ummah as the means of
fending oﬀ European colonization and restoring Islamic civilization
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(Hourani, 1962). According to Riḍā in 1922, the Ummah’s natural bond
inhered in MSA, the only adhesive strong enough to unite Muslims across
interpretations and cultural diﬀerences (Holes, 2004). Perhaps no figure was
as complex and influential in the first half of the 20th century, however, as
Shakīb Arslān, whose translated French writings were widely circulated and
positions often cited within conversations between Muslim orthodox youth.
From an educated Druze family with noble bloodlines, Arslān could be
described as an aspiring Ottoman diplomat who, upon the Ottoman
Empire’s collapse, riveted his considerable energies on fighting European
colonialism through print and his networking abilities. His pro-Ottoman
loyalties during WWI led to his branding as a dangerous troublemaker by
the French and to his eventual exile to Berlin (Cleveland, 1985). From there,
he financed MSA-medium political journals and wrote about the Ummah’s
degeneration at the hands of European colonial powers (Arslān, 2008
[1939]). He likewise became an itinerant intellectual, traveling often to
advise elite Muslim circles across the Eastern and Western Arab world (or
Mashriq and Maghrib) in the ideology of pan-Islamism and resistance tactics,
and recruiting writers to his publications. His eﬀorts to unite the Mashriq
and Maghrib and active mentorship to younger resistance thinkers in
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia during the interwar years brought his
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contemporaries to salute him as a “sincere militant” (Riḍā’s preface, Arslān,
2008 [1939], p. 11). His biographer likewise pens that Arslān both believed
in and himself embodied a “modern jihād ethic” (Cleveland, 1985, p. 119).
Arslān earned his other moniker, “the prince of eloquence” (amīr al-bayān),
thanks to his skill in MSA and rhetoric (Cleveland, 1985, p. 84). When
during the 1930s, for instance, the Salafiyyah Association of Algerian
‘Ulamā‘ (Islamic jurists) needed to navigate between their program for MSAmedium progressive Koranic schools and placating the French, it was Arslān
they called upon to temper their monolingual MSA approach with the
requisite French political strategizing (ibid.).21
To return to Saleh’s narration, historical inquiry confirms that the
French dispossessed Algeria’s religious establishment and urban elites, even
as early as the 1840s, by dismantling MSA-medium education (Cleveland,
1985). In turn, across both the Mashriq and Maghrib intellectuals like Arslān
and his predecessors sought to regain political power and Islamic unity by
reclaiming MSA as their vehicle of edification. MSA also served reformers
like Arslān as a tool for communicating political rhetoric, organizing, and
laying the foundations for the Ummah’s pan-Islamic future. The pious ethic

MSA-medium schools with a similar quest for Islamic revival, called “free schools,” were also
run by the Salafiyya during the Moroccan Protectorate (c.f., Halstead, 1967).
21
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these reformers embodied, and which Saleh evidently admires, is one whose
principal goal was to bolster the Ummah. Underpinning their piety, in other
words, were political and community commitments in addition to
individualized religious goals. As apparent from the emphasis in Saleh’s
narrative on keeping Muslims together, the Ummah is evidently a key
reference for him. Euben (2013) labels this sort of social commitment,
which has moral entities rather than the nation-state as a significant frame
of reference, “Muslim cosmopolitics” (p. 298). Indeed, both Islamic
modernists and Saleh incarnated a measure of openness to the world’s
resources as they sought solutions to bolster the Ummah. In sum, the
ideology of piety spearheaded by modernist Islamic reformers, which was
equal parts moral, political, and communitarian, finds a foothold among
orthodox youth like Saleh as they use education to militate on behalf of the
Muslim community.

Practices of Piety: Illustrations of Al-Walā‘
In this final section, I furnish examples of how the concept of piety as a
“movement towards” local representatives of the Muslim Ummah in fact
materializes in the lives of several individuals. Above, I discussed how speaking
MSA and Standard French was considered a form of pious behavior due to these
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languages’ centrality to keeping the Muslim community strong. Here, I give a
handful of examples of how young Muslims turn to these languages to perform
piety. Via an example of how a young woman named Halima uses highly
standard French, I also demonstrate how youth who ascribe to an ideology of
piety as edification may be drawn to edifying themselves in quite French subject
matters, displaying a “movement towards” non-Muslims as well as Muslims.
Lastly, I present social media instances in which youth visually promoted the
Islamic community-based ideals of love, solidarity, and militantism.
As laid out by Saleh, learning and speaking MSA plays a key role in
nurturing intellectual and religious community and is a central component of
behaving piously. It is in this spirit that several of Saleh’s colleagues at the
private Muslim secondary school practice MSA with their young children on a
daily basis. One of the mosque coordinators, Ghazzal, for instance, decided that
he would always address his children in MSA, while his wife would speak to
them in Algerian (he only asks that they respond in MSA while at the dinner
table, however). Ghazzal, who is Algerian-born, emphasizes that fluency in MSA
will not only enable them to understand Koran and their Islamic studies classes
but will also allow his children to be comfortable “in any Arab
country” (5.14.13).22 The school director, Anwar, who also serves as Imām, and
22

(MSA. fī aī makān fī al-duwal al-‘arabiyyah) أي مكان في الدول العربيّة
ّ في

!216

his wife Hanan instigated a similar linguistic policy in their household.
According to Hanan, the policy was “Anwar: MSA (arabe littéraire), me: French.”
Because Hanan was born and raised in Alsace-Lorraine within a Tunisian family
and Anwar was born and schooled near Tunis, then obtained his doctorate in
mathematics from a university in Nice, both parents had the linguistic skills
necessary for educating their children in highly standard versions of French and
Arabic. Akin to the sentiment in Saleh’s narrative, their decision to use these
languages in the home was specifically motivated by a desire to endow their four
children with the educational and linguistic resources to stand on their own two
feet as young Muslims in France. Hanan spelled out her and Anwar’s thinking
process for me:
“We told ourselves, we both have the capacity. Let’s play the game. And we also
harbored that little bit of resentment, hmm, militant at the beginning. So the language
of this country [France] and then there was the language of the Koran, which is
important.”23

Tellingly, even as Hanan reveals her and her husband’s resentment of the
French, she nevertheless concludes that utter mastery of the French language
will protect her family and assure their position while living in France. Her
husband, too, finds French useful for Muslims. Referencing the linguistic policy
Hanan set up for the household, Anwar admitted to certain lapses in his MSA-

“Comme on s’est dit on a la capacité tout les deux, on joue le jeu. Puis on avait un petit peu ce
côté revendicateur, hein, au début militant revendicatif. Donc la langue, euh, de ce pays et il y
avait la langue du Coran. Elle est importante” (Hanan, 4.16.3).
23
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only role. In fact, he emphasized that he more often speaks in ‘MSA-ified
French’ with his children than MSA.24 Hanan then oﬀered an example of what
this MSA-like French, or Standard French with an Islamic tenor, resembled. She
related how when their infant son arrived at French nursery school:
“He didn’t know how to say ‘I have to go pee-pee.’ He would say ‘I would like to use the
bathroom’ while his classmates would say ‘I have to go pee-pee.’ He would ask me, ‘What
does pee-pee mean?’...I told him ‘Pee-pee means go to the bathroom.’ He didn’t dare say
it.”25

The aspiration to outfit oneself and one’s children with the language form
acknowledged to be the most perfect, whether in Arabic or in French, is closely
tied to the ideal of performing piety through edification, as prefaced in Saleh’s
contributions. The more eloquence or balāghah one displays linguistically,
whether in MSA or in French, the greater commitment one demonstrates to, on
the one hand, strengthening the educational level of the Muslim community in
France, and on the other, heightening their status in the eyes of the French.
The experience of Halima, a young woman raised in an Arab Algerian
family in Northern Marseille, adds further reinforcement to the idea that
Muslims living in Marseille use French to perform piety within their community
but also to perform their educational level to others. Though Halima has not
24

(MSA. afḍal an yatakallam al-nas al-lughah al-‘arabiyya al-fuṣḥā lākin anā la atakallam al-‘arabiyya alfuṣḥā bal al-franciyyah al-fuṣḥā fī l-bayt) أفضل أن يتك ّلم الناس اللغة العربيّة الفصحى لكن أنا ال أتك ّلم العربيّة الفصحى
بل الفرنسيّة الفصحى في البيت
“Il ne savait pas comment dire ‘j'ai envie de faire pipi.” Il disait ‘j'ai envie d'aller aux toilettes.’
Ses camarades disaient ‘je veux faire pipi.’ Il me disait ‘ça veut dire quoi pipi?’... Je lui dit ‘pipi ça
veut dire aller aux toilettes.’ Il osait pas le dire” (Hanan, 4.16.3).
25
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learned MSA to her satisfaction, she comments on how French can convey piety
to Muslims as well as expressive brio to the French:
“I have made it a matter of personal pride (un point d’honneur) to speak [French] as
correctly as possible, with people in my community as well as people outside. And maybe
even I am more careful, and this is a fault of mine I am trying to correct, maybe I am more
careful with people outside my community because I always see myself mirrored in others’
eyes. I see myself as the veiled woman who doesn’t know how to express herself, etcetera.
So it’s my special pleasure to show them that, in fact, no! ((laughing)) It’s horrible. Still,
they react with a ‘hmm, how about that.’ Well, it’s not like my language is extraordinary
but even just speaking without an accent can be surprising.”26

Indeed, Halima often doted, if modestly, on her linguistic transformation from a
child with a Marseillais accent to an “accent-less” Muslim adult. Having grown
up in the projects raised by a Marseille-born gardener (whose parents were
Algerian) and an Algerian-born seamstress, Halima smiles to remember the
Marseillais working-class accent she inherited from her parents. Over a staﬀ
coﬀee break she recounted, for instance, what her French sounded like as an 8 or
9-year old on family videos. “Maman [maməŋ], Amina a laissé ses chaussettes [ʃɔsεtə]
dans la salle [salə] de bains [baŋŋə]!” (mom, Amina left her socks in the
bathroom!).”27 Halima says she replaced this “strong accent” with a French
approximating the Standard when she began practicing Islam in her late teens

“Je mets un point d’honneur à parler le plus correctement possible, autant avec les gens de ma
communauté qu’avec l’extérieur. Parce que j’ai toujours, euh, le miroir dans les yeux de l’autre.
Je me vois comme la femme voilée qui sait pas s’éxprimer, etc., donc je prends un plaisir en fait
leur demontrer qu’en fait non! C’est horrible. Mais c’est vrai qu’ils se disent quand même ‘oh
tiens.’ Bon, c’est pas extraordinaire comme langage mais voilà, rien que de parler sans accent
c’est, des fois c’est surprenant” (Halima, 6.19.13).
26

Note that syllable-final schwa, post-velar nasal, and the realization of Standard French /o/ as
[ɔ] are stereotypically associated with the way that working-class people speak in Marseille.
27
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and was regularly attending the local university’s classes in biology. “Now it’s
true that people think I am from Paris...I go into a store in Marseille and people
say ‘you must be coming through on your way to Paris’!”
Halima’s desire to speak French eloquently was made ever keener by her
experience working at the same Muslim private school as Saleh, where she
began managing accounting after finishing her bachelor’s degree. She and her
23-year old male colleague Fawzi described to me how, if one sought a more
immediate role model than the Prophet himself to emulate linguistically, the
school was rich in Muslim examples of piety. Fawzi gushed that Anwar the
director, for instance:
“So, he uses a [French] language that is mostly sophisticated, very, very, more-never
mundane. Utterly sophisticated. Very, very, very, uh, simple to understand and very
pleasant to the ear (…). When it’s [Modern Standard] Arabic it’s, it’s (I don’t understand
entirely, but) it’s, it’s a symphony! My father, who speaks MSA very well, says he [Anwar]
has a magnificent Arabic. He has a subtle kind of [Modern Standard] Arabic.”28

Perhaps inspired by these local examples, Halima now says she actively pursues
“elevated language, eloquence, and a broader vocabulary” in French via a
number of media. In addition to reading poetry and watching speech eloquence
competitions (concours d’éloquence) on the Internet, she bashfully admits to
watching the 2005 film Pride and Prejudice (based on the Jane Austen novel) “on
“Alors, il utilise un langage souvent soutenu, très, très, plus-jamais courant, jamais. Souvent
soutenu. Très, très, très euh simple à comprendre, et très sympathique à entendre. (…) Quand
c’est de l’arabe c’est, c’est (je ne comprends pas entièrement) mais c’est, c’est une symphonie!
Mon père, qui parle très bien l’arabe, il dit qu’il [Anwar] a un arabe magnifique. Il a un arabe
subtil” (Fawzi, 12.13.12).
28
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loop.” The film, which she watches dubbed in French with English subtitles,
stands alone in her mind as the prime example of French linguistic elegance, not
to mention behavioral and sartorial modesty (pudeur). Indeed, her frequent
citation of one of the more intricate French lines from the film, “Père, n’avez-vous
d’autre objection que la conviction de mon indiﬀérence?” (Father, have you no other
objection than your belief in my indiﬀerence?), led me to teasingly call Halima
“Lizzy” around school in deference to the film’s heroine and author of the above
line, Elizabeth Bennett. Her fascination with the film rested on both linguistic
and romantic parallels Halima found between Victorian-era romantic
relationships and Muslim courtship. In the film, estimated Halima, “Things
proceed as slowly as possible; a touch of the [lover’s] hand is no less than
electric... It’s the Muslim relationship par excellence! The only kiss in my book is
the kiss on the hand.” Not surprisingly, she was particularly drawn to the film
while she was going through her fiançailles (engagement) to her now-husband,
posting several images of Elizabeth Bennett to her Facebook page (c.f., Figure
5.5). Although her then-fiancé did not, according to Halima, share in her
preference for the film, he did grant her that “Islam teaches modesty” to all its
followers.
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Figure 5.5. Halima’s Facebook Profile Picture of Elizabeth Bennett from Pride and Prejudice

Halima also spoke of further parallels she found, interestingly, between
Jane Austen and the 11th century Andalusian Muslim philosopher Ibn Ḥazm. His
Neoplatonic writings on love, which she consulted in a French translation of The
Ring of the Dove: A Treatise on the Art and Practice of Arab Love (1953), focused on
spiritual kinship and its basis in people’s sensory (e.g., visual, aural) recognition
of beauty in one another’s appearance or comportment. Basing herself on Ibn
Ḥazm, Halima often deliberated on contemporary Muslims’ need to do away
with the taboo surrounding love and passion in Islam. As long as love transpires
in the elegant, delicately scripted ways typical of Jane Austen’s novels, she
maintained, love is nothing if not an example of the Islamic injunction to
perfection, edification, and modesty. It occurs to me that Halima’s willingness to
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draw connections between pieces of Western popular culture in French and
guidelines to Islamic piety shows an openness to finding a pious lifestyle within
France. Her focus on love as a religious virtue, moreover, echoes comments by
Ahmed (2016) to the eﬀect that it is love that seals Muslim’s shared identity
within the Ummah. He bases this conclusion on a body of literature he argues
counts as evidence for the existence of an as yet unorthodox “madhhab (school of
Islamic law) of love” (p. 41). Given the calls to Islamic solidarity within this
local culture of orthodoxy, it appears likely that virtues of love and activism may
contribute equally to this local ethic of piety as “association” or al-Walā‘.
Where local Muslims’ relationships to non-Muslims in Marseille are
concerned, many of the comments above describe, perhaps not kinship or a
movement towards non-Muslims, but a gentle engagement with them. I am
reminded of an outing with a group of young orthodox “sisters” (sœurs) on a
rainy day. As we were going down the escalator into the Metro, a young man
going up opposite us said “How go the umbrellas? (ça va les parapluies?) in
reference to how the girls looked in their long wet dresses. I recall being
surprised when one young woman in the group, Amina, gave him a shy smile,
and then turned to us and whispered, “Isn’t it so much better to return an insult
with a smile?” According to these and other orthodox youth who wish to stay in
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Figure 5.6. Mimi’s New Picture: “Allah is gentle”

Marseille despite similar bouts of being alienated, politeness and kindness are
the hallmarks of l’éducation, or being educated, and count as part of one’s pious
contribution to the community. When one is nice to others outside the
community, Amina says, then the community’s image improves and this results
in non-Muslims being nicer to Muslims in turn. In this spirit, Miriam, who goes
by “Mimi” among her friends, a nickname but also a pun on the French slang for
“cute” (mimi), often posts reminders to her Facebook page that Allah prefers
gentleness and good manners. Figure 5.6, for instance, reads “The Prophet,
peace be upon him, said: ‘Allah is gentle, and he loves softness in all things.’”

!224

Figure 5.7. Militant for the Islamic Community

Besides showing love to the Muslim community by being polite to Muslims
and non-Muslims alike, an important part of building up the Muslim community
also lies in being militant for the right causes. In the following three images
from Facebook, Halima and Miriam (“Mimi”) communicate militant feelings on
behalf of the Ummah, and hence display piety. In Figure 7, for instance, Halima
emphasizes diﬀerences between what Islamic militancy means within
Marseille’s Muslim community and from without. Several images represent
what certain people think a Muslim “community militant” (militant associatif)
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does with their time. The translation of the image captions reads: What I think I
do; What my father thinks I do; What the State thinks I do; What Muslim
brothers think I do; What I really do: “Come on people, no one came to the
meeting!!! It’s the third time we’re rescheduling it!!! We have to find another
date!” Muslim community organizing, as Halima well knows from her work at
the Muslim school, is quite mundane and mostly revolves around getting
participating members to come to meetings.

Figure 5.8. Palestinian Woman Wearing Kufiyyah Slings Rocks in Gaza
In another Facebook profile picture (c.f., Figure 5.8), Halima turns her
militant sentiments to issues abroad that negatively aﬀect the global Ummah, like
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Figure 5.9, by contrast, shows an image and story
reposted by Mimi entitled “In the skin of a thug.” Accompanying the image of a
Muslim woman unwaveringly pictured behind a gun barrel is a story telling of
how this woman, who is in fact a French convert to Islam, realized the hurtful
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ways the French act towards Muslims only once she became a Muslim herself. In
this instance, Mimi circulates militant imagery to alert her Facebook friends to
the ills experienced by Muslims in France.

Figure 5.9. Mimi’s Status Post: “In the Skin of a Thug”

This section documented ways in which orthodox youth who plan to stay
in Marseille take it upon themselves to change the city from the inside-out. As
Hanan mentioned in describing her household language policies, there are
myriad channels that Muslims in France can use, both to improve their own
community and lodge complaints about French non-Muslims. Not all of these
channels are typically “Islamic,” however, as Halima’s recontextualization of
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Pride and Prejudice in terms of Islamic virtues demonstrated. Rather, these
channels—edification, MSA, Standard French, teaching, politeness, militant
social activism—are lent an allure of piety insofar as they represent means to the
broader end of reinforcing ties within the Muslim community in Marseille.

III.

Concluding Remarks: Two Double-Movements

This chapter has examined the role of discourse and practices, both in
personal interactions and via social media, in shaping two iterations of the
particular figure of personhood I subsume under the rubric of the Islamic
militant youth from Marseille. The contrastive accounts of piety given in the first
versus the second section reveal this figure of personhood to be neither singular
nor unchanging. Rather, youth’s practices and discourses point to increasingly
divergent definitions of what constitutes pious behavior. Despite orthodox youth
sharing in the sort of prejudice they face in Marseille, they have found diﬀering
ways of both understanding and addressing the resulting experience of
alienation from their hometown.
Gender, in particular, appears to have played a distinct role in the
development of an understanding of piety as requiring relocation. Pious young
women are more likely to struggle to visibly fit into their surroundings and to be
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excluded from French institutions, like secondary schools, that have a direct
bearing on their ability to later integrate the French workforce. Imagining a
future for oneself in a country where one does not meet the job market’s
barriers to entry is a daunting task indeed. Radya, for example, was unable to
find an alternative to French school and thus found herself alone in her
apartment year-round at 17. The prospect of moving forward again as she learns
about Doha and prepares a life there has been a source of great excitement for
her. In a Skype conversation at the close of 2014, for instance, Radya articulated
her enthusiasm at finding a new home, whether in London or Doha, with
obvious emotion: “Let me tell you something. I hope, well, I hope to be stable.
And I’ll be stable in whatever it will be, in one of these places, and I would be
very very very happy if you would come visit.”29
I find that Hage’s (2005) remarks on types of mobility capture the
dynamics of young orthodox women in a particularly elegant and concise way.
Hage explains what he calls “existential mobility” (p. 470) as the shared human
desire to feel like we are “going places” in our lives. He writes, moreover, that
“migratory physical mobility is only contemplated when people experience a
crisis in their sense of existential mobility” (p. 471). As such, the young female

“Je vais te dire une chose. J'éspère, fin, j'éspère être stable... Et je serai stable dans quoique ça
soit, dans un de ces endroits... Je serais très très très contente que tu viennes là-bas.” (12-31-14)
29
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proponents of hijrah that I have presented can be said to be experiencing a crisis
in their existential mobility that, at least to them, appears to have few exit
routes. This crisis renders a dissociative practice of piety more appealing and
leads, ultimately, to their relocation. In the interim, however, which is to say
between the moment when youth feel irreversibly alienated and when they
actually depart Marseille, online media play a vital role for them in at least two
ways. First, networking via online media was shown to help young women lay
the social groundwork to facilitate their relocation. This was the case for Radya
as she went about getting to know people and seeking jobs in the Arabian
Peninsula through Skype and VoIP applications, as it was also the case for Manal
and the other subscribers to the Facebook group “Hijrah to Algeria,” who scoped
out pleasant Algerian cities or good schools for their children through contacts
made online.
A second advantage of young women’s activity online was that it enabled
them to enjoy a modicum of “existential mobility” (in Hage’s terms above)
while still in Marseille. As Qailah disseminated her desire to move to friends on
Facebook or Radya chatted about the Gulf with her friends in Doha through
BlackBerry Messenger, these young women were able to feel as though they
were in the throes of planning to leave Marseille. Such exchanges granted them
the sense that they were moving forward, conducting a virtual hijrah, as it were,
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even as they continued living in Marseille’s housing projects. One sister spoke to
the mental importance of this planning phase for French women conducting
hijrah in a follow-up post to the status post by Qailah analyzed in the first
section of the chapter. This woman urged her fellow French sisters to start
planning: “A piece of advice for all of you: make a project, get organized, and
prepare your departure. (...) I am myself ethnically French, but believe me, this
country is no longer mine, and of this I am reminded every day by the French
themselves. So come up with some plans. If your intention is in keeping with
Allah, Allah will ease your hijra...”30 This young woman’s comments about
feeling disoriented within France despite her Frenchness connect to one of the
larger points made in this chapter. It emerges from the young women’s stories I
have presented that the ongoing apprehensions the French exhibit towards
French Muslims, and especially young orthodox women, have deleterious eﬀects
on their ability to imagine futures for themselves in their French places of
origin. As apparent from these young women’s discourses on piety, their online
practices, and their multilingual use of language, home has in eﬀect become a
moving target for them.

“Un conseil pour tous: faites un projet, organisez vous, et préparez le départ... Je suis moimême française de souche, et croyez moi ce pays n’ai [sic] plus le mien, et ça c’est les français
eux-mêmes qui nous le font comprendre chaque jour. Alors donnez-vous des objectifs, et si votre
intention est pour Allah, Allah vous facilitera votre hijra...”. (1-24-2014).
30
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Perhaps another factor shaping youth’s attraction to diﬀerent poles of
Islamic thought on piety, whether Wahhabi Salafism or Islamic reformism, are
the peer groups in which they participate or the adults with whom they interact,
including parents, religious teachers, other role models, or indeed, the websites
they frequent. Saleh, for instance, looked to the model of piety performed in
front of him on a daily basis by Anwar, who was both the Imām of the mosque he
attends and the director of his school and supervisor for his teaching. A mix of
factors seems contributes to whether youth lean in one or another direction on
what constitutes piety.
It also appears to be the case that, for the youth who came to view piety in
associative terms, as a movement towards Marseille’s Muslim community, this
in turns eased their feelings of alienation. Halima’s willingness to engage with
myriad facets of French life certainly paved the way to lighter social relations
with French non-Muslims and Marseillais, even if her practice of reading Islamic
piety into French popular culture or sewing politeness in her public interactions
represented a way to turn France into a more pleasant place for herself and her
community. I believe that Halima’s kind of outlook might be just what former
Interior Minister Pierre Joxe or former president Nicolas Sarkozy intended when
they spoke about fostering un Islam de France, or a French form of Islam (Bowen,
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2009). Meanwhile, the French public has yet to decide on the measure of Islamic
community they will tolerate on French soil.
As such, the young proponents of the two types of piety discussed in
sections one and two, respectively, can be said to engage in not one but two
types of “double-movement” (Polanyi, 2011[1944], p. 136). On the one hand,
there is an ideological movement in conflicting directions. While some youth see
piety as requiring dissociative al-Barā‘, others push back with a notion of piety
highlighting association or solidarity, al-Walā‘. On the other hand, youth appear
to be physically moving in opposite directions where their life plans are
concerned. For youth who feel their lack of existential mobility is
insurmountable, this crisis renders a dissociative practice of piety more
appealing and leads, ultimately, to their relocation. Other youth, meanwhile, are
led by their inclination to an associative practice of piety in a movement towards
their community via such activities as activism and education within France.
These practices in eﬀect grant them existential mobility and a sense of
community, and thus they remain in Marseille in spite of the obstacles life there
presents to the highly pious. Which of these directions will ultimately come to
identify the Islamic personhood characteristic of orthodox youth in Marseille
remains to be seen.
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VI. The French State Imagines the
Mediterranean: The Making of Place and
People through Modern Standard Arabic
Education and Cultural Programming
I.

Introduction

It was December of 2010 and Ben Omar stood to welcome the wide range
of guests who had come to participate in the conference being hosted by his
community association. Many of the attendees known to him, including Modern
Standard Arabic (MSA) teachers from other Muslim community associations
and from Marseille’s private Muslim secondary school, raised palms in greeting
or oﬀered salaams in anticipation. “On the occasion of our 2010 conference on
the ‘Realities and new challenges of Arabic teaching in the region of Provence,’”
he began in French, “how fitting to find ourselves convened in the Alcazar
Library, in the city of Marseille.” After a meaningful pause, he reframed: “al-qaṣar
fī l-Marsah, Marsīlia” (MSA. the castle in the port of Marseille). A rumble of
laughter aﬃrmed that the facilitator’s puns were not misspent at on least some
members of this audience, whose minds, upon hearing the name of the
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municipal library rendered in MSA, promptly visited the mosaic courtyards of an
11th century Andalusian palace (MSA. al-qaṣar).
Only this palace was located, according to the speaker, not in the city
baptized "Massalia" by the Greeks in the 6th century B.C.E but in a Marseille
named for al-Marsah. Marsah means “port” in Arabic, but within which port was
Ben Omar locating this library-turned-castle? Was he imagining an Al-Andalusera palace within Marseille's Vieux Port, a possible gesture to Muslim
immigrants’ central role in the last hundred years of the port city's history? Or,
being from Tunis himself, was he drawing a connection between Marseille and
the Tunisian suburb of the capital, Al-Marsah? The neighborhood of Al-Marsah,
significantly, lies on the site of Ancient Carthage. The Phoenician city saw
protracted battles between its Semitic custodians and marauding Greek and
Roman forces from the 6th to 2nd centuries CE (Abulafia, 2011; Naylor, 2015). In
either case, Ben Omar began this event about MSA teaching in Marseille by
discursively gathering Marseille and North Africa into the fold of a Semitic if not
Islamic yore, obscuring the Mediterranean's Greek and Latin heritages in the
process.
Over the course of this chapter, it will become clear why Ben Omar, a
leader within Marseille's orthodox Muslim community and the secretary for the
community association called l’Institut Méditerranéen d’Études Musulmanes, or the
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Mediterranean Institute for Muslim Studies, should seek to situate Marseille
within a more broadly Islamic Mediterranean. Although his dusting of Marseille
in such a light seemed, in a first instance, little more than amusement for the
Muslims in his audience, Ben Omar was also laying claim to one of Marseille’s
incarnations over another. Those who would dispute this Marseille were also
present and comprised mainly representatives of the French State employed in
Marseille’s education system and municipal government. Expressly invited by
Ben Omar, this coterie of people included tenured Arabists from the nearby
University of Aix-en-Provence, teachers appointed to teach MSA in Marseille's
public schools, those tasked with developing MSA curricula by the Ministry of
National Education, and also Mayor Patrick Menucci of Marseille’s central
metropolitan district. Despite the diversity in their roles for the State, these
individuals shared in a common vision of Marseille, namely, as a secular and
cultured city whose Mediterranean dimension draws from Classical Antiquity. It
was in the spirit of exposing and perhaps negotiating this discrepancy between
the Muslim and French State visions for Marseille that Ben Omar had solicited
the participation of these functionaries, and his opening remark left little doubt
as to the side of the debate he supported.
This chapter examines competing depictions of the Mediterranean’s past,
whether Semitic and Islamic or Greek and Roman, as claims upon Marseille’s
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present and future. One of these claims appeared in Chapter Five, where some
orthodox Muslims imagined Marseille to stand for pan-Islamic solidarity as the
Mediterranean stood for it in the past. Thus, the Sunni youth in Chapter Five
modeled their social activism in Marseille upon the same commitment to Islamic
community-building they understood to have inspired anti-colonial movements
around the Mediterranean, as elsewhere (c.f., Morocco: Burke, 1972; Halstead,
1967; Egypt: Suleiman, 1996; Syria: Cleveland, 1985; in Zanzibar: Ghazal,
2010). Marseille was, according to them, another place in which to carry forth
the Mediterranean’s Islamic history. This chapter focuses, in turn, on the
alternative imagining of the Mediterranean as “Classical” purveyed by the
French State’s local arm in Marseille. Specifically, I document how activities
undertaken by the Municipality and the local branch of the Ministry of
Education both before and during Marseille’s year (2013) as European Capital of
Culture functioned to disseminate the State notion of the Mediterranean’s
Classical cultural essence. Through an analysis of cultural programming,
including museum exhibits and advertising for Marseille’s year in the spotlight,
as well as educational policy in MSA public classrooms, I show how State actors’
depiction of a Greco-Roman Mediterranean past is also, in eﬀect, a play for an
upwardly mobile Marseille and for the secular nature of its inhabitants.
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Textual and visual depictions of Mediterranean Antiquity are analyzable,
in this sense, as State-led forms of “place-making” (Bank, 2011; Deumert, 2013;
Lefebvre, 1991 [1947]), on the one hand, and “people-making” (Deumert, 2013;
Dick, 2010, 2011), on the other hand. For example, the local Ministry of
Education’s new initiative to transform the classrooms in which many secondgeneration youth from Muslim families learn MSA into “Classical Language
Workshops,” in which MSA is co-taught alongside Greek and Latin, sought to
entail that Marseille was a gentrifying city and that the diasporic youth in
attendance were up-and-coming, secular professionals. Meanwhile, State
depictions of the Mediterranean also ethnographically illustrate Agha’s (2007)
contention that “entextualized projections of time cannot be isolated from those
of locale and personhood” (p. 320). Indeed, this selective re-imagining of
Mediterranean history by State actors is shown to have very real social eﬀects in
Marseille, whether in the guise of ongoing neighborhood renewal projects to
“mediterranize” historic immigrant neighborhoods, or in pedagogical practices
that de-Islamicize the MSA transmitted to students in public classrooms. The
State argument for a particular kind of Mediterranean is, as such, a chronotopic
formulation in Agha’s (2015) sense, juxtaposing time, space, and personage in a
representation to which people anchor themselves.
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Bakhtin (1981) described chronotopes as jointly temporal and spatial
backdrops upon which characters’ actions are inscribed. Although Bakhtin
mainly used chronotopes to characterize artistic genres of novels, Agha (2007b)
reanalyzes Bakhtinian chronotopes, which Bakhtin associated with plot
structures in novels, by arguing for the prevalence in social life of “cultural
chronotopes,” which Agha relates to discursive semiosis in general. Agha
(2007b) shows that people orient to cultural chronotopes when “they engage
each other through discursive signs of any kind” (p. 320). He explains the social
reality of cultural chronotopes by showing, first, how temporal depictions
comport with depictions of place and personhood, and second, how these
portrayals may be animated as people give voice to them. Whereas literary
chronotopes in Bakhtin’s understanding appeared to live in print artifacts like
novels, Agha (2015) describes chronotopic formulations as emerging and
perishing through the uptake they receive by others who respond to them. This
animation or realization of cultural chronotopes was discussed in a diﬀerent
idiom but similar way by M. Silverstein (1994), when he spoke of how narrators
may align to narrated worlds and, in so doing, enable a "break through" (p. 52)
of the narrated chronotope into the horizon of real-life social interactions. This
breakthrough then allows qualities and characters that were previously only
narrated to be leveraged by speakers as resources for social diﬀerentiation and
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position-taking. To detect this process taking place, however, requires
attentiveness to the various statuses social actors assume within a speech event,
what Goﬀman (1979) termed the participant framework of an event, as well as
to the roles performed by speakers, what Goﬀman likewise referred to as the
event’s production format. Story worlds do, as such, hold the capacity to unleash
new resources for meaning and social or political action in the world in which
they are told, vindicating Haroun's father in Rushdie’s Haroun & the Sea of Stories
(1991), who never once doubted the real-world value of stories that are not (or
may not be) even true. Their realization relies, nevertheless, on real-world
individuals’ willingness to align themselves with the imaginaries, or cultural
chronotopes, circulated by society’s constituents.
This chapter finds inspiration, additionally, in Herzfeld’s (2005) invitation
to anthropologists of the Mediterranean to “treat attributions of Mediterranean
culture...as performative utterances that can, under the right ‘felicity conditions,’
actually create the realities that people perceive” (p. 50). In this spirit, I view
portrayals of the Mediterranean not as representing an “original” Mediterranean
history per se, but as instances of “imitation without origin,” in Butler’s (1990,
p. 138) concise formulation. In other words, the cultural chronotope of the
Mediterranean proﬀered by the French State is recognized to exist primarily in
its performances, whether they take the form of advertised images posted on
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billboards or pronouncements on MSA’s Mediterranean dimensions made by the
academic inspector of MSA classrooms. Herzfeld’s reflection begs a further
question, however. Above and beyond the performance of the Classical
Mediterranean performed by powerfully positioned actors within Marseille, is
this vision of Marseille in fact seized upon by those who live in Marseille as
indicative of their reality? Like in Sufi mysticism, which “never assumes that
everyone will always exist on the same plane, even if they physically exist in the
same scene” (Varzi, 2006, p. 5), this chapter queries if indeed the diasporic
youth who attend the Mediterranean museum exhibits and report every day for
MSA class feel that living in Marseille is akin to walking in the footsteps of
Alexander the Great or Marcus Aurelius.
The second section, below, discusses various means the State uses to
channel their view that the Mediterranean’s singularity lies in its Classical
heritage, focusing particularly on the city’s cultural programming during
2012-2013 and its overhaul of MSA educational policy. The third section, in
turn, examines the words of public MSA teachers and students for clues as to
whether they in fact locate Marseille and themselves in this layer of
Mediterranean reality, or perhaps in another. I argue that the State’s chronotopic
imaginary did little to “interpellate” youth from Muslim families into the role of
secular Mediterranean citizen of Marseille, speaking in Althusser’s (1971)
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terms. Instead, I show how youth peered into this distinct imagining of the
Mediterranean and Marseille, and then chose not to partake in the State’s script.
For, as Varzi (2006) says, the layers of reality people inhabit more closely
resemble curtains or veils than walls. Insofar as moving between one and
another Mediterranean involves performance, one may slide between alignments
or, indeed, opt out of aligning.

II.

The State’s Mediterranean: Languages and Images that
Interpellate?
“It’s just the little pebble I bring,” shrugs Lara Durel in reference to the

initiative in Classical languages she began in a handful of Marseillais high
schools in the Fall of 2012. Madame Durel is the Academic Inspector for the
MSA classes held in Southern France’s public schools, but she spends most of
her time in Marseille, where the number of MSA classrooms rivals that in Paris.
Her new program, which she describes as “a coupling of MSA and Latin based in
the view that MSA is a Mediterranean language, like Latin,” more properly
resembles a pebble in a rockslide that has, since at least Napoléon Bonaparte’s
landing in Alexandria in 1798, claimed an exceptional Mediterranean bond
between France and its Arab neighbors on the southern banks of the
Mediterranean. This exceptional bond, argued to lie in France and North Africa’s
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common Classical heritage, has long served France as an ideological touchstone
in her economic and geopolitical interventions, notably Napoléon I’s invasion of
Egypt (1798-1901), the colonial administration of French North Africa, and
especially Algeria (1830-1962), and post-independence politico-economic
overtures made by France to Arab States around the Mediterranean (e.g., 1995
Barcelona Process, 2008 Union for the Mediterranean). In this section, I explore
how various actors on behalf of the French State turn to the chronotope of the
Classical Mediterranean yet again, only this time in the context of Marseille’s
preparations for its year in the spotlight as European Capital of Culture-2013.
Specifically, I propose that Madame Durel’s new initiative for a “Classical
MSA,” along with a Mediterranean imagery campaign coordinated by the
Municipality of Marseille, represent concerted eﬀorts by French State actors to
locally revive what several authors have termed the French myth of
Mediterranean Antiquity (c.f., Basfao & Henry, 1991; Daguzan, 2009; Ruel,
1991). Whereas previously the myth of the Classical Mediterranean had justified
France’s interests abroad, namely in North Africa and the Levant, in this more
recent case France directs its manifest destiny—to unite the Mediterranean
around its common Greco-Roman heritage—inwards, seeking to “classicize”
French youth from Muslim backgrounds and wash Marseille of any visible
Islamic connotations. If, as I argue, the French State has identified Marseille as
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the keystone to France’s Classical Mediterranean destiny, there are at least four
factors that further contributed to the city’s strategic importance in 2012 and
2013. I focus on these four factors in the following pages.
The first factor is that Marseille continues to be France’s foremost city on
the Mediterranean Sea. As France’s second largest commune to-date, neither
Nice nor Montpellier can compete with Marseille in terms of its size and
economic importance. The second is that Marseille is a city that, one-hundred
and fifty years ago as today, has a population with multi-generational ties to
France’s Muslim ex-colonies.1 The cultural import of the fact that Marseille is
home to all manner of people who identify as Muslims, while not immediately
clear from demographic data, is often clear to those who live in Marseille as well
as those who visit. By people deeply familiar with the city, Marseille has been
called the African crossroads (Bertoncello, 2000), an Arab metropole (Tarrius,
1987), and the door to the South (Londres, 1929). Those less familiar, too,
recognize that, as noted by reporter Christopher Dickey for National
Geographic, Marseille in the near future “may well be the first Western
European city with a majority of its residents from Muslim
Census data ill-represent locally born individuals whose parents or grandparents come from
Muslim countries as well as undocumented immigrants and, as such, do little to illustrate the
French post-colonial legacy in Marseille. In 2008, Marseille was listed as France’s second largest
commune, with 859,543 people, of who 34,776 are Moroccan, Algerian, or Tunisian nationals,
11,774 are sub-Saharan African nationals, 61,281 are French by acquisition, and 725,689 are
French-born (INSEE, 2008).
1
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backgrounds” (March, 2012, n.p.). These geographic and demographic
dimensions of Marseille do not, by default, single out the city for the type of
inward-facing measures I will describe. Rather, two further factors are perhaps
most helpful in explaining the clip at which the French State set about
revamping Marseille and its inhabitants as belonging to a diﬀerent kind of
Mediterranean. They are Marseille’s reputation as overrun by violent Muslim
youth, on the one hand, and the financial urgency of making Marseille
presentable in time for its Capital status, on the other.
Indeed, in mid-2012 the French State and Marseille’s municipality were
concerned that, due to serial reports of criminality, drug traﬃc, gun violence,
and clientelism, the city’s reputation was becoming irrevocably tainted. Only
four months before the opening ceremony inaugurating Marseille as European
Capital of Culture, for instance, the Mayor of the northern 15th and 16th
arrondissements, Samia Ghali, pleaded with Minister of the Interior Manuel
Valls to send the French Army to Northern Marseille. She cited turf wars
between drug-dealing groups and the mounting number of drug-related
homicides. He refused however, saying there was no interior enemy and hence
only the police force could resolve the issue. Several weeks later, Marseille was
again infamously portrayed in the French media by the magazine Marianne,
which published an article entitled “Marseille: Lost Territory of the
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Republic” (9.15.2012). The magazine described a city “parceled into
willayas” (Arabic for “provinces”), seventeen counts of turf-related homicides by
Kalashnikov, and a drought of services aﬀecting poor families from the Northern
Quarters, who had neither the benefit of the Metro nor of the free bike system
enjoyed by Central Marseille. Marseille’s government went into a tizzy not
unlike that of State oﬃcials in Rio de Janeiro, who were faced with a wave of
violence against the police in the summer months prior to the 2014 World Cup
(New York Times, May 30th, 2014). Oﬃcials in Marseille were particularly
anxious the news might dissuade the millions of expected people from visiting,
and they struggled to present a united front. It was within this context that
diasporic Muslim youth from Northern Marseille, in particular, became the
target of Marseille’s eﬀorts to prove it could eﬀectively control its population.2
This narrowing of the government’s gaze must be understood,
furthermore, in the context of a France-wide discussion about Muslim youth’s
politically sensitive status. As detailed in Chapter One, a moral panic surrounds
the figure of the “lost second-generation youth.” This panic is nowhere more
alive than in the French popular media, although it also draws concrete
inspiration from conservative academic literature (Brenner, 2002; Finkielkraut,

Documented immigrants and their descendants account for a disproportionate percentage of
the population in the Northern Quarters and are also disproportionately poorer than residents of
other neighborhoods (Césari, Moreau, & Schleyer-Lindenmann, 2001).
2
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2013) and Republican political discourse (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, 2000). A
surge of sociological studies of urban youth have further filled in this sketch of
the generic French Muslim youth who, frustrated with their French birthplace,
aﬃliates him or herself with a vaguely conceived Islam. These surveys have
likewise contributed to causally linking two phenomena: on the one hand, the
high percentages of secondary school failure, delinquency, and joblessness
documented among adolescents of Maghrebi and Sahelian descent, specifically
(Lagrange, 2010); and, on the other, that Muslim youth exhibit a greater degree
of religiosity and more numerous transnational ties to their parents’ countries of
origin than either their first-generation parents or non-Muslim descendants of
other religious backgrounds (INSEE & INED, 2010; Brouard & Tiberj, 2005).
In the wake of these circulating concerns, many politicians in Marseille
wondered if Islam might be to blame for the violence gaining traction among
young men in Marseille’s Northern Quarters. Michel Vauzelle, the president of
the Department of Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur, made comments to this eﬀect

shortly after his appointment, on December 13th, 2012, to new president
François Hollande’s “Parliamentary Mission for the Mediterranean.” In
summarizing the Mission’s purpose, he remarked:
“Arab peoples would do best to ponder what their future could be. Today, they have a
choice between a Euro-Mediterranean future and a future situated to the East. This is to
say either towards Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism, an extreme model of Islam and the
worse Islam has to oﬀer in terms of intolerance, or towards a less extreme model, more
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like that endorsed by Turkey’s current government. The stakes are high.” (VMarseille,
January 2013, p. 72).

To push immigrant descendants in the right direction and break “this vicious
cycle” in Marseille, Vauzelle proposed “soft-power” (or “participative
diplomatic”) solutions, like organizing “meetings among young Mediterraneans”
(p. 73). Another article of the same weekly magazine described how, after young
men with guns entered the Diderot High School to get even with a student, the
school administration encouraged teachers to take “aﬀective measures” to
counter “the economic and familial ruptures experienced by certain
students” (VMarseille, January 2013, p. 27). Among the soft-power measures
considered useful in revivifying second-generation youth and turning them away
from a religious culture perceived as archaic (and violent to boot), perhaps none
was proposed with higher hopes than instructing youth in their home languages.
Indeed, the European Commission’s Maalouf Report (2008) had previously
identified home language instruction as crucial to Muslim youth’s integration
into European societies. The authors of the Report had written that, insofar as
instruction in one’s heritage language restores communication lines between
Muslim youth and their parents, it can act as a “powerful antidote
against...various types of fanaticism” (p. 5) and “social dysfunctioning which can
lead to violence” (p. 20). I will address the shape that home language
instruction took in Marseille after first commenting on the last of the four
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factors in Marseille that militated in favor of the State’s Mediterranean
intervention, so to speak.
To wit, the violence supposedly tarnishing Marseille’s reputation took
place at a crucial moment in the city’s historical trajectory. In 2012 and 2013,
Marseille was at the apex of its transformation by three social and economic
projects of financial consequence. The first of these was the seven-billion Euro
mostly private EuroMéditerranée Project begun there in 1992. Continuing todate and not projected to finish until 2025, this project is sited along Marseille’s
industrial port, in La Joliette. This urban renewal project aims to attract “NeoMarseillais,” or young professionals and aﬄuent people from outside Marseille,
to live or work in its new luxury flats and oﬃce towers and spend money in its
recently renovated stores and restaurants (Trimaille & Gasquet-Cyrus, 2013).
Ironically, this “internationalization” of La Joliette has in large part depended
upon the eviction and displacement of many of the neighborhood’s long-time
residents, mostly immigrants and their descendants, to the less central
neighborhoods along the Northern littoral.
The second of these developments is the partnership between 43 states
begun in Marseille in 2008 as the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) by French
ex-president Nicolas Sarkozy. Unlike its predecessor the Barcelona Process
(1995-2008), whose membership was limited to the Northern “Club Med”
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states, the UfM extended membership to all of the states around the
Mediterranean Basin, whether in North Africa, the Middle East, or Southeastern
Europe. Perhaps judging they had as little to lose as to gain from accepting
Sarkozy’s terms, all states agreed to the UfM’s terms. The UfM nevertheless
remained quite vague in its policy architecture, simply requesting member states
to cooperate politically, economically, and culturally with the UfM if and when
doing so would not interfere with the European Union (Emerson, 2008). In his
founding speeches for the UfM, Sarkozy doted especially on the supposition that
Europe’s future was in all respects dependent upon its relations with the rest of
the Mediterranean, and especially its southern perimeter (Daguzan, 2009).
Sarkozy also called upon Marseille in particular, as France’s second largest city
and its industrial and manufacturing beacon on the Mediterranean Sea, to put
the country’s best Mediterranean foot forward in this new UfM.
The third development is of course Marseille’s designation as European
Capital of Culture 2013 by the Council of the European Union. The radiance
wished upon Marseille by Sarkozy was multiplied a hundredfold by the sheer
quotient of investment, construction, and specifically “Mediterranean” cultural
activity generated between 2012 and 2013. City councils, private sponsors, and
the EU itself inverted 90 million Euros into a total of 900 cultural events
attended by 11 million visitors (The Guardian, 4.1.13). In addition to the
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renewal of investment in Marseille’s EuroMéditerranée Project, 2013 also saw
the construction of several new museums. The most notable among them was
the Museum of European and Mediterranean Civilizations, or MUCEM, with its
190 million-Euro price tag. The city used the budget, additionally, to repave and
remodel Marseille’s historic waterfront, which now connects the Vieux Port via
walkways to the Fort of St. Jean, the new MUCEM, La Majeure Cathedral, and
the Joliette district. This entire stretch was anointed the “Villa Méditerranée” and
is pictured in the two top images of Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.1. Top: The Villa Méditerranée, Middle: The MUCEM, Bottom: Advertisement in
Marseille’s Airport for the EuroMéditerranée Urban Renewal Project
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It was against this political and financial backdrop that the State aﬃrmed
its need for urgent solutions to its problems with violence and drug-traﬃcking
among the young diasporic inhabitants of the Northern Quarters. In the next
subsection, I consider two types of State-led activities, Mediterranean cultural
programming during 2013 and MSA educational policy over the 2012-3013
school year, and how they together formed a campaign created to encourage
Marseille’s young Muslim inhabitants to come to resemble, act, think, and
speak like Classical Mediterranean subjects.

Cultural Programming and MSA Educational Policy: Place and People-Making
In his speech to inaugurate the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008,
then-president Sarkozy proclaimed that, thanks to their common denominator
in the civilizations of Antiquity, the “European dream” and the “Mediterranean
dream” are one. He continued: “the dream that was once Bonaparte’s in Egypt,
Napoléon III’s in Algeria, Lyautey’s in Morocco. This dream which was less a
dream of conquest than one of civilization...” (2.7.2008). Among the cultural
exhibits put on by the city during MP-2013, as the Capital was called, two in
particular further channeled Sarkozy’s vision of how the banks of the
Mediterranean would attain unison by recalling their previous union in the
period of Greek and Latin civilizations (between the 7th century BCE and the 5th
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century CE). These are the permanent exhibit “The Gallery of the
Mediterranean,” spanning the bottom floor of the MUCEM, and the exhibit
entitled “Mediterraneans: From the grand city-states of yesterday to the people
of today,” which ran through the Spring of 2013 at a renovated hangar on the
waterfront. The MUCEM’s Gallery boasts objects and maps that trace
connections between the Classical civilizations of yore and “the Mediterranean
Society” of today, along with a special feature exhibit on Mediterranean
citizenship. There, one learns that the foundations of the French notion of
citizenship, that of rights and duties institutionalized by the French
Constitution of 1793 and continuing to present, are to be found in the
Antiquity-era concept of citizenship, which held it was both an ideal and a
privilege.
Details about this Mediterranean form of citizenship were disclosed by an
ad campaign circulated by the Municipality in promotion of the MUCEM’s
exhibit. Indeed, posted on bus stops and billboards throughout the city were
portraits of people against recognizably Mediterranean landscapes. Whether the
depicted person was wielding a handful of white sand or had donned a Roman
Centurion helmet, a floral perhaps Italian print, or a Moroccan kaftan shirt, the
caption below announced that the MUCEM was all ears to their stories: “All of
the Mediterranean tells its story at the MUCEM.” The people held up as all
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Figure 6.2. Composite of Four Separate Advertisements for the
MUCEM’s “Mediterranean Citizenship” Exhibit

types of Mediterranean, however, overwhelmingly appear young, pale in skin
color, and free of any indicators as to their religious aﬃliations. The text of the
ad and the models’ juxtaposition with sun-washed backdrops nevertheless insist
upon the Méditerranité of this particular group of individuals—and none other.
This campaign to represent (and in so doing, perhaps entail) a youthful, secular
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Figure 6.3. Bus Stop Advertisement

Figure 6.4. J1 Hangar Exhibit Poster

Mediterranean citizenry was joined in force by another poster that went up
around town for the J1 Hangar exhibit (c.f., Figure 6.4). Behind the words
“Mediterraneans: From the Grand City-States of Yesterday to the People of
Today” is a man whose shirtless torso and seafaring portrayal suggest the
personage of Odysseus. Here, the viewer experiences a physical similarity in
landscape between their own location in the J1, looking out onto Marseille’s
harbor, and the Mediterranean backdrop of Antiquity implied by the poster. The
desired eﬀect, it seems, is to lead the viewer to draw a genealogical link between
oneself as a contemporary member of Marseille’s population and the type of
person that inhabited such Greek city-states as Ithaca. As a group, these images
and their accompanying texts reveal the Municipality’s intention to construct
the space of Marseille as a particular kind of Mediterranean place. The
!255

“conversion of spaces into places,” writes Bank (2011, p. 15), is a social,
material, and importantly, discursive process. In his famous writings on space
and place, Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]) mostly described radical anti-capitalist
appropriations of space that aimed to open urban places for alternative lifestyles.
Place-making can also reflect top-down political subjectivities (Hart, 2002),
however, and this seems to be the case in Marseille. Indeed, Marseille was
subject to quite material forms of place-making in the name of gentrification,
like the creation of an international business district from the ashes of La
Joliette’s working-class immigrant port.
In her poignant ethnography of the culture of youth martyrdom in the
Iran of the 1980s, Roxanne Varzi (2006) examines how filmic and still imagery
were leveraged by Khomeini’s government during the Iran-Iraq War as its
primary instrument for simultaneously creating martyrs and Islamic subjects.
Only in death, she writes, were Iranian youth interpellated—in Althusser’s
(1971) sense—as Islamic subjects. Moreover, she argues it was their numerous
deaths which, ultimately, eﬀected the post-War conversion of the Islamic
Republic into a consolidated nation. Inspired by Varzi’s analysis of how Iranian
youth were visually interpellated to Islamic subjecthood, the question arises of
whether the Muslim youth who viewed these images in Marseille, whether on
the street or in the exhibits themselves, were also interpellated as subjects of
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State’s secular Mediterranean. To use Althusser’s (1971, p. 173) turn of phrase,
is this a case of a cultural chronotope that “hails or interpellates concrete
individuals as concrete subjects”? Althusser’s theory of interpellation turns on
two recognitions. First, there are the holders of some ideology, who must
recognize a human target for their ideologizing. Then, there are individuals in
the world who, upon their interpellation by an ideology, recognize themselves as
“always-already” subjects of that ideology (1971, p. 176). In Hughes (2014,
unpublished), for example, he describes how some scholars in religious studies
read a “liberal, inclusive, pluralistic, feminist, gay-friendly” version of Islam into
historical data and, in so doing, seek to interpellate Muslims to recognize
themselves in this Islamic past. Whether Muslims are in fact interpellated by
this scholarly “mythopoesis” (ibid, n.p.) depends, however, on the
institutionalization of such views, as through academic hiring decisions or
teaching, for instance. To circle back to the case at hand, whether or not
Marseille’s Muslims are being “lassoed” onto a coeval plane with this parthypothetical past, to adopt M. Silverstein’s (2005) expression, can only be
discovered through conversing with them about their experiences with such
images. For lack of data on youth’s uptakes of these images, in the next section
(III) I furnish data collected with youth on their reception of the other main
activity through which the State conveyed its Classical Mediterranean imaginary:
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MSA language instruction. In what follows I share more details about MSA
language policies and programs. I then turn to my uptake data and answering
my question above about whether or not youth are in fact interpellated thus.
As prefaced, MSA education in the public system provided the State, in
the form of the local arm of the Ministry of Education, with a vital arena for its
attempts to create individuals consistent with its Mediterranean vision. In
keeping with the recommendations of the European Commission’s Report
(2008), the French Ministry of Education surmised that instruction in “Arabic”
might speak to youth from Muslim families in a more intimate way than, say,
German or Italian. The course of action undertaken by the Ministry of Education
in Marseille departs in important ways from that advised by the Report,
however, which emphasized instruction in youth’s home languages as the key to
de-Islamicizing youth and reconnecting them to peaceful life-ways. Instead,
Marseille’s branch of the Ministry invites youth from varied Muslim
backgrounds, whose families may speak Algerian, Tunisian, Moroccan, Wolof, or
Comorian, to participate in various forms of instruction in MSA, the highly
standardized language that nary a person in the Arabic-speaking world would
call their home or heritage language. 3 One of the two MSA programs available

Defined broadly, heritage languages are those languages other than the oﬃcial language(s)
spoken in a territory by an individual, a family, or a community.
3
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within French public schools nation-wide is nevertheless called a “heritage
language” program (Enseignement des Langues et Cultures d’Origine, or ELCO). This
elective option takes the form of an after-school program, or a pull-out class during
the school day, and is mainly offered at the primary level (though it also exists at the
secondary level).4 The second, more commonly pursued option is the MSA as a
“foreign language” program (langue vivante étrangère). This is part of the national
curriculum and is taught in public schools at the secondary and tertiary levels. The
teachers involved in this kind of MSA instruction have likewise passed the requisite
exams: the CAPES or l’Aggrégation, for the second and third degrees,
respectively.
Marseille’s Ministry of Education has specific goals in mind for its
“foreign language” oﬀering of MSA at the secondary level. When I met with
Madame Durel, one of France’s three inspectors for MSA classes and the person
responsible for the South of France, I hoped she could tell me more about a
particular disconnect I perceived. Why, if MSA was being formulated by the
Ministry as a “foreign language,” placing it on a par with other languages (e.g.,

The Arabic ELCO programs result from a series of bilateral accords made in the 1970s-1980s
between France and North African countries from which France invited large numbers of
immigrant workers. They are coordinated by the Moroccan, Algerian, and Tunisian Ministries
of Education, and though each country independently trains, sends, and pays its respective
teachers in France, the ELCO programs and the quality of instruction are subject to ongoing
evaluations according to standards set by the Council of Europe and applied by the French
Ministry of Education (e.g., Common European Framework of Reference for Languages,
2000).
4
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English, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, and Mandarin) taught in the
Hexagon, were there frequently only children from Muslim families enrolled in
public school classes? I let her know, by way of illustration, that among the four
MSA classes I observed in a northern secondary school (grades 6ème, 5ème, 4ème,
and 3ème, or ages 11-14), there was only one student with a Catholic name, and
even he had a Tunisian grandfather on one side of the family. Madame Durel
half-smiled and replied that this portrayal of MSA is supposed to encourage
students to enroll in MSA classes “on motivations that are not exclusively about
identity (identitaires) but on motivations that are professional, and cultural only
in the broadest sense.” In other words, she used the foreign language label to
cultivate in students an attitude of cultural detachment vis-à-vis MSA, but also
an awareness of the pragmatic value of MSA for them as future professionals.
Madame Durel was in fact pleased, or perhaps relieved, that Muslim-identified
students were, at the very least, attending “our classes” rather than those held in
prayer rooms or Islamic community associations.5 She also believed the
pedagogic initiatives she had put in place were proving eﬀective against the mass
exodus of Islamically curious students towards private religious MSA instruction

In 2006 the 65,000 youth participating in private MSA education surpassed the 4,800 students
enrolled in public high school MSA classes, nation-wide, by a factor of 13.5 (Deheuvels & Dichy,
2006).
5
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—what Falip and Deslandes (1994) have called MSA’s “progressive eviction”
from public schools (p. 68).
Madame Durel was responsible for implementing three kinds of MSA
instruction in Marseille’s public middle and high schools. One links up with the
Ministry of Education’s broader approach to MSA instruction, while the other
two represent innovative takes on MSA teaching. The first she summarized in
her comments on MSA-as-a-foreign-language above. To solve the issue of
parents and students placing their religious hopes on public MSA classes,
Madame Durel accepts such students but instructs her teachers to reframe the
symbolic value of MSA in the classroom. In what would be recognized within
the language policy literature as an instance of “status planning” (Kloss, 1969),
Durel strives to have the teachers under her supervision perform a type of MSA
that is both communicative and professionally valuable. Durel’s “weapon of
revalorization” (arme de revalorisation), as she calls it, is an MSA that, first, stands
above the dialectal fray, not sliding towards the dialectal end of the MSA-toArabic-dialect continuum, and second, eschews ties to Classical Arabic and,
thus, Islam (Suleiman, 2012). Several educational events have been hosted in
recent years with a view towards creating curricula suited to this conception of a
secular professional register of MSA. These include the Ministry of National
Education-led symposium to formulate protocols for Arabic teaching in the
!261

French public system (2006), the Assizes held by the National Assembly in
Marseille to regulate Arabic teaching (2008), and more informal workshops to
discuss curricular development, like that held by the French Association of
Arabisants in Aix-en-Provence (2013). Comments by Bruno Levallois, who is
both France’s General Inspector for Arabic (MSA) instruction and Chairman of
the Board at l’Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris, succinctly illustrate the spirit of
these meetings. In his remarks at a Conference for Arabic Instruction in Europe
held at the Institut Avicenne des Sciences Humaines in Lille, he spoke to the
tonic eﬀects of teaching a forward-looking, communicative MSA, saying,
“cultures are only alive if they are able to project themselves into the future;
otherwise they don’t give wings to many dreams at all” (7.23.12). Levallois’ goal
echoes that of Madame Durel: to make of MSA an international language that
promises French Muslim youth opportunities for professional development and
social mobility. Several weeks after our initial interview, I saw Madame Durel
and thought to show her the cover of French-Maghrebi magazine Le Courrier de
l’Atlas from April, 2013 (c.f., Figure 6.5), which features a boy holding the
Arabic letter “Lam” and the French letter “T,” alongside a caption that reads
“Speaking (Modern Standard) Arabic, now that’s classy!” She nodded and
agreed that only changing MSA’s image would “get us out of this mess” (nous en
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Figure 6.5. Le Courrier de l’Atlas

tirer). Within the context of Marseille, the suggestion to change MSA’s image is
not just a matter of modifying the language’s social status, an instance of status
planning, however. Importantly, revamping MSA is also an exercise in
remodeling the youth who take MSA. Indeed, the behavior of diasporic youth
from Muslim families was transformed into an obstacle at the precise moment
in Marseille’s history when the city was poised to gentrify and become an
economic and cultural center of attention. MSA, as such, became the Statechaperoned vehicle of youth’s desired transformation; it was remade in the
image of the youth the local government sought to remake. Dick (2010b, 2011)
describes this process in terms of “people-making,” or the understanding that
people do not necessarily possess identities, but instead perform them, whether
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for themselves or for others. Dick (2010b) explains how, not infrequently, the
identities attributed to us by others have little to do with the identities we claim
for ourselves through cultural practices. I analyze the Ministry’s move to teach a
professional, secular kind of MSA as an attempt at “people-making” in this last
sense, and in the final section I provide examples of how classroom interactions
were carried out partially in accordance with this pedagogic philosophy.
Durel’s two other projects for teaching MSA, while innovative on a
national scale, represent variations on the same theme of “people-making”
developed above. For one, Durel is testing out an initiative she calls
International or Excellence Sections. The one class she has opened to-date
specifically targets “students other than (dialectal) Arabophone students” (or
French-origin students) from middle and upper-class neighborhoods. This type
of section, she thinks, shows a real potential to free MSA from its dual
connotations: with Muslims on the one hand, and with economically
disadvantaged Arabophone youth, on the other. For the large majority of
currently enrolled MSA students who do in fact fit this description, however, she
has developed a second strategy that goes above and beyond the
professionalization of the MSA that is taught. This strategy is the
“Mediterranean sections,” which make of MSA classes, in Durel’s words, “a real
cultural project” (un vrai projet culturel). If the MSA-as-a-foreign-language
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program’s goal was to reorient youth from their cultural and religious identities
towards a professional one, the “Classical Language Workshops” Madame Durel
set up in 2012 and 2013 in a handful of high school classrooms embrace culture,
as she says, albeit a particular notion of what counts as Mediterranean culture.
Specifically, these classes require that Latin and Greek be taught alongside MSA,
with all three teachers cycling through the classroom to present their respective
materials and, occasionally, teaching co-taught lessons. In Transcript 6.1, below,
Madame Durel fills me in on the vision of “culture” that underpins her
Mediterranean MSA classes.
Transcript 6.1. Mediterranean MSA Class Sections
(CE: Researcher/LD: Lara Durel (Academic inspector for MSA)
CE: How might one call these classes?
LD: We call them “Mediterranean Sections for Mediterranean language and cultures”
CE: I see... And how does it work, exactly?
LD: Well, it’s a co-taught project between teachers of languages from Antiquity: Greek and
Latin, and MSA. But other teachers can also join the project. A history teacher or someone else.
Me, in the project I have at Cézanne [High School] a teacher of Provençal wants to join. I’m sure
we’ll be able to do interesting things: on music, on love poetry, things like that.
CE: That’s a great idea. Is it recent then?
LD: Yes, yes.
CE: And where did it come from thLD: -it began as a shared reflection between people of good faith ((scoﬀs)) who think that uh
Classical languages are in danger here, just like MSA is in danger. And that we must unite these
forces. So it’s that kind of perspective, of the Mediterranean. Which is to say, specifically, that
it’s all that that thinking about the Mediterranean, you know, Braudel uh but even the Union
hmm for the Mediterranean, et cetera. All this is to reflect on-we’re anchoring anchoring France
in a European geographic space but there is another space that has a real coherence, which is the
Mediterranean.
CE: Where France has been present for much more than a century!
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LD: Indeed. Yes, yes. So the Mediterranean, in sum, it’s a very Braudelienne inspiration. By way
of saying that there is a Mediterranean culture. Exchanges have taken place. It’s a very ancient
theater for life, a space of sharing, combats, and of tiesCE: -yes, political onesLD: -and that all of this it creates a shared culture, one we don’t make suﬃcient use of.
CE: And the students, how do they respond toLD: -well in the experiences we’ve had so far, very well! No problems to report. They’re happy.
For example, in the project at Victor Hugo [High School], where two Classical language teachers
and Norah [the MSA teacher] are collaborating, it’s neat mmm! They did some stuﬀ on
Aristotle, on Alexandria, on-they went to Paris to see those manuscripts, from the Bibliothèque
Nationale, the Greek and Latin manuscripts that passed through Arab hands, that were brought
to the Occident by the Arabs. We try to put our little rock on the pile.
CE: ((long pause)) And does this idea of the Mediterranean exist in other non-local MSA
programs elsewhere?
LD: No, no, it’s just a within-France thing. It’s local. I mean, outside of us, who is interested in
MSA instruction? Nobody! In scientific terms? Nobody! In the Arab World there hasn’t been any
development of MSA didacticism, of a scientific pedagogy for MSA. Nor in the other European
countries. Nope! Because they, no, they don’t have-they just have university-level instruction.
We have a real French specialty, we do. On the one hand, the long years of experience teaching
MSA in France... it goes back to the 16th century. On the other hand uh, the colonial history as
well. We can’t exactly omit it. To be exact, we have had a colonial history in the Arab World,
mostly in the Maghreb, which has meant that the study of Arabs-of the culture of Arabic has
been well developed. And it has given rise to a real thought process: which is, how can we teach
MSA as a living foreign language? We are the only ones thinking about that.
CE: In Europe, you mean?
LD: Or even in the Arab World. Who in the Arab World is thinking about that? Nobody!6

Madame Durel, who was born in Morocco, of course knows that MSA is
not a Classical language but rather a language whose base variety lies in the
language of the Koran and the pre-Islamic as well as early Islamic poetry of the
Arabian Peninsula (Suleiman, 2012). She holds, however, that the language’s
own history has made of it a stale, archaic language. In order to concoct an MSA
with communicative potential as a “living language,” she quite intriguingly
reasons that it might need to be coupled to a diﬀerent past, namely that of

This interview was carried out in French on 4.3.13. The French original can be found at the end
of this chapter.
6
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Antiquity. The idea to wed MSA to a pre-Islamic, Classical past maintains sight
lines, indicates Madame Durel, with the perspective animating both the Union
for the Mediterranean and the œuvre of French Mediterreanist Fernand Braudel.
Indeed, in his speeches to inaugurate the UfM Sarkozy was anxious to speak of
Mediterranean unification, depicting himself as “president of a France that
places the Mediterranean on the pathway to reunification after 12 centuries of
division and heartbreak” and the Mediterranean as “the first fraternal
civilization” (Daguzan, 2009, p. 396). The historical portrayal of the
Mediterranean as a unitary object is often traced back to Braudel (1985), who
along with certain French contemporaries, like Louis Bertrand (1921) for
instance, counterposed a unitary Mediterranean before Islam to a Mediterranean
marked by civilizational clashes after Islamic expansion. This comparison is a
fascinating one and is explored in more detail below in the context of Bertrand’s
writing.
In his book Les Villes d’Or: Algérie et Tunisie Romaines (Golden Cities: Roman
Algeria and Tunisia, 1921), Bertrand presents an early formulation of the
contrast between a fraternal Latinate Mediterranean and a barbarous, derelict
Islamic one. Bertrand is especially remembered for his vivid arguments in favor
of the Latin character of North Africa, without which, notes Lorcin (2014),
French settlers would have lacked the requisite “title deed” to North Africa (p.
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201). Indeed, his book reads as an homage to North Africa’s Roman history. He
writes in the preface, for example, that, “in entering Africa, we have done
nothing but recover a lost province of Latinité...Inheritors of Rome, we invoke
rights previous to Islam. Faced with the Arab usurpers...we represent...the true
inheritors of this land... We represent the most exalted and most ancient Africa”
(1921, p. 9). Likewise, in his descriptions Greco-Roman foundations peer out
from beneath the Arab baths and cafés of Algiers, awaiting their liberation from
Islam’s “white shroud of silence and death” (p. 31). Bertrand’s writings can, in
fact, be recognized as ideologically underpinning the binary at the heart of the
contrast the Ministry of Education formulates between religious MSA and
professional MSA contrast. If religious MSA is silent and unmoving, ensconced
in the blind alley of Islamic identity, then the communicative, professional MSA
is—to borrow Bertrand’s description of the “golden cities” of Greco-Latin North
Africa—“entirely exposed, external, public, welcoming, wide open...with
windows and porticos looking out on the vast world, letting in air and
light” (1921, p. 30). It appears that Madame Durel and her colleagues within the
Ministry of Education erected their dream of a professionally mobile and
fraternal MSA precisely upon Bertrand’s dream of a Mediterranean that is alive
with the ferment of Antiquity.
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Notwithstanding Madame Durel’s varied strategies for boosting MSA
instruction and making youth into secular Mediterranean citizens, these
initiatives appear not to have had their intended eﬀects. In the next section, I
show how students enrolled in MSA instruction within a northern secondary
school failed to believe that their futures would be improved by this professional
register of MSA. Their continued understanding of MSA in religious terms and
their articulation of forms of cultural citizenship other than Classical
Mediterranean citizenship suggest that the State’s interpellation of them
“flopped.” Teachers, too, displayed little commitment to this non-cultural
philosophy of MSA, often using their respective regional varieties of Arabic (e.g.,
Moroccan, Syrian) and making unsanctioned asides about religion in the
classroom. As for Madame Durel’s “Classical Languages” initiative, it looks as
though it will remain a passing experiment conducted during 2012-2013, as it
garnered success neither with teachers nor at the ministerial level. In what
follows, I describe for example how one MSA teacher in a Mediterranean Section
did not understand why she was being coupled with such diﬀerent subject
matters. Perhaps the greatest obstacle posed to the longevity of Madame Durel’s
“Classical Languages” initiative, however, is a recently passed measure targeting
secondary school funds called La Réforme du Collège. In April of 2015, Najat
Vallaud-Belkacem, the Minister of Education since 2014, pushed through a
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reform that is supposed to become active in 2016. Beginning then, each
secondary school’s principal will have the option of deciding whether or not to
oﬀer Latin and Greek. Even if they choose to oﬀer these ancient languages, the
reform reduces the weekly hours that can be allotted to their instruction
(Eduscol, 2015). Figures 6.6 and 6.7 below depict the calendar created by Latin
and Greek teachers to protest this reform, in which they dressed up as Greek
gods and captioned themselves as “the immortals.” For the reasons intimated
here and detailed in the last section, it looks probable that any subsequent
professionalization and “mediterranization” of Muslim youth will have to pass
through other means than MSA oﬀerings at the secondary level.

Figure 6.6. 2015-2016 Calendar of Olympic Gods
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Figure 6.7. December (Le Figaro, 9.3.2015)

III.

Reactions to the State’s Mediterranean

The previous section captured a contradiction in how Madame Durel
sought to cordon oﬀ MSA’s symbolic functions from its practical use. Her MSA
language policy aimed to dissociate the language from its historical religious and
cultural dimensions and foreground its professional utility, and yet she described
the co-taught (Greek, Latin, and MSA) Classical language workshops she
instigated as a ministerial project to “bring culture” to MSA students. In what
follows, I show how this intention to “replace” young Muslims’ culture was, not
only typical of Marseille-European Capital of Culture-2013 more broadly, but
also recognized as such by diasporic youth from the city, who contested it on the
public stage as well as more intimately in the classroom.
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I begin, first, by describing the forceful public response to the State’s reimagining of the city’s cultural heritage penned by Minna Sif. A young woman
who was born in Corsica and raised in a Moroccan family, Sif currently makes a
living as a novelist in Marseille. She also works with second-generation youth
from the Northern Quarters, where she lives, and supports their creative
development by organizing writing workshops and spoken word performances.
Perhaps three weeks after Marseille’s inauguration as Capital, Sif contributed an
article entitled “Marseille: Capital of Another Culture” to the daily newspaper
Libération (1.20.2013). In it, she deplored the disconnect between the
Municipality’s “talk” (bouche) and their actions. Why was Marseille-European
Capital of Culture-2013 sold to us as a capital “for all” (pour tous), she asks,
when in fact its programming reveals a more exclusive definition of culture? She
rages at the lack of spaces dedicated to hip-hop and the cultural production of
Marseille’s youth of color, for example, and quizzes the city’s oﬃcials thus:
“The ignominy of our decision-makers, those fearfuls of a culture for all, was to
instrumentalize the multiculturalism at the heart of this city during the period of
Marseille’s candidacy, only to better deny it after the fact [of Marseille’s election to
European Capital of Culture]. (...) Where did the poets and poetesses of rap disappear
to? (...) To not oﬀer them a platform from which to declaim their high hopes, rap about
love and the fear of drugs, and denounce social injustice is non-sensical. (...) People talk
to us about violence in our neighborhoods (quartiers). The worst violence is to prevent
the other from expressing their singularity, to deny them precisely the opportunity to
manifest their cultural wealth.” (1.20.2013, n.p., my translation).

According to Sif, Marseille is not the next node in a series of Greco-Roman
Mediterranean moments, with stops in Egypt and colonial Algeria along the way.
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Sif describes her Marseille, rather, as “an emblematic place for the kind of
multiculturalism I myself exemplify.” She and other youth from Marseille have
great-grandparents who, in their time, “roamed the douars (Arab villages)...with
a shoulder bag to denounce the injustices and ridicule the extravagances of this
or that caïd or col blanc (white-collar person)” (1.20.2013, n.p.). Sif ’s Marseille, in
other words, has a heritage that is working-class, multicultural, and opposed to
being blindly directed from above.
Teachers and students in the MSA classrooms I observed between 2012
and 2013 incarnated the spirit of tongue-in-cheek humor in the face of top-down
policies that Sif transmits above. They were similarly aware of their cultural
heritage and, although they may have imagined themselves as professionally
bound, they did not recognize themselves—in Althusser’s second sense—as the
secular citizens of a city defined by its Classical Mediterranean heritage, as the
Municipality would have it. As will be highlighted by the transcripts below, how
students and teachers perceived MSA and other languages, like English or
Spanish, often flew in the face of the distinction formulated by the Ministry of
Education, namely, between languages with symbolic functions and ones that
are purely instrumental. Moore (2011) identifies this distinction as “the
fundamental dichotomy that organizes the language consciousness of EU
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oﬃcials and intellectuals” (p. 9). He cites the European Commission’s Maalouf
Report (2008), which reads:
“… we would encourage Europeans to take two separate decisions when it
comes to language learning, one dictated by the needs of the broadest possible
communication, and the other guided by a whole host of personal reasons stemming
from individual or family background, emotional ties, professional interest, cultural
preferences, intellectual curiosity... (European Commission, 2008, p. 11).

The European Commission’s recommendation that Europeans label varieties
within their linguistic repertoires in such a way (e.g., home language,
international language) is reflected within Madame Durel’s relegation of
dialectal Arabic to the home and consecration of MSA to the professional and
international realm. She envisaged, for example, that MSA students in her
districts might capitalize on their Arabic skills to become interpreters at the
United Nations, business men and women who exchange with the Arabicspeaking world, or perhaps flight attendants on any number of Arab airlines.
The picture she paints of a professionally mobile, communicative MSA with an
elite, international sphere of possibilities is not echoed from the receiving end,
however, as becomes clear from teachers’ and students’ comments below.
The conversation in Transcript 6.2 takes place in Class 3B, the MSA
classroom whose students I discussed in Chapters Three and Four, as I am
tutoring three female MSA students during their break hour. The three students,
Maisara, whose parents are Muslim Comorians, Fouhda, who is third-generation
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Algerian on both sides, and Sabrina, who is half second-generation Algerian and
half third-generation, have taken MSA for the four years of collège both to please
their families and because the school ushered them towards this particular
bilingual track. They had little previous experience with the language, with the
exception of Maisara, who attended a private religious preschool where she was
taught to read MSA in order to memorize parts of the Koran. The conversation
that unfolded resulted from my questioning them about why they take MSA. I
was frustrated with the three girls because, although they had expressly pleaded
with me to hold MSA tutoring sessions, sometimes they would sleep through
first period and not attend, and other times they would come but not apply
themselves. The girls defend themselves by stating that MSA is both diﬃcult to
learn and useless where their professional futures are concerned.
Transcript 6.2.7 MSA is Good for Nothing
Maisara: Ça sert à rien l’arabe
Fouhda: C’est vrai, ça sert à rien
Cécile: Pourquoi?
Fouhda: Parce que déjà chez nous on parle
pas arabe. Ça sert à rienMaisara: {ouais eh eh}
Fouhda: {Et en plus} si chez nous on parle
arabe c’est pas le même. Là c’est c’est l’arabe
littéraire et, chez nous, c’est pas pareil

7

Maisara: Modern Standard Arabic is good for
nothing
Fouhda: It’s true. It’s good for nothing.
Cécile: Why?
Fouhda: Because already we don’t even speak
(Modern Standard) Arabic at home. It’s
uselessMaisara: {Yeah eh eh}
Fouhda: {Plus} even if at home we speak
“Arabic” it’s not the same one. In this case
it’s Modern Standard Arabic and, at home,
it’s not the same one

This transcript dates from 4.3.13.
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Maisara: Il y a trop de trucs ((sighs))
Fouhda: C’est pas du tout pareil donc ça vava nous servir à rien!
Sabrina: Arabe c’est bien pour lire le Koran
{et tout}
Fouhda: {alors que} l’italien ou l’espagnol, je
ne sais pas, pour plus tard et tout ça...

Maisara: There are too many details ((sighs))
Fouhda: It’s not at all the same one so it’s
not go-gonna be good for a thing!
Sabrina: (Modern Standard) Arabic is good
for reading the Koran {and all}
Fouhda: {Whereas} Italian or Spanish, I
dunno, for later and all...

In a first instance, Maisara states that MSA is not worth a dime. Fouhda nods
and adds that MSA does not help her to communicate with Algerian, darijah or
Algerian Arabic-speaking family members. Maisara clinches their case further,
sighing at the many grammatical details that require study for MSA. Sabrina
then contributes that perhaps the only utility of MSA is to read Koran “and all,”
which likely captures the other religious duties for which MSA might be useful.
Fouhda finishes oﬀ the topic of conversation by commenting on how whereas
MSA is not useful “for later,” Italian and Spanish may prove themselves more
bankable, so to speak. These three young women appear to easily dodge the
Minister’s hailing of them as professional Mediterranean subjects in-andthrough a revamped MSA. Instead, they follow their parents’ lead,
understanding MSA as a language that, while not useful in the home, remains
useful insofar as it can provide a deeper knowledge of scripture. In a word, these
students perceive MSA’s utility to coincide precisely with its cultural and
religious symbolic value. Were it not good for “reading Koran and all,” it would
serve very little purpose at all (indeed, it seemed that even that purpose held
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meager interest for Maisara, Fouhda, and Sabrina). These young women were
hence similar to Madame Durel because they, too, placed high importance on
their future professional options; where they diﬀered, however, was on the
languages they thought would guarantee them these futures.
Transcript 6.3 takes place with another group of female students from the
same MSA class, named Sheyreen, Kenza, and Siwar. All three are secondgeneration young women from Arab families who speak Algerian at home. This
conversation took place during a video-taped interview at the end of the
2012-2013 school year while we four were discussing how they felt about
spending time with their extended families in Algeria over the summer.
Sheyreen goes oﬀ on what is construed, by Kenza, as a tangential rant about her
Algerian cousins’ paltry language skills. Sheyreen draws explicit comparisons
throughout between the eﬀorts students in Marseille make to learn “other
languages” and the lack of eﬀort she believes her cousins show in learning to
speak anything but “Arabic,” which I understand broadly to refer both to the
MSA that Algerians learn at school and the Algerian darijah spoken in most other
contexts.
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Transcript 6.3.8 The Year 2013

French original

English translation

Sheyreen: Moi, je me disais que peut-être
parce que on est en 2013, et queKenza: -et elle, non?Sheyreen: -c’est, c’est la nouvelle génération
et que maintenant tout le monde
normalement d- parler d’autres langues... Eux
non! Ils restent... comme ça: ils parlent arabe,
ils savent pas parler français. Ils savent pas
parler anglais. Ils savent pas... ‘Che pas! En
fin, tout le monde dit ils font des eﬀortsKenza: -AnglaisSheyreen: -et eux non. Ils sont là, ils restent
cons. Euh, ‘che pas.
Kenza: Ça y est! Elle est partie dans son
délire. ((to Sheyreen)) Oh! Calme-toi!
Sheyreen: Non, mais ça m’énerve! Ça
m’énerve. En France on fait tous des eﬀorts.
On s’eﬀorce à apprendre l’anglais pour parler
au monde entier. Et eux non. Ils restent dans
leur coin, dans leur bulle.
Siwar: Ils connaissent que l’arabe, et ils
mententCécile: -Mais, ils parlent bien français, non?
Kenza: Oui, moi-serieusementSheyreen: -Non, ça dépend

Sheyreen: I was thinking that maybe since
we’re in 2013, and thatKenza: -what to do about her, hmm?Sheyreen: -it’s, it’s the new generation and
now, normally, everyone shou-speaks other
languages... Not them! They continue... like
that: they speak Arabic, they don’t know how
to speak French, they don’t know how to
speak English. They don’t know... I dunno! I
mean, everyone makes an eﬀortKenza: -EnglishSheyreen: -But not them. They’re just there,
staying dumb. Uh, I dunno.
Kenza: There she goes! She’s oﬀ on a rant.
((to Sheyreen)) Come on! Calm down!
Sheyreen: No, but it bothers me! It bothers
me. In France we all try. We make an eﬀort to
learn English to speak to the whole world.
But not them. They stay in their corner, in
their bubble.
Siwar: They only know Arabic, and they lieCécile: -But, they speak French well, no?
Kenza: Yes, in my-honestlySheyreen: -No, it depends

Here, Sheyreen places special emphasis on the year 2013. As soon as she says
“we’re in 2013,” the video shows that Kenza, who was doodling on a piece of
paper, jerks her head up, laughs, and throws up a hand in exasperation as she
says “what to do about her, hmm?” Kenza’s strong reaction to Sheyreen, I
believe, relates to the fact that in her speech Sheyreen animates several catchphrases the students have heard from politicians and educators about 2013.

8

This video dates from 6.12.13.
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When Sheyreen says “we’re in 2013,” and also “it’s the new generation,” she
appears to be taking on the persona of the organizers of Marseille-European
Capital of Culture-2013. Kenza’s scoﬀ at this impersonation discloses her
negative stance towards that kind of top-down talk about 2013 and what it
promises to bring. Interestingly, however, Sheyreen is not completely on the
same page with people like Madame Durel. For one, she cites English as the
language one must work to learn in order to “speak to the whole world.” Arabic
of any sort, she implies, is backwards by contrast and is associated with people
who lack international flair. She too, like Fouhda in the previous transcript,
craves an international lifestyle. To prove it, she is willing to make the eﬀort to
learn languages like English and French. MSA is, tellingly, absent from her list of
international languages that befit the people of 2013. In sum, Sheyreen appears
to harbor dreams about 2013 and beyond that do not fall too far from the mark
of the Municipality’s vision, namely, of a forward-looking, cosmopolitan
Marseille. She finds her place within this Marseille, however, not via MSA but
through English and other languages she recognizes to be international.
Speaking MSA or regional varieties of Arabic, as she quips, indicates people who
wish to “stay in their corner, in their bubble.”
Teachers, too, challenged the State construction of MSA as a professional
instrument with few cultural links to the Arab world or Islamdom (Hodgson,
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1974). One teacher named Sara commented that the instructions she received,
not to speak in Moroccan, her home variety, or broach religious topics, made her
feel like “we [MSA teachers] are teaching a fabricated language” (on enseigne une
fausse langue). While on the bus one day, she expressed her hope to me that the
Ministry would soon find her some “language assistants” from the Arabicspeaking world. In some classes, MSA teachers are coupled with language
assistants from Arab countries whose job it is to assist with fostering dialectal
Arabic skills in students. Sara as such, who is the teacher for the six students
who appear in the transcripts above, often leaned on Moroccan as a way of
modeling for students the linguistic reality of dialectal varieties as compared to
the type of “fabricated” MSA she was expected to teach. Sometimes, she would
switch to Moroccan to get students to comply with her wishes. For instance,
most days of the week Sara would seat a student named Ayman at the front right
of class so she could keep an eye on him as he did his work. Without fail, he
would push his desk backwards away from the front of class at the beginning of
the period. Sara disputed this, gesturing and saying “Zidi! Zidi!” (more! more!)
to make him move his desk forward again. At other times, she would depend on
her students’ home experience with regional varieties of Arabic to help them
understand how MSA functions. For example, on a day she was introducing a
new lesson and the unknown vocabulary words zawjah (wife) and zawj
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(husband), she asked in French “what do these words remind you of?” She put
up two fingers, the students paused to think, and then many of them shouted
“zuj!,” the word for two, or a pair, in Algerian. Sara also conducted impromptu
class discussions on such unsanctioned topics as the diﬀerence between Arabs
and Muslims and on whether she and the students should or should not miss
school on Muslim holidays, given the school’s secular (laïcque) status (all,
including Sara, agreed not to attend on Eid Friday).
Another teacher, named Norah, was one of the MSA teachers named to
implement the “Classical Languages Workshop” at the high school where she
had taught MSA for many years. Norah ultimately enjoyed the outcome of the
workshop, though she explains that her enjoyment derived mainly from the fact
that she became friendly with the Greek and Latin teachers, whom she had only
seen in passing before. She also, however, admits to being somewhat perplexed
at what was expected of her and finding it diﬃcult to really deepen students’
knowledge of MSA within such a framework:
“I didn’t know what I was going to do. Uh, Greek...MSA, really for me it meant nothing.
Then we get together the three of us---it was funny because people called us the
‘infernal trio.’ You know, we were three and together all the time... So we would say
‘Okay, what are we going to do today?’ It was good because, as long as we made a
connection between Greek and MSA, we were left the freedom to choose our lesson
plans. (...) It was like a workshop, if you will. They weren’t my students all year long.
(...) For example, at the beginning of the year my colleague did his piece, then the
second colleague did hers, then the third month was mine. Because we said that it made
more sense to have continuity. I wasn’t going to start the [Arabic] alphabet one week
because the class was only once a week. I wasn’t going to start and then leave oﬀ and
then my colleague comes and talks with them about something else. (…) So I started
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with the alphabet, then when I finished the alphabet we did the civilization part. This
meant they had to see the link between Greek philosophy and Arab philosophy: how the
Arabs transmitted, translated, and explained Greek philosophy, and then passed it along.
All of that part was in French. (...) Then we talked about Averroës [Ibn Rushd]. We talked
about him. Umm, my Greek colleagues talked about Aristotle. Because, precisely, it was
Averroës who translated and commented on Aristotle. So they dealt with that piece.
Then they saw films about, I believe Alexander [the Great]. They saw Alexander [the
Great], they saw Cleopatra and Antony, things like that. And we mostly talked about
Alexandria because it was a link between the Arab world and Greece.”9

When I followed up on this, wondering if the students learned to read or speak
any MSA, Norah said that no, due to the few hours allotted to her, they mainly
learned to recognize letters. She and the other two teachers also brought the
class to the J1 Hangar exhibit (“Mediterraneans: From the Grand City-States of
Yesterday to the People of Today”) mentioned in Section II. “It was
complementary and the students went to see the exhibit, of course. Oh yes, yes,
yes, they went to see it,” she assured me.

“Moi je savais pas ce que j'allais faire. Euh grecque, arabe pour moi ça voulait rien dire. Et
après on s'est réuni tout les trois. C’était marrant parce que on nous appelé le trio infernal. Tu
sais on était que trois, tout le temps ensemble et on disait "bon, qu'est-ce qu'on va faire.” (…)
C’était bien parce que on nous a laissé la liberté de choisir le programme qu'on veut, du moment
où on fait un lien entre le grecque et l’arabe, euh, on nous a donné la liberté du contenu. (…)
C’est comme un atelier. Si tu veux. C'est pas mes élèves de toute l'année. (…) Par exemple, on a
fait au début de l'année mon collègue il a fait un mois avec eux tout seul, après l'autre collègue il
a intervenu, et moi j'ai fait le troisième mois. Parce que on a dit que c'est plus logique qu'il y a
une suite. Je vais pas commencer l'alphabet par exemple une semaine (parce que c'est une fois
par semaine seulement, une seule fois), je vais pas commencer et en suite on arrête et l'autre
collègue vient pour parler d’autre chose. (…) Donc j’ai commencé avec l’alphabet. J’ai terminé
l’alphabet. Après on a fait la partie civilizationnelle. Ça veut dire il fallait qu’ils voient le rapport
entre la philosophie arabe. Comment les arabes ils ont, euh, transmis la philosophie grecque et
comment ils ont traduit la philosophie grecque, et comment ils l'ont expliqué, et fait passé en
suite. Donc on en a énormement parlé. Tout ca c’était en français. Alors on a parlé de Averroes.
On a parlé de lui. Euhm mes collègues de grecque ils ont parlé d’Aristote, parce que justement
Averroes il a traduit Aristote et il l’a commenté. Donc eux ils s’occupaient de cette partie. Ils ont
vu des films concernant-alors c’était Alexandre. Ils ont vu Alexandre. Ils ont vu Cléopâtre et
Antonio, des choses comme ça. Et on a parlé surtout sur la thématique d’Alexandrie parce que
c’était un lien entre le monde arabe et grecque.” (Norah, 3.28.13).
9
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The examples reviewed here precipitate a handful of observations about
Madame Durel’s preference—instilled in MSA classes over the 2012-2013 school
year—for an MSA with professional and international utility over an MSA
symbolically tied to Islamic history. As apparent from students’ comments, they
continued to view MSA in a way that had symbolic as well as instrumental
facets. For students, MSA remained a language tied to Islam and hence to their
parents’ countries. It was not, as such, simply a language relating to their
personal identities (“identitaire” in Madame Durel’s words). Rather, youth
thought they might use MSA to read Koran, perhaps garner recognition in
religious settings, and please their extended families. MSA was recognized to
have an international dimension, not because it would lead to jobs around the
globe, but because youth knew this language was admired in Muslim
communities everywhere. As Moore (2011) notes with respect to European
Union language policy more generally, there is a mistaken tendency to push
languages either to the side of the “private person, possessing particular
determinations of an ‘identity’” (p. 17), or to the side of the universalist “public
citizen.” MSA as understood by youth who participate in public school classes
continues, however, to be a language that is neither just private nor insular
insofar as it is tied symbolically to Islam. As students’ parents perhaps reasoned
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in urging their children into MSA classes, MSA has the potential to help youth
maintain ties to the Muslim community within and beyond Marseille.
Just as symbolically laden languages may prove instrumental for those
who ascribe to those symbolic values, so may languages thought only to be
instrumental also be shown to have significant symbolic dimensions. Underlying
Madame Durel’s vision of a practical, communicative MSA was, in eﬀect, more
than just a pitch for youth’s socioeconomic mobility. As aﬃrmed by Moore
(2011), “mere eﬃciency and symbolic value will always contradict each other,
until we realize that eﬃciency is a symbolic value” (p. 21). Within the context of
Marseille-European Capital of Culture-2013, the State’s move to instruct
Muslim youth in a secular, professional register of MSA belies the city’s fear of
Marseille falling backwards into social strife, poverty, and Islamic stringency.
MSA’s eﬃciency, as such, lay in its presumed ability to maneuver Marseille’s
diasporic youth population towards a more Classical, secular Mediterranean
identity. In other words, although MSA was marketed in utilitarian terms to
youth, along with it came a bundle of values endorsed by the local government. I
have argued here that these values were packaged by the Municipality in the
form of a recognizable cultural chronotope: an invitation to believe in a
Mediterranean heritage for Marseille that dates to Antiquity. Insofar as MSA
policy illustrates that swapping religious symbolism for economic utility
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involves more, culturally, than just instrumentality, Minna Sif seems to have
hewed very close to reality when she wrote that, in 2013, Marseille intended to
become “capital of another culture” than its own. Nevertheless, the examples in
this section show that Marseillais youth from Muslim familial backgrounds did
not assume footings, or the stances and dreams, aligned with Durel’s MSA and
were not, as such, interpellated as secular, Mediterranean subjects.

IV.

Concluding Remarks

The premise explored in this chapter is that people may engage in
recollections of the past that remain both perspectival and largely hypothetical.
What is the significance of the French State recollecting a past that maybe never
was, or belonged to someone else, as if it was their own? Can nostalgia be felt
for an unlived past, and when it is, what might that indicate about the present?
Jameson (1994), for instance, describes the blind nostalgia felt by the Russian
characters in Andrei Platonov’s novel Chevengur, who wake in the middle of the
night and search unknowingly for what might be signs of a socialist utopia. This
“nostalgia mode” (Jameson, 1984, p. 66), which Jameson finds equally in the
modernist literature of the former Soviet Union and U.S. films from the postmodernist 1980s, is characterized primarily by “the desperate attempt to
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appropriate a missing past” (ibid.) for the purposes of the present. What role
might signs circulated by the French State in Marseille, like bits of MSA or
contemporary images of Antiquity, play in their nostalgic attempts to bring the
past forward?
This chapter focused, in particular, on how the French State in Marseille
created “imaginary complicities” (Foucault, 1972, p. 4) between discontinuous
nodes in time and space through such means as cultural programming and new
MSA educational policies. Marseille’s Municipality turned to the Mediterranean
of the past, chronotopically hypothesized to have united the Arabs and the
French in a shared Greek and Roman heritage, to sketch a Marseille for the
present, where the city’s diasporic and French-origin people come to share in
one Mediterranean culture. The political and economic backdrop for the
nostalgic reconfiguration of Marseille in these terms is, as described, the context
of Marseille’s ongoing gentrification, its period in the public eye during MP2013,
and its desire to reshape its reputation: from a city associated perhaps more
closely with crime, poverty, and its Algerian population (e.g., Margérie) than with
being a highbrow “cultural” destination. 10

In a reference to Marseille’s numerous Algerians and Algerian descendants, youth sometimes
blend Marseille and Algérie, which yields Margérie.
10
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As apparent from the discrepancies in the importance youth versus the
Municipality ascribed to Marseille’s status as European Capital of Culture, the
city’s residents were engaged during 2012 and 2013 in a protracted negotiation
over the definition of “culture.” Commentators like Minna Sif wondered in what
sense Marseille was to be cosmopolitan, for instance. Why did city oﬃcials not
consider diasporic youth to be representative of Marseille’s desired international
identity? The material analyzed in this chapter prompts a series of related
questions, in turn. Why are the youth socialized into an Islamic milieu not
viewed as cultural contributors to the city, to the extent that their culture must
be swapped out for a secular Mediterranean one? Is the move to push
Marseille’s Muslim youth to identify with a visual appearance and an MSA
defined in relation to a Classical Mediterranean in fact a restorative, historically
accurate one? Does this move restore MSA and, through it, the diasporic youth
who participate in MSA classes, to a long-lost pedigree? And, perhaps most
importantly, did the Municipality’s project to “classicize” the infamous Arab and
African crossroads, through cultural programming and MSA instruction,
successfully entail Mediterranean citizens?
Viewed from a distance, the local Ministry of Education’s elaboration of
MSA as a professional, communicative language in many respects resembles the
language standardization projects that yielded European standard languages like
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French, Spanish, or German (Gal, 2008). Only, interestingly, it is a minority
language in this case, MSA, that is being groomed to linguistically represent
French culture in Marseille. Likewise, the targets of the standardization project
are French Muslims rather than the whole French nation. Madame Durel’s
initiatives can be reframed, thus, as attempts to address a specific crisis, among
diasporic socioeconomically marginalized youth, at a critical time, during
Marseille’s year as Capital, with tools and concepts borrowed from Europe’s
long experience with creating national subjects through language
standardization.
The Municipality’s eﬀorts notwithstanding, conversations with youth
who partake of MSA classes evinced, not only their uncertainty about MSA’s
utility for their careers and their preference for English, French, or Spanish, but
also a perduring understanding of MSA as a religious language. In sum, then,
the invitation Marseille extended to professedly Muslim youth, asking them to
claim Frenchness by aligning themselves with the Greco-Roman Mediterranean,
appears to have been rescinded by youth themselves. As presented in Chapters
Three, Four, and Five, youth articulated their cultural belonging to Marseille and
the Mediterranean in ways that diﬀered substantially from the kind of
Mediterranean identity described in this chapter. Specifically, how youth
positioned themselves culturally with respect to their hometown, their parents’
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Mediterranean countries of origin, and the Muslim World more broadly,
depended upon their conception of themselves as either highly pious Muslims or
else working-class diasporic youth.

!289

Transcript 6.1. French Original
CE: Comment on les appelle ces classes là?
LD: On les appelle "filières Méditerranéennes de langues et cultures Méditerranéennes"
CE: Voilà. Et comment ça marche exactement?
LD: En vérité c'est un travail conjoint entre les professeurs de langues d’antiquité, grecque et latin, et
langue arabe. Mais dans le projet peuvent s’adjoindre d'autres professeurs. Un professeur d’histoire...(C:
Oui) ou autre. Moi, dans le projet que j'ai à Cezanne un professeur de Provençal veut s’adjoindre. Moi je
suis sur qu’on pourrait faire des choses intéressants, sur la musique, sur la poésie d’amour, choses comme
ça.
CE: C’est super comme idée. C’est récent donc?
LD: Ouais, ouais.
CE: Et d'où s'est venue ceLD: -C’est venue d'une réflexion commune entre des gens de bonne volonté ((laughs/scoﬀs)) qui pensent
que, euh, les langues anciennes chez nous sont en danger et l'arabe est en danger, et qu’il faut unir ces
forces. (C: Oui) Donc c'est une perspective comme ça, de Méditerranée. C’est à dire en vérité c'est toute
cette réflexion sur la Méditerranée, vous savez Braudel eh mais même l'Union hein, pour la Méditerranée,
etc. (C: Oui). Tout ça c’est une réflexion de-nous ancrons, nous ancrons la France dans un espace
géographique européen mais il y a un autre espace qui a une vraie cohérence qui est la Méditerranée.
CE: Où la France est présente depuis bien plus qu’un siècle.
LD: Voilà. Oui, oui, donc la Méditerranée, fin, c’est une inspiration très braudelienne. C’est à dire qu’il y a
une culture Méditerranéene. Il y a eu des échanges. C’est un espace de vie très ancien, un espace de
partage, de combats et de (liens?)C: -Politiques aussi, justementLD: -Et que tout ça ça crée une culture commune qu’on exploite pas suﬃsament.
CE: Et les élèves comment ils répondent à ce-?
LD: -Bah les quelques expériences qu'on a, très bien! Il n’y a pas de soucis. Ils sont contents. Par exemple,
le projet qu’il y a sur Victor Hugo, auquel participent deux professeurs de lettres classiques et Norah, c’est
chouette hein. Ols ont fait des trucs sur Aristote, sur Alexandrie, sur-ils sont allés à Paris pour voir les
manuscrits là, de la Bibliothèque Nationale, c’est à dire les manuscrits grecques et latins qui sont passés
par les arabes. Ils ont été apportés au monde occidental par les Arabes. (C: Jmm) On essaie d’apporter
notre pierre à cela.
CE: Je commençais à désespérer mais ça me semble une bonne stratégie, pour régler le statut de l’arabe.
LD: En arabe il faut mieux ne pas désespérer. Il faut mieux très pugnace et être comme ça
C: Oui, optimiste surtout ((long pause)). Et ça existe aussi cette idée de Méditerranée dans d’autres
programmes d’arabe qui sont pas d’ici?
LD: Non, non c’est national. C'est national. Mais en dehors de nous (la France), qui s’intéresse à
l'enseignement de l'arabe? Personne! En termes scientifiques, personne! Dans le monde arabe il y a pas eu
de développement de didactique de l’arabe, de science pedagogique de l’arabe. Les autres pays européens,
non, non plus! Puisque ils n'ont pas-non que l'enseignement qui est universitaire. Nous avons une vraie
spécificité française nous. (C: Mmm). De part l'ancienneté de l'enseignement de l’arabe en France. Ça
remonte au 16ème siècle. De part euh l’histoire coloniale aussi. Il faut pas non plus l'omettre. C’est-à-dire
nous avons eu une histoire coloniale dans le monde arabe, beaucoup au Maghreb, qui a fait que les études
sur les arabes-sur la culture d'arabe se sont beaucoup développées. Et ça a créé une vraie réflexion. C’est
comment on peut enseigner l’arabe en tant que langue vivante étrangère? Nous sommes les seules à
réfléchir à ça.
CE: En Europe vous voulez dire?
LD: Ou même dans le monde arabe. Dans le monde arabe, qui réfléchit à ça? Personne!

!290

VII. Sexual Slurs: The Policing of Peers’
Language Use among Youth from
Muslim Households in Marseille’s
Projects
I.

Introduction

The idea for this chapter began with a curious incident early during my
fieldwork. I was observing a group of twenty students learning MSA in their
public school classroom in Northern Marseille’s 16th arrondissement, the same
classroom, Class 3B, as appeared in Chapters Three and Four. The teacher,
Madame Chérif, asked a student named Mohamed to write a particular sentence
on the chalkboard about a hypothetical character named “Nabil.” Mohamed
began writing out Nabil “ ل-  ي-  ب- ( ”نn-a-b-ī-l) beneath his classmates’ neatly
written sentences, taking his time and exaggerating the tips on his letters. No
sooner had he finished than Madame Chérif, looking displeased, took an eraser
to his tall letters. “But my version is more swag!,” protested Mohamed at his
typical high pitch. New to the term and skeptical of this new writing method,
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Madame Chérif replied, “and what is swag?” Before he could answer, Maisara
piped up “It’s homo!” from the back of the room.11
Among the students of Class 3B, being “swag” meant putting the kind of
eﬀort into appearance, such as clothing, make-up, and accessories, that was
associated with Western pop culture and the global music industry. This
definition for the French label swag holds similarities to both its early
etymological predecessors in England and its more contemporary use in the
United States. First attested in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream at the
turn of the 16th century—“What hempen homespuns have we swaggering here,
so near the cradle of the fairy queen?” (Shakespeare, 1907, p. 35), the verb
swagger pertained to a tremulous or swaying motion in one’s walk, “an aﬀected
manner” (Wedgwood, 1865, p. 356). The meaning of aﬀectation appears to have
accompanied “swagger” in its passage to the United States, where the verb
underwent apocopation and conversion to the noun “swag.” The online freely
editable Urban Dictionary features 535 entries for swag (2012). Entry two reads
“‘the way someone presents themselves.’ Eg, whether someone looks
cool” (2012). The association of swag with coolness is traceable to the early
2000s, when hip-hop artists Jay-Z (“All I Need,” 2001), Soulja Boy (“Pretty Boy

Mohamed: “Mais ma version est plus swag!”/Madame Chérif: “C’est quoi swag?”/Maisara:
“C’est homo!” (12-12-12)
11
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Swag,” 2010), and Lil B (“Wonton Soup,” 2010), along with pop-music singer
Justin Bieber (“Boyfriend,” 2012), put out songs lyrics with swag in the refrain.
Swag’s connection to trends in the music industry explains why youth in Class
3B considered pop singers like Rihanna and Justin Bieber, or media personalities
like Kim Kardashian, to epitomize swag style.
What is, perhaps, unexpected is how, in this youthful context of Northern
Marseille, men having a swag look were often tropically recast as “homo,” or
gay.12 Asked the meaning of swag, many of the students in Class 3B would
provide the folk etymology “S.W.A.G.—secretly we are gay” along with a
definition focused on clothing. I argue that youth’s association of swag style with
homosexuality is one that makes sense only in light of contrastive ideologies of
personhood and language that youth have developed locally. On the one hand,
they evaluated white, Western behaviors, like dressing swag and speaking
Standard French, as indexing a “soft” (mou) disposition. To this persona, they
counterposed their own image as tough, on the other hand. Among the
behaviors thought to index this toughness were youth’s preferred tracksuitsand-sneakers style and a linguistically syncretic register of French and Arabic,
which they dubbed Castellanois after their project (c.f., Chapter Three). Given

Within the body of the text, I use quotes to indicate verbatim speech I recorded with youth
and English translations of what was said. Italics within the text indicate a language other than
English. I provide the original text in footnotes.
12
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these contrastive ideological frames, when a male classmate deviated from his
tough persona, peers understood such deviant behavior in terms of a softening
of character. In Mohamed’s case, his claim to write Arabic in a swag style,
together with his high-pitched voice, served to align him with the “softness” of
white, Western culture and thus contributed to his construal by Maisara as a
“fag.”
The primary concern of this chapter, as such, is to investigate the
linguistic and behavioral crossing (Rampton, 1995) practices of diasporic youth
from Marseille’s housing projects who have been socialized into Muslim
traditions since childhood. The four questions orienting my inquiry are: to
which language registers do youth hew as indexical of their various identities;
what reasons might they have to cross out of these in-group registers; how are
instances of crossing received by their peers; and what role does youth’s
socialization into Islam play in these reactions? The data for this chapter were
drawn from my fieldwork with three main peer groups: one, the MSA students
in public school Class 3B; two, a friend-group of orthodox Muslim-identified
female students at a local public university; and three, orthodox youth who
either worked or attended the private Muslim secondary school in Marseille’s
15th arrondissement.
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The anecdote with which I began this chapter introduced the tendency for
youth from Northern Marseille to position as queer or sexually non-normative
the behaviors they associated with other ethnic, class, and religious groups. To
better understand this phenomenon, in Section II below I discuss a handful of
analogous ethnographic examples from various minority contexts. These studies
show that in contexts where several dimensions of social marginality overlap,
where people are for example confronted to substandard living conditions and
violence, or they experience economic or religious marginalization in addition to
ethnic minority status, forms of group solidarity develop that make it socially
delicate to behave in ways that transgress group boundaries. I discuss how the
practice of linguistic “crossing” (Rampton, 1995) in particular, when one draws
on linguistic resources associated with an (often ethnic) outsider to your social
group, carries heavy—and often gendered—consequences for the individual who
engages in it. The impression of crossing centrally depends on people
distinguishing in their environment between at least two diﬀerent
“registers” (Agha, 2007a), or two separate types of personhood understood to
inhere in certain expressive behaviors, including language, clothing, and other
signs. These images of personhood may, furthermore, be made of such
aﬃliations as class, ethnoracial or religious group, gender, and age, among
others. Viewing cultural identity within a semiotic framework of this sort allows
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for a more technical discussion of what has previously been discussed in terms
of the intersectionality of identity (Crenshaw, 1992). As such, the studies I
review pay particular attention to how, in any event where someone deploys a
linguistic or other sign token, “multiple social axes of identification coincide,
emerge, or undergo ‘erasure’” (Alim & Reyes, 2011, p. 381), depending upon
local conditions and sociocultural understandings.
Following this review of the literature, in Section III I compare two
instances of youth from Class 3B crossing from Castellanois into Standard French,
one by a young male resident of the project and another by a female student
from Class 3B. I demonstrate that youth in this context deployed sexual slurs in
reaction to linguistic crossing as a means of policing ethnoracial, class, and
religious (or moral) boundaries that they wanted to keep intact. In addition, I
oﬀer suggestions as to why instances of young men from La Castellane speaking
a more standard form of French prompted readings of gayness, whereas young
women from the community crossing in this way on occasion led them to be
constructed as sexually easy or “slutty” (i.e., bandeuse, folle, bimbo, crasseuse, hamham [ħɑmħɑm]). In Section IV, I present two transcripts from a slightly older
peer group of female university students who, though also raised in Northern
Marseille’s housing projects in North, West, and East African households,
identified instead as orthodox Muslims (c.f., Chapter Five). In one, a Muslim
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sister, or Islamically pious woman, exhorts other sisters to speak elegantly, in
Standard French, as a means of enacting piety. In the other, a lunchtime
interaction between several orthodox sisters unfolds in which one of them
crosses into a “project French” not unlike Castellanois, an interactional move I
analyze as the young woman’s desire to reveal her queerness to her closest
friends. Taken as a whole, this chapter captures how youth from this milieu in
Marseille, in creating certain ideological frameworks of ethnicity, class, and
religion, at times eclipsed gender and sexuality altogether, and at other junctures
rendered nothing but gender and sexuality visible.

II.

The Language Practices of Minority Groups in Mainstream Contexts:
Intersectionality and the Penalties of Linguistic Crossing

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, researchers in the social sciences fell
into step with activists for minority rights in challenging assumptions about
both the fixity and uniformity of identity. Gender and race, in particular,
emerged from this pivotal period understood as societal achievements rather
than innate personal qualities. Butler (1990) urged the view that gender, for
instance, represented “a normative ideal rather than a descriptive feature of
experience” (p. 23). As such, it lacked “ontological priority to the various roles
and functions through which it assumes visibility and meaning” (ibid., p. 22).
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The destabilization of identity categories instigated by postmodern
anthropologists like Butler was pushed further by the arrival of third wave
feminists, many of whom were women of color, to the Women’s Movement in
the early 1990s. In 1992, Rebecca Walker, daughter of African American activist
and novelist Alice Walker, wrote a magazine article in which she disputed
“women” as a unified category. She envisioned that third wave feminism would
be uniquely attentive to the ways in which female struggles were crosscut by
women’s experiences with race, class, age, sexuality, religion, and so forth.
Among the sources of inspiration for Walker’s work (1995), and for that of later
third wave activists (e.g., Baumgardner & Richards, 2000; Rehman &
Hernández, 2006), were writings from the 1980s by second-wave feminists of
color (Anzaldúa, 1987; Morraga, 1983; Lorde, 1984) in which they alluded to
gaping diﬀerences between women’s lives depending upon their circumstances.
The point that neither “womanhood” nor “blackness” were singular cultural
categories was made especially clear, in the case of the United States, by
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s (1992) revelation of the way in which American blacks
and whites reacted to attorney Anita Hill when she accused Clarence Thomas of
sexual harassment on the eve of his Supreme Court nomination. Crenshaw
argues that educated black women like Anita Hill tend to fall between the cracks
of recognizable American stereotypes and face repudiation from all camps as a
!298

result. Hill, shows Crenshaw, was unable to inhabit the figure of the violated
white “Madonna” during her hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee (p.
408), nor that of the black individual wronged at the hands of white society,
often typified as a black male. She thus remained unaccounted for by the
feminist movement, unvindicated by “dominant whites” (431), and vilified by
“black people across a political and class spectrum” (p. 433). To summarize, the
scholarly and community concern with the politics of minority representation in
the late 1980s and early 1990s marked a turning point in how social scientists
approached race and gender issues. Postmodernism in anthropology and its
sister disciplines meant greater awareness of how people construct social
categories in historically and culturally specific ways, many of which articulate
and criss-cross dimensions of human identity (Hall, 1992).
Insights from researchers interested in language and discourse both fed
into and deepened the postmodern—alias “linguistic”—turn (Canning, 1994).
Indeed, nowhere were postmodern foci, like “indeterminacy, performativity,
and…the unrepresentable” (Lucas, 2013, p. 640), more apparent than in the
interplay between people’s language use and the identities they claimed. Among
those whose linguistically oriented research informed postmodern thinking
about identity were cultural anthropologists examining fieldworkers’
positionality with respect to their informants (e.g., Briggs, 1986; Crapanzano,
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1980; Dwyer, 1982; Rosaldo, 1986); social theorists who argued for discourse as
the fundamental medium for the exercise of power in society (e.g., Bourdieu,
1979; 1982; Foucault, 1971, 1972); and linguistic anthropologists and
sociolinguists who theorized the sociocultural functions of language where
gender was concerned (Gal, 1989; Lakoﬀ, 1975; M. Silverstein, 1985a), race and
ethnicity (Baugh, 1983; Brice-Heath, 1983; Anzaldúa, 1987; Ervin-Tripp, 2001;
Goodwin, 1982; Labov, 1972a; 1972b; Mitchell-Kernan, 1971; Rickford, 1991;
Smitherman, 1977; Zentella, 1982), and class and status (Bourdieu, 1979;
Honey, 1989; Irvine, 1974; Macauley, 1977). Four key theoretical tools these and
other scholars leaned upon in documenting language’s social functions in the
various communities in which they worked were indexicality (Silverstein, 1976),
ideology (Silverstein, 1979), performance (Bauman & Briggs, 1990; M.
Silverstein, 1985b), and register (Agha, 2007a).
The terms indexicality, ideology, performance, and register highlight
language’s systematic reliance on cultural context for its meaning. Such terms
mark an approach to language quite diﬀerent from that of Ferdinand de Saussure
(1916), who attributed a mainly symbolic, decontextualized nature to language
as a system. Indexicality, more specifically, refers to language’s ability to
presuppose as well as enact social or pragmatic meanings, given specific
contextual parameters and ideological set-ups, above and beyond its semantic or
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referential meanings (M. Silverstein, 1976). Certain contextual aspects of a
speech event can be brought into “sharp cognitive relief ” (ibid., p. 34) when
language is functioning indexically, at times strategically and other times
through a mismatch of the ideologies at play and contextual factors. Ideologies
are key to the ability of linguistic forms to index social meanings. Ideologies, or
“native metapragmatic…rationalizations about the use of language” (M.
Silverstein, 1979, p. 207), serve to specify the social tenor of linguistic forms,
while grammatical rules lay the latticework for speech. Reflexive ideologies
about language in eﬀect permit the “enregisterment” (Agha, 2005), or a
measure of social concertation about, the social meanings indexed by a way of
speaking. A performance and poetics approach (Bauman & Briggs, 1990;
Jakobson, 1960; M. Silverstein, 1985b), in turn, looks to the poetic organization
of a text (e.g., parallelism) in order to read the positions speakers presuppose or
create in the elapse of an interaction. If ideologies about language tend to
narrow the scope of social meanings available to speakers, then the notion of
performance “involves an active process of negotiation [of such ideological
meanings] in which participants reflexively examine the discourse as it is
emerging, embedding assessments of its structure and significance in the speech
itself ” (Bauman & Briggs, 1990, p. 69). The authors I cite below have drawn
upon these theoretical refinements to illuminate how minority groups in a
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variety of locations have created ways of speaking, or “registers” (Agha, 2007a),
that index their group qualities.
A register, as per Agha (2007a), is “a reflexive model of behavior that
evaluates a semiotic repertoire (or set of repertoires) as appropriate to specific
types of conduct (such as the conduct of a given social practice), to
classifications of persons whose conduct it is, and, hence, to performable roles
(personae, identities) and relationships among them” (p. 147). Any register is
organized in three dimensions: it has a “repertoire” of forms (its criterial signs,
linguistic and otherwise); it has a “social range” of pragmatic values (the
personae and relationships its forms can index) thanks to circulating ideologies;
and it has a “social domain” (domains of people socialized to use or simply
recognize the register; ibid., p. 169). The following ethnographic examples show
how registers of language and conduct serve minority communities as
touchstones for community members to communicate significant dimensions of
their identities, but also, on occasion, a mooring from which it proves perilous
for them to stray. The phenomenon of “crossing,” which Rampton (1995)
elaborated in his study of the multilingual practices of English youth of Anglo,
Pakistani, and Afro-Caribbean descent in a South Midlands school, is
particularly useful in understanding the politics and motives involved when
people from a particular ethnic background step out of their in-group register
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and into a way of speaking stereotypically associated with another ethnoracial
group.
Rampton subsumes three types of linguistic behaviors under the label
“crossing.” In each case, crossing is at hand because youth are moving into the
linguistic space of an ethnic other. Of the three behaviors, however, two are
intended and received humorously, while one seems to be an earnest attempt to
identify with members of another ethnic group. The humorous practices
include, first, how youth of Anglo and Afro-Caribbean descent embed
fragmentary Panjabi into their speech, and second, how youth of Anglo, AfroCaribbean, and South Asian descent stylize or exaggerate Indian English. The
third kind of crossing is when youth of South Asian and Anglo descent adopted
elements of a Creole register to index a “sense of multiracial working class
identity” (p. 136). The youth who crossed in this way hailed from working-class
families in Ashmead village and were closely tied into black peer groups.
Rampton describes black and white Ashmead youth’s use of an English with
Creole characteristics as indexing qualities like “assertiveness, verbal
resourcefulness, and opposition to authority” (p. 53). It also operated to
diﬀerentiate Ashmead youth from “posh Anglos” living in wealthier districts,
whom were variously classified as “‘posh,’ ‘snobs,’ even ‘posh wimpies’” (p. 61)
and were the least likely to attempt crossing. Rampton’s work draws attention
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to a great number of phenomena germane to the data I analyze in this chapter,
among them the observation that there are social barriers to linguistic crossing,
that in-group and out-group uses of language help youth index certain qualities
(e.g., Creole register indexing being anti-establishment), and that in this context
Ashmead youth disparaged their aﬄuent white male peers in feminizing terms.
Whereas Rampton (1995) analyzed instances of mainly male youth from
Anglo and other ethnic backgrounds crossing into varieties associated with
minorities, like Jamaican Creole or Indian English, I am also keen to discern
what is at stake when minority youth—male as well as female—cross instead
into more standard language varieties. What are the stereotypical qualities,
personal barriers, and social consequences involved for minority youth who
venture into linguistic standards that in Western contexts have historically been
the purview of a powerful, lighter-skinned majority? Undoubtedly the crossing
dynamic of this sort that has been the most thoroughly documented is that of
African Americans crossing into Standard English. Rickford’s (1985) research on
the speech of black and white people from South Carolina’s Sea Islands provides
useful inroads into this question. Rickford found that black Sea Islanders were
much more likely to use black Vernacular English morphosyntax (alias, African
American Vernacular English, or AAVE) and participate in certain speech genres
(e.g., folk-praying on Sunday morning) than white Sea Islanders. Rickford saw
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these speech behaviors as “acts of identity” (Le Page & Tabouret-Keller, 1985),
meaning black speakers spoke in AAVE to index their ethnic identity in
opposition to white people. He also noted that, in this context, “approximation
to or adoption of the other [white] group’s linguistic norms may be negatively
viewed as crossing-over…and regarded with suspicion or hostility” (p. 116).
What, more specifically, are the stereotypical values that accrue to African
Americans who cross into speech practices or behaviors thought to proceed from
white American culture?
Mitchell-Kernan (1971), in her work on black speech genres like
“signifying,” comments on how crossing is often perceived to be both about
wanting to climb the class ladder and to be white. She relays a conversation in
which a young black woman challenges another about “being one of those
Negroes who don’t eat chit’lins.” The accused woman replies that “I ate enough
black-eyed peas and neckbones during the Depression that I can’t get too excited
over it. I eat prime rib and T-bone because I like to, not because I’m trying to be
white” (pp. 95-96). Here, the charge of acting higher class is shot through with
overtones of assimilating to whiteness. The accused woman feels pressed to
justify her preference for costlier cuts of meat in order to prove that she is not,
in fact, trying to act white. Relatedly, Rahman (2008) has examined the fraught
position of middle-class blacks insofar as crossing is a frequent part of their daily
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routines. She details how middle-class African Americans, who have access to
standard and vernacular poles of AAVE and mainstream varieties of Standard
English, may be accused of “talking white” if they unduly standardize their
speech in casual community interactions (p. 142), and yet may be
simultaneously criticized for using AAVE in corporate settings. In her work on
black comedic performances, in turn, Rahman (2007) inspects comedians’ use of
AAVE and Standard English for the black and white social personae they index,
respectively. She shows how when black comedians speak in AAVE it is to
perform values like “down-home common sense and resourcefulness,”
“assertiveness and directness,” a “no-pretenses attitude,” “black coolness,” and
“soul,” defined as the emotional depth one gains from having experienced
suﬀering (p. 67, p. 80). When they imitate white people, by contrast, their
characters show traits like blandness, “mechanicalness” (p. 80), and
“ineﬀectualness, supposedly the result of a stereotyped life of privilege” (p. 68).
This ideological contrast, between hardened and resourceful African Americans
and soft and ineﬀectual whites, generates powerful tropes involving gender and
sexuality when black men in particular engage in linguistic crossing.
Baugh (1987), for one, hints at unequal interpretations of crossing for
black men than for black women. Telling of his own experience in Philadelphia,
he writes "Most of my childhood black peers were openly hostile to standard
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English, and boys who chose to speak the standard were usually called ‘sissies’
or worse" (p. 237). Similarly, Fordham and Ogbu (1986) and Ogbu (2004)
describe how, in a Washington D.C. high school, black male students who
“behaved and talked according to the white definition” (Ogbu, 2004, p. 8),
getting good grades and taking Advanced Placement courses, feared being called
“pervert brainiacs” and “homosexuals” by their peers (p. 194). Jackson (2005)
elaborates further on this link between black success and perceived sexuality. In
the context of Harlem’s gentrification, he relates how male “Harlemites”
characterized new establishments catering to a clientele with disposable income
as “feminized and homosexual” spaces (p. 53). One black male youth, for
instance, spoke of the “faggoty” taint of a gourmet bakery in Lower Harlem that
was frequented by white and black middle-class patrons (p. 53). Summarizing
this man’s position, Jackson explains that “middle-class status is articulated
through homosexuality—two equally soft versions of public life—in
contradistinction to the more stereotypically hardened performances of lowerclass black masculinity” (p. 54). In sum, it appears that at least some African
Americans ideologically link whiteness with aﬄuence and personal weakness
thus that crossing into Standard English, the language of the mainstream
establishment, can lead one to be tropically construed as “gay.” It also seems à
propos here to remark upon the documented tendency for African American
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communities to ridicule black gay men as individuals trying to mimic white
culture (Johnson, 2003, 2004; Sears, 1991). Johnson (2004) writes, for instance,
of how he witnessed a black gay man being called “Miss Ann” (p. 252). This
man’s likening to a imperious white woman depends, again, on links held to
obtain in black cultural circles between eﬀeminacy, an “uppity” class stance, and
whiteness.
What is the function, more importantly, of the feminization (e.g., sissies,
Miss Ann) or sexualization (e.g., faggoty, homosexual) of men of color’s
crossing behavior? Might there be comparable phenomena among young female
crossers that shed light on this question? In revealing work on Texan Chicanas,
Gallindo (1992, 1993) contests the notion, widespread among Chicanos, that a
slang register called Caló is spoken exclusively by Pachucos, male representatives
of a Chicano subculture originating in El Paso, Texas. Gallindo unveils that
Texan Chicanas of various ages and career ilk also spoke and identified with
Caló. The female speakers she interviewed felt that when they crossed into Caló,
an otherwise male-dominated register, they sought to inhabit the role of “any
woman who is liberated and breaking away from her traditional role” (Gallindo,
1992, p. 16). Given Caló’s radical indexicality, at least for women, it is perhaps
not surprising that men in their social circles monitored women’s use of Caló by
claiming that only “putas” (prostitutes), “cantineras” (barmaids), and
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“pachucas” (gang women) were wont to use Caló (Gallindo, 1993, p. 27). In sum,
by speaking Caló these Chicanas risked having their reputations sexualized by
men in their communities. Relatedly, Billiez, Krief, and Lambert (2003) report
on the case of suburban diasporic youth from Grenoble who, depending on their
gender, speak varying degrees of a local “langage racaille” (lowlife language).
When young women chose to dial up their use of this register, by swearing on a
par with young men for example, they were singled out by young men and
women as being tomboys (garçons manqués), dudes in-the-flesh (des vrais mecs),
and unattractive to their male peers (p. 183). In this Chicana Texan and French
cases, women who crossed into registers associated with the opposite sex were
disciplined by men via assertions of their masculinization and their
desexualization.
In all, the review in this section has aimed to diversify perspectives on
crossing as a sociolinguistic practice by using theoretical tools from linguistic
anthropology and examining cases with an intersectional yet semiotic lens.
Crossing may involve, as in Rampton’s (1995) definition, moving partially or
entirely into a register indexical of another ethnic group. This movement took
place from a majority towards a minority ethnic group in Rampton’s case of
Anglos embedding Creole features in their English, but took place in the
opposite direction, from an ethnic minority towards a majority group, in the
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African American examples. Obstacles presented themselves in both directions
of crossing, though I focused particularly on the tools minority groups have
developed to hinder people’s transgression of group etiquette and established
social boundaries. Notable among these devices are moves to feminize,
masculinize, sexualize, and desexualize crossers. In the ethnographic section
that follows, I examine what local norms are for language use and behavior in La
Castellane and La Bricarde projects and if they vary by gender. I also analyze
instances in which male and female youth linguistically deviated from these
norms and the diﬀerent social consequences they faced depending on their
gender.

III.

Language and Gender among Youth from La Castellane and La
Bricarde Projects

Writing in 1990, William Labov summarized a little over two decades
worth of quantitative sociolinguistic studies that had examined the interaction
between sex and language. He proposed two principles to capture what he saw
as the significant tendencies: 1) “For stable sociolinguistic variables, men use a
higher frequency of nonstandard forms than women” (p. 210); 2) “In change
from below, women are most often the innovators” (p. 215). A corollary of the
first principle was that “In change from above, women favor the incoming
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prestige form more than men” (p. 213). This corollary meant that women
employed more numerous standard language forms than men, but only when
they were aware of the relative prestige of linguistic forms. Although this body
of research used sex of speaker as a methodological tool (and not the speaker’s
gender identity), Labov and others have furnished attempts at explaining these
hypothesized tendencies that represent theorizations of gender. For instance,
Labov (1990) suggests that women’s greater attraction to standard speech
derives from their need to assert dominance symbolically—namely, through
language—unable as they are to wield the same “material power” as men (p.
214). In parallel with Labov, Trudgill (1983) contributes the line of reasoning
that women are less drawn to the language forms of the working-class because
of their characteristic toughness and the links society draws between being
tough and being masculine. Much research has revealed, however, that
toughness is not a quality to which only men aspire. Data from Trudgill’s (1972)
own research in Norwich speak to the need to explore group-specific definitions
of femininity. When the lower working-class women from Norwich in his study
conversed casually with the interviewer, interestingly they tallied the same
number of non-Received Pronunciation forms (i.e., [ən] as opposed to RP [ɪŋ])
as their lower working-class male counterparts. In another context where gender
and class intersect, Mendoza-Dentón (1996, 2008) has written about how
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Chicana homegirls from Northern California orient their speech and behavior to
an ideal of acting macha, or tough and demanding of respect. These young
women cite intimidating behaviors like “looking in” (looking down past an
upthrust chin), wearing long eyeliner, and not smiling as semiotic devices they
use to claim more egalitarian relationships with their partners and fend for their
families (Mendoza-Dentón, 2008, p. 104). In yet another context, in schools
around France, Baines (2007) administered a survey to 483 French youth and
found that the quotient of insults reported by young men and women diﬀered
little. If these studies are any indication, researchers have already begun
reassessing the claim of a one-to-one relationship between male gender and
non-standard speech. Though this section intends mainly to explain a particular
ethnographic phenomenon, it is certainly the case as well that the findings I
present sit at odds with the sociolinguistic “natures” of men and women
generalized by Labov and Trudgill above. Further, that the explanations I have
found to best account for these data necessarily invoke dynamics of religion,
class, and ethnicity likewise reinforces Ochs’ (1983) insight that, insofar as
several domains of social reality come together in constituting gender, gender
must not be studied in isolation, as an independent variable.
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Project-Specific Ideals of Youth Masculinity and Femininity
As described in Chapter Three, La Castellane and La Bricarde Projects
perch upon a hillside in the 16th arrondissement of Marseille, overlooking the city
from its northern reaches. Both projects are also adjacent to the public
secondary school attended by the students of Class 3B. Here, I discuss
femininity and masculinity as they were locally formulated by the students of
Class 3B. Ochs (1983) writes of the relationship between language and gender
that, although there are linguistic forms that directly index or presuppose
speakers’ genders cross-linguistically, most typically gender is indexed indirectly,
meaning people ideologically link language forms to certain stances or qualities
and these in turn feed into images of male and female gender. Similarly, my
exploration of the topic of gender in the setting of Class 3B began, not by posing
questions about masculinity or femininity per se, but by asking the students to
describe their style and dispositions to me. I was intrigued to observe that
gender surfaced very little in students’ responses and that replies to my
questions overlapped significantly between boys and girls.
Apparel was among the first subjects to arise, and both male and female
students, with only a few exceptions, described their fashion norm as “survêtesbaskets,” or tracksuits and sneakers. Asma explained this preference as one of
choosing comfort over looks. She spoke of going to door-to-door in La Bricarde
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with Kenza and Siwar, distributing maqrūt, North African date-filled cookies, to
neighbors during Ramadan, and how even on those special occasions the girls
avoided the discomfort and hassle of make-up, heels, and dresses (2.14.13). The
girls’ emphasis on comfort and going plain by no means translated into less care
in selecting clothes, however. Whether during the week or on the weekends, the
girls paid careful attention to both their outfits and their hair. Kardiatou
preferred Adidas-inspired tracksuits matched to Palladium high-tops (montantes),
which she finished with Senegalese bangles and a snippy ponytail. Asma tended
to go for sweatshirts over jeans and rip-oﬀ Nike shoes, avoiding jewelry
altogether but straightening her long hair. Siwar wore loose-fitting tracksuits in
varying colors, while Anisa loved to wear black and would top oﬀ her
sophisticated look with a Burberry-inspired scarf and hoop earrings. The boys
opted for blue and green tracksuits instead of the pink and purple ones enjoyed
by the girls, but shared a liking for puﬀy vests, scarves, counterfeit-brand
sneakers, and coiﬀed hair with the girls. On a typical day, Kader wore an Adidasstriped tracksuit, razored slits in his eyebrows, and a gelled mohawk. Ayman
opted for a modern-day James Dean look, wearing a black leather jacket over a tshirt, dark tight jeans tucked into high-tops, a scarf tightly wound around his
neck, and his hair gelled into a devil-may-care wave. Mohamed summarized the
local fashion norms thus:
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“The fashion of the northern projects is tracksuits, caps… [soccer] club tracksuits and
sneakers: Adidas, Manchester, Lacoste, Chelsea. Lacoste used to be mean-cool but now
it’s burned out” (2.11.13).13

The students were unanimous in opposing their “mean-cool” (méchant)
tracksuit-and-sneakers norm to the style they called swag, and girls as well as
boys had uproarious reactions when I asked them if they personally dressed
swag:
Cécile: And you guys, are you swag?
All: Noooo! ((laughing loudly))
Samia: No, no, no ((laughing))
Kardiatou: Tracksuits-and-sneakers
Anisa: And yeah, like, sneakers
Asma: The swag people are more those people who wear knit sweaters, big sunglasses,
Jordans…
Kardiatou: Like Americans!
Asma: Yeah! Like Americans. 14

These girls, on a later occasion, let me into the negative perceptions they held of
certain female students, from another class called Class 3A, whom they
considered to be swag (2.10.13):

“La mode des Quartiers Nord c’est survêtes, casquettes… des survêtes de clubs [de fut] et des baskets:
Adidas, Manchester, Lacoste, Chelsea. Lacoste avant c’était méchant mais maintenant c’est devenu
cramé” (Mohamed, 2.11.13).
13

Cécile: Et vous, vous etês swag?
All: Noooon! ((laughing loudly))
Samia: Non, non, non ((laughing))
Kardiatou: Survêtes-baskets
Anisa: Et ouais, genre, les baskets
Asma: Les swag c’est plus eux qui mettent des tricots, les grosses lunettes, les Jordans…
Kardiatou: Comme les americaines!
Asma: Ouais! Comme les americaines.
14
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Kenza: Do you know, like, Juliette?15
Anisa: Juliette and ((unclear))
Asma: They are always trying to act pretty!
Cécile: In 3B?
Kardiatou: No, no, no
Kenza: In 3A
Asma: Eeeeeh if they [the girls] did that in 3B… ((unclear)) [The girls in 3A] They have
money to dress up and all, but they’re dumb in the head
Cécile: How do they dress?
Kardiatou: They wear foundation
Kenza: How do we say...
Cecile: Lots of make-up?
Kardiatou: Because they’re all full of pimples! ((Kenza laughs))
Cécile: Are they Arab girls?
Kardiatou: A Chinese girl, a Cambodian girl, another is an I-don’t-know-what
Kenza: A gypsy
Asma: A gypsy, an Arab
Kardiatou: Another she’s a-a Madagascan
Cécile: But do they dress tracksuits-and-sneakers?
Kenza: Eeeehm no! They dress really swag. They wear skirts in winter
Asma: Plus, they hang around more and all with the boys and all that
15

Kenza: Tu connais Juliette et tout?
Anisa: Juliette et ((unclear))
Asma: Elles font trop les belles!
Cécile: Dans la 3B?
Kardiatou: Non, non, non
Kenza: Dans la 3A
Asma: Eeeeeh dans la 3B ils font ça et... ((unclear)) [The girls in 3A] Elles ont des sous
à sapper et tout, mais elles sont bêtes dans la tête
Cécile: Elles s’habillent comment?
Kardiatou: Elles mettent du font de teint
Kenza: Comment on dit...
Cecile: Beaucoup de maquillage?
Kardiatou: Parce-qu'elles ont plein de boutons! ((Kenza laughs))
Cécile: C’est des filles arabes?
Kardiatou: Une chinoise, cambodgienne, une autre c’est une chez-pas-quoi
Kenza: Une gitane
Asma: Une gitane, une arabe
Kardiatou: Une autre c'est une-une malgache
Cécile: Mais elles s’habillent survêtes-baskets?
Kenza: Eeeehm non! Elles s’habillent bien swag, elles portent des jupes en hiver.
Asma: En plus, elles trainent plus avec tout les garçons et tout ça
Kardiatou: Ufhh
Kenza: Ouais, elles font les populaires
Kardiatou: Et elles vont fumer dans les toilettes avec eux
Kenza: Mais dans le collège. ((pauses)) Notre class en fait on a un bon délire quoi
Asma: Ouais, on n'est pas style trop habillé
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Kardiatou: Ufhh
Kenza: Yeah, they act all popular
Kardiatou: And they go smoke in the bathroom with them [the boys]
Kenza: But at the secondary school. ((pauses)) Our class, we’ve got a good style going
you know
Asma: Yeah, we’re not too dressed up in our style

In these transcripts, the students of Class 3B identify a specific “project”
sartorial style, characterized by tracksuits and sneakers and “not being too
dressed up” (pas style trop habillé) as the desirable norm for both girls and boys.
This kind of no-nonsense clothing style was indicative of a more general
disposition held by youth in Class 3B, summed up by a student named Kader as
the “mentality of the projects” (2.14.13).16 This disposition was explained to me
as the need to show grit and act tough, whether one was male or female.
Mohamed explained this mentality, more specifically, as a quality into which
youth from the projects are socialized. When I asked him about where he
planned to live in the future, he spoke of staying in La Castellane and teaching
his future son about having backbone:
“To stay in the projects that way my-that way my son he has a-he has the project
upbringing, that way he has a project upbringing. He won’t let people mess with him…
He’s tough, he’s not scared of anybody” (4.4.13).17

This orientation to toughness manifested itself quite clearly in the classroom,
where both male and female students were willing to face disciplinary action in

16

“J’ai la mentalité des quartiers” (Kader, 2.14.13).

“Rester dans les quartiers comme ça mon-comme ça mon fils il a du-il a l’éducation quartiers, comme ça il a
une éducation quartiers. Il se laisse pas faire…Il est dur, c’est il a peur de personne” (Mohamed, 4.4.13).
17
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order to prevent a peer from insulting them or having their autonomy
compromised. Ayman was notorious among his classmates for not allowing even
the most minimal slight to his person. On a Friday in mid-March, 2013, Ayman
was barred from class for refusing to follow the teacher’s directions. Ayman had
gone to sit at the backmost desk of the classroom and, try as the teacher might
to get him to sit in one of the seats closer to her, where she might keep a better
eye on him, he would not budge. Ayman was not alone in his eﬀorts to prove he
was proud and unafraid of people. In October earlier that year, Nacima received
a detention for having yelled profanities at Kader during classtime. Kader and
Nacima were in fact friendly more generally, but on this day Kader firmly crossed
a line into racist territory when he called her “King Kong.” Nacima, whose
parents are Comorian and Maorese, stood up and lunged for Kader, hurling
insults in Comorian and French (to the eﬀect of “go get some balls”)18 and
trying to scratch at his face. She had to be held back by two male students and
the teacher, and Madame Chérif immediately meted out three hours of detention
for Nacima and three days of expulsion for Kader. Once calm returned to the
classroom, Madame Chérif walked by my desk and murmured, “I didn’t think a

Nacima began her sentence in French, “va chercher,” and then inserted the object in Comorian.
Another Comorian-speaking student glossed the object as a vulgar word for testicles, like couilles
in French, but I was not able to write down the Comorian word (10.17.12).
18

!318

girl could talk like that” (10.17.12).19 The teacher was not alone in her surprise
at these girls’ behavior being on a par with that of the boys. When I brought up
the topic with a young woman named Gaëlle, who worked at a nearby
community center with a similar demographic of youth, she aﬃrmed that “The
girls are obliged to ‘masculinize’ themselves in order to exist” (1.23.13).20 The
concept of girls acting like boys, oﬀered as an account by the teacher and this
youth leader, turns on the assumption that boys are normatively exhorted to act
toughly, whereas girls are not. I argue, contrastively, that in the particular
cultural milieu of Marseille’s northern-most projects, youth enjoined toughness
and inviolability upon their male as well as female peers. When the girls in 3B
acted with brawn, they were simply acting like project girls.
An ancillary point to this argument is the observation that, if toughness
was expected of both the boys and girls in Class 3B, the girls faced the additional
expectation that they be modest in their clothing, behavior, and relationships
with the opposite sex. Who enforced these rules? Girls themselves played a part,
as shown by the transcript above in which the girls from Class 3B commented
on the lapses of the girls in Class 3A. The latter, who forsook tracksuits and
sneakers for swag style, were negatively judged as contravenors of project

19

"Je ne pensais pas qu'une fille pouvait parler comme ça” (Madame Chérif, 10.17.12).

20

“Les filles sont obligées de se masculiniser pour exister” (Gaëlle, 1.23.13).
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femininity: wearing heavy make-up and skirts showing their legs, smoking
cigarettes with boys in the bathroom, and preening (“faire la belle”). The
students’ Muslim parents also urged modesty upon their daughters, asking them
not to spend time with boys outside of school or to stray too far from home.
When for example the girls from Class 3B visited my apartment on the
weekends, a parent with a car chaperoned them to and from my doorstep, rather
than letting them take the bus and the Métro system. In the video excerpt below,
Kader tells a similar story of how Sabrina’s mother restricts her movements.
Though told in jest, Kader’s store is based on a premise rooted in a specific
reality, namely, that of parents monitoring their teenage daughters’ relationships
and movements around the projects in a way unthinkable for their teenage sons.
Cécile: What’s your favorite neighborhood?
Sabrina: None.
Kader: It’s Carrefour Grand Littoral! ((Sabrina laughs loudly)) She’s not allowed to go
past it.
Sabrina: No… ((puts hand up in protest))
Kader: I swear to you, her mom made red lines. “Don’t pass these!” Tac, tac, tac
((gesture as if putting down red tape)). “If you pass these, Sabrina…”
Sabrina: No! What’s your problem? Hey Maisara! ((Looking to Maisara, across the table,
for help))
Kader: Then the buzzer rings! Here comes the slap.
Cécile: Is it like with Mohammed?
Sabrina: It’s not true!
Maisara: Ayaaaah!
Sabrina: It’s not true. My mom lets me… but not too far away. She’s scared. Hey, my
mom is scared, I’m a girl, hein!
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Kader: Ah, here comes the slap! 21

Girls, in other words, acted tough, and yet they were protected by their parents
as if harm could befall them at any turn. There were, I should note,
circumstances that would give any parent cause to worry. Students came to
school on at least two occasions over the course of the school year with reports
of Kalashnikov shots fired between rival groups during drug skirmishes in La
Castellane. On another occasion, the teenage daughter of the janitor at the local
youth center was admitted to the hospital after sustaining injuries from a gang
(une bande) of female teenagers armed with knives and a gun. To summarize this
discussion of gender norms for young men and women from these projects, it
This excerpt is from a filmed interview with Kader, Sabrina, and Maisara dated 6.12.13. The
Carrefour Grand Littoral is the large mall located just above La Bricarde and La Castellane. The
students and their families do their grocery and other shopping there, as it is only a walking
distance away. When I ask if Sabrina’s situation is similar to that of Mohamed’s, I am referring
to a previous conversation I had with a group of boys in which Kader teased Mohamed—who the
boys often construct as being girly—of facing the same restrictions on his movements as his
female peers.
21

Cécile: C’est quoi ton quartier préféré?
Sabrina: Rien.
Kader: C’est Carrefour Grand Littoral! ((Sabrina laughs loudly)) Elle n’a pas le droit de
le dépasser.
Sabrina: Non… ((puts hand up in protest))
Kader: Je te jure, sa mère elle a fait des traits. “Tu depasses pas ça!” Tac, tac, tac
((gesture as if putting down red tape)). “Tu dépasses ça, Sabrina…”
Sabrina: Non! Ça va pas ou quoi? Eh Maisara! ((Looking to Maisara, across the table, for
help))
Kader: Il y a la sonnette qui sonne! Alors voilà la claquette.
Cécile: C’est comme Mohammed?
Sabrina: C’est pas vrai!
Maisara: Ayaaaah!
Sabrina: C’est pas vrai. Ma mère elle me laisse… mais pas trop loin. Elle a peur. Oh, elle
a peur ma mère, je suis une fille, hein!
Kader: Ah, la voilà la claquette!
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can be said that both genders valued and oriented to toughness as a stance
indexical of a project mentality or upbringing. Local images of male and female
gender, as such, resembled one another insofar as they were grounded in
working-class values like holding one’s head high, getting things done, and
living a no-frills existence. Where they diverged, however, was in the accessory
requirement that young women faced to be modest as well, a gendered notion of
propriety based in Islamic values, like female modesty and pre-marital chastity,
which youth presumably learned about from their parents.
Given these initial remarks on how youth masculinity and femininity took
shape in these two projects, I now shift to examining the ways in which youth
from Class 3B indexed these overlapping—class, ethnicity, religion, and genderbased—identities in their speech, more specifically. I look, first, at how boys and
girls indexed toughness linguistically; second, I consider youth’s relationship to
Standard French; and third, I present two examples of a young man and then a
young woman crossing into Standard French in anomalous ways, together with
their peers’ reactions.

Linguistic Repertoires of the Project Youth and the Paillot
The identification of a linguistic behavior as crossing requires that
speakers distinguish between language varieties and their attendant social
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personae. Said diﬀerently, at least two registers, in Agha’s (2007a) sense, must
be afoot when crossing is attested. In the previous section, I introduced male
and female youth’s adherence to a demeanor of toughness. Here, I consider how
they indexed this tough disposition through the linguistic register of Castellanois
(c.f., Chapter Three) and their relation to Standard French as though it indexed
an opposing model of personhood. One of my initial observations in this regard
was that the students, though I often heard them speaking more standardly in
their French class with Madame Massi, consistently sought to mark their lack of
ownership over Standard French. When for instance I asked them for their views
on Standard French, they would respond that it was a kind of French spoken
naturally by others than themselves, those whom they designated “paillots” (c.f.,
Chapter Four). In the excerpt below, taken from a conversation I had with
Sabrina, Maisara, and Fouhda while sitting on the school steps, quite early into
the school year and our acquaintance, Sabrina explains how the term paillot
describes both a type of speaker and the type of speech associated with them.
Sabrina: Paillot, that’s the Parisians when they talk. They talk well!
Cecile: Are there students from Class 3B that speak paillot?
Maisara and Sabrina: Degunnng!!! [dɛgəŋŋ] (‘not a soul’)
Maisara: Madame no one speaks paillot here. It’s more Southern Marseille, over there.
Maisara: ((singing an RnB song)) …et la melancolie fait partie de ma vie…
Sabrina: But Madame if I find-if I could, I would speak like the paillots. But I can’t do it
here.
Cecile: You want to speak like that?
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Sabrina: Yeah, but I can’t do it here, you see? It’s too many swear words and all [in
Castellanois]. So I can’t keep [Standard French] going. 22

Sabrina identifies “les paillots” as people who live in the more aﬄuent southern
parts of Marseille, or else in Paris. The paillots, says Sabrina, “speak well” (ils
parlent bien), while she and her peers in Class 3B “speak badly” (on parle mal), a
point she raised later in the same conversation.23 In evaluating Standard French
versus Castellanois thus, Sabrina would seem to be voicing the French
institutional perspective on the country’s linguistic landscape. This is an
institutionalized discourse, purveyed by such regulating bodies as l’Académie
Française and the Ministry of Education, according to which Standard French is
the guarantor of, not merely educational and professional success, but also
national unity. Analyzing the character of Standard French in comparison to
other standard languages, Le Page (1989) writes that French can be said to be
the “most reified, totemized, and institutionalized” language among them (p.
12). In the same vein, Armstrong and Mackenzie (2013) advert that “the
Sabrina: Paillot, c’est les parisiens quand ils parlent. Ils parlent bien!
Cécile: Et il y a des élèves de la 3B qui parlent paillot?
Sabrina: Degunnng!!! [dɛgəŋŋ]
Maisara: Madame, personne parle paillot ici. C’est plus les Quartiers Sud là-bas. ((singing))…et
la mélancolie fait partie de ma vie…
Sabrina: Bon Madame si je trouve-si je pourrais, je parlerais comme les paillots mais j’arrive pas
ici.
Cécile: Tu veux parler comme ça?
Sabrina: Oui! Mais j’arrive pas ici, vous voyez? C’est trop des gros mots et tout. Donc j'arrive pas
a garder…
(Sabrina, Maisara, 11.12.12).
22

23

Sabrina: Ils parlent bien, vous avez vu. Nous quand on parle, on parle trop mal. (11.12.12).
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association between writing and formal speaking is perhaps closer in French
than in comparable languages” (p. 219).24 Sabrina was continually exposed to
this discourse about French at school, and notably in French class. To illustrate,
in one lesson the French teacher focused on helping the students distinguish
between “le français familier” (colloquial forms of French, like Castellanois), “le
français courant” (everyday educated French), and “le français soutenu” (elevated
French). The first, she explained to the students, is proper to peer interactions;
the second, to public settings and speaking and writing in her classroom; and
the third, to formal writing and rhetoric (2.11.13). The teacher drew further
links between Standard French and success when, after the class did poorly on a
practice Baccalaureate exam (Bac Blanc), she emphasized that they must study
the nuances between such Standard French verbs—featured in the exam
instructions—as cite, identify, define, compare, classify, and enumerate.25 To
return to my interaction with Sabrina, I believe it was my presence, as someone
she had only seen observing her Arabic classroom and had not yet encountered
outside of class, that led her in this interaction to articulate similar thoughts on
language as those of her teachers.

My husband, for instance, who learned French at an early age in Senegal and later moved to
France, was often complimented by French friends who found that he spoke “like a book” (parler
comme un livre).
24

25

Interview with Madame Massi (4.4.13).
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Sabrina’s comments about paillot, or Standard French, also hint at a more
complex set of calculations youth face in regards to this register. Put simply,
why, if youth are familiar with an institutional arrangement wherein using
Standard French confers social benefits upon the speaker, does Sabrina
emphatically state that “not a soul” (degun) in Class 3B speaks paillot? Should
Sabrina’s statement be read as evidence for these youth’s minimal exposure to
Standard French and diﬃculty with its production, or might social calculations
and an element of choice be involved when youth deal with this register? Two
observations can be made in this respect. The youth in Class 3B did sometimes
struggle to master Standard French. Madame Massi, the French teacher, traced
this struggle to a relative lack of exposure to Standard French in the home
compared to youth from other backgrounds. She remarked that her students had
to work extra hard, compared to youth from other neighborhoods, to become
fluent in the French misleadingly called “courant” (or commonplace) French. On
a similar note, a particularly diligent student named Kenza admitted that, when
she went to intern in a pharmacy for a week as part of a school requirement, she
was insecure in her interactions with customers. She mentioned feeling as
though she did not know how to greet clients when they walked in nor which
formalities to use while taking their orders. A second observation is that, such
diﬃculties notwithstanding, youth occasionally found it socially perilous to
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speak Standard French, depending on their interlocutors and the speech event at
hand. In her comments above, Sabrina implies that her location in the projects
makes it socially unwise to speak paillot (“If I could, I would speak like the paillots.
But I can’t do it here”). She adds that a personality contrast exists between
Castellanois, which she links to vulgarity (“gros mots”), and the well-mannered
French of the paillots. This contrast prevents her from keeping paillot going for
very long (“je peux pas garder [l’accent paillot]”). Below, I argue that Sabrina
describes her experience with Standard French as fleeting because she and her
peers only borrowed its indexicality in moments of strategic need.
When I inquired with Sabrina whether any students in Class 3B spoke
paillot, she replied that none did. It is thus necessary to distinguish between
what Sabrina understood by speaking paillot, which she vowed “not a soul” in
Class 3B did, and crossing into paillot, which every member of Class 3B did on
occasion and with certain interlocutors. Speaking paillot was to consistently use
the repertoire of Standard French because of an aﬃnity with the social persona
of the paillot. The quality youth from Class 3B ascribed to this social persona
was, in Mohamed’s words, being soft (“mou”), to which he contrasted the tough
persona of youth raised in the projects (4.4.13).26 Table 7.1 summarizes the
salient oppositions between the registers of the project youth and the paillot,
26

“Mohamed: L’éducation de quartiers c’est… il est dur, il a pas peur.” (4.2.13).
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with regards to speech, clothing, and the stereotypical qualities indexed through
the use of these repertoires. Swag, as discussed in the initial anecdote, is one
among several clothing styles youth associate with the persona of the paillot.

Table 7.1. Two Registers in Northern Marseille

________________________________________________________________________
Social Personae
Project Youth
Paillot
______________________________________________________________________________________
Repertoire
Clothes

Survêtes-Baskets

Language

Castellanois

Swag

Le français paillot
(Standard French)
______________________________________________________________________________________
Stereotypic Quality

Toughness

Softness

________________________________________________________________________

If Sabrina refused the charge that she spoke paillot, in the sense of
defaulting to Standard French and the indexicality that corresponded to it
locally, the practice of episodically crossing into paillot was one at which she and
her peers were quite adept. Mohamed, for example, commented that he crossed
into forms approximating Standard French in order to show respect to authority
figures around school: “As soon as I have to speak with the principal or vice
principal, I talk well. I don’t talk like that [in Castellanois]” (4.2.13).27 In her
“Dès que je dois parler avec le principal ou la CPE je parle bien. Je parle pas comme ça” (Mohamed,
4.2.13). CPE is an acronym for Conseiller Principal de l’Éducation and is the person in French
secondary schools who is in charge of discipline, absences, and student aﬀairs more generally.
27
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study of tu and vous usage in France, Morford (1996) writes that her informants
chose one or the other pronominal form as a means of strategically “defining the
setting or the relationship between the speaker and addressee” (p. 24). In the
case of Class 3B, similarly, the students turned to a paillot repertoire in order to
index a soft disposition. Imbuing their demeanor with the quality of softness
served, in particular, to express deference to people in their environment from
whom they stood to gain or lose something, whether a school vice principal or a
potential employer. In the following excerpt from a video interview (6.12.13),
for instance, Kader demonstrates the extent to which his use of paillot French
was goal oriented. He recounts the process of having to make phone calls to
business owners in order to arrange a one-week internship. As one of their exit
requirements for secondary school (collège), the students interned in local
businesses of their choosing, including pharmacies, car shops, hair salons, and
department and retail stores at the local mall (e.g., Darty).
Cecile: Do you guys speak kinda paillot sometimes? ((Sabrina shaking her head no))
Kader: “Ummm, yes, ummmm” ((Sabrina laughs))
Sabrina: No but sometimes to goof oﬀ, butKader: -That’s all they say, “Ummm, yes, ummmm”Sabrina: -almost never no, never!
Kader: But it’s true that I, to call the bosses I would do the paillot
Sabrina: Yeah, but that, I mean, but {like}
Kader: {“Oh hello}, are you (2nd person plural) planning on takingSabrina: But when you’re {asking for internships too}
Kader: -{“an intern?”} They tell me non, then (akhé) I say, but at the hand ((hand
gesture)) “Well, go fuck yourself (2nd person singular)!”
Sabrina: ((laughing)) He speaks paillot and then he does that! No….
Cecile: How would you speak to them?
Sabrina: To ask for internships
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Kader: First I ask. I ask. If he tells me “yes,” I say “Well, great, thanks and all.” Then
(akhé) if they tell me “no,” I say “go fuck yourself ” (2nd person singular) or “go fuck
yourself ” (2nd person singular) and I hang up! ((grinning))28

The bolded text in this segment are Kader’s requests and replies to hypothetical
business owners in paillot. His use of repetitive interjections of euh [œw] to
show polite hesitation, the French uvular voiceless fricative /ʁ/ in bonjour and
prenez, and cordial lexis (e.g., oui, allez bonjour, merci et tout alors) together serve to
cordon oﬀ the voice of the paillot from his regular speech, in Castellanois. 29
Despite the comedic mood of his retelling, via this story Kader also reveals the
strategic, façade-like rapport he maintains to Standard French. Strictly speaking,
the paillot register is one he is willing to inhabit with a prospective employer but

28

Cecile: Vous parlez un peu paillot des fois? ((Sabrina shaking her head no))
Kader: “Euh, ouiiii euhhh” ((Sabrina laughs))
Sabrina: Non mais, des fois pour faire des délires, maisKader: -Ils font que “euuhh oui euhh”Sabrina: -presque jamais non, jamais!
Kader: Et moi c’est vrai, pour appeler les patrons je faisais le paillot.
Sabrina: Ouais après voilà mais {genre…}
Kader: {“Allez bonjour}, est-ce que vous prenezSabrina: après quand {tu demandes} des stages aussi
Kader: -{“un apprenti?”} Ils me disent non, akhé je dis mais à la fin ((hand gesture))
“Bah, vas te faire enculer!”
Sabrina: ((laughing)) Il parle paillot après il fait ça! Non..
Cecile: Tu leur parlais comment?
Sabrina: Pour demander des stages.
Kader: D’abord je demande, je demande. S’il me dit “oui,” je dis “bah, ça va, merci et
tout alors.” Akhé [ɑχχɛ] si ils me disent non je dis “vas te faire foutre” ou “vas te faire
foutre” et je raccroche! ((grinning))

The only notably Castellanois element in Kader’s paillot voice is his aﬀrication in apprenti
[apʁənʧi]. Despite this example to the contrary, youth from La Castellane generally showed
themselves in our conversation to be acutely aware of this particularity in their speech. The
ascension of aﬀrication to emblematic status in Marseille has previously been suggested by
Gasquet-Cyrus (2004) and Vernet and Trimaille (2007), and they describe the feature as being
increasingly associated by Marseille’s residents with youth from Northern Marseille.
29
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only so long as they oﬀer him an internship. When in his hypothetical scenario
the internship does not come through, Kader reverts to Castellanois and to tu (va
te faire enculer). The insult he tacks on (“Bah, va te faire enculer!”) expresses his
disgust at having played the paillot and yet come away empty-handed.
These examples illustrated how, when faced with high-stakes
interactions, youth crossed into paillot to index deference and thereby produce
certain results. The yield was nevertheless not always guaranteed, as in Kader’s
story, and disillusionment or frustration could ensue. More intractable
diﬃculties arose, however, in scenarios when youth crossed into Standard
French without what peers perceived to be a clearly defined goal. Two case
studies of this type of scenario are examined below. In sub-section 3 below, I
analyze how a group of female students constructs a male peer when he
transgresses the project’s linguistic norms. Then, in sub-section 4, I trace how
male students from Class 3B participated in sexualizing a female peer who
tended to speak Standard French.

Qui Parle Tarplin Français?:30 A Case Study of a Male Crosser into Paillot
On Sunday afternoons, a group of six girls from Class 3B often came over
to my apartment in La Joliette, at the northern edge of Central Marseille, to
This translates roughly to “who speaks so much (or such an intense degree of) [Standard]
French.”
30
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practice their English and chat with me. Of them, three—Asma, Kenza, and
Sheyreen—were raised, or diapered (“couche-culotte”) as they liked to say, in La
Bricarde project. The other three, Anisa, Kardiatou, and Siwar, were from La
Castellane project. All but one of the girls was born locally, though their parents
came from several countries: Asma’s parents were Tunisian and French (from
the North); Kenza’s parents were both Algerian; Sheyreen’s mother was
Algerian and her step-father Egyptian; Anisa’s parents were Algerian Kabyles;
Kardiatou’s were Pulaar from Senegal; and Siwar’s parents were Algerian.
Within this group of young women, Anisa, Asma, Siwar, and Kardiatou were the
most admired speakers of Castellanois.31 Asma saw Castellanois as her default
mode: “I always speak like this [in Castellanois], except when I speak with
adults” (10.29.12).32 The girls lauded Siwar’s gab in particular, holding her up as
the professor of project-language (“professeuse de la langue des quartiers,” 7.12.13),
due to her ability to draw various languages into her speech and riﬀ on rap
lyrics. Sheyreen and Kenza, by contrast, were generally recognized to be less
project-like in their speech, a fact to which I will return below.

Asma and Anisa were also among the most high-achieving students in the Arabic class, often
called upon by Madame Chérif to explain diﬃcult points or leave class alone to fetch materials
from the main oﬃce.
31

32

“Je parle toujours comme ça [en Castellanois], à part quand je parle avec des adultes” (Asma, 10.29.12).
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In the following transcript, the girls were sitting around my kitchen table
discussing their impending Arabic fieldtrip to Paris. Though none had ever been
to Paris, they nevertheless had some intuitions, likely gleaned from the media,
about how Paris would compare to Marseille, and Parisians to youth like them.
In an echo of Sabrina’s comments on who speaks paillot, Sheyreen begins by
announcing that Parisians speak “French, French, French.” Youth from La
Castellane, she compares, “mix all languages, actually creating our own
language.” Through spatial and personal deictics, Sheyreen establishes an initial
map—or poetic structure (M. Silverstein, 1985b, p. 185)—where certain types of
language are naturalized as belonging to particular people and places. Standard
French is the domain of Parisians (“they”) and distant Paris, while Castellanois
forms the base from which “we” maneuver “here” in Marseille. As Wortham
(1996) has noted, the “minimal interactional framework” (p. 344) sketched by
these deictics reveals little as to how these respective interactional camps are
evaluated. Useful devices for understanding participants’ alignments are what
Gumperz (1982) has called “contextualization cues” (p. 131), which are textual
indications as to how speakers are interpreting an ongoing interaction. In the
next sequence of the transcript, Asma interjects to tell the story of how she
overheard a young man using Standard French to order bread in the boulangerie
at the foot of La Castellane. Her excoriation of this young man’s behavior and
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her girlfriends’ supportive reactions of her judgment act as contextualization
cues exposing the group’s negative stance towards paillots more generally but
also, quite tellingly, their disapproval of individuals from the projects who cross
into Standard French, not to perform deference to others in a high-stakes
situation, but to imbue themselves with the qualities of soft sophistication
indexed by the paillot repertoire.
Transcript 7.1.33 “Bread Please”
French Original

English Translation

Sheyreen: Non non, moi j'aime pas trop les
parisiens parce que eux ils n'ont pas de culture,
tu vois? Nous, ici à Marseille, on melange toutes
les langues en fait et ça nous fait notre propre
langage, alors que eux ils parlent français,
français, français. Et nous on decou-des fois, on
decouvre des nouveaux mots. Regarde, et {ceux
qui comprennent pas l’arabe}
Asma: {Ce que je crains le plus}Kenza: C’est quoi?
Asma: -C’est les garçons qui parlent tarplin
français. Ah l’autre fois j‘étais à côté de - tu te
rappeles - d’un mec. Akhaaa [ɑχɑ::]-t’as vu il
était bien stylé et tout mais tu le vois arriverAnisa: -les filles {ça va mieux mais les garçons}
Asma: {“Bonjour} un pain [pε̃] s’il-vous
plaît”
Sheyreen: Ah! {Une drôle de fille}
Kardiatou: {On dirait une gadji}

Sheyreen: No no, I don’t really like Parisians
because they don’t have any culture, you
know? Us, here in Marseille, we mix all
languages in fact and we come up with our
own language, whereas they speak French,
French, French. And we make-sometimes,
we make up new words. Look, {and those
that don’t understand dialectal Arabic}
Asma: {What I really shudder at}Kenza: Is what?
Asma: -is boys that speak lots of French. Ah
the other day I was next to-do you
remember-a guy. Akhaaa [ɑχɑ::]-you know he
was styled right and all but you hear him
come withAnisa: -girls {are alright but boys}
Asma: {“Hello} bread please”
Sheyreen: Ah! {A strange girl}
Kardiatou: {Seems like a girl}

33

This interview dates from 1.27.13.
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Anisa: {Les filles ça va mieux mais...}
Asma: {Il parle trop...}
Kenza: Les filles c’est vrai ça passe hein mais tu
vois des garçons
Asma: Ouais!
Cécile: C’est qui? C’est quelqu’un que tu
connais? Comme ça, {un mec?}
Asma: {Non, non} c’était juste un mec qui était
venu acheter et tout mais genre il a fait
“Bonjour, euh, je voudrais alors un pain
[pε̃]?”
{C’est pas beau!}
Anisa: {Oh ouais}. Moi j’etais partie en
Normandie {ils disent “pain” [pε ̃]}
Cécile: Parce que ça fait pas comme vous quoi.
C’est ça que tu veux dire?
Asma: Ouais. Ça fait trooop tapette.
Cécile: {Trop quo::::::i?}
Anisa: {Pain, pain, pain [pε ̃]}

Anisa: {With girls it’s alright but...}
Asma: {He was talking too...}
Kenza: It’s true with girls it goes over okay
hein but you see some guys
Asma: Yeah!
Cécile: Who was he? Someone that you
know? Just like that, {some guy?}
Asma: {No, no} it was just a guy who came
to buy and all but he went like “Hello, um, I
would love a piece of bread?”
{It’s so ugly!}
Anisa: {Oh yeah}. I went to Normandy [they
say “bread” [pε ̃]]
Cécile: Because it’s not the way you would
do it, right. Is that what you mean?
Asma: Yeah. It comes oﬀ as sooo gay.
Cécile: {So wha::::::t?}
Anisa: {Bread, bread, bread [[pε ̃]]}
((imitating how people in Normandy
pronounce “pain”))

When Asma begins recounting what happened, she assumes a projectcentric footing (Goﬀman, 1981) by speaking in Castellanois. She aﬀricates her
stop consonants, uses a transformed version of the Marseillais vernacular adverb
tarpin (>“tarplin”), employs project slang lexis like gadji [gaʤi] ‘girl’ and the
neologism akha ([ɑχɑ]), roughly glossable as ’oh my gosh,’ and most
importantly, renounces the paillot rendition of pain ‘bread’ (with a nasalized
vowel: [pε ̃]) in favor of the velar nasal in the Castellanois version of the word:
[pɛŋ]. Asma introduces her story by stating that what she hates the most (ce que
je crains le plus) are boys who speak French to the nth degree (qui parlent tarplin
français). She then asks Kenza if she recalls how, while waiting in line at the local
bakery, they had witnessed a boy ordering at the counter in Standard French.
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She imitates his order twice, dwelling on paillot elements like the greeting
bonjour, his overly polite way of asking for bread (je voudrais alors un pain), his
hesitating use of euh, and his nasalization of the final vowel in pain. The girls
immediately flag the young man’s recourse to Standard French in this casual
neighborhood setting as non-normative. All the more so because, as Asma
indicates, the boy was likely a resident of La Castellane, judging by the
conformity he showed to project fashion norms (il était bien stylé et tout). Their
negative evaluation of his crossing takes the form of slurs focusing on the young
man’s gender and sexuality. Sheyreen opens the commentary with “a strange
girl” (une drole de fille), Kardiatou then calls him a slang word for “girl” (gadji),
and Asma wraps up the story with the slur “fag” (tapette). The girls draw several
important distinctions, both explicitly and implicitly, between types of crossing
into paillot here. First, Anisa and Kenza oﬀer the point that crossing into paillot is
more acceptable for girls: “It’s true with girls it goes over okay hein but you see
some guys…” Second, and much more subtly, the girls draw a distinction
between their own crossing practices and the crossing behavior of this young
man. In the case of youth in Class 3B, as I have chronicled, youth crossed into
the paillot register episodically, or when interacting with individuals towards
whom indexing deference proved socially advantageous in some tangible way.
Youth relied on the “soft” indexicality of Standard French in these contexts in
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order to demonstrate their knowledge and respect of their interlocutors’ status.
By contrast, the girls suspected that the young man in the bakery was regularly
using paillot to self-formulate as being diﬀerent from other project-dwellers:
perhaps more educated or sophisticated.
This example is interesting because it illustrates what takes place when a
young man from the projects contravenes the normative persona of the tough
project youth. In the cultural landscape of the 16th arrondissement, local youth are
expected to speak in Castellanois (and its equivalents in other projects) as a
means of indexing values like toughness, grit, and working-class and multiethnic solidarity. Crossing into paillot, a register typically associated with more
aﬄuent, ethnically French people from beyond the projects, is acceptable—even
expected—given interactions involving outsiders to the projects. The anecdote
related by Asma, however, involved a young man using paillot in a non-normative
way, namely, with employees at his local breadshop. The result was for the
young man’s linguistic non-normativity to be read as his own sociological
deviance. Insofar as he failed to index the tough persona normatively enjoined
upon him as a youth from the projects, the girls at my dining table were able to
tropically construct him as “a fag” (une tapette). Given this example’s similarity
with my introductory anecdote, in which Mohamed was called a “homo” for
engaging in swag style, I argue that the construal as “fags” of male youth who
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personally aﬃliate themselves with paillot behavior has become a “normalized
trope” (Agha, 2007a, p. 356), or a trope that has gained wider recognizability
within this youth population. Agha defines normalized tropes as “usages that
are denotationally anomalous but interactionally felicitous under certain
conditions of role inhabitance” (p. 367). In these cases, the denotational
anomaly lies in these male youth not in fact being gay yet being felicitously
construed as such due to their inhabitance of a persona, the paillot, at odds with
project-specific formulations of masculinity. Beyond the mere regularization or
dissemination of this trope on male sexuality, it is also worth pointing out that
these youth turned to non-normative sexuality, in particular, as the means
through which to monitor their peers’ social transgressions. Youth’s
socialization into Islamic traditions, including ideas about defined gender roles
and the abnormality of homosexuality, no doubt informed youth’s choice of
tactics with which to police their male peers’ behavior. To illustrate this
relevance of Islamic morality to the youth in Class 3B, the following anecdote
further explores how Islamic ideas about female reserve surfaced in 3B
classmates’ discourse. Specifically, I inquire into how these circulating ideas
influenced the way youth read their female peers who, rather than act projectlike, used Standard French and dressed swag.
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“Tche une bandeuse!”: The Sexualization of Female Crossing into Paillot and Swag
Leaning back in her chair during Arabic class, Sheyreen peered out the
window at a boy named Idris in the recess yard. The teacher was spelling out
why the students must learn to read words in MSA without their attendant
vowel markings, but Sheyreen’s attention was drawn to a little ditty Idris was
singing and which she could just barely make out through the window. “Ta mère
fait du stop-euh sans sa culotte-euh…” (12-12-12).34 Sheyreen absentmindedly
mimed Idris under her breath, “Your mother can get her ride on... without a
stitch on…” Sitting near Sheyreen and Ayman, I then overheard Ayman mutter
to her: “you’re a slut!” (t’es [ʧε] une bandeuse [bəŋdœzə]). Sheyreen’s explosive
reaction, and Ayman’s part in provoking it, had them both excluded from classes
for the next 24 hours. I analyze the sexual trope of which Sheyreen was a victim
in this incident as yet another kind of social policing, only in this case one lead
by young men interested in curtailing what they perceived to be overly paillot
and swag behaviors among their female peers. Sheyreen was recognized among
her peers as tending in her style towards paillot speech and swag clothes. This
backdrop, together with the suggestive content of the song she sang in class,
opened up her up to the normalized sexual trope of the “slut,” which youth in

This translates, literally, to “your mom hitchhikes without her underwear” (Ayman,
12-12-12).
34

!339

Class 3B captured with various labels, among them bimbo, bandeuse, bimbo, hamham ([ħɑmħɑm]), and crasseuse.
Sheyreen, as I mentioned in the last section, was raised in La Bricarde by
an Algerian mother and an Egyptian step-father. She was also among the few
students born outside of Marseille, in the northern département of Pas-de-Calais.
Though she was raised locally and spoke ardently about the virtues of
Marseille’s projects, Sheyreen also enjoyed the cachet of being able to claim the
somewhat exotic identity of being born elsewhere with her friends. Sheyreen’s
speech, too, reflected her attempt to cultivate this allure of being from
elsewhere. In the quotes below, Sheyreen sets herself apart from the typical
project youth as someone who tends to speak less Castellanois—and more paillot:
“They [the other students] pronounce everything with an Arabic accent, in
fact.” (10.29.12) 35
“Here [at school], to tell the truth, I’m not allowed to speak normally. If I speak
normally, I know I am going to get whacked around. Because when we speak correctly,
well then people make fun of you and it sounds like yeah, “you’re a paillote, yadda yadda
yadda…” (7.12.13)36
“When I go home [from school], I am a paillote. So when I go home, I speak French
super well. Sometimes, I speak English to practice. And that’s it! And I speak Hindu
[sic] too. In fact, I take words from [Bollywood] films and I try to
understand.” (10.29.12)37
35

“Ils prononcent tout avec l’accent arabe, en fait” (Sheyreen, 10.29.12).

“Ici, en fait, j’ai pas le droit de parler normalement. Si je parle normalement, je sais que je vais me prendre
des claquets. Parce que quand on parle correctement, et ben ça se moque de toi et ça dit oui, “t’es un paillote, nia
nia nia…” (Sheyreen, 7.12.13).
36

“Je rentre chez moi, je suis une paillote. Donc je rentre chez moi je parle très bien français. Je parle anglais
des fois pour m’entrainer. Et c’est tout! Et je parle Hindu [sic] aussi. Je reprends en fait des mots des films
[Bollywood] et j’essaie de comprendre.” (Sheyreen, 10.29.12)
37
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Here, Sheyreen identifies speaking “French super well” as her normal or
preferred mode. In front of two female peers and myself, Sheyreen seemed to
have surprisingly few qualms about announcing her ease and pleasure in
speaking paillot, particularly given her cognizance of her peers’ negative
perceptions of the persona associated with this repertoire. Sheyreen flouted
other norms as well, notably choosing clothing that was recognizably swag. She
combined elements of the tracksuits-and-sneakers look, like loose-fitting jeans
over sneakers and going make-up-less, with such swag elements as frilly
scrunchies and tops trimmed with see-through lace that exposed her arms and
shoulders. She took pains not to call herself swag, however. Indeed, youth in
Class 3B had come to understand swag, not merely as a clothing repertoire
begun by stars in the music and television industry, including Rihanna, Justin
Bieber, and Kim Kardashian, but also, more significantly, as a Western lifestyle
centered on free choices and boundless sexuality.
Class 3B youth’s more textured understanding of swag, namely, as a
clothing style indicative of a free-wheeling, libertine lifestyle, was directly
influenced by a particular reality television diva, Nabilla Benattia. Her show, Les
anges de la télé-réalité, aired over the 2012-2013 school year on the public
television channel NRJ-12, and the students watched and frequently discussed
the show’s developments. Nabilla is an aspiring model who was born in 1992 in
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a French town near Switzerland to an Italian mother and an Algerian father. The
show follows, among other storylines, Nabilla’s eﬀorts to land modeling gigs
with American agencies while living in a house in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. In
one episode, she did a scantily clad photoshoot with a magazine in Las Vegas. In
another, she invited Kim Kardashian to her house as a consultant in how to
become, in her words, further “swaguée.” Other episodes, meanwhile, featured
her on-and-oﬀ relationships with the men who lived in her house. One student
in Class 3B, Fouhda, was exceptional insofar as she dressed swag and identified
Nabilla as her role model in doing so. Fouhda dressed noticeably diﬀerently than
the other female students in Class 3B. She straightened her hair, got French
manicures, and wore make-up and tight-fitting sweaters over holey jeans. One
day I asked Fouhda what she thought of being labeled swag by her peers. Fouhda
replied that she was proud of being swag, like Nabilla: “I’m like Nabilla because I
wear what I want and I don't care if others like it or not” (11.3.12).38 She
contrasted her own stance with that of another girl in her year, who after being
called swag one day at school went home during lunch break to change out of
her tunic and tights. For Fouhda, Nabilla represented the possibility of resisting
social pressure to dress modestly. Nabilla also represented the stereotypical

“Fouhda: Je suis comme Nabilla parce que je m’habille comme je veux, ceux qui n’aiment
pas…!” (4.3.13).
38
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speaker of Standard French. Her performance of this register was made
particularly clear to the students after a much-publicized monologue Nabilla

Figure 7.1. Nabilla in Action

gave in an episode that aired on March, 4th, 2013. Nabilla had given a short, but
memorably vacuous diatribe on how two other women on the show were
capable of traveling without their shampoo. While pretending to be on the
phone with one hand, she exclaimed in a ditzy but Standard French: “Hello?
Come on, hello! You’re a girl and you don’t have your shampoo?” (Allô? Non mais
allô quoi! T’es une fille et t’as pas de shampoing?). Her line became famous thanks to
repeated showings on television in the weeks following the episode and much
commentary in social media. This and other behaviors of Nabilla’s were
circulated and digested by the students of Class 3B, who came to consider her as
the embodiment—and thus, the connection—between speaking paillot, dressing
swag, and being sexually loose.
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For the students, Nabilla’s sexual behavior stood witness to the
possibility that a second-generation female from an Arab and Muslim family
background might lapse in her moral socialization. A couple weeks after
Nabilla’s famed episode, for instance, I directed a study hall for five male
students from Class 3B. With my appreciable encouragement, quiet work
quickly devolved into an energetic exchange of tidbits about Nabilla. Amid a
deafening chorus of Nabilla “shampoing” imitations, the following conversation
took place:
Cécile: Did you guys see the Nabilla thing with “hallo”? What is Nabilla about? ((Nabilla
imitations in the background))
Mohamed: She’s a bimbo. She’s all touched up. Her dream is to be an it girl, a girl who
gives her body. She’s totally plastified. ((more Nabilla imitations))
Cécile: And is she Arab?
Mohamed: Well, Nabilla she’s not actually an Arab. She said she was an Arab but like
she didn’t have an Arab education because her mother was Spanish and her dad, she
never saw him
Cécile: So she was never educated as a Muslim?
Mohamed: She’s Muslim but she neverElias: -but she’s with Thomas in the pool!!!39

In this excerpt, Mohamed appears to struggle with the disjuncture between
Nabilla being une arabe—the ethnic and religious category to which he connects

“Cécile: Vous avez vu le truc de Nabilla avec ‘hallo’? Nabilla, c’est qui en fait?
Mohamed: C’est une bimbo et elle est toute refaite. Son rêve c’est d’être une ‘hit girl.’ Elle est en
plastique.
Cécile: C’est une Arabe?
Mohamed: Genre Nabilla en fait c’est pas une Arabe. Elle a dit c’est une Arabe mais, genre, elle a
pas eu une éducation d’Arabe. Genre parce que sa mère c’était une espagnole et son père elle l’a
jamais vu.
Cécile: Donc elle n’a jamais été eduquée en tant que musulmaneMohamed: -Elle est musulmane mais elle a jamaisElias: -Elle est avec Thomas dans la piscine!”
(4-4-13)
39
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himself—and Nabilla’s dreams of being an “it girl,” her plastic surgeries, and her
sexual overtures to Thomas in the pool. He settles on Nabilla being Arab and
Muslim but, given her Algerian father’s absence in her life, lacking the requisite
socialization into Islamic morals. As shown by Mohamed’s uptake of Nabilla’s
persona, whom throughout this conversation the boys called une bimbo, une folle,
and une crasseuse, behaviors like speaking paillot and dressing swag were
sometimes perceived in Class 3B as having a sexual patina.40
Returning to the incident with Sheyreen, then, it can be said that several
factors came together to make Sheyreen the unwilling target of a sexual slur. On
the one hand, Class 3B was at the time in the throes of a reality television show
the heroine of which was a young woman born in Europe to a part-Muslim
family and whom, notably, crystallized connections between swag style, paillot
speech, and sexually loose behavior. On the other, Sheyreen herself engaged in
some behaviors—such as paillot speech and swag style, but also singing a
playfully “dirty” song in class—that led to her perception as indexing softness
and immodesty rather than the toughness at the heart of the project youth’s
self-image. This incident reveals youth’s local ideology of toughness to impose
unequal or gendered requirements on young women as compared to young men.

Fouhda added to this list of slurs for females the term ham-ham [ħɑmħɑm], also meaning
“slut.” The term appears to be a neologism created with the Arabic phoneme /ħ/.
40
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Whereas young men were simply required to act tough, young women were
expected to act tough and modest. When young women failed to show bodily
modesty and sexual reserve, two kinds of female etiquette drawn from Islamic
moral discourses, this resulted in their policing through sexual slurs, which
were levied at them by their male as well as female peers. Despite these youth’s
ready admissions that they would not pray as required nor fast consistently
during Ramadan, such instances are pointed illustrations of the continued
relevance of certain Islamic norms among these Marseille-born youth. Although
youth’s orientation to Islam influenced interactions in a more tacit way, it was
also occasionally the case that youth flagged their aﬃliation to Islam in more
tangible ways. In my fieldnotes from the day Ayman insulted Sheyreen, for
instance, I wrote “Ayman has Allah written in Arabic on his right hand in
purple” (12-12-12).
A last point in this regard pertains to the very real consequences for
young women of such sexual name-calling. Towards the end of the school year, I
conducted another interview with Fouhda in which we happened to discuss
what we each thought of Facebook. Fouhda explained that, “Now that they have
made a page for ‘The Sluts of Marseille,’ I’ve closed my account” (4.3.13).41 She
filled me in on how some unknown Facebook users had created a page featuring
41

“Fouhda: Depuis qu’ils ont fait la ‘Page des Folles’ j’ai fermé mon Facebook.” (4.3.13)
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local swag girls’ profile pictures and had tagged them with the label folle, or
“slut.” Many of these photos were then insultingly commented upon (e.g.,
“you’re a crasseuse and all”), and some of the male commentators even feigned
rendezvous with the depicted girls (e.g., “come at 4 p.m. to the Carrefour”).
Fouhda, who earlier in the year had enjoyed penning the word love on her wrist
and dressing how she wished, was now quite concerned about whether her
previous labeling as swag would lead to the marring of her reputation,
potentially changing it to bimbo. She approached her transition to high school
the following year with no small degree of trepidation.

Figure 7.2. (Left) Fouhda Writes “Love” on her Wrist Using Ayman’s Purple Marker (12-12-12)
Figure 7.3. (Right) Phone Numbers for Made-Up “Folles” on a Chair at a Northern Marseille
Tram Stop
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IV.

“Za’ama Je Crois à Notre Amour:” Standard French and Northern
Marseille’s Youth Register as Resources for Performance among
Orthodox Muslim Female Youth

In the ethnographic examples given above from La Castellane and La
Bricarde housing projects, youth from Class 3B were shown to trope on
ideological contrasts between local social types, positioning their peers in
sexualized ways as a means of policing behaviors thought to be aberrant for the
projects. In this section, I present how orthodox-identified individuals, likewise
from Northern Marseille, diﬀerently orient to these same social types. A few of
the examples I draw upon come from the time I spent teaching at a private
Muslim school in Marseille 15th arrondissement. The majority, however, derive
from my friendships with a group of female youth from Cité La Viste, another
project in Northern Marseille. These young women, who were nineteen and
twenty years-old when I met them in 2012 and 2013, attended the local public
university and were studying to receive their Bachelor’s degree in Arabic
language and literature. The majority of the women in this friend group lived
with their families while attending the university, mainly in La Viste project,
while a few of them also lived on campus. These young women identified as
orthodox or Sunni Muslims in the sense I described in Chapter Five. They
followed strict prayer schedules, went together to Friday prayer, dressed in
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jilbābs, ‘abāyahs, and ḥijābs, and actively sought out Islamic knowledge.
Throughout the year, I interacted with these young women at the university,
attending classes and spending time studying with them, but also on the
weekends. We traveled around Marseille to see visiting cheikhs speak on topics of
interest, participated in tajwīd courses at a mosque in Central Marseille, went on
hikes in Marseille’s calanque cliﬀ areas, and enjoyed women-only events like an
Islamic fashion show and an all-girls pool day.
These young women were notable in a linguistic sense insofar as they
were raised in the projects of Northern Marseille but chose to speak, not a youth
register like Castellanois, nor even Marseille’s vernacular French, but a French
closer in phonology, syntax, and lexis to Standard French. As argued in Chapter
Five, for diasporic youth who claimed Islamic orthodoxy, a key behavior through
which they indexed their piety was to speak in languages they considered
cultivated, like Standard French and Modern Standard Arabic. Male and female
orthodox youth drew iconic links between these institutionalized and
historically valued varieties of French and Arabic, on the one hand, and an ethos
of pious personhood based in such qualities as elegance, education, and
cordiality, on the other hand.
An intriguing question in this regard is whether young orthodox men and
women were equally impelled to follow this ideology of piety. In the transcripts
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that follow, which are drawn from this female peer group and a handful of
orthodox male acquaintances, I demonstrate how both young men and women
try to uphold a measure of linguistic standardness in their speech, and yet
community members often judge women who fail to speak thus by a diﬀerent
standard. The examples I present reveal that members of the orthodox
community in Marseille tend to read young females’ use of project-like behavior
or linguistic features, like those of Castellanois, as not only impious but also
abnormally masculine. Young men, too, are typically reminded to act more
Muslim when they assume stances reminiscent of the projects, only such
reproofs seem to have little bearing on how others interpret their gender or
sexuality. In an interesting final twist, I discuss instances in which young women
from this friend-group exploited the link between so-called project language and
toughness in order to index such interactional stances as humor or even, in one
young woman’s case, being gender-queer.
I turn now to discussing the relation between language, piety, and gender
in Islam, as understood by a young woman named Amel, one of the young
orthodox-identified women who took part in the above-mentioned friendship
group at the public university. Amel was somewhat unusual in her peer group in
that she was not from Northern Marseille’s projects but was born and raised in
the working-class, diverse neighborhood of Aix-en-Provence called Encagnane
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Corsy (alias “La Zup”). After turning sixteen, she and her family moved to
Manosque, a large town about 90 kilometers northeast of Marseille, and it was
from there that she commuted to the university for classes. Her father, who was
born in France to an Algerian family, worked as a janitor, and her mother, who
came from Algeria at age nineteen, was a personal aide to the elderly. Among
the life experiences Amel did share with her female peers at the university,
however, was an early socialization into Islamic traditions, along with a
transition towards greater piety at the end of her teens:
“Islam has always been present in my life. I have been immersed in it since very young. I
began fasting, praying near six years of age. I had a period of distance with it, between
sixteen and eighteen years, where I lived kind of like a youth, before returning to myself
in full consciousness, maturity, around nineteen years old. Since that day, I do things
and I understand why I do them, hamdulilah.”42 (3.2.16).

Here, Amel plots a timeline in which the period of youth is accompanied by a
distancing from Islam, and then entrance into maturity likewise entails a growth
in Islamic consciousness. Insofar as she now observes Prophetic Sunnah, Amel
feels that she acts knowingly, or with direction. In the following one-on-one
conversation I held with Amel (4.3.13), she described what she understood to
be Sunnah’s special requirements for women. Some of the requirements she
mentions, like having a compassionate and calm demeanor, are recognizable
“L'Islam a toujours était présent chez moi. Depuis toute jeune je baigne dedans. J'ai commencé
à jeuner, prier vers l'âge de 6 ans. J'ai eu une période, entre 16 et 18 ans, d'éloignement où je
vivais un peu comme une jeune pour eﬀectuer un retour de moi-même et en pleine conscience,
maturité, vers 19 ans. Depuis ce jour, je fais les choses et comprends pourquoi
hamdulilah.” (Amel, 3.2.16).
42
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from Prophetic Ḥadith traditions. Meanwhile, others show locally formulated
ideologies of what being a “sister” (sœur) demands, like for instance her point
that Muslim women must avoid speaking in the youth registers characteristic of
Marseille’s projects.
Transcript 7.243
French Original

English Translation

Amel: L’Islam il peut te-en tant que fe:mme, je
veux dire, t’as pas envie de passer pour euh, je
veux dire, tu dois être une femme tu dois être
posée douce et tu dois, fin, posée, douce. C’est
les trucs que, tu vois? Mais je veux dire, tu
dois avoir une certaine conduite féminine
quoi. Tu dois pas arriver devant quelqu’un et
lui parler comme une sauvage. En fin c’est
contraire à l’éthique et au comportement quoi.
Donc après si tu veux suivre le comportement
de:s-des Ṣaḥābāt [sɑħɑ:bɑ:t] comme on dit et
des-voilà, après t’as un choix à faire quoi. Tu
vois? Et là directemente tu te places plus ou
moi::nsCécile: -Ṣaḥābah [saħɑ:bɑ] je connais. Ṣaḥābāt
[saħɑ;bɑ:t] c’est nouveau pour moi. {C’est
mignon j’aime bien}
Amel: ((laughs)){ Ṣaḥābiyāt} et voilà quoi du
coup euhm, tu vois, tu euh te places dans ce
contexte la quoi il faut que…je pense que oui,
de toute façon quand tu es musulmane tu fais
un eﬀort mais l’eﬀort ne-il vient plus
naturellement peut-être. Mais après tu vois
des soeurs en jilbab. Elle arrive la soeur, “wesh
wesh” [wεʃ wεʃ]. Euhhh c’est surprenant
franchement, c’est surprenant, parce que tu ne
t’y attends pas trop en fait
Cécile: -tu t’y attends pas parce que il y a un
modèle de fémininité dans l’Islam {qui qui
euh}

Amel: Islam can make you-as a woman, I
mean, you don’t want to seem like, uh, I mean
you have to be a woman. You have to be calm,
gentle, and you have to, well…calm, gentle.
Those are the things that-you see? But, I
mean, you have to have a kind of feminine
behavior you know? You shouldn’t appear
before someone and speak to them like a
savage. I mean, it’s contrary to ethics, to
behavior. So then if you want to follow the
behavior of the Ṣaḥābāt [sɑħɑ:bɑ:t], as we say,
and of-there! Then you have a choice to make.
You see? And right away you position yourself
more or lessCecile: I knew about Ṣaḥābah [sɑħɑbɑ] (:male
companions of the Prophet”) but Ṣaḥābāt
[sɑħɑ:bɑ:t] is new to me. {It’s sweet. I like it}
Amel: { Ṣaḥābiyāt [sɑħɑbijɑ:t].} And so in this
way umm, you see? You put yourself in that
particular frame of mind. You have to… (.08).
I think that for sure if you’re a Muslim woman,
then you have to make an eﬀort anyway. But
the eﬀort doesn’t-comes more naturally
maybe. But then you see Muslim sisters in
jilbāb [jilba:b]… The sister arrives “wesh
wesh” [wεʃ wεʃ] (“what’s up”). Uh, it’s truly
surprising. It’s surprising because you really
don’t expect it. You don’t expect it becauseCecile: You don’t expect it because there’s a
model of femininity in Islam that that uh…

43

This interview dates from 4.3.13.
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Amel: -{c’est ÇA} qui est assez primordial
parce que: la femme c’est la mère… C’est euh
c’est la douceur. C’est l’aﬀection. D’ailleurs
quand on la décrit dans le Qur’ān c’est
souvent par ses qualités là tu vois donc c’est
vrai que quand tu-c’est vrai que pour une
musulmane quelqu’un qui rentre dans l’Islam
et qui s’y intéresse et qui à la base a un accent
très très prononcé à mon avis la soeu:r
automatiquement elle va faire un eﬀort pour
euh peut-être pas parce que changer un accent
c’est dificile, hein, quand c’est quelque chose
qui est depuis l’enfance
Cécile: oh
Amel: C’est c’est possible mais c’est peut-être
un peu plus dur mais je pense qu’à partir de là
du moment où elle fait l’eﬀort elle se dit “il y a
certains mots que je banis” comme il y a
certains mots c’est ni du français, c’est du-du
truc du quartier, là tu vois donc ceux-là tu le:s
tu les dis plus et après…

Amel: That’s it. That is pretty primordial
because the woman is the mother: she’s
sweetness, she’s aﬀection. And by the way,
when we describe her in the Koran it’s often
by those exact characteristics. You see? So it’s
true that when you… It’s true that for a
Muslim girl, someone who enters into Islam
and interests themselves and who has a very
very pronounced accent from the get-go, in my
opinion the sister will automatically make an
eﬀort to, euh, maybe not because changing an
accent is diﬃcult. Yeah, especially when it’s
something that dates from childhood.
Cecile: Oh
Amel: It’s, it’s possible but maybe a little
more diﬃcult. But I think as long as she makes
the eﬀort to say to herself “there are certain
words I banish,” since there are certain words
that are not even French. It’s the-the stuﬀ of
the projects, there, you know? So those things
you stop saying them then and there…

In this narrative, Amel explains that there are two types of young female
Muslims in Marseille. The first is she who calls herself a Muslim and follows the
behaviors expected of the Prophet Mohamed’s female companions, the Ṣaḥābiyāt.
These, she notes, include being gentle (douce), calm or patient (posée), and
having a certain feminine conduct (avoir une certaine conduite féminine). Amel
identifies the second local type of female Muslim as the young woman who calls
herself a Muslim but has not yet adopted the appropriate ethic. Such women,
says Amel, are liable to wear the Islamically appropriate jilbāb and yet greet
people with wesh wesh (“what’s up”) and “arrive before someone speaking like a
savage.” This greeting, deriving from the Algerian interrogative word wesh [wɛʃ],
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meaning “what,” is one typical of interactions between youth from Marseille’s
projects, and from other suburban locations in France as well (Caubet, 2007).
Towards the end of the transcript, Amel clarifies that wesh wesh belongs to
project ways of speaking, which she does not consider part of the French
language (ce ni du français, c’est du-du truc du quartier, là). She states that young
women who have a “very pronounced accent” of this sort must work hard to
banish such ways of speaking from their repertoire, should they wish to enter
full-heartedly into Islam. She herself delivers her comments in a French
phonologically recognizable as standard, without the aﬀrication of stops,
devoicing of uvulars, velar nasals, and word-final schwas that I have discussed as
marking Northern Marseille’s youth registers (and Marseille’s historical
vernacular, to a certain extent). In sum, in her remarks Amel diagrams two
linguistic poles and their corresponding social indexicalities. Speaking softly, and
in “French,” indexes the female Muslim persona of the ṣaḥābiyah, understood to
be sweet, aﬀectionate, and maternal. Project speech like wesh wesh, in contrast,
indexes the speaker’s aﬃnity with the subculture of the projects (quartiers).
According to Amel, this rough-hewn or “savage” persona is antithetical to the
ideals of Islamic femininity, if not those of Islam more generally.
Indeed, both the young orthodox women and men I interviewed tended
to place project-aﬃliated behaviors on the opposite side of the spectrum from an
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Islamic disposition, regardless of their gender identity. Amina, one of Amel’s
orthodox girlfriends, deliberately eschewed “accents” from the projects, though
she did not necessarily tie her aversion to gender. She explained her linguistic
aspirations principally in terms of a desire to speak in an elegant and educated
way: “I don’t like accents. I like all sorts of sophisticated language, so that is
how I endeavor to speak” (10-29-12).44 Amina in fact so exuded gentility that
her female friends at the university were moved to nickname her “paradisiacal
Amina” (Amina Paradis). This pet name was a nod to Amina’s courteous
treatment of others around her but also to her use of a whispery, almost dreamy
voice that was often so quiet it prompted people to ask her to repeat herself. The
image of sweetness Amina projected stood out to others as well, such as a
female employee at the university cafeteria who would greet Amina in particular
with “how are you, my little sweetie?” (ça va, ma choupette? [literally, my little
female cabbage]). Another friend from this group, Karima, found it particularly
oﬀensive when young women engaged in so-called project behavior while
wearing jilbāb. She considered it less an aﬀront to Islamic femininity per se than
a stain on Islam’s reputation, however: “They laugh loudly, they talk loudly, they
insult people, they don’t pay their Métro ticket” (10-29-12).45 The girls agreed
“J’aime pas les accents. J'aime tout ce qui est langue soutenue donc c’est comme ça que je
m'eﬀorce de parler” (Amina, 10-29-12).
44

45

“Ça rit fort, ça parle fort, ça insulte, ça paie pas son ticket de Métro” (Karima, 10-29-12).
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that professing Islam meant they could no longer, if they ever did, behave like
the stereotypical project resident. Amina thus reminded her friends of their duty
—not as Muslim women, but as Muslims tout court—namely, to behave well as a
means of both upholding their own piety and of educating the wider public
about true Islamic values:
“Before putting on the ḥijāb, we weren’t necessarily like this. But now there’s a job to be
done, an image to give. We have the impression that we’re ambassadors for
Islam” (10-29-12).46

These examples have served to show that many of the qualities Amel imputed to
the ṣaḥābiyah, while seemingly gendered, were often also invoked as virtues to
which all Muslims in Marseille should aspire, irrespective of gender.
Indeed, young orthodox men echoed many of these thoughts on what was
considered appropriate demeanor and speech. Ramin was a seventeen-year old
male high school student whose Algerian mother I had befriended. Though all
five children in the family prayed regularly, Ramin, who was the eldest, had
become particularly assiduous in his pursuit of Islamic knowledge. In 2012, he
had taken to wearing Islamic men’s wear, like short-cropped pants and a cap,
and to visiting a nearby prayer room at prayer times and for tajwīd recitation

“Avant de mettre le ḥijāb on était pas forcément comme ça. Mais maintenant il y a un travail à
faire, une image à donner… On a l'impression d’être des ambassatrices de l’Islam” (Amina,
10-29-12).
46
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classes. In a boulangerie with me one afternoon, Ramin reflected over a
raspberry tartelette on his linguistic behavior as a Muslim:
Cécile: Do you keep an eye on your language or not so much?
Ramin: Yes, a lot! Because God, he already asks that of us: “believe in Allah and utter
words that are sadidah,” the opposite of vulgar. I’m at high school and they teach us to
speak well, for interviews. So we pay attention to what comes out of our mouths. (…)
[Modern Standard] Arabic is the most beautiful. Darijahs (“colloquial Arabics”) are
shot. Moroccans, they say “antshi” [antʃi]. They transform the “ta” to be “ch.” like
people from Marseille. Literary Arabic is better than darijah. At the mosque, they teach
us the value of literary Arabic.47

Here, Ramin retraces ideological linkages parallel to those drawn by Amel above.
He aligns himself with well-spoken French and Modern Standard Arabic. These
are linguistically correct (sadidah) languages, he states, taught by French schools
and mosques, respectively. As such, they are among the forms of speech God has
ordained. Algerian darijah and Marseille’s accent, by contrast, he evaluates as
“shot” (flingué). He mentions that darijah speakers, for example, realize “t” as
[tʃ], as in [antʃi] instead of [anti] (‘you’). He then adds that this error is
characteristic of how people from Marseille speak French as well.
With this ideological backdrop in mind, I now move to examining cases
where orthodox youth crossed into conduct associated with the projects,
whether speech or behavior, and the ensuing reactions. Given that I personally
“Cécile: Tu veilles un peu sur ton langage ou pas trop?
Ramin: Oui beaucoup! Parce que dejà Dieu nous l’ordonne: creignez Allah et dites des mots
‘sadidah’ (contraire de vulgaire)... Je suis au lycée ils nous entrainent a bien parler, pour les
entretiens, on fait attention à ce qui sort de notre bouche… l'arabe c'est plus beau les darija c'est
flingué, les marocains ils disent antshi - le ta ils le transforment en tch (comme les marseillais)...
littéraire soutenu c'est meilleur que darija... a la mosque ils nous ont donne la valeur de l'arabe
littéraire... avant non” (Ramin, 6.15.13)
47
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witnessed more instances of young women adopting project-identified behaviors
than young men, I oﬀer one male example and then focus mainly on young
women crossing and the scope of reactions by orthodox-identified community
members. I find that, when a young woman’s crossing represented an isolated
occurrence, community members often found it amusing or humorous. In some
cases, such rebelliousness even inspired a measure of admiration among
onlookers. In others, however, and particularly when the young woman took a
project-like stance on a regular basis, community members’ remarks evince a
tendency to position such women as overly masculine or lacking in piety.
Perhaps due to the nature of my interactions with the young orthodox men
I knew, I was privy to fewer situations in which this type of crossing behavior
might have been a possibility. One occasion stands out in my fieldnotes,
however, and pertains to the private Muslim secondary school where I taught
English during the 2012-2013 school year. In April of 2013, I accompanied
several teachers and a group of thirty students from this school on a one-week
fieldtrip to London. While visiting the city on the first day of our trip, we
decided to stop in Regent’s Park for a picnic lunch. The teachers and I sat at the
edge of a grassy area with our sandwiches and watched as some of the male
students played soccer on the lawn. Rida, one of these fourteen year old boys,
got excited and began shouting out plays in a hoarse voice that carried easily to
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where the principal’s wife was sitting. She shot to her feet and scolded Rida at
close range:
“Stop acting like a North African from the 15th [arrondissement]! Be a good Muslim! Don’t
attract attention!”48

In her remarks to Rida, Hanan sets up a contrast between North Africans from
the 15th arrondissement and good Muslims from the 15th arrondissement, where the
school is located and where most of the students live. She signals that Rida’s
loud voice and rowdy behavior is representative of the former demographic,
while she expects him to act as though he belongs to the latter group. The fact
that Rida comes from a Muslim, Algerian family is not enough, she says; Rida
must act like a Muslim, speaking quietly so as to perform reserve and respect of
others. In this example, therefore, Hanan is able to curtail Rida’s raucous
behavior by relating it to a type of impious project person whom he, as a student
in an orthodox Muslim school, would be ashamed to resemble.
If Rida met with the threat of impiety for acting in line with supposed
project norms on a certain occasion, the cases of two young women from his 8th
grade class (3ième) illustrate other possible kinds of reactions to such behavior.
Rania was a young woman in Rida’s grade whom the adults at school considered
a notorious trouble-maker and who was also among the lowest grade-earning

“Arrête de faire ton maghrébin du 15ième! Sois un bon musulman! Ne te fais pas
remarquer!" (Hanan, 4-15-13).
48
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students in the school. In my own classroom, I noticed that Rania enjoyed
making cynical remarks and entertaining side conversations with the male
students. Rania was likewise an exception to linguistic trends at the school,
preferring to speak in the project or quartiers register. I learned about others’
perceptions of Rania and her speech in the following conversation with Fawzi, a
man in his early twenties who was the school recess monitor:
Cécile: Generally, I find that students here don’t speak like that.
Fawzi: It’s true that it’s rare here. But there is the student Rania, or Rani as we call her.
Rania speaks kind of like this, okay “Stop dəħing! Come on, move it! You’ve pissed me
oﬀ!” (Arrête de dəħ! Vas-y bouge! Tu m'as soulé! [aχεtə də dəħ vɑzi bu:ʒə ʧu mɑ su:lε]).
Halima [the school accountant], who is uh very feminine, especially compared to Rania,
was shocked when she heard her say that. She told her “Wait, you’re a guy (mec). It’s
just not possible. I’m going to call you Rani.” One time, Rania even came to see me and
said, “Fawzi, it’s fine. Don’t call me Rania anymore. Now my name is Karim” (Fawzi c’est
bon! Tu [ʧu] m’appelles plus Rania. Maintenant je m’appelle Karim [kaχim]). “Euh, okay, if you
like! How’s it going, Karim?” ‘“Yeah, yeah, it’s all good (We, we, ça va [wε wε sɑ vɑ]).”
Okaaaay… ((shrugs his shoulders))

Fawzi imitates Rania using many of the devices I have shown to be typical of the
project register, including Arabic phonology-influenced neologisms ([dəħ] “mess
around”), stop aﬀrication, and devoicing of French uvulars. In these comments,
both Fawzi and Halima, the school accountant, position Rania as her
hypothetical male counterpart, Rani, due to her project-like speech.49 As in
Amel’s comment about orthodox women who greet with wesh wesh, whom she
found “truly surprising,” here Fawzi cues various forms of disbelief. He reports
Halima being “shocked” and saying that “it’s just not possible.” Then he himself
Many Arabic names for females end in “a,” making the absence of this suﬃx recognizably
male by contrast (e.g., Rashida/Rashid, Karima, Karim).
49
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indexes reluctance after Rania asks him to call her “Karim,” marking his
hesitation with “euh” and two instances of “okay,” which he produces with rising
intonation and a shoulder shrug.
I argue that Rania’s anomalous linguistic behavior was easily tolerated
because the school staﬀ who were familiar with her believed that her parents
lacked the schooling to instruct her otherwise. There was relatively less
tolerance though for Rania’s knack at creating friendships with boys, a behavior
for which adults at school held her personally responsible and for which she was
frequently dismissed from class.50 In other words, when orthodox girls spoke in
project-like French it was often not analyzed as crossing at all but instead as a
way of speaking to which they were continually exposed, living in Northern
Marseille. This account dovetails with Amel’s comment that one must be
understanding of young women who speak thus because “it’s something that
dates from childhood” and hence requires much eﬀort to change. The case of
another girl in this class named Zineb provides further evidence to this eﬀect.
Zineb was a vivacious, stubby girl who was among the few female students at
the private Muslim school who, during non-prayer hours, opted not to wear the
ḥijāb. During an informal conversation while on the London Tube, vice-principal

On our fieldtrip, for instance, Rania was placed in the room furthest from the boys’ room and
in which two teachers were sleeping.
50
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Hanan singled out Zineb as a young woman who speaks with “gouaille.” Not
knowing this French word, I asked Hanan to explain further. “Gouaille means she
is expressive and has a popular sense of humor. She gets it from her Egyptian
side,” elaborated Hanan (4-16-13). 51 Other meanings given for gouaille place it in
the semantic vicinity of words like cockiness, cheek, and gall, all stereotypically
related to masculinity. Here, again, a young woman’s “popular” speech is
interpreted as a masculine form of behavior. Although Hanan does not fault
Zineb for her speech, seeing its origins in the fourteen-year-old’s familial milieu,
her designation of “popular” speech as manly and humorous serves nonetheless
as an implicit reminder of the more graceful aﬀect typifying pious Muslims in
Marseille, and, with it, diﬀerences between social groups.
In the accounts of Rania and Zineb’s behavior above, others rationalized
their project-like behavior as traits traceable to their environments and were
thus able to find it humorous, if understandable. Below, I introduce two further
examples that capacitate another version of events. My main point will be that,
on occasion, young orthodox women strategically turn to the linguistic and
behavioral repertoire of the project register to index certain qualities, such as

“Gouaille ça veut dire qu’elle est expressive est qu’elle a de l’humour populaire. Elle tire ça de
son côté Egyptien.” (Hanan, 4-16-13).
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!362

rebelliousness, bravado, or even queerness, in their interactions with other
orthodox female peers.
A first anecdote relates to a conversation I held with Amina and Miriam,
the two female university students, as we were walking towards the Aix-enProvence train station where we would catch the train back to Marseille. We
were discussing my impending wedding, and in particular which shoes I might
wear, when the following interaction took place (3-27-13).
Cécile: Yeah, I’m going to wear low heels. Not too high.
Amina: Me, on the day of my wedding, I’m going to wear sneakers!
Cécile: Ahahaah
Amina: Big fat sneakers! I’ve always dreamed of doing that. It’s…to mess around. I’ve
always…
Cécile: But why not go barefoot if you want to have a laugh?
Amina: To grind my feet into the ground?
Cécile: ((laughing)) Sneakers…
Miriam: I had a girlfriend who did that. A converted girl, too. She had a wedding dre…
Well, her feet weren’t visible.
Cécile: That’s it! No one ever sees your shoes.
Miriam: When she came down the stairs, I saw her TNs! I swear, I was so shocked. It
didn’t seem very…
Cécile: Where was that?
Miriam: It was here, in Marseille. I swear that, from the bottom of the stairs, it was
super shocking. You know?
Cécile: Were people laughing?
Miriam: It was just me and my sister. But she [the bride] didn’t give a dam. She owned
it! She said it would never work with heels on...
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Amina: I think it’s too hard too. I would like some pretty ballerina flats for girls, like
when we were little, the little black shoes that sparkled with the little laces…52

Above, Miriam regales Amina and me with a story of how a converted Muslim
“sister” came down a staircase in a wedding dress only to lift her train and
expose a pair of Nike TN sneakers, a favorite brand of sneakers in the housing
projects. The contrast upon which Miriam and Amina alight in this story is one
between an image of the Muslim woman as modestly feminine and one of the
project girl as headstrong and unfeminine. Both young women seem to mark
their greater identification with the normative image of Muslim femininity. First,
Miriam tells the story quickly and excitedly, as if it were a tale of epic
proportions, and thus signals the unusualness of a Muslim person embracing
project behavior. She also expresses hesitation at certain points in the transcript,
Cécile: Ouais, je mets des petits talons. Pas trop grand.
Amina: Moi, le jour de mon mariage je vais mettre des baskets!
Cécile: Ahahaah
Amina: Des grosses baskets [sic]! J'ai toujours revé de faire ça. C’est...pour rigoler. Toujours
j’ai…
Cécile: Mais pourquoi ne pas être pieds nud si tu veux rigoler?
Amina: Pour m’écraser les pioles dans le sol?
Cécile: ((laughing)) Des baskets…
Miriam: J'ai une copine qui avait fait ça. Une convertie, en plus. Elle avait une robe de m-en fait,
on voyait pas ses pieds.
Cécile: C’est ça! On voit jamais les chaussures.
Miriam: Quand elle a descendu les escaliers, j'ai vu des TNs! Je te jure, ca m'a trop choqué. Mais
ça faisait pas..
Cécile: C’était ou ça?
Miriam: C’était ici, à Marseille. Je te jure qu’en bas des escaliers c’était hyper choquant. Tu vois?
Cécile: Les gens rigolaient?
Miriam: Il y avait que moi et ma sœur. Mais elle [the bride] s'en foutait. Elle assumait! Elle disait
ça va jamais marcher avec des talons…
Amina: Moi aussi je trouve que c’est trop dur. Moi j’aimerais bien les belles ballerines pour filles,
comme quand on était petites, les petites chaussures noires qui brillaient avec les petits lacets…
(3-27-13).
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swearing upon her dismay (“I was so shocked”) and hinting at the deviance of
the bride’s shoe choice (“It doesn’t seem very…”). Amina, likewise, wound up
our exploration of this particular theme stating that she would prefer to wear
“pretty little ballerina flats for girls.” Noteworthy in this interaction as well,
however, are certain indications that Amina and Miriam find this transgressive
behavior appealing. Amina, for instance, discloses initially that she has always
dreamed of wearing “big fat sneakers” on her wedding day (though she later
recants). Miriam, too, evaluates the bride in ways bespeaking admiration of her
choice to wear sneakers, remarking with uncharacteristic profanity and
considerable enthusiasm that the bride “owned” her decision and “didn’t give a
damn.” Beyond her own use of profanity, Miriam’s shift to a project register
footing in this part of the transcript is further supported by her aﬀrication of the
t’s in convertie and tu. In short, this transcript depicts how, for young orthodox
women, crossing into behaviors enregistered as “project-like” represented an
opportunity for them to index qualities like self-will and defiance.
The second anecdote I use to illustrate these young women’s tactical
recourse to the project register concerns a female student at the university
named Safia. Arriving at the start of university from her native Toulouse, Safia
quickly integrated herself into the circle of orthodox Muslim female students I
have been discussing, in which Amel, Miriam, Amina, and others participated.
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Like them, she was studying to receive a bachelor’s degree in Arabic language
and literature. Where Safia parted ways with her female friends was in her
clothing tastes. Safia swore oﬀ the long skirts worn by her friends—“I will never
wear a skirt”53—and opted for monochromatic “joggings” (or sweatsuits) instead.
She did not cover her hair either, which she wore parted down the middle and
gathered in a low ponytail. When I asked Safia about her religious practice, she
described it as a more recent development in her life. She grew up in a
household where Islam was present “but really forgotten,” 54 and it was only
once at the university that she settled into a semblance of an Islamic routine,
praying more consistently and cutting down on cigarettes, with notable help and
motivation from her newfound orthodox girlfriends.
Safia: It’s true that here [at the university] I’m more surrounded by Muslim women.
Cécile: Here? And why? Do you also have French or non-Muslim friends or not really?
Safia: In Toulouse, lots!
Cécile: But not too many here?
Safia: Not here.
Cécile: And why?
Safia: Dunno, I wanted to settle down ((Safia laughing))
Cécile: To settle down? Were you less relaxed before?
Safia: Yeah! That’s it! That’s it! I actually like the fact they they [her girlfriends at the
university] keep an eye on me, that they remind me of things. Do you know what I
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“Je mettrais jamais des jupes” (Safia, 12.4.12).

“J’ai grandi dans l’Islam mais c’était vachement oublié quoi. Mon père il m’en parlait pas tout
les jours. La prière on l’a appris toutes seules. Fin, de mon grandpère” (Safia, 12.4.12).
54
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mean? “Stop smoking!” “Pray!” Because it’s true that sometimes I neglect my prayers.
So, for lots of reasons.55

Safia was aware, and even seemed to enjoy the fact, that her friends considered
her an unusual addition to their friend group. She played up her atypical
clothing choices, oﬀering for instance to “walk” (défiler) in an all-female Islamic
fashion show that was being organized in Northern Marseille. Somewhat
consternated by Safia’s suggestion, her friends played along so as not to oﬀend
her. When however Safia finally revealed her planned outfit to be a “tracksuitand-sneakers” (survêts-baskets), all lapsed into relieved giggles and there was no
further serious talk of her participation.
Quite interestingly, Safia was unconventional in her speech as well.
Although Safia had only spent two years in Marseille, she reported that many of
her acquaintances found her speech to resemble that of a person from
Marseille’s projects.
Cécile: And in terms of accents, do you think you have a Marseillais accent or not? I’m
just asking, I don’t know.
Safia: I don’t know. No. Well people tell me that, but I don’t have that impression.
Cécile: Everyone tells you that you have a Marseillais accent?
Safia: C’est vrai qu’ici je suis plus entourée de musulmanes.
Cécile: Ici? Et pourquoi? T’as aussi des amis français ou non-musulmans ou pas trop?
Safia: À Toulouse, énormement!
Cécile: Mais pas trop ici?
Safia: Non ici.
Cécile: Et pourquoi?
Safia: Ch’ais pas, j’avais envie de me poser ((Safia laughing))
Cécile: De te poser? T’étais moins tranquille avant?
Safia: Ouais! C’est ça! C’est ça! J’aime bien le fait qu’elles me surveillent, qu’elles me fassent des
rappels, en fait. Tu vois ce que je veux dire? “Fume pas! Prie!” Parce que c’est vrai que ça
m’arrive de la délaisser. Fin, plein de choses. (12-4-12).
55
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Safia: Eeeeeveryone!
Cécile: How can that be? You told me that it’s been, what, two years since you got here?
Safia: Dunno.
Cécile: What do they tell you?
Safia: You seem like a girl from Marseille.
Cécile: And what do you think of the accent here?
Safia: Horrible ((Cécile laughing)). Vile. Listening to that accent is not pleasant in any
way. It shatters your ears.56

Above, Safia’s negatively characterizes the accent of Northern Marseille,
assuming a similar ideological position as her orthodox friends, and yet she
admits to others’ perception of her as having just such an accent. Tellingly in
this regard, there were several occasions on which I observed Safia deploying
linguistic features associated with the register of Marseille’s Northern projects,
seemingly to point to her non-normative gender and sexual identity.57 In the
following conversation, for instance, Safia uses the quartiers register to index
bravado and, seemingly, to suggest her queerness to her closest girlfriends.

Cécile: Et niveau accent, tu trouves que t’as un accent marseillais ou pas? je te demande, je
sais pas
Safia: Je sais pas. Non. Mais on me le dit mais j’ai pas l’impression
Cécile: Tout le monde te dit que t’as un accent marseillais?
Safia: Touuut le monde!
Cécile: Comment ça se fait? Tu m’as dit que ca fait, quoi, deux ans que t’es là?
Safia: Ch’ais pas
Cécile: Ils te disent quoi?
Safia: On dirait une fille de Marseille
Cécile: Et comment tu trouves l’accent ici?
Safia: Horrible ((Cécile laughing)). Immonde. Il y a aucun plaisir à entendre cet accent. Ça ruine
les oreilles.
56

Although Safia was not “out” to any of her friends, based on her comments and my ongoing
interactions with her, I have reason to believe she identifies as queer, if not gay. Given the
stigmatization of such an orientation in the Muslim milieu of Marseille, Safia had good reason to
be circumspect.
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The conversation transcribed below took place while Safia, five of her
orthodox friends, and I sat around a circular table outside the university
cafeteria having lunch. In the interest of clarity, the sequence of conversational
moves is the following. After a long silence, Safia declares that a friend of hers,
Miriam, who is eating lunch at the table next to her, is “hers.” Safia then takes
back her declaration of love to Miriam and pledges herself to Bushrah instead.
This reminds Bushrah of a recent conversation she had with Safia. Safia had
asked Bushrah whether she would understand her were she a man. Safia denies
instigating that conversation, retorting that Bushrah was the first to raise the
idea of Safia being the perfect mate for her, if only Safia had been a man. Safia
then pulls out a cigarette and is rebuﬀed by Bushrah for smoking against her
orders. I intervene and jokingly turn the conversation to a hypothetical scenario
where Safia brings her future bride, played by Bushrah, home to meet her
parents.
Transcript 7.3. “Miriam, You Are Mine”
(French Original)

(English Translation)

Safia: ((general lunch noises)) Miriam, tu [ʧu]
es à moi.
Miriam: ((giggling softly)) Je t’ai dit qu’elle
me draguait tout à l’heure.

Safia: ((general lunch noises)) Miriam, you
are mine.
Miriam: ((giggling softly)) I told you that she
was hitting on me earlier
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Safia: Mais TOUT le temps [təŋ] je la drague Safia: But ALL the time I hit on her, °all the
time.° Za’ama, (“like” in Algerian) I’ve got a
[dʁagə], °tout le temps [təŋ].° Za’ama
chance, you know? Za’ama ((laughs),) I believe
[zaʕma], j’ai des chances [ʃəŋs], tu sais?
it, you see? I believe in °our love.° NO, I’m
Za’ama [zaʕma]… ((laughs)) J’y crois [kχɑ],
with Bushrah.
tu [tu] vois? Je crois [kχɑ] à °notre amour.°
Nour: Ah ((laughing)), can you believe what
NON [nɑŋ], je suis avec Bushrah
Nour: Ah ((laughing)) T’as [ta] vu ce qu’elle she’s on about?
Bushrah: {Yesterday she was saying to me}
raconte?
Nour: {No I don’t know}
Bushrah: {Hier elle me disait}
Bushrah: Yeah, yesterday she was saying to
Nour: {Non je ne sais pas}
me, “Yes if I were a man would you
Bushrah: Ouais, hier elle me disait, “Oui, si
understand me and all?” Now I’m thinking
j’étais un homme est-ce que tu me
about that.
comprendrais et tout?” Je pense à ça
Safia: Wait, wait, wait, wait!
maintenant.
Bushrah: {You can’t act like a hypocrite when
Safia: Attends [atəŋ], attends [atəŋ], attends
I’m not here to my face.}
[atəŋ], attends [atəŋ]!
Safia: {No, since…} ((laughing)). No, no, but
Bushrah: {Faut pas faire hypocrite quand je
listen!
suis pas là-en face de moi.}
Cécile: She’s not embarrassed. ((laughing))
Safia: {Non, puisque…} ((laughing)) Non,
Safia: Me and her one day we were in the caf
non, mais écoute!
and, I dunno why, she goes to me, “If you
Cécile: Elle a pas honte. ((laughing))
were-if you had been a man, za’ama, I would
Safia: Moi et elle, un jour on était dans le caf
have been perfect.” You know? So then I just
et, je sais pas pourquoi, elle me fait “Si
t’étais, si t’avais été un homme, za’ama [zaʕma] returned the question, za’ama, to see if the
je l’aurais été parfait.” Tu vois? Eh ben du coup sentiment had stayed…
Bushrah: ((harrumphs)) Mmmm…
je lui ai reposé la question, za’ama [zaʕma],
Safia: What she said about had I been a man
pour voir si c’est resté ce sentiment…
would-you see? ((Safia raises a cigarette to her
Bushrah: ((harrumphs)) Mmmm…
Safia: Qu’elle a dit si j’avais été un homme est- lips))
Bushrah: ((chuckling)) But I’ve told you not
ce que-tu comprends [cõpʁəŋ]? ((Safia raises a
to do that ((unclear))
cigarette to her lips))
Safia: But you remember Cécile you had—
Bushrah: ((chuckling)) Mais je t’ai toujours
Bushrah: ((to Safia)) But I don’t want you
interdit ça.
doing that. Enough!
Safia: Mais tu te rappelles, Cécile, tu [ʧu]
Safia: Ah yes I was supposed to-I’m
m’as—
supposed to stop smoking. But I don’t have a
Bushrah: ((to Safia)) Mais je t’interdis ça.
dick in any case, so I can keep smoking.
C’est bon!
Cécile: ((unclear)) And how much is the
Safia: Ah oui, il fallait-il faut que j’arrête de
bride price?
fumer. Mai::s dans tous les ca::s, j’ai pas de
Bushrah: “I’m not a man in any case, so I can
zizi, donc je peux continuer à fumer.
keep on SMOKING.” Hhhh!
Cécile: ((unclear)) Et la dote c’est combien?
Miriam: Bushrah, what’s the bride price?
Bushrah: “Dans tout les cas je suis pas un
Cécile: °Yeah,° what’s the bride price?
homme donc je peux continuer à FUMER.”
Safia: AH y, well now, Cécile I missed you
Hhhhh!
((laughing)). I’m in a housing project and you
Miriam: Bushrah, c’est quoi la dote?
say that to your dad. You say that “I”… You
Cécile: °Ouais,° c’est quoi la dote?
say, you’re a girl, and you say. “I’ve
Safia: AH t-alors là, Cécile tu m’as manqué.
((unclear)), I’m Moroccan” ((conversation
((laughing)) Je suis dans une cité et tu dis ça à
continues about how Safia will run away))
ton père. Tu dis que, “je”…Tu dis, t’es une fille,
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tu dis, “J’ai ((unclear)), je suis
marocaine” ((conversation continues about
how Safia will run away))
Safia: Ah putain [putεŋ]! Mais je vois trop
arriver mon père “Papa, je vais me marier” et
tout. “Ah OUI, lala, (“miss” in Moroccan), en
fin.” ((all laughing)) Imagine, mais imagine,
imagine! Mais j’ouvre ((unclear)). Je vais me la
faire celle-là, à mon avis celle-là…. “Bah
attends. Reste ici.”
Nour: “Papa, j’ai trouvé quelqu’un de très
bien. C’est… Croit en dieu….
Cécile: C’est une gadji [gaʤi]
Safia: Je rammène Bushrah!
Miriam: Ah, il faudra filmer cette scène-là.
Cécile: [Ah ouais]
Miriam: [Faut faire un film]
Safia: Non, mais il y aura pas temps de
filmer. Ma daronne elle va juste VOIR ÇA LÀ,
elle va même pas poser les yeux voilà—
Nour: “Ah, les cheveux longs” ((Safia
laughing)) “elle est voilée, Safia!”

Safia: Ah fuck! But I can really see it now,
my dad arriving, “Dad, I’m getting married”
and all. “Oh yes, lala! (‘miss’ in Moroccan)
finally.” ((all laughing)) Imagine, just imagine,
imagine! I just open ((unclear)). I’m gonna get
her for myself, that gal… “Well, wait here.
Stay here.”
Nour: “Dad, I found someone really great.
They’re…God fearing…”
Cécile: They’re a girl!
Safia: I bring Bushrah in!
Miriam: Ah that scene’s got to be filmed.
Cécile: [Oh yeah]
Miriam: [Have to make a movie]
Safia: No, but there won’t be time to film.
My daronne (Fr. ‘mother’), she’s just gonna
SEE THAT THERE, she’s not even going to let
her eyes rest
Nour: “Ah, what long hair” ((Safia
laughing)) “And she wears a veil, this Safia!”

There are, in a sense, two texts coming together in this transcript. One is
a denotational text in which Safia and her friends speak in hypothetical or joking
terms about love between Safia and her girlfriends. The second is an
interactional text where Safia, by crossing into the speech register associated
with the toughness of Marseille’s projects, is able to take on a masculine or
“husbandly” gender role. As flagged in the bolded IPA renditions in the
transcript, Safia uses several features and elements of project speech throughout
this conversation. She aﬀricates her ‘t’s’ and ‘d’s,’ makes liberal use of the velar
nasal, and devoices the French uvular fricative /ʁ/. Significant, too, are her uses
of the Algerian discourse marker “za’ama” [zaʕma], the legendary Marseillais
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curse word “putain” [putεŋ] (or “fuck”), and language considered blasphemous
(zizi/“dick,” je vais me la faire celle-là/I’m going to get her, that gal). Her language
in this segment is noticeably diﬀerent from that of her friends. Nour uses the
uncontracted, academic form “je ne sais pas” (I do not know). Bushrah translates
Safia’s comment about not having “a dick” (un zizi) by euphemistically stating
that Safia is “not a man” (pas un homme). Safia’s friends, in turn, speak French
more standardly, without stop aﬀrication, nasal velarization, or uvular devoicing.
This contrast in register between Safia and her lunchmates parallels an
opposition in social indexicality as well. Whereas Safia asserts herself as
masculine by using a project register stereotypically indexical of brawn, her
friends assume a footing of Islamic propriety according to an ideology linking
standard speech and practicing Muslims. Safia’s assertion of masculinity is
reinforced, too, by a role playing sequence in which she engages with Bushrah.
After some back-and-forth with her friends, Safia pulls out a smoke, as if to take
a break from all the tiresome arguing. Bushrah promptly reminds Safia of their
agreement that Safia should not smoke. Safia concedes Bushrah’s point, but then
recants and vows to continue smoking. Here, Bushrah and Safia fall easily into
the roles of the nagging wife and the ornery husband. Even after Safia suddenly
awakens to the husbandly role she has been playing, and moves to reject her
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duties (to stop smoking) by claiming to lack male genitalia, she continues to
enact the husband-and-wife script by ultimately rejecting Bushrah’s advice.
This example with Safia showed how, despite not being from Marseille,
she was able to draw upon her knowledge of the way in which her orthodox
female friends normatively mapped gender to the language options present in
Marseille in order to create a gendered trope of queerness. As a member of this
friend group, Safia was aware that when Muslim females crossed into projectaﬃliated apparel and speech, this was interpreted as masculine or impious
behavior. She nevertheless consistently crossed into behavior connected to
Marseille’s projects, a tendency that I have argued served to position her as
gender-queer. Due to the close connection between gender and sexuality for
those socialized in an Islamic cultural milieu, it may be that it was enough for
Safia to create a disjuncture between her sex and her gender image in order to
convey information about her sexuality as well. In Salima Amari’s (2013)
groundbreaking study with Franco-Maghrebi lesbians living in Paris, she notes
that the Maghrebi relatives of these young women infer their sexuality from
gender roles the women do or do not uphold. When women do not hold to
certain Arabo-Islamic ideals of femininity, refusing to marry or wear their hair
long, for example, the tie that scripture has naturalized between gender and
sexuality is sundered. In other words, her lesbian interlocutors’ silence on the
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gendered tasks they are expected to perform as women marks a tacit “coming
out” to their families and friends. In sum, through various ethnographic
examples this section has captured how orthodox Muslim youth both reinforce
and trope upon ideologies marrying options on Marseille’s linguistic palette to
gradations of piety and gender.

V.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has examined, in a first instance, the ideologies that
variously positioned youth from Muslim households in Northern Marseille have
created about languages in their environment, whether standard languages or
project youth registers like Castellanois. My objective, in a second instance, has
been to scrutinize why, when youth crossed into the registers thought to be
typical of other social groups, peers often foregrounded these speakers’ gender
or sexuality as non-normative.
In the first series of ethnographic examples, I discussed how fourteenyear-old adolescents from two northern projects, who were students in an
Arabic class in a public secondary school, negotiated their identities by claiming
particular speech and clothing styles. In their talk about themselves and others,
the students from Class 3B drew dividing lines between an in-group
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“project” (quartiers) register and an out-group register, paillot, which they
associated with ethnically French, aﬄuent individuals from outside the projects.
Youth pitted their own register, indexed through Castellanois speech and
tracksuits-and-sneakers clothing style, to that of the paillots, indexed in turn
through Standard French and clothing styles such as swag. Interestingly, when
describing what it meant to be from the projects the young men and women in
Class 3B did not flag gender as something needing to be especially addressed.
Both male and female youth saw toughness as their disposition and sought
equally to maintain it through the aforementioned behaviors. Thus, it can be
said that, in ideologizing their own project mentality, youth erased gender
diﬀerences within their ranks. Gal and Irvine (2000) define erasure as when
“facts that are inconsistent with the ideological scheme either go unnoticed or
get explained away” (p. 38).
Significantly, It was when individuals from Class 3B contravened the
norms of project behavior, that diﬀerences in how young women and young men
were expected to act returned with the most clarity. One of these salient norms
with respect to language was that it was acceptable for youth from the projects
to cross into Standard French when an important gain or loss might be made in
doing so. Hence, I reported on how, when youth were faced with authority
figures at school or potential employers, they relied on the softness
!375

stereotypically associated with Standard French to index deference to such
people. Another norm held that defaulting to Standard French, without regards
to context and interlocutor, was anomalous behavior. Thus, peers negatively
judged the young man in the bakery who addressed others from La Castellane in
paillot, as well as Sheyreen and Fouhda’s ongoing exploration of paillot speech
and swag apparel. Transgressions in project norms of this sort consistently led to
young men being called “fags” and young women “sluts,” a fact warranting my
argument that sexual tropes have come to represent normalized ways for youth
to construe such behavior. I contend, further, that if youth have normalized such
tropes—involving the sexualization of their peers’ anomalous use of semiotic
resources, and with consequences diﬀering by gender—this is because these
slurs serve as an eﬀective means of policing boundaries between social groups.
When youth deploy such labels as “fag” or “slut,” they appeal to cultural
coordinates with which youth are familiar due to their socialization into Islamic
values. Hence these slurs act as potent warning signs, eﬀectively likening
youth’s anomalous behavior to culturally unacceptable sexual modes of
existence. Moreover, that youth react in such trenchant ways to their peers’
displays of earnest aﬃliation with other social groups would appear to indicate
the importance, in this milieu of economic duress, of showing solidarity to one
another through semiotically tangible means.
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A similar dynamic, of the ideological erasure but interactional
foregrounding of gender and sexuality, was also evident among youth from
Northern Marseille’s projects that identified as orthodox or practicing Muslims.
Attributing qualities like elegance and piety to the use of Standard French and
MSA, Muslims in Marseille encouraged young women as well as men to embody
these qualities through this kind of speech. For youth who grew up in the
projects to the north of the city, this often meant working to actively rid their
speech of phonological and lexical indicators of having been socialized in the
projects. I compared instances where young men and young women exhibited
project-like behavior and demonstrated that, whereas young men were rebuked
for lacking in piety, young women were typically positioned as overly masculine,
in addition to lacking in piety. Although within the orthodox community such
female behaviors were rationalized as deriving from these young women’s
surroundings, and hence humorously tolerated, I also oﬀered a diﬀerent account
whereby this behavior might be considered purposeful crossing. Leaning on the
case of Safia, I proposed that occasionally young women crossed into project-like
speech and apparel in order to index, not only the masculinity stereotypically
attributed to this register, but also stances of audacity or, possibly, queerness.
When the case of youth from Northern Marseille is compared to the
ethnographic cases I reviewed initially, one question that arises is whether
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suﬃcient evidence exists to support the generalization that, in minority
contexts, in-group languages tend to carry a stereotypic indexicality of
toughness and masculinity, while standard languages are routinely evaluated as
soft and feminine. Although such a hypothesis may hold true for certain
contexts, it remains important to dwell on the specificities of local categories
and how they are invoked in interaction. For one, the orthodox youth I described
in my latter examples represent a clear illustration of minority youth negatively
evaluating what some might imagine was their in-group register and positively
regarding national standard languages. Specifically, in an instance of register
reanalysis (Agha, 2007a), they reframed the stereotypical values that Standard
French is widely recognized to have, like softness or educational sophistication,
as the hallmarks of Islamic piety. It follows that labels like “in-group” and “outgroup” must be used in a highly emic way if they are to be useful. A second
observation is that labels for behavior may resemble one another across
ethnographic contexts and yet comport with diﬀering socioindexical values. In
Denmark, for instance, Madsen (2013, 2015) describes a “street” register used
among youth of diverse linguistic and ethnic backgrounds, as well as their
identification of an “integrated” Standard Danish register. The street register
was similar in some respects to Castellanois, such as in its devoicing of Danish’s
uvular “r” (/ʁ/) and in its ability to index youthful toughness and “panethnic
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minority street culture” (Madsen, 2013, p. 133). In other respects, the
Copenhagen street register diﬀered notably from project culture in Marseille.
Madsen (2015) describes heavy make-up and large jewelry, for instance, as part
of the Copenhagen street register, both behaviors which young women from
Class 3B would have labeled paillot and looked down upon as being linked to the
sexual easiness of the mainstream French population. Likewise, at the level of
indexicality, Copenhagen street register is associated with masculinity and lack
of academic skills. Marseille’s project register, by contrast, was a resource to
which young men and young women alike turned to index toughness. By the
same token, the youth in Class 3B ascribed values like smarts, creativity, and
resourcefulness to being from the quartiers; it was being paillot and dressing swag
that indexed vacuousness.
Broader implications of these findings for sociolinguistics are that, as
mentioned previously in regards to Ochs’ (1983) work, language does not
necessarily index gender in a one-to-one manner. Images of male and female
gender are tied up with other axes of belonging, like ethnoracial group, religion,
and class, inter alia, and complex semiotic processes may result in either the
erasure or the highlighting of sex and gender, depending on the ideologies
people hold and the resources upon which they draw. As for the concept of
intersectional identities (Crenshaw, 1992), the evidence adduced in this chapter
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helped illustrate how people are not simply situated, in a passive sense, at the
crossroads of multiple hierarchies: economic, racial, class, and gender
marginalities. Rather, with the aid of theoretical tools like register, ideology,
performance, and indexicality, inroads may be made towards understanding
people’s responsibility in creating ideologies. The youth in this chapter at times
aligned with ideological figures, other times found themselves at their mercy,
and in yet other instances were able to trope upon them, generating unexpected
permutations. It is within such a space of indeterminacy that we can imagine
young men and women from Northern Marseille tinkering with the social
meanings of labels like quartiers, paillots, swag, and ṣaḥābiyah, and opening up
novel ways for youth from the projects to exist.
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VIII. Conclusion
This dissertation demonstrates that diasporic youth from Marseille are,
culturally speaking, not beyond the pale of the French Republic. Due to
prevailing social dynamics, however, youth from Muslim households, and
particularly youth who practice Islamic orthodoxy in Marseille, appear not to
garner the wider public’s recognition as cultural citizens of France. Will youth
have to take it upon themselves, either to change or to employ diﬀerent
strategies to increase their national legibility? Or must the French mainstream
find ways to be more attentive to the historically contingent and emic ways in
which such diasporic youth perform variations on Frenchness? Only French
society can determine the answers to these questions.
In the meanwhile, this dissertation has challenged the notion, which I
recently read in the news was the basis for many Western countries’ counterterrorism and surveillance eﬀorts (Malik, 3.30.16), that to qualify as a “preradical” Muslim one need simply belong to a Muslim community. Being Muslim,
as an examination of fewer than a hundred youth from Muslim households in
Marseille has clarified, takes countless guises, many of which recontextualize
what are often thought of as more orthodox Islamic traditions. Certainly all of
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these behavioral takes on the so-called Muslim category, when considered
together, defy attempts at homogenization.
The findings presented here also point to further directions for possible
research. I plan, in the future, to travel to locations like Algiers and Doha, where
some of my female orthodox research participants have resettled, in order to
investigate the challenges posed by their relocation. Foreseeable among these
challenges, for example, is the mismatch between their French version of Islamic
piety and the host country’s practice of Islam, something these young women
have already indicated in their more recent conversations with me. How do
these young women’s life paths unfold as time moves on: what careers do they
pursue, what links do they maintain with France, and how do their convictions
potentially change as they build families? These are some of the questions I plan
to raise in the near future.
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